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Class No.....

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**SECRET.**

# PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE COMMITTEE ON THE OBLIGATIONS DEVOLVING ON THE  
ARMY IN INDIA, ITS STRENGTH AND COST

APPOINTED BY

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL

(SHORT TITLE)

THE ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1912.

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VOLUME I-A.

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COMMITTEE ON THE OBLIGATIONS DEVOLVING ON THE  
ARMY IN INDIA, ITS STRENGTH AND COST.

(ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1912)

MINORITY REPORT BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR PERCY LAKE  
AND LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ROBERT SCALLON.

PART I.

Section I.—Preliminary.

1. The Committee was constituted as follows under Resolution No. 2276-A., dated Simla, 9th April 1912, of the Government of India in the Army Department:—

PRESIDENT:

Field-Marshal Lord NICHOLSON, G.C.B.

MEMBERS:

Lieut.-General Sir PERCY H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G.,  
C.B.

Lieut.-General Sir ROBERT I. SCALLON, K.C.I.E.,  
C.B., D.S.O., I.A., A.D.C.

Sir WILLIAM S. MEYER, K.C.I.E., I.C.S.

SECRETARY:

Lieut.-Colonel C. W. G. RICHARDSON, I.A.,  
(21st Punjabis.)

The first meeting was held on the 7th May 1912 and the sixty-third and last meeting on the 21st January 1913.

Terms of  
reference.

2. The Committee's terms of reference were:—

(i) To carry out a comprehensive survey of the various circumstances requiring the use of military force, which may arise out of the external and internal situation in India, under the conditions which now exist, or may probably arise during the next few years.

(ii) To consider and report on the numbers and constitution of the armed force which should be maintained in India to meet these obligations.

(iii) To consider and report whether any, and if so what, measures for the reduction of military expenditure are compatible with the efficient maintenance of that force.

Minority  
Report.

3. We, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Percy Lake and Sir Robert Scallon, have the honour to submit for the information of Government a separate Report, drawn up in accordance with the instructions of His Excellency the Viceroy, communicated to us by the President, under the circumstances referred to in our letter of the 20th April 1913, giving cover to this Report.

Annexure W.

References and  
marginal notes  
made in this  
Report.

4. We would explain that the figures entered in the margin against the paragraphs of this Report refer to either the Questions or the Replies recorded in the Minutes of Evidence, in Volumes II to IV, and that, unless otherwise stated, the Annexures to which we allude are those bound up as Annexures to either the Majority Report, Volume I, or this Report, Volume I-A.

## Section II.—Introductory.

**Lord Kitchener's reforms as affecting the present organization of the army in India and its readiness for war.**

Pros. B., October 1904, Nos.  
1522-66.

5. The present system of army administration and organization are mainly based on the Schemes prepared by Field Marshal Lord Kitchener in 1903 and 1904 for the Redistribution and Reorganization of the army.

Organization  
of the army in  
India.

6. When Lord Kitchener arrived in India at the close of 1902, the army was divided into four Commands, *viz* :—Bengal, Punjab, Madras and Bombay. Generally speaking, Indian units were then seldom called upon to serve outside of the Command to which they belonged. Importance was still attached to the system of keeping the various portions of the Native army in "watertight compartments," in order to minimise the risk of the whole army being able to combine for concerted action against the Government.

7. The Field Army consisted of four divisions and five cavalry brigades, with the necessary Army Troops. Arrangements had been contemplated which would have enabled each of the four Commands to furnish a complete division for the Field Army. But owing to the great difference in fighting value of the Indian troops within the Commands, it was impossible to put such a system into practice, so long as the policy obtained which segregated the various classes of the Native army, in order to guard against the possibility of a second mutiny, and relegated the organization of the army for war to a secondary place. A reference to the composition of the Field Army as it was to have been after the annual reliefs of 1902-03 (*i.e.*, at the time of Lord Kitchener's arrival in India), shows that out of 44 Indian infantry units, 18 were drawn from the Punjab, and but one from Bengal. Of the remainder, 13 were either Gurkha or Garhwali battalions, three Baluch or Baluchistan regiments (from Quetta), two belonged to the Hyderabad Contingent, three to the Madras and four to the Bombay Command (in addition to the three from Quetta). So little could the territorial principle be then observed, that three districts contributed to the 6th Brigade, and four districts were drawn upon for each of the 10th and 11th Brigades.

The Field Army  
1902-03.

171, 176, 177, 447, 2358,  
3837, 5276, and 7208.

8. From some of the questions put to witnesses, it might be inferred that the strength of the Field Army had actually been raised to six divisions, which was not however the case. In 1902 the Government of India sanctioned proposals submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, with a view to setting free enough British infantry to enable fifth and sixth divisions to be added to the Field Army, by a redistribution of battalions and the utilization of British infantry depôts in the obligatory garrisons of India. The Secretary of State however, objected, in consequence of the War Office demurring to the depôts of British infantry being taken into account for primarily increasing the strength of the obligatory garrisons, on the ground that the duty of the depôts was to make good wastage in the units serving at the front. The further consideration of the project was then held over pending the whole question of the defence of India being dealt with, in accordance with a suggestion which had been put forward by the Secretary of State.

Lord  
Kitchener's  
schemes  
developed  
the aims of his  
predecessors.

Necessity for  
redistribution  
and  
reorganization  
realized before  
Lord  
Kitchener's  
arrival in India

9. Just as Lord Haldane's scheme for the reorganization of the armed forces of the Crown at Home was built up from proposals which originated when Mr. Childers was Secretary of State for War, so Lord Kitchener's schemes were but the development and realization of what many officers had desired, but which, under the policy of the day and the stress of financial considerations, it had not previously been possible to bring within the bounds of practical politics.

10. In April 1902 the Military Member of the Council had pointed out that the original division of the army into four "Commands" had been but the first step in decentralization, and that much broader views on the subject then prevailed. The Adjutant-General in India (Major-General H. L. Smith-Dorrien), writing to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, on the 7th May 1902, stated on behalf of Sir Power Palmer, the Commander-in-Chief, that :—

"His Excellency recognises that the existing distribution of troops in India is by no means suited to modern requirements, or to the altered conditions produced by railway extensions and our general scheme for mobilization. The object that should be aimed at is a redistribution of troops, followed by a fresh grouping of districts and commands which would enable each military area to provide its definite quota to the field army with the least possible dislocation; with divisions and brigades, if possible, taking their places in the field under the commanders who had trained the various units in peace, and leaving sufficient troops in obligatory garrisons to hold the country in rear.

\* \* \* \* \*

"\* \* for it is obvious that the distribution and organization of our army in India should be such as will be best adapted to the requirements of war and will ensure that everything will work smoothly and with the least dislocation when a great emergency may arise."

11. According to Sir Edmond Elles (writing when Military Member in 1903), the then existing scheme for mobilization which Sir Power Palmer and Lord Kitchener, as well as the Viceroy (Lord Curzon) desired to amend, was :—

"from the first recognized as faulty because the larger units of brigades and divisions had no organization in peace, but were paper bodies dispersed often over large areas, even in different districts or commands, and never brought together under their commanders in peace time. These defects were due to the policy of military distribution being based entirely on preservation of internal peace instead of for external war, and also to the fact that part of the then Bombay Native army and the whole of the Madras Native army were considered unfit for foreign service against a European enemy. \* \* "

12. Lord Curzon's view on this subject was stated in the following terms :—

"\* \* the present distribution and organization of our military forces in India are both obsolete and faulty. They are no longer suited to conditions under which the problem of external action has superseded that of internal defence; and they dissipate and sacrifice instead of economising and concentrating our available strength."

13. The Redistribution and the Reorganization Schemes of 1903-04, submitted to Government by Lord Kitchener, were therefore but the consummation of projects which had been considered by his predecessors, and which had been emphatically acknowledged to be necessary by the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, before Lord Kitchener arrived in India to assume command of the army.

Pros. B., September 1902, Nos.  
472-76.

Pros. B., October 1904, Nos.  
1522-66.

*Ibid.*

*Ibid.*  
2359 (ii), 2361, 2387.



14. The following extracts from his Schemes show the more important objects which Lord Kitchener had in view and how in his opinion many of them were to be attained. They have been selected so as to show as briefly as possible the principles upon which his measures were based.

**Lord Kitchener's Redistribution and Reorganization Schemes.**

### A.

Pros. B., October 1904, Nos. 1522-66.

*Extract from letter No. 2850-A., dated Simla, the 5th November 1903, from the Quartermaster-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.*

#### "Scheme for the Redistribution of the Army in India."

\* \* \* \* \*

2. The aim of the project is, firstly, to ascertain the lowest limits to which—by improvements in organization, and distribution—we can reduce the forces required for the maintenance of internal security, so that, while the troops employed on this duty may be able to perform their part effectively, and not be liable (as is the case at present) to be surrounded and overwhelmed in isolated detachments, we may be able to place our full fighting strength in the field whenever it may become necessary to do so in defence of the frontiers of India against a powerful European enemy.

**Aim, after providing for internal security, to produce the largest possible Field Army.**

It is a recognised fact that, owing to the improved condition of our civil administration in India, combined with the increased facilities for rapid communication and the decreasing military power of Native States, the maintenance of large forces to hold the country against internal risings is a less vital matter now than in days gone by. His Excellency the Viceroy has pointed out the changed conditions in the state of affairs on the frontiers of India and the increased danger of external aggression to which we are now exposed, facts which make it incumbent on India to keep her forces ready to meet the enemy in far greater strength than has hitherto been calculated in estimating what military forces could possibly threaten our continued possession of the country.

The second object of the scheme is to introduce a war organization in which every available unit, and man, shall have their definitely allotted places, thus ensuring such efficient training and complete readiness for war that our forces may take the field thoroughly prepared for the conflict before them.

A further aim has been to make our peace formations correspond, not rigidly, but in the most essential conditions, with our war organization, so that the transition from a state of peace to one of war, which occurs on mobilization may be effected smoothly and without undue disturbance.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. It will be observed that the scheme provides for the formation of practically nine field divisions after leaving behind in India certain forces considered adequate for the purposes of internal security. If this reorganization of our resources be adopted, it will mark a very large advance upon our present arrangements which provide us with barely four field divisions.

It is hardly necessary to point out the utter inadequacy of these four divisions to meet the altered situation on our North-West Frontier now rapidly becoming minatory owing to the improvement of the Russian communications in Central Asia; and the urgent necessity which these conditions impose upon us of organizing the largest possible proportion of the troops at our disposal in India in such formations as to enable them to take the field rapidly and with the least possible dislocation.

\* \* \* \* \*

### B.

#### "Scheme for the Redistribution of the army in India."

*Extract paragraph 1 from the "Introduction" to the above scheme.*

"One of the most important military questions which needs consideration in India is the redistribution of the army, in order

to secure its efficient training in time of peace and to enable it to pass readily into a state of war without unnecessary dislocation or confusion."

\* \* \* \* \*

### C.

#### *Part II. (Proposed Redistribution.)*

\* \* \* \* \*

To redistribute the army according to these requirements, with due regard to essentials and economy.

67. Having determined the minimum garrisons which are required for internal defence, a few words only are necessary to explain the distribution proposed.

68. If we had a *tabula rasa* to work upon, the ideal scheme would be to arrange that—

(i) each division of the field army would be located in a definite area under its divisional commander, with the troops in each brigade quartered together under their brigadiers; so that the whole might, in peace time, be commanded and trained as a homogeneous division, with homogeneous brigades—to be rapidly mobilized when required; and

(ii) when the field army has been placed in the field, there would be left behind, throughout the country, a series of definite tactical units, each allotted for the internal defence of its given area.

This ideal cannot, however, be obtained except at prohibitive—and what is considered unnecessary—cost. But it is practicable to arrive at an organization and distribution which will meet the essential requirements of the case.

69. A field army is required in India mainly to defend the country from invasion from the north-west. For operations on, or beyond, the North-West Frontier, a divisional organization is considered to be more suited to the varied nature of the country in which operations would be conducted. In providing for the location and distribution of troops, the "division" has, therefore, been taken as the basis; and in this scheme it has been arranged—

(i) that the units for one division shall be located in the same divisional area, together with the troops which will have to be left behind for the protection of the area to which they are allotted for internal defence;

(ii) that units shall be collected, in suitable bodies, at large centres, where they can be efficiently trained in peace time in tactical formations.\* The desirability of removing the troops, as far as possible from the contamination of large native centres of population, has also received full consideration;

(iii) that detachment stations shall eventually be abandoned in all cases where their retention is not absolutely necessary for political purposes; as, by maintaining troops in such isolated positions, their efficiency is destroyed, whilst the security of the country is in no way improved.

\* \* \* \* \*

To revise the administration.

72. With such an organization, it will be, of course, necessary to revise the staff arrangements—to secure a suitable staff organization for peace administration and the efficient training of the troops for war, and one which can be expanded when war takes place. The ideal arrangement would be to have brigades organized in peace time in the formations in which they would take the field, and each commanded and trained under its own brigadier. But it is recognized that, just as such a formation would involve prohibitive initial cost in the construction of new accommodation, so it will not be possible, with due regard to economy, to provide brigadiers and complete brigade staffs for all the brigades in time of peace.

\* \* \* \* \*

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\* NOTE.—It is not meant by this that all the units allotted in this scheme to a given station should necessarily be located side by side in the same cantonment; but that the troops allotted to the same centre or station shall be located within a day's march of each other so that they can be trained together. For instance, a cavalry brigade is allotted to Mardan, but the new lines will not actually be at Mardan itself, but in its neighbourhood. A good site for two cavalry regiments and a battery of horse artillery exists on the Nowshera-Mardan road.

## D.

*Extracts from Lord Kitchener's Memorandum on the preparation of the army in India for war.*

\* \* \* \* \*

On the 5th November 1903 a scheme for the reorganization and redistribution of the army in India was forwarded for the con-

Preparation for war.

\* *Vide* Extract "A," sideration and approval of Government,\* page 4 *ante*.

as a primary basis on which the forces existing in this country should be organized for internal defence and for the protection of the country against invasion.

The main objects of the scheme were—

Summary of Redistribution Scheme.

(i) to determine the minimum to which—by improvements in organization and distribution—it would be possible to reduce the forces required for the maintenance of internal security, so that while the troops employed on this duty could perform their part effectively, we could place our full fighting strength in the field whenever it might become necessary to do so in defence of the frontiers of India against a powerful European enemy;

(ii) to secure a war organization in which every available unit and man should have their definitely allotted places, thus insuring that efficient training and complete readiness for war by which alone the troops could take the field thoroughly prepared for the conflict before them;

(iii) to make the peace formations correspond—not rigidly, but in the most essential conditions—with our war organization, so that the transition from a state of peace to one of war, which occurs on mobilization, might be effected smoothly and without undue disturbance;

(iv) to provide a pre-determined system and scale on which the army in India should be organized for field service, so as to have a definite standard by which to calculate our requirements and gauge the military problems with which we may be confronted from time to time.

2. Hitherto the bulk of the army in India has been allotted for internal defence; and after the garrisons for internal defence have been provided, sufficient forces have only remained for the formation of a field army of four divisions, with a few extra units for lines of communication. But owing to the improved condition of the civil administration, combined with the increased facilities for rapid communication and the decreasing military power of the Native States, it has been recognized that it is unnecessary to maintain such large forces to hold the country against possible internal risings. And, on the other hand, it is equally recognized that the present field army (aggregating only 11,756 sabres, 55,132 bayonets, and 258 guns) is quite inadequate to defend the country from external aggression under the changed conditions which have been, and are, steadily becoming more and more threatening and dangerous.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. The issue of a war of the nature contemplated will depend largely on the relative preparedness of the two Powers to undertake the preliminary operations. Its ultimate result will, no doubt, rest on the power of the British Empire as a whole, as compared with that of Russia; but in its initial stages—and for some time at least—success on our part, and even the subsequent course and outcome of the war, will largely, if not entirely, depend on our power of seizing certain important strategical positions and being able to stem the tide of invasion until the sea roads are cleared and unlimited reinforcements and munitions of war can be poured into the country from England and the Colonies.

6. But it has been stated by the Home authorities in unmistakably clear terms, that in the event of such a war it may not be possible, for a considerable time, to obtain the clear command of the sea and domination of the main routes which would permit of the despatch of reinforcements. It has been categorically stated that "it is impossible to make any forecast as to the time which might so elapse;" that "the term is, in fact, indefinite and incalculable and may extend to nine or even twelve months"; and that, "India must provide for eventualities without any guarantee as to the date of arrival of troops from England or over-sea."

Reinforcements from Home.

If it is, therefore, essential that India—for its own security and as a simple matter of insurance against the overwhelming consequences of possible defeat and invasion—should be in a position to hold its own successfully during the first stages of such a campaign, until the sea routes can be cleared and rendered safe for the passage of reinforcements, and until the resources of the rest of the Empire can be brought to her aid. And it is also necessary that the organization adopted should be one which will prepare the way effectively for the employment of reinforcements as they arrive. In other words, it is necessary—

The essential requirements which the scheme proposed to meet.

(i) that the field army in India should be sufficiently strong to seize, and successfully hold, such strategical positions on or beyond the frontier as may be vital for the subsequent success of the operations; so that there may be a clearly defined plan of campaign, carefully thought out and elaborated beforehand, and so that when the time for action may arise we may not be confronted with vacillating proposals and a halting policy through being found unprepared;

(ii) that it should be so located that it can be mobilized rapidly in suitable formations;

(iii) that it should be thoroughly equipped in all details and be trained and prepared for the war in which it would be involved;

(iv) that it should have ample railway communications leading to the theatre of war, so that it can be placed rapidly in the field and be supplied during the progress of the campaign with the necessary reinforcements in men, animals, and munitions of war; and

(v) that it should be able to maintain itself in the field on its own resources for a year until the command of the sea has been established and reinforcements and stores can be safely brought into the country from other parts of the Empire.

7. The scheme for the reorganization and redistribution of the army in India which has recently been prepared and submitted for the approval of Government is a first necessary step towards attaining these objects. Under that scheme every unit will have its definitely allotted place in the field army or for internal defence; and the war divisions and brigades will be so located that they can be trained properly in peace and be mobilized rapidly and in suitable formations when required for war. By the improved organization and distribution proposed, we shall also more than double the strength of our present field army; for, when required, we shall be able to operate with an army of nine infantry divisions, eight cavalry brigades, and some additional batteries of corps artillery.

The scheme thus marks a first step in advance, by providing for an improved organization and distribution of the army in India and by utilizing our existing resources to the utmost extent. But before full advantage can be obtained from it, it will be necessary that the organization should be completed in all its details and that the troops should be thoroughly prepared and equipped. The object of this paper, therefore, is to show what measures will be necessary to thoroughly prepare the army for war, so that it may be able to maintain itself during a year's campaign until command of the sea has been securely established.

\* \* \* \* \*

## E.

*Extracts from Lord Kitchener's Memorandum on the "Preparation of the Army in India for War."*

\* \* \* \* \*

137. The three railway lines, therefore, which are most immediately important for the defence of India are—

(i) A broad-gauge railway to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal with the necessary terminal sidings and arrangements for the establishment of a base of operations there;

(ii) A broad-gauge railway over the Khyber range with terminal sidings in the neighbourhood of Kam Dakka, and the storage of 100 miles of plant for the extension of the line on the outbreak of hostilities;

(iii) Direct broad-gauge connection between Bombay and Sind.

Railway requirements.

139. In the above schedule only such measures are included as are considered to be immediately essential and are believed to be within the scope of practical financial considerations at the present time. Their cost has been estimated as accurately as available information permits, though, on closer examination by financial experts, discrepancies will possibly be found. In round numbers it is calculated that these essential measures will involve an initial expenditure of about four crores of rupees and a recurring annual expenditure of about one crore. If to this be added a crore for increasing the plant of factories and providing adequate reserves to enable the army under the new organization to hold its own for a year's campaign, the cost will be, roundly, five crores initial and one crore recurring expenditure.

Estimated cost  
of the Scheme.

Under the reorganization scheme, proposals have been submitted for a redistribution of the army, suitable to the requirements of peace training while placing it in formations and in positions from which it can take the field readily and without undue dislocation. That scheme involves an initial expenditure of about two and a half crores. This paper deals with the measures of preparation which are immediately necessary to give effect to the reorganization scheme and the result arrived at is that their cost will be about five crores initial and one crore recurring. The total military expenditure will, therefore, be approximately seven and a half crores initial and one crore recurring.

But no army will fulfil its purpose unless it can concentrate rapidly and maintain itself in the strategical positions which are essential for the success of the campaign. In order, therefore, that full advantage may be obtained from the means at our disposal, it is necessary that the three railways mentioned in paragraph 137 should be taken in hand as soon as possible.

\* \* \* \* \*

15. It is of course a truism to say that the whole of Lord Kitchener's projects have not been completed. But, as reference was frequently made to this point in the examination of witnesses, it is perhaps worth while to point out that, when, in 1903-04, Lord Kitchener made known to Government what he believed to be requisite, in order to make the army ready to deal effectively with the defence of India, both internally and against outside aggression, he, as Commander-in-Chief and executive head of the army, had done all that it was in his power to do. It then rested with the Government of India in the Military Department (in whose hands the administration of the army was centred) to consider, from the view of Government policy and expediency, to what extent the proposals made could be accepted and sanctioned, and the order in which their relative importance demanded that they should be put in hand. The Commander-in-Chief's responsibilities ceased when his recommendations had reached the Member in Charge of the Military Department, and until they were presented to Council he had no claim to take any part in the subsequent discussions.

System of army  
administration  
in 1903-04.

5897, 5940.

16. When, in 1906, on the abolition of the Military, and the creation of the Army Department, the Commander-in-Chief attained a large share in the administration of the army, even then practically everything connected with the provision of what was necessary to fit out the army for war, *viz.*, arms, ammunition, stores, equipment, remounts, clothing, etc., still remained under the control of another Department of Government.

17. It was also in 1906, that the Secretary of State first questioned the necessity of proceeding with the Redistribution and Reorganization Schemes on their original lines; the political-military situation having been altered by the diplomatic understandings which had been arrived at between France and Japan on the

Reasons which  
led to schemes  
not being  
fully carried  
out.

one hand, and Great Britain on the other. These were followed in 1907 by the Anglo-Russian Convention.

18. In 1908 these considerations, together with the increased burden imposed on the revenues of India by the additional payment of £300,000 which the Secretary of State had agreed to make in settlement of the War Office claims for services rendered to India, and the necessity for increasing the pay of the Native army, led Lord Morley to arrest the progress of the measures undertaken with the approval of his predecessors and of the Committee of Imperial Defence, including the following additions to the permanent establishment of the army, *viz* :—

3 battalions, British Infantry.

4 batteries, Native Mountain Artillery.

1 regiment, Native Cavalry.

6 batteries, Heavy Artillery with ammunition columns. (In substitution for 6 companies, Royal Garrison Artillery.)

4 companies, Railway Engineers.

2 companies of Telegraph Engineers.

Lord Morley also withheld sanction to the creation of a cavalry cantonment in the Quetta Area.

19. The Supply Department disappeared in March 1909, and the Commander-in-Chief and Army Member became for the first time fully responsible for, and able to deal with, the administration of the army as a whole. But it was then too late for him to deal with all the needs of the army that year, because the military Budget had been already prepared. It was the first of a series which financial stress caused to be framed with a view to reduce, exclude, or postpone every charge which could be so dealt with. Many items which he had hoped to see brought to fruition before he left India were perforce omitted. In September 1909, before the next Budget was framed, Lord Kitchener had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. It is unnecessary to explain further the reasons why many plans remained uncompleted.

20. Lord Kitchener's projects fell under two main heads, *viz.*, the requirements for internal defence and those for the field army. For both of these purposes, his aim was to make "peace formations correspond, not rigidly, but in the most essential conditions, with our war organization."

21. When, on the organization of the General Staff in 1910, the situation was again examined, doubts began to be entertained whether, in the light of later experience, the minimum provision made for internal security in the Schemes of 1903-04 was adequate for the new conditions which had since arisen. It is therefore necessary to consider what, in general terms, were the arrangements in the first instance proposed.

22. Paragraph 38 of the Redistribution Scheme (reproduced below) indicates the lines on which internal security was provided for, *viz.*, (i) to safeguard arsenals, railways, etc., (ii) to make use of the Volunteers, Police, etc., for the passive defence of localities and to maintain order under the civil administration, (iii) to supply

Pros. B., October 1909, Nos. 2061-63.

161, 5942, 5966, 5968.

The Commander-in-Chief made fully responsible for army administration in 1909.

Lord Kitchener's plans.

Internal Security.

317, 546, 2359, 3855, 5277, 5427, 7209.



definite tactical forces of regulars for active defence, capable of operating as formed bodies of the three arms for the suppression of rebellion. The underlying principle, as compared with the former system, was to release troops for active operations, instead of shutting up regular troops in obligatory garrisons.

## F.

Pros. B., October 1904, Nos.  
1522-66.

\* \* \* \* \*

"38. It remains now to consider what force of regular troops will be necessary for the internal defence of the country.

Requirements  
of internal  
security.

"It is evident that the present system of 'obligatory garrisons,' under which it is proposed to hold the country by a large number of scattered detachments, is radically unsound from a military point of view. In many cases these detachments are so small that they would be liable to be surrounded and overwhelmed, and they are also too small and too widely scattered to be able, in themselves, to dominate the surrounding country and stamp out rebellion. What seems to be wanted is, after examining the conditions and requirements of the different parts of the country—the arsenals, railways, bridges, Native States, and people—and after seeing what number of volunteers and police would be available as auxiliaries for the defence of given areas, then to determine what military force would be required for the protection of each area, and to allot this force—not in a series of dispersed detachments, but as a definite tactical force for the defence of the area. These military forces for internal defence would then be practically mixed brigades, which would be available for use as required. If, in any part of the country it be desirable, at any time, to hold certain definite points, the force would be distributed accordingly. If, on the other hand, it is required to use the whole force in any area as an integral tactical unit—to operate as such and put down rebellion—it should be so concentrated and used. The troops forming these mixed brigades would, in peace time, be located in the area of defence to which they are allotted, under a Colonel on the Staff, one of whose most important duties would be to consider, in communication with the civil authorities, the requirements of his area, and work out the necessary schemes for fortified posts, moveable columns, etc., so that he would be fully prepared for the defence of his area when the field army is mobilized. When mobilization occurs, these Colonels on the Staff would suitably be given the rank of Brigadier-Generals as they would then be in command of their areas."

*Ibid.*

23. The Commander-in-Chief's proposals, formulated after consultation with General Officers of Commands, and special investigation on the spot, were forwarded by the Government of India to all Local Governments and Administrations, for examination and consideration. They were advised that the object in view was "an improved location of our military forces so that, whilst the troops employed for the maintenance of internal security can perform their part effectively, we may be able to place our full fighting strength in the field, only in case it may become necessary to do so, in defence of the frontiers of India, against a powerful European enemy \* \* \*." At the same time it was pointed out that "although, under the organization proposed, nine divisions will be available for mobilization, it does not necessarily follow that all the nine will be mobilized and sent to the front. The number of divisions to be mobilized and the number to be left behind will be a question for the Government of India to decide with due regard to the contingencies, external and internal, that may have to be faced. \* \* \* Local Governments will not necessarily be dependent solely on the troops within their own civil area, but on the general military resources of the country at the disposal of the

Proposals for  
redistribution  
submitted to  
Local Govern-  
ments.

Supreme Government, who alone will be in a position to gauge the urgency of the requirements of each particular case, and to judge whether the whole field army can be mobilized for external service, or whether one or more divisions must be kept back for internal defence generally throughout India."

Co-ordination  
for the maintain-  
ance of order of  
all forces civil  
and military.

24. An important feature in the proposed arrangements for internal security was the intention to co-ordinate for a common purpose all forces, Regulars, Volunteers, armed Europeans, Military and Civil police, for the maintenance of order, and to enlist on the side of Government bodies of loyal yeomanry, similar to those who were raised and who performed such useful service in the days of the second Sikh war and of the Mutiny.

25. The marginally noted questions put to witnesses who gave evidence, or supplied information to the Committee, appear to indicate that Lord Kitchener's views as to the assistance which Volunteers and Police ought to be able to render in case of riots and rebellion, may have been somewhat misunderstood.

26. From a reference to paragraphs 28, 29, 33, 37, 38, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 56, 59, 61, 63, of "The Redistribution Scheme," and to the letters addressed in 1904 to all Local Governments, it will be apparent that the rôle which Lord Kitchener proposed to assign to the Volunteers and Police was, essentially—

Volunteers.

(a) To maintain and to restore order under normal conditions, when no greater danger than rioting might have to be dealt with.

(b) In case of rebellion, to assist in holding certain localities, and thereby to release regular troops (other than those allotted to Coast Defence and obligatory garrisons) for service with the movable columns.

27. As regards the Volunteers in particular it was Lord Kitchener's belief that—

"little use could be made of them until commerce was completely dislocated. The more marked the dislocation became, the greater would be the assistance that they might be expected to render."

28. In 1908 the Government of India in a communication to the Secretary of State wrote that the Volunteers—

"are not required or intended for offensive purposes. They are of great value, both in formed bodies and as individuals pursuing their civil duties, for preserving order, protecting property and quelling disturbances, whilst they also release a large number of British troops who would otherwise have to be detailed to guard railways and various important centres, and who are thus set free for movable columns."

Police.

29. As regards the Police, it will be seen by a reference to the extracts from paragraphs 33 to 35 of the "Redistribution Scheme," given below, Lord Kitchener realized that the first duty of the Police must be to maintain control in the civil districts during a time of great emergency and political excitement, and that it would be dangerous then to withdraw men from duty at outlying police posts. He suggested that this difficulty could be met by stopping, and by recalling men from, leave, and replacing the two or three constables withdrawn from each police outpost by leave men, village chowkidars or old soldiers.

Pros. B., October 1904, Nos. 1522-66. Redistribution Scheme, paragraph 37.

2674, 5225, 5637.

Volunteers—

Questions.—2960, 2974, 4216, 4218, 5474, 6720, 7212, 7214, 8137, 9361, and written questions, 163 page 1313, 344 page 1344, 346 page 1346 Vol. IV.

Police—

Questions.—2152, 2160, 2162, 2168, 2174, 6533, 6557, 7722, and written questions, 5 page 1284, 105-106 pages 1304-06, 316 page 1339, Vol. IV, and reply 6528.



Pros. B., October 1904, Nos. 1522-66.

*Extracts from the "Introduction" to the Scheme for the redistribution of the army in India, Part I, "The Internal Defence of India."*

\* \* \* \* \*

"33. The duty of preserving order, protecting property, and quelling disturbances, rests in the first instance with the police, the troops being an armed reserve which should be collected at convenient central stations, and kept in the back-ground till required. Under suitable arrangements, the police should usually be able to secure the internal security of British India with little assistance or intervention on the part of the regular army. But owing to there being no pre-arranged system under which the armed police can be collected at centres when required, troops have been called out 69 times during the three years from 1899 to 1901, in bodies varying from a few men to a couple of companies—mostly in cases of small importance; and in the event of it ever being found necessary in a great emergency to withdraw troops for use in the field, the large bodies of armed police would lie scattered without cohesion.

Police.

34. It, therefore, seems desirable to have some simple system in each province under which, when required, armed police could be collected at given centres for use in bodies. To effect this it would not be necessary in any way to interfere with the ordinary methods under which the force would be controlled and administered for its usual duties. It would still remain completely under the civil authorities and be distributed under their orders for the maintenance of the public security, as at present. But in each district there could be a simple pre-arranged system by which bodies of armed police would, on an emergency, be brought together to form one or more companies under their European Inspectors; and these again might, if required, be grouped together with those of adjoining districts, to form larger bodies which would practically be armed police battalions under a British officer, with two or three European assistants.

35. \* \* \* \* \*

At a time of great emergency and political excitement, it is all the more necessary to maintain control throughout the districts and not lessen the hold that usually prevails. And, as a large number of the men who would be concentrated are necessarily scattered throughout the outlying police posts, it appears at first sight that it might be dangerous to withdraw them. But at such a time all leave would be stopped, and men on leave be recalled. These would give a considerable access of strength. And if from each outlying post even two or three special men were drawn into the centre, their places being taken by leave men, old soldiers, or village chowkidars, there would only be a very inappreciable loss of strength in the districts, with a material addition of strength at the centres where a display of force would be most necessary to put down rioting and mass gatherings. In other words, it would not be a reduction of the police; but an automatic increase. There might, possibly, be a slight and almost inappreciable weakening of the outlying posts till the incoming men were fully trained; but there would be a considerable augmentation of force in the districts and divisions as a whole, with groups formed in the large cities or centres where danger is likely to be most felt from masses of rioters and disturbers of the peace. And it would materially increase the security of each district if the men intended for these formed bodies were recruited as "specials" from outside the district, so that they would have no sympathy with the local population.

Such a system of being able to group police together for collective action could only tend to strengthen the hands of the civil authorities, while it need not interfere with the duties or distribution of the police in ordinary times; and the knowledge of where such police bodies could be formed would be of great assistance to the military authorities if ever they were called upon to put the military forces into motion to maintain order and suppress rebellion.

36. \* \* \* \* \*

Of course, if it became impossible at any time to maintain control over any outlying districts, the whole of the police force in such tracts (or those who remained loyal) would be available and would gradually be collected at points which it was intended to hold."

\* \* \* \* \*

20. We have therefore this position in regard to internal security, that, full use of the Volunteers and Police having been made on carefully considered lines, and full consultation with local military authorities as to the question of internal security having been held, the civil authorities were finally asked whether they agreed that the proposed minimum allotments of troops were adequate. With but few exceptions Lord Kitchener's proposals for internal security were accepted by Local Governments. In some cases they were amended so as to meet local requirements, otherwise they are still officially in force, and are the arrangements which our Committee has had to consider, under its Terms of Reference.

The Field  
Army.

31. Passing now to the Field Army, Lord Kitchener's scheme aimed to bring about the following results:—

*Firstly*, that the units for any one division should be located in the same divisional area, together with the troops required for its internal security, so that the divisions would be complete organizations in peace as well as for war.

2331-3.  
2341.

*Secondly*, that units should be collected in suitable bodies at or near large centres, where they could be efficiently trained during peace in tactical formations, having troops of all arms located together so as to admit of "combined training."

5325-31.

Lord Kitchener, however, recognized that, for financial reasons, it was out of the question to have brigades organized in peace time in the *identical* formations in which they would take the field, (*i.e.*, completed with their field service transport and ambulance details) each commanded and trained by its own Brigadier.

32. Having first ascertained the minimum force that could ensure the internal safety of India at the time of a great war, he found that the balance available for the Field Army amounted to practically (but not quite) nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades, with army troops.

In two important points Lord Kitchener's plans widely departed from what had been accepted in the past. The first was the proposed employment of homogeneous brigades in the Field Army, the second was to make peace and war organizations correspond in their essential conditions.

3907, 5303, 5315, 7148,  
7184.

Homogeneous  
versus mixed  
brigades.

33. The advantages and disadvantages of homogeneous brigades (*i.e.*, brigades composed entirely of either British, or Indian troops), were fully discussed during 1905. It was eventually decided that homogeneous brigades would only be necessary in the event of a war against a European power. The plans for mobilization therefore made two allotments for the Field Army, *viz* :—

Prop., Organization B., May  
1908, No. 2162.

(a) The "Red" allotment (so called because the scheme is bound in a red cover), for

a Field Army composed of divisions, each containing three homogeneous infantry brigades. This was the original scheme, which provided also for the incorporation of reinforcements sent to India, in time of war, from other parts of the Empire.

- (b) The "Yellow" allotment (so called because the scheme is bound in a yellow cover), which provides for a Field Army consisting of divisions, each composed of three mixed infantry brigades.

2399.  
2404, 3913.  
3919-21.  
5303, 5321.

34. Up to 1904 the peace distribution of troops had not been made with any regard to the training of brigades and divisions organized as for war. When a force was required for active service its components were assembled from all parts of India. Not only were general officers and their staffs unknown as a rule to the troops,\* but it not infrequently happened that the officers so selected had had no previous practice in peace time in the duties they were called upon to perform in war. The disadvantages of this want of system were apparent during the frontier rising in 1897-98, and also in South Africa, where officers who had not commanded in peace the brigades they were placed over during the war frequently failed; whilst in the one case in which a brigade served in South Africa under its original commander, that brigadier did well.

Peace and war organizations had never corresponded.

35. Before formulating his schemes for the redistribution of the army and its preparation for war, Lord Kitchener recognized the necessity for studying the probable theatre of operations. He, therefore, visited the whole of the frontier from Chaman to Chitral, in order to acquaint himself thoroughly with the local conditions. His calculations were then examined by the General Staff at the War Office, as well as by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Data on which Lord Kitchener's schemes were based.

Paper No. 59-D., submitted by the General Staff to the Committee of Imperial Defence in June 1904.

36. Lord Kitchener dealt in detail with the problem as he understood it, in a Minute on the Military Policy of India, dated the 25th August 1905, which is too lengthy to reproduce in this Report, but which indicates clearly that he had appreciated its difficulties and its special peculiarities; and also that he believed that, in order to meet them satisfactorily and economically, it was essential that ample railway communications leading to the seat of war should be completed before the necessity arose to mobilize the army. We shall refer to the questions of communications, and of the maintenance of an army beyond the frontier, in Sections VIII and XXXIII.

37. As we have already indicated, in paragraphs 18 and 19, owing to circumstances over which Lord Kitchener had no control, his schemes for redistributing the army and for self-contained divisional areas have yet to be completed in many details; amongst them are the following:—

Items of the schemes which have not been completed.

- (a) The Peshawar Divisional area, as organized at present, is short of a third infantry brigade, owing to the proposal to form a cantonment at Torsappar having had

Torsappar Cantonment.

\* See paragraph 11 of this Report.

to be dropped when the project to construct the Shilman Ghakke railway was abandoned, for, as Lord Kitchener wrote—

“The whole question of the placing of troops at Torsappar and Shilman Ghakke depends on the construction of the railway to the latter place \* \* \*. Should no railway be made, the necessity to place troops at these particular places will cease to exist \* \* \*.”

We may mention that it was to the late Sir R. Warburton, who for many years had advocated the location of British troops at Torsappar, that the proposal to form a cantonment at this place owed its origin.

Cavalry  
Brigade for the  
Quetta area.

(b) The 4th Cavalry Brigade, which was assigned to the 4th Division, has not been formed, owing to the Secretary of State having vetoed the proposal to collect the units for it within the Quetta area.

(c) The Field Army is deficient of the units referred to in paragraph 18 of this Report.

Provisional  
battalions of  
Reservists

(d) The idea of utilizing battalions of reservists for internal defence has been dropped.

This however was not originally an idea of Lord Kitchener's, but a proposal which Lord Roberts had suggested in 1865, and which was re-raised in 1896 (at the time when an endeavour was being made to find troops to hold the Northern line of communication), to form provisional battalions of Native infantry reservists. Under this proposal, before Lord Kitchener arrived in India, 31 reserve battalions were to be embodied for service, and to be made available to set free an equal number of regular battalions for employment in the field. On further consideration it was decided that they would not be suitable, even if the men were available for this service.

Mounted  
Infantry.

(e) No provision has been made for the mounted infantry who were included in the original scheme, because, on the rearmament of the Indian cavalry with a small-bore magazine rifle, the shooting of that arm of the service so wonderfully improved, that Lord Kitchener felt it was illogical to train Indian infantry in mounted duties, when he had to hand a large number of Indian cavalry, who, as cavalry, had ordinarily but little chance of seeing active service, but who could use their rifles as well as could the infantry, and were also trained to dismounted action and were good riders and horse masters.

Commands.

38. The question of command, both in peace and with a view to the requirements of war, still remains to be referred to. The original Redistribution Scheme had contemplated the grouping of the nine divisions in three armies, each under a Lieutenant-General. When Lord Kitchener's proposals were examined in the Military Department of the Government of India the Military Member, Sir E. Elles, however, maintained the view that two such commands would be sufficient, and that the money spent on the third could be utilized to better purpose for increasing the number of Brigade Commanders.

39. The abolition of the Madras Command had caused the 9th (Secunderabad) Division to be temporarily independent, as it remained under General Sir Charles Egerton who had previously held command of the Madras Command. Burma was already independent. The experience thus gained in the Secunderabad and Burma Divisions, of permitting divisional

5227.

Note dated 23rd April 1904, Pros. B., October 1904, Nos. 1522-66.

commanders to exercise practically the full powers of Lieutenant-Generals of Commands, and to correspond direct with Army Headquarters, was so satisfactory, that it was decided to introduce it throughout India.

40. The scheme for operations in Afghanistan showed that the armies in the field would be two, *viz.*, one in the north pivoted on Kabul, a second in the south, pivoted on Kandahar. This made it desirable to appoint two general officers, who would be responsible for the efficiency of these armies in peace, and who might be appointed to command them in war. These proposals were sanctioned by the Secretary of State, and were introduced in 1907. The divisional commanders were then given the powers which had hitherto been delegated to Lieutenant-Generals of Commands, and were placed in direct correspondence with Army Headquarters.

Two Army  
Commands  
formed

41. It has been argued that this change tended to deprive four senior officers of the higher experience of command, training, and administration which a Command afforded, and also to deprive certain of the administrative staff of the army of a means of learning what would fit them for employment on the Headquarters Staff in peace or of a large force in the field. This contention might be true, were it not that today the headquarters of ten divisions are gaining this experience, and that the key-note of all staff work, throughout the army, is the practical training and preparation of the troops and the departmental services for war. The inter-divisional manoeuvres held near Delhi in December 1912 illustrated the smoothness with which the staff work is now conducted, owing to the close touch and hearty co-operation which exists between all branches of the staff, at Headquarters and in the divisions of the army, which was not, and indeed could not be the case when a third, the Command staff, intervened.

Effect of the  
abolition of  
Commands.

7365.

161,	186,	319,	478,	2523,
2359,	3769,	3838,	3919,	
3921,	3964,	4631,	5257,	
5303,	5315,	5713,	5732,	
5767,	5864,	7203,	7229.	

42. Another great advantage of the present system is that all departmental officers in divisions are the staff officers of the divisional commanders, who have as wide powers as had the Lieutenant-Generals of Commands, and are personally responsible for the efficiency of the departmental services. This is greatly to the benefit of the army, as compared with the previous system under which the heads of departmental services were responsible to the Military Department and not to the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener's anticipations in this respect have been realized, and in actual practice few drawbacks have been met with.

Departmental  
Services.

43. Of the two Army Commanders who appeared before the Committee, the one whose health had permitted him to carry out the inspection of divisions and brigades under training as intended, was strongly of opinion that Lord Kitchener's reforms have been beneficial to the army; and our personal experience, both on the Headquarters Staff and as divisional commanders administering the system in force, has led us to the same conclusion.

4648,	5257,	5303,	5315,
5713,	5723,	5767,	5864.

44. Having thus glanced briefly at the inception of Lord Kitchener's reforms, and their effect on the present organization of the Army, together with the circumstances which have in some cases arrested their development, we now proceed to the consideration of the first Term of our Reference.

## PART II.

## FIRST TERM OF REFERENCE.

The First Term  
of Reference.

*"To carry out a comprehensive survey of the various circumstances requiring the use of military force, which may arise out of the external and internal situation in India, under the conditions which now exist, or may probably arise during the next few years."*

## Section III.—The Internal Situation.

The Internal  
situation.

45. We adopt the following general principles as those on which provision should be made for the internal security of the country, *viz* :—

"(i) The first requirement is to provide for the maintenance of the authority of Government including the Civil Power generally, and for its ability to enforce its commands.

Appendix I, Volume VI, para. 38.

The means used for this purpose are the police and the army. As the power of the former is insufficient in itself to deal with resistance on a large scale, the ultimate support of the Civil Power is the army.

Hence it is necessary to ensure that the military forces are properly distributed, that the arsenals and seaports upon which they depend for the supply of munitions of war, other supplies, and reinforcements are properly defended, and that the railways and other communications, which enable those forces to be moved to the points where they are needed, are safeguarded from interruption.

(ii) The second requirement is to maintain, in conjunction with the civil authorities, as complete information as possible regarding the elements which make for rebellion, sedition, or civil disturbances, whether those elements exist in areas entirely under our rule, or in areas governed by protected or semi-independent Native States, to keep a close watch upon them, and to make good arrangements for controlling in their early stages movements which might if unchecked develop into dangerous forces, or which might affect the recruiting grounds of the army."

\* \* \* \* \*

The present  
situation in  
India.

46. After a careful consideration of the evidence which has been given and of the other information which has been placed before our Committee, we are of opinion that the following extract, from a minute prepared last year by the Chief of the General Staff, is a fair exposition of the internal problem with which the Government of India is faced to-day.

Appendix I, Vol. VI.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The danger which appeared most imminent in 1904 when plans were prepared for the redistribution and reorganization of the army in India, was a war with Russia, entailing a campaign in Afghanistan. It was realised that the protection of India from external invasion, and the preservation of internal security within its borders, were inter-dependent problems, and that any scheme adopted for the reorganization and redistribution of India's armed forces should be one which would provide conveniently and effectively for both these objects.

Para. 41.

Sedition.

"This was the basis of the army organization and distribution effected by Lord Kitchener. During the last five years however, certain factors have come into prominence which have had as important an effect on the problem of India's internal security, as the Anglo-Russian Convention has had on that of her external responsibilities. In 1904 the contentment of the people as a whole; and their acquiescence in British rule, were not seriously questioned, and though the existence of sedition in certain areas was known, it was not regarded as a matter of any serious importance, as it was confined to a small class and to certain districts the inhabitants of which were unwarlike. Since then, however, the situation has changed for the worse. The triumph of Japan over Russia; and her consequent elevation to the position of a World Power, has stirred the Asiatic world from Tokio to Teheran, and has awakened long slumbering national aspirations

Para. 42.



and a hatred of European domination. The innate racial difference between the East and the West has found expression through the Press, and has given rise to a campaign of calumny and vilification which has stirred the masses against Government in a manner which is as startling as it is unexpected. Encouraged by the support of English politicians who fail to realise that the democratic methods of government which obtain in Europe, are as yet unsuited to the East with its different ideals and backward civilization, the educated classes in India have started an agitation for political independence which ranges from the aspirations of the moderates, who hope to see India enjoying within the Empire the same degree of autonomy as the self-governing Dominions, to the violent hostility of extremists who would be satisfied with nothing less than complete revolution and independence, and are prepared to resort to every form of violence in order to attain their object. If this awakening of national aspirations and desire for political emancipation were confined to the educated classes, and to unwarlike races, such as the people of the Dekhan and Bengal, it would be of comparatively little importance from a military point of view. The propaganda, however, has spread to the Punjab, the great recruiting ground of the Indian army, and has been successful in alienating the loyalty of some of the people of that province to a dangerous extent.

Para. 43.

"Realising that no political propaganda can arouse the people from their apathy unless it is associated with religion, the promoters of sedition have been careful to find religious motives for their activities. Apart from causing discontent against British rule, they have stirred up religious animosities, and by encouraging fanaticism have increased the probability of riots between Musalmans and Hindus. Well aware of the fact that the resources at the disposal of Government, and their own lack of arms, precludes the possibility of a successful insurrection, the leaders of the extremist movement have made a study of anarchical methods. If open revolt is impracticable, it is at any rate possible by assassination, bomb-throwing, and political dacoities, to work upon the fears of the timorous, and to spread the idea that Government is powerless to protect the lives and property of its subjects. Again, if the forces of Government cannot be faced in the field, it is at any rate possible to hamper their mobility by cutting the telegraph wires, encouraging strikes among miners and railway employés, derailing trains, and damaging bridges and rolling stock. Nor is the obtaining of arms an altogether insuperable difficulty. In spite of the Arms Act, a considerable supply of revolvers has been distributed throughout the country, and though the smuggling of arms and ammunition into India undoubtedly presents great difficulties, cargoes of rifles could probably be landed at some of the smaller ports, more especially at places like Goa and Pondicherry, and they could be smuggled thence into the interior with no greater risk of detection than attends the smuggling of arms from India across the North-West frontier.

Para 44.

"The facts above stated have increased the importance of providing means for the maintenance of internal security, and of estimating the relative value to be attached to the religious and political movements which threaten to disturb the peace of India.

\* \* \* \* \*

Para 130.

"The maintenance of the authority of the Civil Power being the main requirement, \* \* its authority is most threatened by the chance of serious rebellion, whether occasioned by a wave of religious feeling, such as an outburst of Moslem fanaticism or the anti-cow-killing movement, or engineered by seditious agitation, or secretly set in motion and supported either by disaffected native rulers or by external agencies.

Para. 131.

"Northern India, i.e., the Punjab and the United Provinces, is the region in which a successful rebellion would be fraught with the most serious consequences. It is the great recruiting ground of the Indian army, and a revolt of its martial population, which might easily spread to the troops, would tax the military resources of Government to the uttermost. Delhi is the strategic centre of Northern India upon which the railways from Bombay and Calcutta converge, and from which other lines radiate to Peshawar, Quetta, and Karachi. To hold Delhi, the Imperial capital, is to dominate Northern India, and to dominate the latter is to ensure the submission and tranquility of less warlike portions of the country, such as the Dekhan, Bengal and Madras. The security

of Delhi, and of the railways which link it to the sea-bases of Bombay and Calcutta, may, therefore, be regarded as the basis of India's peace strategy.

"Next to Northern India, the powerful Mahratta States of Gwalior, Indore, and Baroda in Central India, may be regarded as the principal danger from the strategic point of view, as from their central position, commanding our principal lines of communication between Bombay and Delhi, they are in a position to give the lead in any great Hindu revolt, especially if it originated in the Mahratta country with which their rulers are racially connected. Their rulers may be trusted to be loyal to the British Government in their own interests, so long as circumstances do not force them to a contrary course.

Para. 132.

"The powerful Native States of Southern India, though not perhaps probable sources of danger, also demand attention; nor is it safe to assume, in spite of the accepted loyalty of their chiefs, that the power of the Rajput States does not require suitable military provision. These chiefs are merely "*primi inter pares*"; they are continually at variance with their Thakurs, and so the chief being loyal, his Thakurs or some of them may take a contrary course; as did the Thakur of Awah in the mutiny, when his chief, Jodhpur, remained staunch.

Para. 133.

"Rebellion, as the fruit of seditious agitation, appears most probable in Northern India, less likely in the Dekhan, and least likely in Bengal.

Para. 134.

Strikes.

"Strikes, possibly also incited by agitators, would be most likely to lead to trouble in large industrial centres, such as Calcutta, Asansol, Cawnpore, Ahmedabad, Nagpore, etc. They are likely to occur with increasing frequency as the industrial development of the country progresses. They may be expected among postal, telegraph and railway employes, as well as among the operatives of mines, mills, workshops and dockyards. The creation of labour disputes offers a fine field of activity for the professional agitator, and the excitability of the people increases the probability of their resulting in riots requiring force for their suppression. Strikes among telegraph and railway subordinates are likely to be brought about with political objects, as most of them belong to the educated classes amongst whom the anti-British propaganda has made considerable progress. Men of these classes are fully aware of the inconvenience which a strike would cause, especially if it occurred either when mobilization was in progress or when internal disturbances necessitated considerable movements of troops. The Arya Samaj element is strongly represented on the staff of the railways which radiate from Delhi, and the Chitpavans are equally numerous on those of the lines which start from Bombay. The same may be said of the telegraph service, which, in Northern India, is largely composed of Arya Samajists, and in Western and Central India of Dekhani Brahmans. Both these classes are numerous in Government offices, where they are in a position to carry on an effective system of espionage, by which the leaders of the political societies to which they belong are supplied with early information as to the actions and intentions of Government.

Para. 135.

"All these conditions require the provision of military forces suitably situated to deal with them, while a very important requirement is indicated by the necessity for safeguarding the railway and other communications upon which depend the power of the military forces both to arm and supply themselves, and to be conveyed to the disturbed areas for the suppression of local risings which, if not dealt with at once, might spread and develop into serious rebellions.

Para. 136.

Railways.

"The railways of greatest importance from this point of view are:—

Para. 137.

- (i) The Great Indian Peninsula Railway from Bombay to Delhi.
- (ii) The Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway from Bombay to Muttra.
- (iii) The East Indian Railway from Calcutta to Ambala and in a less degree to Kalka.



- (iv) The North-Western Railway from Ambala to Lahore; from Delhi to Lahore *via* Bhatinda; from Lahore to Karachi; from Sukkur to Chaman; and from Samasata to Jand.
- (v) The Great Indian Peninsula Railway from Bombay to Raichur.
- (vi) The Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway from Raichur to Madras.

Para. 188.

"Lastly, the security of places important in themselves demands careful attention. Such places are capitals, such as Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Lahore and Patna; great defended ports, such as Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Rangoon, and Aden; military arsenals and factories, such as Rawal Pindi, Ferozepore, Quetta, Allahabad, Dum-Dum, Ishapore, Coonoor, and Jubbulpore; and points of great strategical importance among which Delhi, Allahabad and Quetta again appear, with the addition of Lucknow, Agra and Peshawar."

47. There has come about in recent years a great change in the attitude of the Natives towards the British in India, due to reasons which are quite natural, but which are possible sources of danger. The higher castes, whose ancestors held what was practically a monopoly of State appointments, resent the impartiality of the British Government towards all classes, and the limitations which our presence in the country imposes on their position and power.

Attitude of natives of India towards the ruling race.

Annexure II, page 498, Vol. II.  
309, 965, 1710,  
2603, 11360, 13235.

48. Education has made others dissatisfied with their lot, causing them to be both unable and unwilling to obtain a livelihood by means which satisfied their parents, and creating desires which either their caste rules, or their personal qualifications make it impossible to satisfy. The yearly increasing numbers who visit England and other Western countries for education, trade, etc., resent the social gulf which exists in India between Europeans and Natives, but which they had not experienced abroad.

Reasons for changes which have occurred in recent years.

49. The closer control exercised of late by the Secretary of State, and the greater facilities which now exist for Natives of India to obtain a sympathetic hearing at home for their alleged grievances, and the line taken by some Members of Parliament when dealing with matters affecting this country, have all tended to diminish the prestige of the Government of India in the eyes of the people, and their belief in the infallibility of its civil officers.

3700-3706,  
3720.  
1143.

50. The evidence given by Sir Henry McMahon indicates that a change has also come about in the relationship between some of the Ruling Chiefs and the Supreme Government. We believe this to be a natural result of the better system under which the Chiefs have been educated in recent years, in itself most desirable, and also to the frequent visits paid by these Chiefs to Europe, by the friendships they form there with influential people, and by the high social, almost Royal, position accorded to them out of India. The Chiefs, as a necessary consequence, are to-day under less control than formerly, and the importance of the position of the Political Agent has dwindled proportionately, with the result that the prestige of our "Raj" has been lowered in the eyes of the people of the Native States, who, being now less able to obtain redress readily through the mediation of the Political Officers, imagine that the British Government has lost in power. It may be noted that Mr. Brodrick in

Native States.

1904 and Lord (then Mr.) Morley in 1907, each considered that the Government of India had overrated the growth of loyalty in the Native States.

51. A failure to appreciate the principles of our Government has, amongst other causes, contributed to make some Native States and their Rulers think that Government control of the country is less strong than it was, and although we believe that the general loyalty of the Chiefs to the British Crown is unimpaired, we fear that their respect for, and their belief in, the strength and stability of the rule of the Government of India has in some cases weakened. 3708.

Irregular  
Forces of  
Native States.

52. So long as Regular Troops or Volunteers are available to oppose them we consider that the irregular troops of the Native States are not a formidable danger. But as they are armed with more or less serviceable arms, and as in some cases their artillery includes a battery of 9-pr. M. L. R. guns, with a supply of ammunition, we do not think it possible altogether to ignore these forces, since the civil police and the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts under our Government are practically unarmed.

422.  
Annexure page 91, Vol. II.  
1986, 2068, 2638, 2642,  
3125, 3631, 3666, 3676,  
4191, 5469.  
68, 94, 96, written evidence.  
Pages 1296-99, Vol. IV.

"Unrest" in  
1913.

53. As regards the condition of India to-day in respect to "unrest," the frequent cases of political dacoity by the "Bhadralog" of Bengal\*, of assassinations of police officers and of informers, the secrecy maintained as to the instigators and perpetrators of the murderous attack on the Viceroy in December 1912, and the posting up in Calcutta of notices publicly approving of this outrage, and otherwise showing an antipathy to our rule, all tend to show that the attitude of the extreme party towards Government is still dangerously hostile.

333, 412.  
927, 929.  
947, 953.  
959, 963.  
1159, 1167.  
2275, 2279.  
2603, 5409.  
8087, 11360.

Musalman  
feeling.

54. The recent war in Tripoli and the present war in Turkey have given rise to feelings amongst the Musalmans of India which are not favourable to our administration, and the annulment of the partition of Bengal has caused many Musalmans to consider whether it really pays to acquiesce quietly and loyally in the decrees of Government. On the other hand the satisfaction which the re-union of Eastern Bengal with the rest of the province excited in Bengal, has been discounted by the feeling that the transfer of the Capital of India from Bengal to Delhi has shorn the Bengal "Nation" of much of the political importance it had previously believed itself to possess.

339-343.  
350.  
1766, 1774.  
2217-2223.  
2299.  
4946.

Bengal feeling.

General  
situation.

55. Whilst the great majority of the inhabitants of the land have probably no pronounced feelings one way or the other, the educated classes are on the whole, if not actually disloyal, dissatisfied and far more inclined to criticise Government unfavourably than to acknowledge the many benefits it has conferred on them. Many of those who take a part in the public life of the country find that it adds to their importance, and that it is to their personal advantage to adopt a critical, if not an altogether unfriendly attitude towards the ruling power, rather than to profess and inculcate a spirit of loyalty. The facilities we have provided for inter-communication and intercourse have assisted to bring together those who desire to pose as "reformers" and "patriots."

309, 325, 2603.  
Annexure II, page 498, Vol. II.  
11360, 13235.

Education.

56. It is probable that, whilst the present situation may be attributed to "education," it will be in education

309, 325, 2281, 2603.  
Annexure II, page 498, Vol. II.  
11360, 13235.

\* Between 1906 and 1913, no less than 1,100 dacoities are said to have been committed in Bengal, and in only 150 cases have convictions been obtained.

that the remedy will be found, since genuine education cannot fail to be a source of strength to Government, when the training of the teachers and the instruction they afford to people, both morally and intellectually, is influenced and controlled by the State on sound lines, so that we may give to India what has enabled us to attain to the position we hold.

57. Whilst venturing to applaud the wisdom of the policy which has included Indians in the Councils of the country, and in giving to them a share in its government, we cannot but feel that risk would be involved in adding to the numbers who hold appointments as District officers. The people at large know Government chiefly by the officials with whom they are in touch, with whom rests the power and responsibility of maintaining order in time of danger. We believe it to be as much in the interests of the subject races, as for the stability of our rule in India, that the District officers who administer the country and who interpret to the people the intentions of the British Government should be drawn from the European members of the Indian Civil Service.

Indians as  
District officers.

6954, 6955 and paras. 9-11.  
Annexure II, Volume II, p.  
492-4.

58. But the position of a Government, alien to the people, must always depend on the power to enforce its laws, that is to say on the armed forces of the State, civil and military. In this connexion the reliability of the Police and of the Native army are both important factors. We have referred to the police in Section XXVII of this Report. As regards the Native army two questions call for some consideration, *viz*:—whether the relative homogeneity, as soldiers, of the Indian army of to-day which has been the natural consequence of the abolition of the Commands, has conduced to a community of interests inimical to the advantage of the State, and, secondly, to what extent was, and is, the Indian army affected by the wave of so called “unrest” which has passed over the land. And further, in regard to the latter point, was the action taken in connection with the unrest, as it affected the army in 1906-8, adequate and correct.

The power of  
Government.

Reliability of  
Police and  
Indian army.

59. As regards the first question, we do not consider that the relative homogeneity of the present day Native army has conduced to a community of interests to such an extent as to cause anxiety. In a class squadron or double-company regiment, although a community of interests exists which tends to foster *esprit de corps*, it is only apparent in the men's, so to speak, artificial life as soldiers of the British Raj. Being composed of men of different castes, religions, and perhaps provinces, the class squadrons and double-companies have but little in common; they live their own lives almost as much as if they were in separate regiments. They exist together on a peaceful, if not friendly, footing under the eye of the British officer, but when speaking of, or criticising one another in conversation with their officers, it is apparent that at heart each class has but little real appreciation for the others.

Homogeneity  
of the army.

11804.

2759, 5529, 5808, 5810,  
8773.

60. With reference to “unrest” in the army and its treatment, we have come to the following conclusions. Indians of all classes are easily moved. For centuries the Indian has regarded a Ruler as a hard task master if not almost an enemy. They are in consequence very apt to give credence to statements and rumours which are discreditable to Government. There are still very many who fail to understand why a Government should gratuitously go out of its way to do good

“Unrest” in  
the army.

to its subjects. As the methods adopted by Government are not always presented to the peasant in the form which Government intended, owing perhaps to the rascality, perhaps to the ignorance of subordinates, new ideas and new ways are regarded with a suspicion which sometimes amounts to resentment.

61. The sepoy belongs to the people. What stirs the people naturally moves him. But the sepoy, having been in much closer touch with Englishmen, and having seen so much more of the world and having got to appreciate, to some extent at least, the power and the desire for justice of the white man, more quickly recovers his senses than do many of his civil fellow countrymen. The sepoy in this respect can be compared to a useful and usually docile horse, which in a temporary panic may try to unseat his rider. Treated with firmness and kindness his confidence is easily restored. Treated with over-severity or timidity, man or animal may be ruined. Just as easily as one frightened horse may cause the horses of a whole regiment to stampede, so may sepoys be temporarily led astray. But it is probable that all who have not been killed or permanently injured in the outbreak will, when brought back, again do good work for their employer, be they horses or sepoys.

249, 367.

Sedition in the army.

62. We believe that the power of the Indian soldier for evil is reduced the further he is removed from the area inhabited by people of his own nationality, religion, or class, and the more frequently he is stationed in districts of which the inhabitants have little in common with him, even as to language.

184, 1292, 2818, 3041, 5711, 6624, 8697.

63. There are sections of the Indian army which undoubtedly have been affected by political and religious movements of the present day. In most cases the men themselves are probably in entire ignorance of the real motives which underlie apparently excellent objects, such as the revival of Sikhism, the education of Sikh women and the encouragement given to Sikh women to study Sikh scriptures, and to attend the services in the 'Gurdwaras.' Even British officers are not always alive to the danger to the British Raj, which is the intended ultimate aim of those who promote these revivals.

249-55, 343, 353, 410, 414, 996, 1087-1095, 1235, 1260, 1710, 1718, 1750, 2603, 2743-5, 2769-71, 3025, 3177, 4280, 4286, 5217, 5409-13, 5533, 5563, 5844, 6638, 7741, 10960, 11360, 11738.

13189.

64. In spite of the wave of disaffection which swept over the country in 1907, we have no information which leads us to believe that any portion of the Indian army showed an inclination to mutiny, although the Commander-in-Chief found it necessary to inform Government—

"that not only have persistent and determined attempts been made to tamper with the Native army, but that in the case of very numerous individuals and in some instances, even as regards units as a body, a large measure of success has been attained."

Difficult to obtain precise information or to secure a conviction.

65. Owing to the great difficulty in bringing home charges, so as to establish the seditious character of an offence, only one Indian soldier, a Sikh, was actually brought to trial—and although he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment with hard labour, it was on being convicted of the alternative charge of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.

66. Sir George Roos-Keppel and Sir James Willcocks informed the Committee of an incident during the Zakka Khel Expedition in 1908, which the former attributed to the regiment concerned being tainted. But this incident is susceptible of quite another interpretation, and it does not appear to have been reported to

368, 898, 900, 1740, 1782-4, 8092, 8093, 8107, 8765, 8775.

Annexure VIII, p. 623, Vol. III.

Army Headquarters as being a matter which called into question the honour and the loyalty of the men concerned.

67. The case of the 10th Jats, of which the Committee were informed in the replies quoted in the margin, is a good illustration of the possible dangers connected with a society like the Arya Samaj, which has for its ostensible aim the social and religious welfare of its members. It also shows how very difficult it is for the officers of a regiment to gauge the true importance, so far as their men are concerned, of such a society, and to know what action to take to safeguard them against its influences. It also exemplifies how unreasonable it is to rely upon Indian officers and men of a class regiment, enlisted mainly from one civil area, being willing to incur the risk involved by acting as informers, especially when it is apparent that the authorities may not believe them, owing to a want of sufficient knowledge to enable the insidious danger brought to notice to be justly appreciated. Further, it was another instance which shows how exceedingly difficult it is to bring home a charge of "sedition."

68. In connexion with the further question, should or should not more drastic steps have been taken, when it became apparent that the Indian army had become (more or less) affected by the spirit of so-called "unrest," which existed in 1906-08, two points have, we think, to be considered, *viz* :—

Sufficiency or otherwise of the steps taken in dealing with "unrest" in the army in 1906-08.

(a) That the Government of India were, and are, unable to take steps, openly, to suppress societies such as the Arya Samaj, the Friends of India, the Tat Khalsa and the like, while at first Government permitted public speakers very great latitude in their comments and criticisms.

(b) That it would have been a fatal mistake to institute proceedings for sedition and the like, unless there was a probability, amounting almost to a certainty, of convictions being secured and upheld on appeal. Nor would it have been right to punish Indian soldiers without trial, with the knowledge that the evidence available was not strong enough to justify trial.

69. With reference to (a), it was not desirable for the Commander-in-Chief or for the Viceroy to institute a policy in respect to suspects serving in the army, which could not be applied to the population at large, and which was not covered by the special laws under which the troops served. Nor was it easy for officers to convince their men that it was a crime for soldiers to attend a lecture given publicly and with the knowledge of the Civil authorities. Indeed, we have heard that when officers pointed out that it was wrong to join this or that society, or to attend such and such meetings, the question was invariably asked, how can such societies or meetings be harmful to the State, since Government permits them.

12139.

70. As to (b), it is public knowledge how great have been the difficulties experienced in obtaining convictions in the Civil Courts for sedition, or offences kindred to sedition, even when Government has employed the most skilful counsel available. There would have been no better prospect of securing convictions had Indian soldiers been placed on trial. An abortive trial, or a sentence reversed on appeal, would have done an infinite amount of harm.

Lord  
Kitchener's  
views.

71. Lord Kitchener considered that it was important that nothing should ever obtain publicity, which might advertise any want of confidence in the troops. Such publicity might have resulted in very materially lessening the value of the Native army to the State, and would obviously have played into the hands of those who desired to incite the sepoys against Government. Lord Kitchener's aims were designed to cure the evil by striking at the root. He urgently pressed on Government the necessity of taking steps to protect the army from the baneful influences by which the men were surrounded. It was due mainly to his representations to the Government of India, that the Secretary of State was induced to sanction an Act being passed to put a stop to meetings which were likely to promote sedition. Judging from results we are of opinion that the policy followed has justified itself, as being based on a correct appreciation of the situation.

1740, 4276.

72. Some doubt was expressed by a witness as to the action taken by the then Viceroy in withholding sanction to the Punjab Canal Colonies Bill, but we believe that events have proved it to have been wise, however it may have been mis-represented at the time to, or by, the people concerned.

251.

1662-64.

The effect  
produced by  
the defeat of  
Russia by  
Japan, and by  
the recent  
events in  
Tripoli, Turkey,  
etc.

73. The prolonged war in South Africa, and the defeat by the Japanese in Manchuria of the Russian Army, which had been regarded for so long as a serious menace to the safety of India, combined to cause the belief to grow that after all the European soldier may not be the superior of the Asiatic. We doubt if these ideas have been discounted by recent events in Tripoli and Morocco, or the present war in Turkey, because the only information regarding them which is credited by the natives of India is that which comes to them through the medium of the vernacular Press, which reproduces the reputed victories gained by Turkey, reported in Turkish and Egyptian newspapers. We think that the Pan-Islamic feelings which these events have aroused will need careful watching, and that the British officers of the Native army will have to exercise great care to protect their men from the undesirable, and not always patent influences of the Tat Khalsa, Arya Samaj and kindred movements.

273, 5844, 13235-9.

Pan-Islamism  
and religious  
movements.

74. Although we do not believe in a policy which subordinates the interests of the army at large, and therefore of the State, to the personal convenience and views of the native soldiers, we hold that in the long run it must be a real economy to treat the Indian ranks in a manner which will leave no doubt in their minds as to the advantages to be gained by being "faithful to their salt."

Conclusions.

75. We believe that, although the presence in India of Their Imperial Majesties the King and Queen in 1911-12 has given rise to a strong feeling of reverence and of loyalty to the Crown, the political situation still gives cause for watchful care. Speaking generally, we agree with the opinion expressed by the General Staff in 1911, that conditions both civil and military render some revision of the existing arrangements for internal security desirable, and we have put forward our proposals thereon, when dealing with the second Term of Reference.

1163, 1274.

2301, 3007.

7927, 7942.

12163.

50, 78, written evidence, Vol. IV.



## Section IV.—The External Situation.

76. The external circumstances which affect the size and duties of the army in India appear to us to be :—

The external situation.

(a) Our treaty obligations and imperial liabilities.

(b) The conditions on the North-West frontier, affecting Russia, Persia and the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and the independent tribes.

(c) The conditions on the North-East frontier, affecting Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan, China, and the independent tribes.

(d) The conditions on the East and South-Eastern frontier, including Annam and Siam.

(a) *Treaty obligations and imperial liabilities.*

Appendix I, Volume VI.

77. Our treaty obligations are summarised in a note prepared by the Chief of the General Staff from which the following extracts have been taken :—

Treaty obligations.

Para. 3.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The most important of our treaty obligations, as one which might involve us in military operations, is the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, revised in July 1911, by which we are bound to come to Japan's assistance in defence of her territorial rights or special interests in Eastern Asia in the event of unprovoked attack, or aggressive action against her by any Power or Powers with whom we have not concluded a treaty of general arbitration. This responsibility is a wide one, and it is hardly possible to discuss within the limits of this paper the conditions under which, and the means by which, the naval and military authorities of the High Contracting parties would arrange to make our assistance available. But unless the aggressive Power were either Russia or China, any assistance which India could render would be by means of an oversea expedition only. \* \* \* \*

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

\* \* \* \* \* But it has been thought desirable to point out here that the obligation exists, and its effect is that any serious reduction of our military forces in India *pro tanto* strengthens Japan's potential enemies in Eastern Asia, and, so far increases Japan's risk of being attacked and our liability to be called to her assistance. Japan may fairly disapprove such action on the part of her ally, while, if persisted in, it might tend to lessen the value of the alliance in her eyes.

Para. 4.

"Another important obligation is our compact with the Amir of Afghanistan. This agreement is somewhat vaguely worded; but the Committee of Imperial Defence considered, in 1907, that practically, so long as the Amir acts in his foreign relations in accordance with our wishes and advice, it binds us to assist him in maintaining the integrity of his dominions against external enemies. \* \* \* \*

Agreement with the Amir of Afghanistan.

Para. 5.

\* \* \* \* \*

"We have recently made a somewhat similar treaty with Bhutan by which we guarantee the integrity of that country so long as its ruler conducts his relations with foreign Powers in accordance with our wishes. Although we have no such treaty with Nepal, we have given her an assurance that we will support and protect her in the event of an unprovoked attack from any quarter. In the case of Kashmir we have definitely guaranteed its protection against external enemies, and its foreign relations are conducted by the Indian Government. All these obligations create a situation between us and China along the borders of these States, which may require military measures to discharge them. Moreover, it is understood that Nepal, Bhutan and the Sikkim States have all got special rights and privileges in Tibet which we have pledged ourselves to defend.

Treaty with Bhutan and understandings with Nepal, Kashmir and Sikkim.

Para. 6.

"The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 is a treaty equal in importance to our agreement with Japan. It closely affects the position in Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia at the present time. The object of this convention was to put an end to Anglo-Russian

Anglo-Russian Convention.

rivalries in these countries ; in Tibet both of the contracting parties desired to maintain the *status quo* but practically have retired in favour of China ; in Afghanistan, Russia acknowledged our exclusive political interests while maintaining her commercial ones ; in Persia each was given a definite sphere of influence with a neutral zone between the two spheres.

Arrangements  
with Chiefs in  
Arabia, etc.

"Outside India itself, but within the province of the Indian Government, besides the agreements above-mentioned, we have numerous treaties with Chiefs along the sea coast from Aden to Karachi, the most important of which are those with Muhammerah, Koweit and Maskat. All these treaties place the territories of these various Chiefs more or less under our protection against aggression by foreign Powers, in return for certain action on their part as regards their foreign relations. All these engagements make demands on the army in India from time to time, which hitherto, however, have not been of a serious nature."

Para. 7.

Imperial  
liabilities.

78. As regards India's imperial liabilities, we have no definite data to guide us, either as to their nature, or their extent. But it may reasonably be presumed that, should the Empire be at war under circumstances which involved military operations in China (or elsewhere in the further East), or which necessitated military action in the Eastern Provinces of Asia Minor, or in Persia, or required a reinforcement of the Army of Occupation in Egypt, the Indian Government would be called upon to provide a large portion, if not the whole, of the troops.

79. We are of the opinion that whilst such demands are a liability which must be taken into account, and while the Indian army should be so organized and equipped as to be capable of meeting them, without denuding India of troops to a dangerous extent, it is not necessary to take them into account to the extent of providing an army of greater strength than is sufficient for the requirements of India itself.

(b) *The North-West frontier, including Russia, Persia, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and the independent tribes.*

The N.-W.  
frontier.

80. We have already mentioned, in paragraph 17 of this Report, that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 very materially altered the military conditions which Lord Kitchener's proposals had been framed to meet.

81. In a despatch, No. 50, dated the 20th March 1908, Lord Morley in reviewing the new situation, made the following remarks :—

Pros. B., July 1908, Nos. 2006-08.

\* \* \* \* \*

"8. They (His Majesty's Government) do not ignore new risks in the political situation of India. Nor are they unaware that the conclusion of a Convention does not of itself justify—and has never been regarded by even the most pacific Powers as justifying—the abandonment of precautions that are necessary to ensure its observance. Risks, however, are not to be overstated. Nor is it possible for any Government to prepare against every hypothetical contingency that may be conjured up by vivid and ingenious imagination. \* \* \* \* \*

"As for Afghanistan, the Convention has in no sense extended what were already, in fact, our virtual responsibilities ; and it is reasonable to suppose that the Convention would make the Amir much more rather than less cautious about quarrelling with either of the two great military Powers between which his kingdom lies. \* \* \* \* \*

"10. \* \* \* I venture in a sentence to invite Your Excellency's consideration of what is undoubtedly a fundamental principle of military policy in India, namely, that in the event of an assault upon India the whole strength of the British Empire by land and sea would be exerted to repel it. Upon this reserve of force the defence of India must ultimately and inevitably depend.



It is conceivable, indeed, that we might lose command of our communication by sea, but if that catastrophe should overtake us, it would endanger interests even more vital to national power than the most imposing of our transmarine possessions. Assuming the stability of our national strength in all its elements and dimensions, we are justified in leaning upon that, instead of burdening the revenues of India with the enormous cost of an excessive military force."

82. Lord Morley concluded by asking the Government of India to consider whether it was necessary to add, to the Indian establishment, the additional units which had been contemplated in Lord Kitchener's scheme; and, with reference to the distribution of troops in the divisional areas, "to consider whether, by some alterations in the boundaries of the areas, it may not be possible, without dislocating the divisional organization, to provide at much less cost for placing a suitable number of troops under each divisional General, so distributed as to allow of combined training and reasonably rapid mobilization."

Pros. B., July 1908, Nos. 2006-08.

83. The Government of India replied to this in a despatch of the 2nd July 1908, No. 65, from which we quote the following remarks.

Views of the Government of India on the situation in 1908.

"3. India does not maintain and has never aspired to create an army capable of carrying through a campaign against Russia. We have always recognized what Your Lordship lays down in paragraph 10 of your despatch, as 'a fundamental principle of military policy in India, namely, that in the event of an assault upon India the whole strength of the British Empire by land and sea would be exerted to repel it. Upon this reserve of force the defence of India must ultimately and inevitably depend.' In accordance with this principle we have always confined our aims to the provision of an army capable of preserving internal order in India itself, of meeting any trouble which may arise on the border whether from the frontier tribes or from Afghanistan, of warding off an assault by Russia during the period that must elapse before the resources of the Empire can be brought to our assistance, and of forming, in virtue of its local experience and knowledge of the theatre of war, a substantial and effective nucleus on which reinforcements can be engrafted as they arrive. Whatever benefits may be derived from the conclusion of the Convention, we must still remain in a position to ensure internal tranquillity and to repel rapidly and effectively incursions across our border. There remains then only the question whether we should be justified in depriving ourselves of the ability to ward off a possible attack by Russia until the Empire at large can come to our assistance. We believe that there can be but one answer to this question, and that to divest ourselves of this limited power of self-protection would be to treat the Convention as in itself justifying the abandonment of the precautions necessary to secure its observance—a course which Your Lordship's despatch justly deprecates."

84. The Government of India added that—

"5. We must, however, demur to the supposition that the conclusion of the Convention has decreased the risk of a quarrel being forced on us by Afghanistan.

"6. The garrisons laid down as necessary in time of war must, however, be regarded as tentative only. They were fixed at a time when India appeared tranquil and contented, and represent the minimum necessary under those conditions. Were war to break out during a period of unrest in India these garrisons would have to be increased to an extent which cannot be precisely indicated, since it would depend on circumstances impossible to predict. To provide these increased garrisons the troops available for the Field Army would have to be correspondingly reduced, and this consideration has an important bearing on the question whether the total force we maintain is capable of reduction."

"10. We believe that, without reducing the army and without abandoning the intention eventually to complete its organization for war, it may be possible without undue risk to meet your wishes to a very considerable extent. In view of our improved

Government of India averse to any reduction of the army, but prepared to agree to the postponement of certain reorganization measures.

relations with Russia the steps necessary to complete our organization may, in our opinion, now be carried into effect more slowly and deliberately than has hitherto been contemplated. We are therefore prepared to agree to a material extension of the period within which it was originally intended to complete the programme; to surrender the Special grant; and to forego the regrant of lapses."

85. Again, in a despatch of the 2nd September 1909, No. 105, the Government of India, in observing that, for the present, it had been decided not to add to the army the additional units desired by Lord Kitchener, made the following remarks.

Pros. B., October 1909, Nos. 2061-63.

\* \* \* \* \*

"4. The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention having, as we hope, decreased the presumption of war with Russia, the enemies whom we must, for the present, be prepared to face are more likely to be Asiatics than Europeans. For obvious financial reasons we should endeavour, if possible, to carry through a war against an Asiatic enemy without calling on England, or the Empire, to assist us with troops; and therefore, in addition to the difference in our ostensible enemy, the power of absorbing reinforcements without dislocation of our formations becomes a matter of lesser importance. These two considerations made it possible for us to prepare an alternative plan for the mobilization of our Field Army in which mixed brigades consisting partly of British and partly of Native troops are substituted for the homogeneous British and Native brigades intended for use in a struggle with a European adversary. The result of this arrangement is that each division then contains one battalion of British infantry less and one battalion of Indian infantry more than under the alternative system and enables us not only to mobilize our full nine divisions as regards infantry without reckoning on the three British battalions, the addition of which to the army in India has been postponed, but also increases the number of British battalions allotted to internal defence by six—an addition which under certain circumstances might be most important. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

"7. From this explanation Your Lordship will see that the temporary deficiency of the few units referred to in no way prevents our mobilizing nine effective field divisions, whilst providing adequately for the internal security of the country; and we have no hesitation in affirming that in our opinion nine divisions is the minimum force which we should be ready to place in the field, and that the reserve of stores and animals to be maintained should be such as will admit of our doing so without undue delay. Setting all question of Russia on one side for the moment, there are, as Your Lordship is aware, other and growing dangers of considerable magnitude of which it is incumbent on us to take cognizance and which we must be prepared to meet. In the case of the tribal territory within the Durand Line, the information at our disposal impresses us more and more with the serious nature of the situation which is being created by the large and growing traffic which is being carried on in arms imported from the Persian Gulf. The fighting strength of these tribes is now about 334,000 men, and, in addition to the modern arms which they possessed in 1897, and those which they acquired between that year and 1906, Sir George Roos-Keppel estimates that 90,000 modern rifles have been obtained by these tribes in the last three years; in his opinion the tribesmen are perhaps ten times better armed today than they were at the date of the last great rising in 1897-98. Moreover, he tells us that 'communication between them is increasing, and it is quite on the cards that if one tribe goes we shall have a general rising again.'

"8. Nor is the situation in Afghanistan one which we can view with equanimity. The present Amir has reversed the policy of his father in regard to the arming of his subjects. Not only did the Amir Abdur Rahman forcibly disarm large communities, but he strongly discouraged the acquisition of modern rifles by the remainder of his subjects. He did not even issue efficient weapons to his regular troops, but preferred to leave them stored in his arsenals. The Amir Habibullah, on the contrary, directly supports and encourages the arms traffic, even to the extent of financing it to large amounts. He causes it to be made known, far and wide,

that arms are procurable at Kabul and at other points in his dominions such as Jalalabad, that he wishes not merely his own subjects but also the tribes within our sphere to purchase them, and that, where necessary, loans will be given to individuals to enable them to supply themselves with rifles. These features of Afghan policy are significant. The Amir cannot fail to recognize that the general armament of his subjects gravely increases the danger of internal rebellion against his authority, but he deliberately accepts that risk in order that not his own subjects merely, but also the tribes within our borders, may be available in the event of a rupture with us.

"9. Your Lordship will remember the critical situation which arose only last year and continued throughout the summer of 1908; and, though, since that time, conditions have improved, there are many symptoms which indicate that war with Afghanistan—however earnestly we may seek to avoid it—is a possibility which we cannot lose sight of, or neglect in our calculations. And in this connection it is useless to close our eyes to the fact that, once the cry of *jihad* was raised, the great majority, if not the whole, of the border tribes, over whom we have little effective control, would probably throw in their lot against us. Remembering that during the frontier disturbances of 1897-98 it was found necessary to mobilize nearly 70,000 troops, and making due allowance for the enormous accession of strength which has recently been acquired both by them and by the Afghans owing to the arms traffic through the Gulf, we feel compelled to place before Your Lordship our deliberate and considered opinion that a force of nine divisions fully equipped and ready to take the field is essential to the security of India, and that we could not accept without grave protest a reduction to a seven division standard."

Pros. B., May 1910, Nos. 1679-80.

86. In a despatch, No. 133, of the 19th November 1909, the Secretary of State accepted the elimination of the additional units and the stores required for them, and, as we have already mentioned in paragraph 18 of this Report, he approved of the modified composition of the Field Army proposed. Lord Morley also directed that no further steps should be taken in regard to the railway extensions up the Kurram and Kabul River Valleys, to the completion of which Lord Kitchener had attributed so much importance.

87. The organization of the troops allotted for the internal defence of India and its frontiers, still remains as proposed in the Kitchener scheme, subject to such modifications as have been indicated. It was not until October 1911 that the question of revising that scheme, with reference to the changed political situation, was raised by the Government of India, in the despatch of October 1911 which led to the appointment of the present Committee.

Revision of frontier defence arrangements.

3197, 3201, 3219, 3221,  
3243, 3245, 3255, 3269,  
3279, 3285, 5403.

88. In regard to the Anglo-Russian Convention, we consider that it will naturally hold good so long as it suits the policy of both parties, but if the interests represented in those policies tend to diverge, we doubt whether it will exercise much restraining influence. The understanding has, for the time, transferred Indian military attention from the Oxus to Northern Persia—it is equally convenient to both parties as giving breathing space or time for precautionary preparations—and we believe that this period will be prolonged in proportion to the advantage we are known to have taken of it. At the same time, although we see no present danger of its being terminated, we ought not, in considering our relations with Russia, to ignore the fact that the political kaleidoscope may change, and that our old, more or less unfriendly, relations may at some future time be resumed, a state of things which might be hastened by any material reduction in our armed strength.

The Anglo-Russian Convention.

Anglo-Japanese  
Treaty.

89. It appears to us that our Alliance with Japan is, to a certain extent, discounted by an uncertainty as to how she will interpret her obligations to assist us, should Russia have a quarrel with the independent kingdom of Afghanistan, or should Russian activities in the future force us to be the first to take action. The fact also, that a community of interests in North China and the adjacent territories have tended to a friendly understanding between Russia and Japan may cause Japan's inclinations in the near future to run counter to our interests. We have yet to discover what underlies the carefully concealed interest which Japan is taking at the present moment in the internal affairs of India and Burma.

3197, 3231-57, 3287, 3291,  
3295.

Treaty  
obligations  
affect the  
strength of the  
army in India.

90. As in the case of our convention with Russia, the value which Japan places on her treaty with us must be materially affected by the strength and efficiency of the army in India. She might reasonably complain were India, by a reduction in the present strength of her Field Army, to invite the attack, which would require Japan to act up to her treaty obligations.

91. While we consider that both the Anglo-Russian Convention and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty have proved, and are likely to prove of much value, we feel that so far as India is concerned, there is some risk that the latter may turn out to be of moral, rather than of material utility, unless, at the time when we ask that its terms shall be fulfilled, Japan has, for her own interests, a ground for quarrel with Russia; while the value of our agreement with Russia lies more in the time it gives us to put our house in order, than in any permanent security it affords, as was indicated in Lord Morley's despatch of March 1908, from which we have quoted. Whilst we realize that it is not necessary to maintain war organizations with reference to all possible future contingencies, and that these organizations must be suited to the existing external and internal situation, we feel that they ought to be capable of adaptation to meet changing conditions, and we regard it as our proper policy to maintain a fully equipped Field Army competent to deal with present probable dangers, and so constituted that we can expand it, if necessary, should these dangers increase.

3219, 3279, 5403.

Persia.

92. The circumstances which may arise in Persia to require the despatch of troops from India are :—

(a) Internal disorder of so serious a nature as to endanger the lives of European officials and subjects, and to force interference by a foreign power.

(b) A condition of affairs in Persia, which makes partition of the country between ourselves and one or more other European powers practically unavoidable.

93. The first case has almost arisen. The Indian Government has already this year had to contemplate the possible despatch of one division to Southern Persia. The fact cannot be disguised that the condition of the country is so bad, and that the probability of improvement is so slender, that we may be forced to send a strong force to Southern Persia in the near future. The experience which the Russians have had in the north, and our own with the Central India Horse at Shiraz, show that, when once troops have entered Persia to restore and maintain order or to protect officials, it is most difficult to recall them.

3243-45-47, 3257, 3261.

3219, 3221, 3225, 3257, 3688,  
6928 and para. 8 of Bo. Gov.  
letter No. 212 of 1912, p. 492,  
Vol. II.

94. We are doubtful as to the effect on India of a partition of Persia. It would certainly be viewed with disfavour by the Muhammadans of our Empire (many of whom might, on the contrary, approve of our annexing the whole country). It might easily prove an inconvenient drain on the military resources of India whilst a civil administration was in course of formation, and before local levies and police were raised and trained for its support, demanding the presence in the country of probably at least two divisions for a period which it is not possible to estimate; but we are inclined to believe that the advantages of having a settled frontier with a European power would on the whole outweigh its disadvantages, and the existence of such a frontier would at least constitute a line of demarcation, any deliberate infringement of which would be tantamount to a declaration of war.

The possible  
effects of a  
partition of  
Persia.

95. We have now to refer to the question of Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the independent tribes on the North-West frontier of India.

Afghanistan,  
Baluchistan  
and the tribes.

3213, 3387, 3425, 3487,  
3515, 3539, 3545.

96. It can, we think, be safely accepted that while the present Amir is alive and in power, there is no likelihood of Afghanistan intriguing with Russia against us, and that His Majesty will not break his faith with us, so long as he has no good cause to imagine that we have broken faith with him. Sir Henry McMahon has told us that the Anglo-Russian Convention put for a time a severe strain on our relations with the Amir, and caused much ill-feeling in Afghanistan: but that, in the long run the Convention has but little affected our relations, and that there is no reason to anticipate that the Amir may be deposed, or that the Afghan Kingdom may break up. He also said that the anti-foreign feeling in Afghanistan is less than it was thirty years ago (although it has been fostered and encouraged), and our present relations with the independent tribes are on the whole satisfactory; but that it is impossible to say how long this state of affairs may last, whilst the possibility of a large and general combination of the frontier tribes against us is a contingency that must always be recognized. Sir Henry McMahon also told us that the Amir, as head of the only Muhammadan independent power in the world, except Turkey, holds a very important place in Muhammadan eyes; and that a *jihad* emanating from him would, apart from its novelty, which in itself would appeal to public imagination, arouse not only the border tribes, but disturb the Muhammadans of the whole of India. In the event of a war with Afghanistan, it is Sir Henry McMahon's belief that we must expect to have against us all the frontier tribes, who have been instilled by Sardar Nasrulla Khan with a national spirit, by stirring up their fanaticism and teaching them that their interests and those of Afghanistan are one; whilst, on the other hand, should we be engaged with the tribes, we may rely on their receiving sympathy and material assistance from the Afghans, although the Afghan Government will avoid aiding them openly.

The  
independent  
tribes on the  
North-West  
frontier.

3515.

3545.

4776.

4908, 4918.

97. Sir George Roos-Keppel told us that while our relations with the tribes had improved of late years, and were on the whole friendly, and while he saw no present likelihood of a general combination against us, still, were any important tribe to rise and prolonged operations against it to be necessary, the fire would doubtless spread. The most important tribes in his opinion are the Swatis,

Afridis and the Wazirs, the last obviously hostile to us at present, the first-named fanatical, priest-ridden and extraordinarily inflammable. "At any time out of a blue sky, with little or no warning, we might hear of an attack upon Chakdara, the Malakand, or the Chitral reliefs." Sir G. Roos-Keppel added that the Afridis were shrewd and selfish, and only likely to rise if they had a real grievance.

3545, 4776, 4918, 4908,  
4928, 4930, 4944, 4982,  
5026, 5042, 5113, 5131,  
5141, 5543.

The present  
situation as  
regards  
Afghanistan.

98. For the present the situation, therefore, appears to depend on our being able to maintain friendly relations with His Majesty the Amir, and while we are not at all likely to take, of our own initiative, any action which would disturb such relations, yet some risk is involved in the power which the Anglo-Russian Agreement gives Russia, should she ever wish to do so, to force our hands, by making us press on the Afghan Government action which might be unpalatable to them, cause our motives to be misunderstood, cast doubt on our good faith and even seriously impair our prestige; as a result of which Afghanistan might be tempted to vent her ill-feeling against us in such a manner that we would be bound to retaliate.

Pan-Islamism.

99. The effect of the Pan-Islamic movement, and of the belief which many Musalmans hold that the Christian nations are today making common cause against the Muhammadan world, cannot be ignored in any consideration of our dealings with Afghanistan and the independent tribes, with whom a war would undoubtedly be given a religious colouring, and it is not easy to judge what its effect would be on the Muhammadans of India, both in and out of the army.

2217, 2223, 3197, 3682,  
4286, 4292, 4300, 4946,  
5543.

100. It is a curious fact, even if it be no more than a coincidence, that, on at least two previous occasions, when Turkey has been engaged in war in Europe, frontier troubles on a large scale have occurred after a short interval. Whether Turkey's troubles have been the cause or not, this circumstance is one which deserves to be borne in mind, more especially as the state of affairs in Southern Persia is such that we might at any moment be forced to send an expedition into that country. The very despatch of such an expedition might start the conflagration.

101. There is good reason to believe, that the upheaval in 1897 was in no small measure due to "the mischievous advantage taken of the Græco-Turkish War by the religious classes of the frontier, Afghanistan and elsewhere, to stir up the feelings of the ignorant and bigoted Muhammadans of the border."\* If so small a cause led to such results, what might we not expect, in the event of our having to go to war with Afghanistan, should the word go forth that Great Britain was aiming at the extermination of the last of the great Muhammadan powers in Asia?

3557.

Baluchistan.

102. There is no reason to anticipate any trouble in Baluchistan, or that the inhabitants of that province will join in any combination against us, so long as we continue to maintain order, and to secure to them the benefits they now enjoy.

103. We are referring in Section VIII to the question of the military strength of Afghanistan and the tribes, when considering the force which we consider to be

\* Note by Sir H. McMahon, dated September 1907, on the probable attitude of the Frontier Tribes and of Afghanistan in the event of an attempted invasion of India by Russia.



necessary to deal with the problem of a war against the two in combination.

2549, 2563, 3515, 3545,  
4778, 4884, 4918.

104. Our conclusion is that a war between ourselves and Afghanistan, in combination with the independent frontier tribes, is a contingency, the possibility of which, even though not imminent, must, as Sir Henry McMahon said, always be recognized, and which, like the rising in Swat in 1897, "might come about with a suddenness that surprises the tribes themselves, almost as much as it surprises us." "The people in lower Swat in 1897 had no knowledge in the morning of the likelihood of a rising that afternoon."

Conclusions.

(c) *The North-East frontier, including Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan, China and Siam.*

The N.-E.  
frontier.

3579.

105. The Committee have been told by Sir Henry McMahon that, when the occupation of Tibet re-opened the question of the status of Nepal, that Darbar was informed "that the British Government will support and protect Nepal in the event of an unprovoked attack from any quarter and that \* \* \* \* \*

Nepal.

\* \* \* His Majesty's Government will not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected, or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet."

3579.

103. In 1910, China was advised by His Majesty's Government that no administrative changes in Tibet would be allowed to affect, or prejudice the integrity of Nepal, and that they were prepared to protect the interests and rights of that State; to which China replied that Nepal was her vassal. The position, therefore, as it now stands, is "one of *de facto* although not *de jure* suzerainty to us, tacitly (never openly) acknowledged by Nepal, but denied by China."

Nepal and  
China.

3595.

107. Nepal hopes to obtain compensation from China for the losses sustained by the overthrow of the *status quo* in Tibet prior to 1903, but the recent revolution in China, and the withdrawal of the Chinese from Tibet, has for the present removed the risk of a conflict between Nepal and China.

3609.

108. As regards the relations of the Nepal Darbar towards the Government of India, we fully concur in the opinion expressed by Sir Henry McMahon that we have no more loyal or obliging friend.

The loyal  
friendship  
of Nepal.

3621, 3627.

109. Whilst China still claims Nepal and Bhutan as vassal States, she has admitted that Sikkim is by treaty under the protection of Great Britain. Until a more stable and powerful Government is formed in China, we need not anticipate any trouble in Bhutan. But as regards Tibet, we believe that it is quite likely that China will again attempt to assert her supremacy, whether at the instance of the Central Government, or merely on the initiative of the semi-independent Governor of Szechuan. The course of events in Tibet will need careful watching.

Bhutan, Sikkim  
and Tibet.

(d) *East and South-East frontiers, including Annam and Siam.*

3623.

110. On the Eastern borders of Assam and Burma, China has shown an inclination to occupy territory within what we have regarded as our spheres of influence. In former years aggression on the part of China would have been dealt with by our fleet in the China seas. But the position is now changed, owing to the present central Government being unable to exert its influence throughout the Empire. We anticipate no organized

The Eastern  
frontier,  
Assam and  
Burma.

action against us by the Chinese Government, but until this Government is firmly established, we must be as prepared to safeguard our border in Assam and Burma from open or insidious encroachments, as we are on the North-West frontier and elsewhere. At present the provincial authorities of Yunnan and Szechuan take little notice of orders from Peking. And within the last month or two, armed bands of Chinese soldiers are known to have been moving several marches inside the frontier we claim, and have come into collision with our military police more than once.

South-East  
frontier, Siam.

111. Our understanding with France has happily removed the risk of danger in the South-East, where our frontiers march with those of French and Siamese territory. Although the Government of Siam is taking measures to increase and improve their army, we see no element of present danger in it.

Conclusions  
in regard to  
the External  
Situation.

112. The conclusions we have arrived at, on the general question of the External Situation, are:—

- (a) That the Anglo-Russian Agreement has, for the present, removed the danger of war with Russia, and that friendly relations will hold good so long as our interests admit of our accepting Russia's policy, and she requires our support elsewhere.
- (b) That the Treaty with Japan, as worded, makes its actual value to India open to some doubt, should it ever be to Japan's interest, under conceivable conditions, to question it.
- (c) That unless untoward circumstances compel us to bring pressure on Afghanistan, in regard to their dealings with Russia, the present Amir will loyally endeavour to act up to his treaty agreements with the British Government.
- (d) That it will be unwise to determine our military strength in India on the assumption that friendly relations with Russia or Afghanistan must necessarily be permanent.
- (e) That the greatest danger to be more immediately prepared for is a war against the Amir of Afghanistan in combination with the frontier tribes, at a time when the internal political condition of India was such as to cause anxiety.
- (f) That Imperial requirements may cause a demand to be made on India, which could not be refused, for troops (possibly as much as two divisions), for service in Persia, or Turkish Arabia—to mention only places within India's sphere of action.
- (g) That while India should not maintain troops expressly for the purpose of meeting Imperial requirements, yet the fact that such calls may be made must be borne in mind, when the strength necessary for India's Field Army is being considered.

113. We have no wish to over-estimate our liabilities or our dangers, and we do not regard any of the latter as beyond our resources to deal with, but, on the other hand, we entertain no doubt that they do exist and demand watchful care.



## PART III.

## SECOND TERM OF REFERENCE.

114. In dealing with the Second Term of Reference, which is as follows:—

*“To consider and report on the numbers and constitution of the armed force which should be maintained in India to meet these obligations”*

we have arranged our recommendations under certain heads for convenience of consideration.

### Section V.—The armed forces now maintained in India.

115. The following statement shows the distribution of the present strength of the regular army, as between staff, cavalry, artillery, engineers and infantry.

Strength by arms of the service.

## ESTABLISHMENTS FOR 1912-13.

Detail.	BRITISH ARMY IN INDIA.		Indian ranks.	INDIAN ARMY (INCLUDING BODY-GUARDS AND NEPAL ESCORT.)		Indian ranks.	Remarks.
	British.			British.			
	Officers.	Other ranks.		Officers.	Other ranks.		
Staff (a) ...	(b) 411	421	...	...	...	21	(a) Includes— The personal staffs of the Governor-General, Governors and Lieutenant-Governors. Recruiting staff. Veterinary Inspection. Staff College. Inspectors of British Army Schools. Musketry Instruction. Gymnastic Instruction. Army Signalling School. Cavalry School. School of Cookery. Lawrence Military Asylum. Officers studying in Japan.
Cavalry ...	243	5,373	...	(c) 552	...	(c) 24,586	
Artillery (including Brigade Staff).	580	15,163	6,122	68	...	4,149	
Sappers and Miners ...	...	...	...	86	344	5,154	
Infantry ...	1,456	52,186	...	(d) 1,879	...	120,078	
Totals ...	2,690	73,143	6,122	2,585	344	153,988	
Officers of the Unattached List of the Indian Army and unemployed officers below General's rank.	96	...	...	...	...	...	
Hill Sanatoria and Depôts ...	13	20	...	...	...	...	
GRAND TOTALS ...	2,799	73,163	6,122	2,585	344	153,988	(b) Includes officers of both British and Indian armies. (c) Excludes Deoli and Erinpura Squadrons. (d) Includes 13 officers each for the 42nd and 43rd regiments.

We desire here to record our considered opinion, that no reduction, either in British units of the army in India, or in British officers and men, is compatible with the maintenance of the security and tranquillity of the country, unless accompanied by counterbalancing increases in other British units, or personnel. Our recommendations which follow have been made upon this basis.

No reduction in British personnel.

Allotment of units on mobilization before and after reliefs, 1912-13.

116 Under existing arrangements, the regular troops allotted to internal security, excluding the depôts of Field Army units (which however add considerably to the forces within the country available to preserve order) and reservists, amount to about 82,000 men, including 17 batteries of horse, field and mountain artillery, besides the mobile guns of defences in the hands of garrison artillery. The regular troops allotted to the Field Army number about 128,000 men, including 65 batteries of horse, field, mountain and heavy artillery, and exclusive of some 24,000 men remaining at the depôts to be drawn upon for various duties as required.

Departmental Services.

117. Outside the regular troops of the several arms, the principal military departments, namely, Medical, Ordnance, Supply and Transport, and Military Works Services, give us a strength of:—

Detail.	BRITISH.		Indian Ranks.	Attested Followers.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Other Ranks.			
Medical Department ...	(a) 606	(b) 424	(c) 740	5,462	(a) Excludes 452 in Civil employ.
Ordnance Department ...	(d) 105	312	...	1,265	(b) Excludes 282 in Civil employ.
„ (seconded) ...	(d) 9	92	...	...	(c) Excludes 131 in Civil employ.
Supply and Transport Corps ...	(d) 254	530	(e) 3,063	(e) 19,683	(d) Includes commissioned officers with honorary rank.
Military Works Department ...	(f, g) 161	(h) 213	(i) 197	...	(e) In the case of the Supply Department the proportion of Indian ranks and followers is approximate, though the total of the two together is correct.
Total ...	1,135	1,571	4,000	26,410	(f) Excludes 146 officers and 14 non-commissioned officers in civil employ.
Military Accounts Department ...	43	...	...	...	(g) Includes 1 civilian.
Dairy Farms ...	2	33	...	...	(h) Includes 6 civilian upper subordinates.
Army Clothing Department ...	6	18	...	...	(i) Includes 185 civilian subordinates.
Army Remount Department ...	28	23	8	...	
Veterinary Services ...	49	24	...	...	
Cantonment Magistrates' Department.	47	...	2	...	
GRAND TOTALS ...	1,310	1,669	4,010	26,410	

Reservists, and non-regular forces.

118. In addition to the above regular troops there are:—

- (a) Reservists—establishment for 1912-13 ... 34,600
- (b) Volunteers—about ... 40,000
- (c) Imperial Service Troops—about ... 22,000
- (d) Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, numbering in all about ... 34,000
- (e) Civil Police, about 187,000 of whom about one-third have arms, generally of an obsolete description.

Of the Imperial Service Troops, about 3,500 belong to Kashmir and are detailed to the defence of that State. The remainder are available for the Field Army, including some 3,000 at present reported to be more or less unfit for field service.

## Section VI.—Command and Administration of the Army in India, outside Army Headquarters.

119. At the present time, the command and administration of the army in India are carried on by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in his dual capacities as Commander-in-Chief and Army Member, through the staff at Army Headquarters and in the Army Department, and through the General Officers Commanding divisions and independent brigades. Standing somewhat outside the direct line of this chain of control, though exercising certain powers of command and administration in connection with it, the two General Officers Commanding armies are responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the inspection of the troops and for the supervision of their training, within the areas of their respective commands.

Chain of command of the army in India.

120. We propose to discuss the organization and duties of the Branches of Army Headquarters, and their relations to the Army Department, at a later stage in this Report, and for the present confine ourselves to the subject of the command and administration of armies and divisional areas, omitting the independent brigades, which are administered on practically the same system as the last named.

121. We do not recommend any change in the position, or the present duties and responsibilities, of the General Officers Commanding the Northern and Southern armies. With some knowledge of the work they have to carry out, we are satisfied that there is amply sufficient to keep the most energetic officer fully employed. They perform valuable functions in inspecting and instructing the troops under their command, in supervising their training so as to keep it upon the prescribed lines, and in assisting the Commander-in-Chief to form his conclusions upon the merits and capabilities of commanders and senior officers.

The Northern and Southern Army Commands.

122. From the views which we have expressed in Part I, paragraphs 38-43, it will be seen that we hold that the divisional system of command and administration, introduced by Lord Kitchener, marked a decided advance upon the Command system (under the conditions then obtaining) which it superseded. As regards the duties of command, it has given General Officers an opportunity of getting into close contact with the troops whom they will lead in war, and of practising themselves in the art of handling organized bodies of troops, in fact of studying man-mastership and leadership, in a way that was hardly possible to them before.

The Divisional System.

As regards peace administration, we consider that it is, in all essentials, a satisfactory working system at present, and is readily capable of being made even more so; *e.g.*, by bringing divisional commanders in closer touch with finance through their Deputy Controllers; and by making better provision for the command and administration of internal security areas after the departure of the Field Army.

123. We therefore recommend the retention of the existing divisional system of command and administration, and of the present number of divisional areas, which contain as many troops and are quite as extensive as a single officer can properly control. The strengthening of the financial side of the divisional commander's administration was touched upon in Mr. Brunyate's examination, and is, we understand now

4632.  
5713.  
5723.  
5729.  
5864.  
  
5304-9.

3769.

5303.  
5315.  
5729.

4632.  
5315.

6150.  
6165.

6138.  
6150-63.

under consideration. We need not therefore refer to it further than to say, that the closer the touch between those commanders and their financial advisers the better for economy of administration and efficiency.

Command of  
internal  
security troops.

124. Turning now to the question of internal security or defence areas, we feel that the command and administration of the troops left behind in India, at a time when the whole of the Field Army is concentrated on or beyond the North-West frontier, requires especial consideration. These troops would consist of (a) occupation or internal security troops, (b) dépôt troops of units on field service, (c) reservists, whether of troops in the field or of occupation troops, who would be attached for training to dépôts or to occupation units, (d) possibly also dépôts of occupation troops.

The command and administration of this body of troops, amounting to over 100,000 men, besides families and followers, is an important matter. Lord Kitchener, in paragraph 38 of the Redistribution Scheme, proposed that there should be, for each of the defence areas into which the country was to be divided, a Colonel on the Staff, whose duties should be to command the troops detailed for the defence of the area, and, in communication with the civil authorities, to work out in peace all arrangements for its defence. On mobilization he was to receive the rank of Brigadier and be in command of the area.

M. D. Pro B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

125. In paragraph 14 of his Memorandum on the Preparation of the Army in India for War, he said that, in addition to the then existing 4 Lieutenant-Generals, and the staffs for the three Army Corps and Burma, Brigadiers would be required for each of the 17 internal defence areas except Assam, and for Burma, Aden, Bombay and Karachi (Colonel on the Staff), in order to provide for the requirements of internal defence and general administration. It would appear from the noting, however, that the abolition of the Command system and its replacement by the Divisional system was apparently under consideration even at that time, though it was not until 1907 that it was carried out. The General Officers Commanding Northern and Southern armies were then appointed, and designated to command the Northern and Southern lines of advance respectively, in the event of war with Russia in Afghanistan, and all the divisional commanders, except the General Officer Commanding in Burma, were required to command divisions in the field.

M. D. Pro. B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

M. D. Pro. A., September 1904,  
Nos. 2806-16.

126. There thus remained no provision for the command of internal security areas, other than the recommendation already referred to, that 17 Brigadiers or Colonels on the Staff should be appointed, besides the Brigade Commanders at Aden, Karachi, Bombay and in Burma. There can be little doubt, however, that Lord Kitchener intended first to provide permanent Brigade Commanders for the Field Army, and subsequently those for internal security areas.

Commanders  
available for  
Brigades of the  
Field Army.

127. The present position is, that Brigade Commanders are available for the brigades of the whole 9 divisions and 5 cavalry brigades of the Field Army with one exception, the brigade from Mhow. And for this brigade we recommend that the Brigadier-General, Mandalay Brigade, whom we propose to reduce from Burma, (see below) should be transferred to Mhow. This will provide for the whole of the Field Army.

128. Outside the brigade commanders of the Field Army, the following brigade commanders remain, who are available for the command and administration of internal security troops—Bannu, Derajat, Presidency, Southern, Secunderabad Cavalry, Bombay, Karachi, Rangoon and Aden. Of these, Bannu, Derajat and Aden cannot be counted upon for internal security purposes inside India. With the exception therefore of the Presidency, Madras (Southern), Hyderabad (Secunderabad Cavalry), Bombay, Sind (Karachi) and Rangoon areas, the remaining defence areas are unprovided with permanent commanders. The existing arrangement is, that, while the divisional commander is responsible for the preparation of all defence schemes within the area in time of peace, the senior officer of the troops allotted for occupation purposes within the area will take command on mobilization, being assisted by the General Staff Officer, 2nd grade, of the division, whose especial duty it is to examine and hold in charge the several defence schemes, on behalf of the divisional commander.

Other Brigade Commanders available.

3923.

13677 to 13699.

129. During the examination of witnesses, some doubt was expressed as to whether the senior officer of occupation troops would always be fit for this command, and whether in some cases he might not be handicapped by being new to the area, perhaps having come in with his unit from another area where it was located in time of peace. The former danger is not a serious one, in view of the fact that officers of Lieutenant-Colonel's rank and upwards are carefully selected, and the latter case, that of an officer coming from an outside area, can only possibly happen in the Rawal Pindi area. In every other instance, some officer within the area will be senior to the outsider. And, indeed, it is quite possible to attach too much importance to familiarity with the area. Areas are so large that it is practically out of the question for any one officer to know more than a small portion of most of them.

2491, 3923, 5773, 13677.

130. At the same time the situation is not really satisfactory, and we recommend therefore that the principle of Lord Kitchener's original scheme, that of having a special officer responsible for defence matters in each area, should be so far adopted that nine additional officers, with the rank of Brigadier-General, should be appointed for this purpose, who should be located at the headquarters (with one exception) of each of the nine divisions in India proper, and (again with one exception) should relieve the divisional commander of the administration of those troops, who are now under his direct charge. Each should be provided with a staff officer and the necessary clerks. The one exception mentioned above is the 9th Division, where, in view of the fact that both the defence areas, Hyderabad and Madras, are already, and will on mobilization remain, in charge of Brigadier-Generals, the additional officer seems unnecessary.

Additional Brigade Commanders required.

131. The foregoing accounts for eight of the additional officers proposed; the ninth is to command the enlarged garrison of Delhi, as recommended in Annexure B, item 3, Volume I of the Report.

132. In regard to Burma, we recommend the disestablishment of the Mandalay Brigade. We consider that there is no necessity for three General Officers—one divisional commander, and two brigade commanders—in Burma. We propose, therefore, that the Mandalay Brigade should cease to exist as a separate command.

Disestablishment of the Mandalay Brigade.

Meiktila might be handed over to the Rangoon Brigade, and the rest of the troops in the Mandalay Brigade could come under the direct command of the divisional commander. Owing to the scattered disposition of the troops in Upper Burma, it is practically impossible, in present circumstances, for the divisional commander to assemble them for combined training, and his inspectional functions are therefore mainly a duplication of those of the Brigadier-General at Mandalay. We are therefore in favour of reducing the latter.

133. We thus get a net increase of nine Brigadier-Generals, nine staff officers and ten office establishments, since, though the officer commanding the Mandalay Brigade and his brigade major can be transferred to India, the office establishment, (which we understand to consist of two clerks only), must pass to the divisional commander, as additional work will be thrown on him.

134. If the foregoing proposals are accepted, there will remain in each of the nine divisional areas, upon the mobilization of the Field Army and its departure for the front, an officer of Brigadier-General's rank, who will be responsible for the command and administration of the troops retained in those areas for internal security or other purposes, and who, having been responsible to the divisional commander for the preparation, in peace time, of the defence schemes of the area, ought to be thoroughly acquainted with the conditions obtaining therein, and the duties which would fall to his lot. He will also have a small staff of two officers to assist him, one being the General Staff Officer, 2nd grade, already mentioned, the other for administrative duties. Each, being permanently appointed, will also be conversant with the area and its conditions.

Divisional  
Artillery  
Commanders.

135. In the course of the proceedings of the Committee, a proposal was made to reduce two of the six officers recently appointed, with the rank of Brigadier-General, to command the artillery of divisions, under the authority of Secretary of State's telegram of August 24th 1911, on the following grounds:—

5860, 8747, 14493, 14497,  
14501.

A. D. Pros. A., April 1912,  
Nos. 1285-92.

- (a) That, on the creation of these appointments in 1911, the Government of India only asked for six such officers, instead of one for each division and therefore one for each division could not have been thought necessary.
- (b) That the artillery complement of an Indian division is much less than that of a Home division.
- (c) That, under the Command system, four officers sufficed for the purpose of artillery inspection and training.

136. The first argument is, however, answered by the fact that the despatch, in which these appointments were asked for (No. 101 of 1911), itself states that the reason for not asking for the full number of officers was the stringency of the financial situation at the time.

*Ibid.*

137. As regards (b).—While it is true that a Home division has a larger number of guns than one in India, this does not affect the necessity for having an officer to command the divisional artillery. It is not so much the number of guns to be handled, as the number of different natures, that calls for high technical skill, in order to utilize their various powers to the best advantage;

and the artillery commander in an Indian division will always have the same number of natures of guns to deal with as at Home, and may have more. When we come to training, the difference in actual numbers practically disappears, since there are in India a considerable number of 'internal security' batteries, which likewise come under the divisional artillery commanders for training, while a divisional artillery commander at home is only responsible for the training of Field Army units.

14493.

138. As regards (c).—It may be true that, under the standard of training of the Command system, four officers sufficed for the purpose of artillery inspection and training. But the standard of training has been entirely altered since those days. The South African War taught us that the old system of leaving artillery training to senior officers of artillery, independent of the generals to whose command the artillery belonged, although it had resulted in a high state of technical efficiency, had failed to teach the artillery the paramount necessity of tactical co-operation with other arms; while, from the fact that general officers commanding had practically nothing to do with the training of their artillery in peace, it naturally followed that they were as a rule unable to handle it to the best advantage in war.

14493.

14501.

But, until the appointment of divisional artillery commanders, it was, in practice, very difficult for divisional commanders to train either themselves or their artillery. For the technical training was, up to that time, in the hands of Inspectors of Artillery, who were neither responsible to, nor in personal touch with divisional commanders. Consequently most divisional commanders took little interest in the matter; and, as the dates of the practice camps had to be arranged to suit the Inspectors, it often happened that the divisional commander could not attend the practice camp, and sometimes that the divisional artillery was absent from the training of the other troops. Moreover, the Inspectors were so fully occupied with their practice camps that they could rarely attend manœuvres themselves, and so learnt little of the handling of the artillery in combination with the other arms. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that, at artillery practice camps, tactical training was frequently subordinated to mere target shooting. There can be no doubt that the substitution of Divisional Artillery Commanders for Inspectors of Artillery, has conducted largely to the great progress made of late by that arm, to the interest taken by it in the other arms, and by them in its efficiency. Sir Robert Scallan, who was at first disposed to concur in the proposed reduction, having reconsidered the subject in the above light, now joins with Sir Percy Lake in deprecating any reduction being made in the present number of divisional artillery commanders. Indeed, both wish to point out that, when financial considerations admit, it would be desirable to have one artillery commander for each division.

139. There are at present ten Lieutenant-Colonels of Royal Garrison Artillery on the Indian establishment, *viz.*, one at each of the defended ports of Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi and Rangoon; three in command of mountain artillery brigades; one at Nowgong, commanding the two heavy batteries there; and one at Roorkee. One company of garrison artillery, only, being now

Reduction of  
the complement  
of Lieutenant-  
Colonels, R. G.  
A. from 10 to 9.



detailed for the Hooghly defences, a Lieutenant-Colonel is no longer required at Calcutta; and it is recommended that his appointment should be utilized to provide a Lieutenant-Colonel to command the brigade of two British mountain batteries, which we recommend substituting for two heavy batteries, which will be withdrawn from Nowgong. The Lieutenant-Colonel at the latter station will then become surplus, and we recommend the disestablishment of the appointment, thus reducing the complement from ten to nine Lieutenant-Colonels, Royal Garrison Artillery.

Recommendations.

140. Apart from the proposals made in the foregoing paragraphs, we do not recommend any change in the present arrangements for the command and administration of the army outside of Army Headquarters, or in the present number and ranks of Commanders and Staff Officers, which we consider to be suitable to existing conditions.

### Section VII.—Internal Security requirements.

Recommendation in regard to Internal Security arrangements.

141. To provide for the occurrence of such an emergency as will require the mobilization of the whole available Field Army, and its concentration for service on or beyond the frontier, we recommend the following arrangements for the maintenance of the internal security of India :—

- (a) That a previously fixed allotment of troops, for occupation purposes, be made to the administrative area of each Divisional or Independent Brigade command, for employment in assuring the safety of important cities, arsenals and forts, in safeguarding important railway and other communications, and in maintaining peace and order throughout the area by means of mobile military forces—the whole being employed at the discretion of the officer in command, in consultation with the civil authorities. Where advisable, the divisional area should be subdivided into two or more defence areas.
- (b) That one of the nine divisions of the Field Army should be detailed to furnish three mobile columns, if the conditions of the moment require it. Each column would consist of a brigade of all arms, based in the first instance on an important centre, such as Delhi, Allahabad or Jhansi, but available for special employment wherever circumstances might dictate.
- (c) That the security of Burma and the Eastern frontier should be provided for by three small mobile columns, to be furnished from the occupation troops of Upper Burma.
- (d) That Frontier Militias, Levy Corps, Volunteers and the Military and Civil Police should be employed upon the principles, and generally in the manner, recommended by Lord Kitchener, subject to such modifications as local circumstances may make desirable.
- (e) That, should the circumstances of the occasion be sufficiently serious to make it advisable, the personal services of loyal and influential Indian Sardars and landholders should be

2605, 2607, 4103, 7347, 14037.

2159, 2313, 2315, 2644, 2684, 2973, 4195, 4203, 4205, 5103, 5193, 5471, 5475, 6528-30, 6534, 6721, 6723, 6731. Written evidence. 6, 106, 108, 164, 305, 315, 347, Vol. IV.



2674, 4422, 5225, 5637.

enlisted on the side of law and order, by getting them to raise bodies of Yeomanry, for employment under either the civil or military administration, as may be most expedient.

See also para. 21.

142. The proposals which follow are based upon these recommendations, which to some extent modify Lord Kitchener's original arrangements. When, on the formation of the General Staff in 1910, the internal security question began to be more closely examined, a doubt was felt whether, in view of the altered internal condition of the country, the troops originally allotted for the purpose were still adequate.

Modifications  
in troops  
originally  
allotted.

In 1911, therefore, revised proposals for allotment were put forward by the General Staff, which were communicated to local Governments by the Army Department in February and March 1912. We are generally in accord with those proposals, subject to certain modifications, which will be mentioned under the different defence areas.

#### INDEPENDENT FRONTIER BRIGADES—KOHAT, BANNU, AND THE DERAJAT.

143. The Kohat Brigade, including the Samana garrison, now contains :—

Kohat Brigade.

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 mountain battery (Indian).
- 1 company, Indian Frontier Garrison Artillery.\*
- 4 battalions, Indian infantry.

The proposals of the General Staff in 1912 were to bring that part of the area from Kohat (inclusive) onwards under the Line of Communications of the Central Line; to allot from the peace garrison, for the defence of the remainder of the area,

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry;
- Detachment, Frontier Garrison Artillery;
- 1 battalion, Indian infantry;

and to transfer the rest of the troops to the Peshawar area, either for internal security purposes, or inclusion in the Field Army.

144. The Bannu Brigade contains :—

Bannu Brigade.

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 mountain battery (Indian).
- Detachment Frontier Garrison Artillery.
- 3 battalions, Indian infantry (one temporary).

This force was to be retained for internal security, being distributed between the garrison for Bannu and a movable column to be based on that place.

145. The Derajat Brigade contains :—

Derajat  
Brigade.

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 mountain battery (Indian).
- 3 battalions, Indian infantry.

This force, also, was to be assigned to internal security, one battalion of Indian infantry being the garrison for Dera Ismail Khan and outposts, and the remainder detailed for a movable column.

\* For purposes of convenience in this connection, this company has been credited to Kohat where it has its headquarters, but as a matter of fact it is distributed along the frontier.

146. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, accepted these proposals, though he considered that the movable column at Kohat was small if the Afridis were likely to be hostile, and unnecessarily large otherwise.

N.-W. F. Prov., No. 133-P., 15th February 1912.

Employment  
of frontier  
brigades in  
war.

147. At the 55th meeting of the Committee it was decided by the majority that, with the exception of one battalion of the Kohat Brigade, which it was intended to move into the Peshawar area for occupation purposes, the whole of the Frontier Brigades, as they stand in peace, should always be retained within their own areas in war, as occupation troops, and that under no circumstances would they be included in the Field Army, even if active operations were in progress within or close by their own peace areas.

We agree with the view of the General Staff that it would be an awkward and inelastic arrangement, to have an independent brigade in occupation, for defence purposes, of an area within or close to which active operations were in progress under another commander. It would be a waste of power and likely to lead to disjointed effort. We are of opinion that, when the scene of operations includes the country or frontier, for the security of which one of these brigades is responsible in peace, it is desirable that that brigade should be included as an integral part of the organized fighting force, and not be left as a semi-independent command.

5235.

Kohat Brigade.

148. Under any aspects of a general war on the frontier, or against the tribes in combination with the Afghans, which is the contingency with which it is agreed that our preparations should deal, it is practically certain that the Kohat Brigade area, and the tribal territory immediately in touch with it, would be the scene of active operations. In this case it would be far beyond the power of the Kohat Brigade alone to control matters, and we have therefore decided that the infantry portion of this brigade, with the exception of one battalion, ought to be reckoned as part of the Field Army, and that it can most conveniently and advantageously be included in the 2nd Division, for training and war purposes. By this course the various administrative arrangements necessary for its maintenance in the field will automatically be provided for, and unity of control of the fighting force will be ensured. We do not propose that the brigade should, in time of peace and for administrative purposes, cease to be an independent brigade. We think that the system in force, under which its commander is in independent charge in peace, and is in direct communication with the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, works satisfactorily and should not be altered in any way. At the same time, it will be easy to arrange that the infantry of the Kohat Brigade should train as one of the three brigades of the 2nd Division, when that division trains as such in time of peace. Hitherto, while efficient in its own particular duties, the brigade has not had the opportunity for training in other directions. We may add that the method we propose for employing these troops in war is in agreement with the views of Sir George Roos-Keppel.

5455, 7357.

5235.

Bannu and  
Derajat  
Brigades.

Similar considerations do not apply so strongly to the Bannu and Derajat Brigades, where it is possible that, in the event of a war with Afghanistan and the tribes combined, we may find it advisable to stand on the

defensive at first. Otherwise they would be included in the Field Force, and be placed under its commander, if it was decided to assume the offensive in the vicinity of their areas.

Pros A, October 1910, Nos.  
986-991.

149. We do not think it necessary to retain, in the Bannu area, the extra Indian battalion now temporarily attached to the brigade. The reorganization of the military Frontier Constabulary will shortly make its retention there in peace unnecessary, and we believe that there is no intention on the part of Government to keep it there. Existing plans contemplate the effective reinforcement of both the Bannu and Derajat Brigades by cavalry and other troops, as may be required at the moment.

150. The occupation troops allotted to the frontier brigade areas therefore amount to :— Allotment.

- 3 Regiments Indian cavalry.
- 3 Batteries Indian mountain artillery.
- 1 Company Frontier garrison artillery.
- 6 Battalions Indian infantry.

#### 1ST (PESHAWAR) DIVISIONAL AREA.

151. The proposals of the General Staff in 1912 were as follows :— Peshawar  
Division.

#### *Garrisons at :—*

Peshawar	...	...	1 squadron, Indian cavalry. 2 guns, field artillery. 4 companies, British infantry. 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Nowshera	...	...	2 companies, British infantry.
Malakand	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, Indian cavalry. 2 battalions, Indian infantry.
Chitral	...	...	2 mountain guns (Indian). $\frac{1}{4}$ company, sappers and miners. 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

#### *Movable columns at :—*

Peshawar	...	...	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons, Indian cavalry. 4 guns, field artillery. 4 companies, British infantry. 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Mardan	...	...	1 squadron, Indian cavalry. 4 mountain guns (Indian). 6 companies, British infantry.

#### *Railway defence.*

2 companies, British infantry, taken from the troops allotted to Peshawar, Nowshera and Mardan.

This gave a total strength of :—

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 1 mountain battery (Indian).
- $\frac{1}{4}$  company, sappers and miners.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 5 battalions, Indian infantry.

N.-W. F. Prov., No. 138-P.,  
15th February 1912.

152. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, accepted these proposals.

Reduction of  
Internal  
defence  
troops by one  
battalion  
British  
Infantry.

153. In view of the fact that, in the event of war, there will always be a considerable number of British troops in the Peshawar area on their way to the front, we are of opinion that one battalion, British infantry, instead of two, will suffice for the internal security of the area. We recommend that the battalion thus released be allotted to the Lahore Divisional Area.

Out post  
garrisons.

154. We do not consider that any additional Indian infantry need be added in war to the Peshawar area occupation troops, for the purpose of providing regular garrisons for Shabkadr, Abazai and other outposts. Sir George Roos-Keppel, no doubt expressed anxiety that their safety should be adequately provided for, and we agree with him. But his request was made at a time when it was understood that the present regular garrisons were to be withdrawn from the posts, and the Border Military Police to be left in sole charge. When he represented the matter, it was arranged that the regular garrisons should not be withdrawn, and the present security scheme for the area provides these garrisons from the occupation troops already allotted. Moreover we think the fact had been overlooked that, under the assumed conditions of a frontier war, we should either, if the Mohmands were hostile, have a strong force operating against that tribe in advance of the places named—which force would, in the ordinary course of events, provide for the safety of its own line of communications, thereby securing Shabkadr and Abazai—or if the Mohmands were quiet, we should have another division in occupation of the whole Peshawar area, and that division would then naturally provide extra troops for the safety of the area, thereby securing these posts.

5185, 5820, 5822.

Chitral  
garrison.

155. In giving evidence before us, the Chief Commissioner further urged, that the present position, with one regiment moving to and from Chitral in relief annually, was a dangerous one, and he desired to increase the garrison there to two battalions. Sir J. Willcocks, on the other hand, did not consider such an increase necessary, and Major-General Aylmer agreed with him. In our opinion, it is not necessary to increase the Chitral garrison, but we think it desirable to make the relief biennial and not to allow furlough or other than local leave to the troops during their tour of service there. This change would reduce by one-half the dangers on which the Chief Commissioner laid stress, in regard to the relief seasons.

5141-51.

5824-36.

8685-9.

Allotment.

The troops allotted to the Peshawar area for occupation purposes thus amount to :—

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 1 mountain battery (Indian).
- $\frac{1}{2}$  company, sappers and miners.
- 1 battalion, British infantry.
- 5 battalions, Indian infantry.

#### 2ND (RAWAL PINDI) DIVISIONAL AREA.

Rawal Pindi  
Division.

156. The General Staff proposals of 1912 were as follows :—

No. 1802-2-A. D, 11th March 1912.

#### Garrisons at :—

- Rawal Pindi (arsenal) ... 1 company, garrison artillery.  
... 2 companies, British infantry.
- Jhelum and Attock ... 2 companies, British infantry.

*Movable columns at :—*

Jhelum	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry, and if available, 3 companies, Indian infantry, from depôts at Jhelum.
Rawal Pindi	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry. 1 battery, field artillery. 4 companies, British infantry.

*Railway defence.*

1 battalion, Indian infantry.

These gave a total of :—

Allotment.

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 1 company, garrison artillery.
- 1 battalion, British infantry.
- 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

Punjab Govt. No. 108-Mily.,  
28th March 1912.

The Punjab Government accepted these proposals and we do not suggest any alterations.

## 3RD (LAHORE) DIVISIONAL AREA.

157. The General Staff proposals of 1912 were as follows :—

Lahore  
Division.

*Garrisons at :—*

Lahore	..	...	½ company, garrison artillery. 3 companies, British infantry.
Amritsar	...	...	½ company, garrison artillery. 2 companies, British infantry.
Ferozepore (arsenal)	...	...	1 company, garrison artillery. 2 companies, British infantry.
Multan	...	...	2 companies, British infantry.

*Movable columns at :—*

Lahore	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry. 4 guns, field artillery. 3 companies, British infantry. 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Multan	...	...	1 squadron, Indian cavalry. 2 guns, field artillery. 3 companies, British infantry. 6 companies, Indian infantry.

*Railway defence :—*

- 1½ regiments, Indian cavalry.
- 1 company, British infantry.
- 2 companies, Indian infantry.

The total amounted to :—

- re iments, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 2 companies, garrison artillery.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 2 battalions, Indian infantry.

Punjab Govt. No. 108-Mily.,  
dated 28th March 1912.

1294, 1802, 1808, 4257, 5511  
5513,

The Punjab Government accepted the General Staff proposals. We have, however, thought it desirable to increase the force allotted to this area by one British battalion, which is needed for Lahore.

## Allotment.

The troops allotted to this area for occupation purposes, therefore, are :—

- 2 regiments, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 2 companies, garrison artillery.
- 3 battalions, British infantry.
- 2        ,,        Indian        ,,

## 4TH (QUETTA) DIVISIONAL AREA.

Quetta  
Division.

158. No change in the original allotment was suggested for this area by the General Staff proposals of 1912. The garrisons allotted to the two defence areas included in this Divisional area, were as follows :—

(a) *Baluchistan Area.**Garrisons at :—*

Quetta	...	...	4 companies, British infantry and 3 British infantry depôts.
Loralai	...	...	1 company, Indian infantry.

*Movable columns at :—*

Quetta	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry. 4 guns, mountain artillery. 4 companies, British infantry.
Loralai	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry. 2 guns, mountain artillery. 3 companies, Indian infantry.

*Railway defence :—*

1½ battalions, Indian infantry.

(b) *Sind Area.*

Karachi	...	...	2 companies, garrison artillery. 7½ companies, British infantry.
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*Movable column at :—*

Karachi	...	...	4 companies, Indian infantry.
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*Railway defence :—*

½ company, British infantry.  
4 companies, Indian infantry.

No. 1802-7-A. D., 11th March 1912.

## Allotment.

These gave a total strength of :—

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 mountain battery (Indian).
- 2 companies, garrison artillery.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 3 battalions, Indian infantry.

The Bombay Government agreed to these proposals so far as Sind was concerned, and we do not propose any alteration, except that, in the event of war with a maritime power, one squadron of Imperial Service Cavalry from Kathiawar would be added for duty at Karachi.

Bombay Govt. No. 3477, 23rd April 1912.

## 5TH (MHOW) DIVISIONAL AREA.

## Mhow Division.

159. The General Staff proposals of 1912 were as follows, for the three defence areas herein comprised :—

(a) *Nasirabad (Rajputana) Area.**Garrison and small movable column at :—*

Ajmere...	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry. 1 battalion,* Indian infantry.
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F. D. No. 5-<sup>I-A.</sup>/<sub>C.</sub>, 23rd January 1912, A. G. G., Central India.

F. D. No. 6-<sup>I-A.</sup>/<sub>C.</sub>, *idem*, to A. G. G., Rajputana.  
No. 1802-7-A. D., 11th March, to Bo. Govt.  
No. 1802-6-A. D., *idem*, to C. C., Central Provinces.

\* 2 companies, movable column, Ajmere.  
5 companies, railway defence.  
1 company, garrison Ajmere.

*(b) Central India Area.**Garrisons at :—*

Mhow (including Indore Residency)	1	company, British infantry.
Jhansi	...	1 company, British infantry.
Baroda (necessary by treaty)	...	1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Ahmadabad	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry.

*Movable columns at :—*

Mhow	...	2 squadrons, British cavalry.
		1 battery, horse artillery.
		4 companies, British infantry.
Jhansi	...	2 squadrons, British cavalry.
		1 battery, horse artillery.
		2 companies, British infantry.

*Railway defence.*

2 battalions, Indian infantry.

*(c) Jubbulpore Area.**Garrisons at :—*

Jubbulpore (Gun carriage factory)	2	companies, British infantry.
	1	company, Indian infantry.
Nagpur (Sitabuldi)	...	2 companies, British infantry.
	1	company, Indian infantry.

*Movable columns at :—*

Jubbulpore	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry.
		2 guns, field artillery.
		2 companies, British infantry.
		3 companies, Indian infantry.
Nagpur	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry.
		4 guns, field artillery.
		2 companies, British infantry.
		3 companies, Indian infantry.

*Railway defence :—*

1 battalion, Indian infantry.

The foregoing allotments gave a total of :—

- 1 regiment, British cavalry.
- 2 regiments, Indian cavalry.
- 2 batteries, horse artillery.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 6 battalions, Indian infantry.

C. C., Central Prov. No. 22,  
10th April 1912.  
A. G. G., Central India, No.  
590, 15th February 1912.  
A. G. G., Rajputana, No. 87-  
P., 29th March 1912.  
Written evidence 82, Vol. IV.

160. The Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, agreed so far as he was concerned, and so did the Agent to the Governor-General, Central India. The Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, on the other hand, objected to the provision for the Nasirabad area as inadequate, and held that some British troops were required there.



The Bombay Government agreed so far as the scheme concerned them, but subsequently proposed to us a material increase in the garrison at Ahmadabad.

Bo. Govt. No. 3477, 23rd April 1912.  
Volume II, Annexure II, page 491.

#### Allotment.

It was found possible by a rearrangement of troops to meet the requirements of both the Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, and the Bombay Government, without detailing additional troops and the troops allotted now stand as follows :—

##### (a) *Nasirabad (Rajputana) Area.*

- 1 squadron, British cavalry.
- 2 squadrons, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

##### (b) *Central India Area.*

- 3 squadrons, British cavalry.
- 2 squadrons, Indian cavalry.
- 2 batteries, horse artillery.
- 1 battalion, British infantry.
- 3 battalions, Indian infantry.

##### (c) *Jubbulpore Area.*

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 1 battalion, British infantry.
- 2 battalions, Indian infantry.

#### 6TH (POONA) DIVISIONAL AREA.

#### Poona Division.

161. The General Staff proposals of 1912 were as follows, for the two defence areas comprised herein :—

No. 1802—7-A. D., dated 11th March 1912, to Bombay Government.

##### (a) *Bombay Area.*

##### *Garrison at :—*

Bombay. For defence of city, and to guard railway bridges on the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway up to Surat.	3 companies, garrison artillery.
	1 battalion, British infantry.
	2 battalions, Indian infantry.

##### (b) *Poona Area.*

##### *Garrisons at :—*

Kirkee (arsenal)	...	2 guns, field artillery.
		4 companies, British infantry.
Belgaum	...	2 companies, Indian infantry.
Satara	...	1 company, Indian infantry.

##### *Movable columns at :—*

Poona-Kirkee	...	1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
		4 guns, field artillery.
		1½ battalions, British infantry.
Belgaum	...	2 companies, Indian infantry.

##### *Railway defence :—*

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry (or its equivalent in infantry from movable columns).
- 2 companies, British infantry.
- 3 companies, Indian infantry.

These allotments gave a total strength of :—

- 2 regiments, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 3 companies, garrison artillery.
- 3 battalions, British infantry.
- 3 battalions, Indian infantry.

Bombay Government No. 3477,  
dated 23rd April 1912  
Volume II, Annexure II, page  
491.

162. The Bombay Government accepted these proposals, but have subsequently proposed to add some British troops to the movable column provided at Belgaum, in addition to the Indian infantry. We have found it possible, by a redistribution, to meet the wish of the Bombay Government.

Allotment.

The only alteration which we recommend is that the fourth company of Royal Garrison Artillery, recently transferred temporarily to Bombay, should be permanently stationed there and allotted to its defence.

The troops, therefore, detailed by us, for occupation purposes, to the two defence areas comprised in the Poona Divisional area are :—

(a) *Bombay Area.*

- 1 squadron, Indian cavalry.
- 4 companies, garrison artillery.
- 1 battalion, British infantry.
- 2 battalions, Indian infantry.

(b) *Poona Area.*

- 1½ regiments, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

7TH (MEERUT) DIVISIONAL AREA.

No. 1802-3-A. D., 11th March  
1912.

163. The General Staff proposals of 1912 were as follows :—

Meerut  
Division.

*Garrisons at :—*

Delhi Fort	...	...	1 company, garrison artillery.
			2 companies, British infantry.
Agra Fort	...	...	1 company, garrison artillery.
			2 companies, British infantry.
Bareilly	...	...	3 companies, British infantry.
Meerut	...	...	1½ companies, British infantry.

*Movable columns at :—*

Delhi	...	...	1 squadron, Indian cavalry.
			4 companies, British infantry.
			2 companies, Indian infantry.
Agra	...	...	1 squadron, Indian cavalry.
			2 guns, field artillery.
			4 companies, British infantry.
			2 companies, Indian infantry.
Meerut	...	...	1 squadron, Indian cavalry.
			2 guns, field artillery.
			4 companies, British infantry.
			2 companies, Indian infantry.
Bareilly	...	...	1 squadron, Indian cavalry.
			2 guns, field artillery.
			3 companies, British infantry.
			3 companies, Indian infantry.

*Railway defence :—*

- ½ company, British infantry.
- 7 companies, Indian infantry.

The proposals further provided a battery of horse artillery and a regiment of British cavalry, to admit of

additional infantry being withdrawn from movable columns for railway defence, if required, and to allow of guns being available for each movable column.

This came to a total of :—

- 1 regiment, British cavalry.  
1 regiment, Indian cavalry.  
1 battery, horse artillery.  
1 battery, field artillery.  
2 companies, garrison artillery.  
3 battalions, British infantry.  
2 battalions, Indian infantry.

Garrison for  
Delhi.

164. The United Provinces Government accepted this scheme which, though circulated after, had been drawn up before the decision to make Delhi the Capital had been made public. The Committee, having been asked to submit proposals for the ordinary garrison of Delhi, recommended the following peace garrison :—

Volume I, Annexure B, Item 3.

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.  
1 battery, horse artillery.  
1 company, garrison artillery.  
1½ battalion, British infantry.  
2 battalions, Indian infantry.

These troops were to be retained also in time of war, for the protection of Delhi and the immediately surrounding district. We adhere to this recommendation, with the small modification that we consider 1 battalion of British infantry, instead of  $1\frac{1}{4}$  will be sufficient. The net increase to the Meerut area, consequent on these proposals, is 1 battalion of Indian infantry, while an additional battery of horse artillery is substituted for one of field.

**Allotment.**

The troops detailed by us for occupation purposes the Meerut area are therefore :—

- 1 regiment, British cavalry.  
1 regiment, Indian cavalry.  
2 batteries, horse artillery.  
2 companies, garrison artillery.  
3 battalions, British infantry.  
3 battalions, Indian infantry.

8TH (LUCKNOW) DIVISIONAL AREA.

**Lucknow  
Division.**

165. The General Staff proposals of 1912 were as follows, for the four defence areas comprised herein :—

No. 1802—3-A. D., 11th March  
1912, to U. P. Govt.

(a) *Oudh Defence Area.*

No. 1802—2-A. D., *idem*, to  
Bengal Govt.  
No. 1802—5-A. D., *idem*, to E.  
Bengal & Assam Govt.

No change was proposed in the hitherto accepted allotment, *viz* :—

*Garrison at :—*

Lucknow	...	...	2 guns, field artillery.
			‡ battalion, British infantry.

*Available for movable columns :—*

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.  
4 guns, field artillery.  
1½ battalions, British infantry.  
1 battalion, Indian infantry.

*(b) Allahabad Area.**Garrisons at :—*

Allahabad	...	...	1 company, garrison artillery. 2 companies, British infantry.
Cawnpore	...	...	2 companies, British infantry.

*Available for movable columns—*

1 regiment, British cavalry.  
 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.  
 4 guns, field artillery.  
 $\frac{1}{2}$  battalion, British infantry.  
 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

*Railway defence.*

Troops taken as required from the units available for movable columns.

*(c) Presidency Brigade Area.**Garrison for :—*

Calcutta and its environs	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry. 2 guns, field artillery. 1 company, garrison artillery. 1 battalion, British infantry.
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*Movable column at :—*

Asansol	...	...	2 squadrons, Indian cavalry. 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
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*For Railway defence.*

1 battalion, Indian infantry.

*(d) Assam Brigade Area.*

One battalion of Indian infantry which, with mounted Volunteers and military police, was to form small movable columns at Gauhati, Dibrugarh, Tura, Dinapore, Manipur, Silchar, Shamsheernagar, Chittagong, Dacca and Saidpur.

These proposals gave the following total :—

1 regiment, British cavalry.  
 3 regiments, Indian cavalry.  
 2 batteries, field artillery.  
 2 companies, garrison artillery.  
 4 battalions, British infantry.  
 5 battalions, Indian infantry.

U. P. Government No. 17, 27th March 1912.

C. C., Assam, No. 56-C., 4th May 1912.

Bengal Government No. 773-P. D. L., 6th May 1912.

166. The United Provinces and Assam Governments accepted the General Staff proposals, as also did the Government of Bengal which at that time included Bihar.

Later on, the military authorities suggested the addition of a battalion of Indian infantry to form the garrison of the newly formed province of Bihar and Orissa, while the Government of that province, writing to the Army in India Committee on the subject, urged that two companies of British infantry should be located at Dinapore, besides a battalion of Indian infantry, of which half might be stationed at Dinapore and half in the Jherria coal-fields. They added, however, that, if Indian cavalry were available for Asansol, it might be possible to dispense with half the Indian battalion.

167. The transfer of the Capital from Calcutta does not diminish its importance as a great port and trade centre, near which are located our most important Ordnance factories; and, now that Patna has become the seat of a Local Government, in whose area we have been told that troubles may be possible, it is desirable that Dinapore should be well garrisoned.

319, 349, Written evidence, Vol. IV.

We have therefore allotted in our scheme an extra British Infantry battalion between Calcutta and Dinapore. The question of additional field artillery for Calcutta was raised in Committee, but in view of the fact that, in addition to 20 mobile field guns in Fort William, the Cossipore Artillery Volunteers have 30 field guns, two-thirds of which are in Calcutta, and the Port Defence Volunteers have 6, a further allotment for Calcutta seems unnecessary. We have, however, given a full battery of Field Artillery between Calcutta and Dinapore.

168. We have also been told by the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, and by Mr. Lovett speaking on his behalf, that the allotment of British troops to the Allahabad area would be inadequate, if Great Britain were at war with a great European power simultaneously with a war on the frontier against Afghanistan and the tribes, but that if there were no concurrent complications in Europe, order could be maintained by firm government with the garrisons proposed. Under these circumstances, and in view of the presence of a mobile brigade of all arms in the vicinity, the effect of which has, we think, been underestimated by the civil authorities, we are not convinced of the necessity for any addition to the sedentary garrison at Allahabad, where there are also 12 mobile field guns in the Fort, the presence of which seems to have been overlooked. We have completed the two sections, field artillery, previously allotted to Allahabad, to a full battery.

Vol. II, Annexure I, p. 203.

2824, 2832, 2834.

#### Allotment.

169. The troops detailed for the five defence areas now constituted within the Lucknow Divisional area are therefore as follows :—

##### (a) *Oudh Area.*

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

##### (b) *Allahabad Area.*

- 1 regiment, British cavalry.
- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 1 company, garrison artillery.
- 1 battalion, British infantry.
- 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

##### (c) *Bihar and Orissa Area.*

- 1 section, field artillery.
- $\frac{1}{2}$  battalion, British infantry.
- $\frac{1}{2}$  battalion, Indian infantry.

##### (d) *Presidency Area.*

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 2 sections, field artillery.
- 1 company, garrison artillery.
- $1\frac{1}{2}$  battalions, British infantry.
- $1\frac{1}{2}$  battalions, Indian infantry.

*(e) Assam Area.*

1 battalion, Indian infantry.

## 9TH (SECUNDERABAD) DIVISIONAL AREA.

170. The General Staff proposals of 1912, for the two defence areas comprised, were as follows :—

Secunderabad  
Division.

*(a) Hyderabad Area.**Garrison at :—*

Secunderabad ... 2 guns, horse artillery.  
4 companies, British infantry.

*Movable column at :—*

Secunderabad (to operate also  
in the Madras area if required).  
1 regiment, British cavalry.  
2 regiments, Indian cavalry.  
4 guns, horse artillery.  
1½ battalions, British infantry.  
1 battalion, Indian infantry.

*Railway defence :—*

1 battalion, Indian infantry.

*(b) Madras Area.**Garrisons at :—*

Madras ... 2 guns, field artillery.  
2 companies, British infantry.  
Wellington ... 2 companies, British infantry.

*Other troops.*

Mostly concentrated at Bangalore,  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ regiment, Indian cavalry.} \\ 4 \text{ guns, field artillery.} \\ 4 \text{ companies, British infantry.} \\ 1 \text{ battalion, Indian infantry.} \end{array} \right.$

*Railway defence.*

1 battalion, Indian infantry.

No troops were specifically allotted for the defence of Bangalore.

*The total allotment came to :—*

1 regiment, British cavalry.  
3 regiments, Indian cavalry.  
1 battery, horse artillery.  
1 battery, field artillery.  
3 battalions, British infantry.  
4 battalions, Indian infantry.

Resident, Hyderabad, No. 104,  
27th February 1912.  
Madras Government No. 523-  
P.D., 1st May 1912.

135 Written evidence, Vol. IV.  
Annexure, p. 1817, Vol IV.

171. The Resident in Hyderabad and the Madras Government accepted the General Staff proposals, the former pointing out, however, that the movable column should not be detached from Hyderabad till the safety of the Nizam's person and the peace of the State had been secured. But, writing to us later, the Madras Government held that the arrangements made for the defence of the Madras area on general mobilization were not entirely satisfactory, and that the headquarters of the troops left in this area should be at Fort St. George rather than at Bangalore. They also desired to have a detachment at Mallapuram, in the Moplah country, both in peace and war.

The total allotment of troops remaining the same, there is no difficulty in meeting the wishes of the Madras Government, as the divisional commander has to prepare his local defence schemes in consultation with the civil Governments concerned.

#### Allotment.

The troops detailed for the two defence areas within the Secunderabad Divisional area are therefore :—

#### (a) Hyderabad Area.

- 1 regiment, British cavalry.
- 2 regiments, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, horse artillery.
- 1½ battalions, British infantry.
- 2 battalions, Indian infantry.

#### (b) Madras Area.

- 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
- 1 battery, field artillery.
- 1½ battalion, British infantry.
- 2 battalions, Indian infantry.

#### Hyderabad occupation troops.

172. We think it desirable to recall to mind the fact that the occupation troops allotted to the Hyderabad area are much in excess of what we are bound, under our treaty with the Nizam, to retain for his protection, *viz.*, either two battalions of Indian, or one of British infantry. The force allotted under present arrangements, for the whole area, is a complete cavalry brigade, and in addition one and three quarters battalions of British and two of Indian infantry.

We are aware that the Madras Government have been informed that, in the case of a general mobilization, they can count on the retention of these troops in the Hyderabad area. This assurance must of course be adhered to, but it seems at least possible that Southern India may be in such a tranquil condition at any given moment, that the Madras Government might be willing to dispense with some of these battalions, if they were really needed elsewhere in the interests of the general security.

#### BURMA DIVISIONAL AREA.

#### Burma Division.

173. The Local Government was not addressed in 1912, though there had been some previous correspondence with it in regard to the reduction of the number of troops stationed in the province in peace.

The proposed scheme of the military authorities on general mobilization, as set forth in the General Staff memorandum of July 1911, gave a total allotment to the province of :—

- 2 companies, garrison artillery.
- 1 battery, Indian mountain artillery.
- 1 company, sappers and miners.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 4 battalions, Indian infantry.

Having regard to what the Burma Government has told us in regard to the possibilities of internal disturbances in this province, we do not think this allotment sufficient and would increase it by two battalions of Indian infantry.

4104, 4142, 4669, and written evidence, 225-228, 265-268, 274-277, 291-294 and Annexure I, p. 1334, Vol. IV.



The troops detailed for this area would therefore be— Allotment.

- 2 companies, garrison artillery.
- 1 battery, Indian mountain artillery.
- 1 company, sappers and miners.
- 2 battalions, British infantry.
- 6 battalions, Indian infantry.

This will enable provision to be made for three mobile columns, each consisting of 2 guns, 50 mounted infantry, 2 companies of British and 1 battalion of Indian infantry, which we recommend for the internal security of Burma and the Eastern frontier.

#### ADEN.

174. The normal garrison of Aden in peace consists of— Aden.

- 1 troop, Indian cavalry (Aden Troop).
- 3 companies, garrison artillery.
- 1 (fortress) company, sappers and miners.
- 1 battalion, British infantry, of which 2 companies are at Poona owing to lack of accommodation at Aden.
- 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

4708-4710. In time of war these troops would all be required at Aden. We consider that barrack accommodation should be provided for a whole British battalion. In case of war with a maritime power, it might be necessary to reinforce the garrison by a second battalion of Indian infantry.

4708-4710. If this re-inforcement is decided to be a definite obligation, we think it desirable that the second Indian battalion should be quartered at Aden in peace; but we understand that the latest pronouncement of the Overseas Defence Committee tends to throw doubt upon the necessity for it, and it is evident that it would only be required in the event of England being at war with a maritime power. Consequently, it seems unlikely that barracks will be built at Aden for a second battalion for some years to come. Meanwhile, though a battalion should be earmarked for despatch to Aden in the event of war with a maritime nation, it will be available for service in India, should a general mobilization be ordered at a time when Great Britain was at peace elsewhere.

175. Summing up the foregoing paragraphs, we thus get a total requirement, for internal security purposes, of what may be called occupation troops for the whole of India, as follows :—

Summary of  
Internal  
Security troops.

British cavalry regiments	...	...	4
Indian cavalry regiments	...	...	19½
R. H. A. batteries	...	...	5
R. F. A. „	...	...	9
R. G. A. companies	...	...	18
Mountain batteries	...	...	6
Frontier Garrison Artillery company	...	...	1
Sapper and Miner companies	...	...	1½
British infantry battalions	...	...	26
Indian infantry battalions	...	...	46

Annexure X, table B, shows our various proposals under this head, in one statement.

## THE MOBILE BRIGADES.

176. The question of the mobile brigades, which were referred to in the letters to Local Governments in February and March 1912, remains to be considered. We shall refer to this subject again later, but it is desirable to state here that, instead of three brigades being permanently detailed for the purpose, we propose, that, when the time comes, one or other of the Field Army divisions, according to the requirements of the moment, should be told off to supply these brigades, the divisional troops, with an extra cavalry regiment allotted for the purpose, being divided between them.

177. Each mobile brigade would then consist of—

1 infantry brigade.

1 battery, field artillery, and section of ammunition column.

2 squadrons, cavalry ("Delhi" Brigade 1 regiment).

1 company, sappers and miners ("Delhi" Brigade 1 regiment Pioneers), besides the necessary departmental troops.

These brigades, if required, will be primarily located in the neighbourhood of Delhi, near Allahabad, and between Mhow and Jhansi, respectively, being pivoted on those places but free to move in whatever direction may be required.

178. While, however, as already said, we accept the provision of these brigades as a liability, we desire to place on record our opinion that it should not be regarded as an absolute certainty that, in the event of a general mobilization for a serious frontier war, these mobile brigades must of necessity, and under all circumstances, be constituted as such and left behind.

Local Governments have been told that they can reckon upon these brigades being, generally speaking, allotted to the areas Delhi-Meerut, Allahabad-Dinapore, and Mhow-Jhansi, and this is a promise which must be kept in mind. But we regard it as quite possible that in the event of really serious complications on the frontier, the feeling and general condition of the country may be such, that the civil authorities themselves may be prepared to dispense with one or all of these brigades, so that they may be used for active operations, should the Central Government desire so to utilize them. It will be remembered that the inhabitants of the country generally are unarmed and that the bulk of the people specially in the South and West, are peacefully inclined.

4000, 4098.

We make the reservation regarding these brigades, because we feel that it is undesirable to regard the present allotment (which under existing circumstances we certainly recommend) as a hard and fast rule. However carefully worked out our plans may be, the authorities when the time comes may find it desirable to modify them in some particulars. To regard them as immutable is to create a false impression in the minds of those who may be responsible for preliminary action.

5277, 5279, 5427, 5429,  
14043.

179. Allowing, however, for these mobile brigades being, in fact, a complete division apportioned for the purpose, the following statement shows, by units, the total number of troops which, under our proposals, are allotted (a) for the purpose of maintaining internal order, (b) for the division which furnishes the three mobile

brigades, and (c) for the other eight divisions of the Field Army.

Units.	Indian peace establishment.	EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS.		NOW PROPOSED.		
		Internal Defence.	Field Army.	Occupation Troops.	Mobile Brigades (one Division).	Balance allotted to remaining Divisions and Cavalry Brigades of Field Army.
British cavalry regiments ...	9	1	8	4	...	5
Indian cavalry regiments ...	(b) 39½	14½	25	19½	2	18
Royal Horse Artillery ...	11	2	9	5	...	6
Royal Field Artillery (including Howitzer batteries).	45	9	36	9	3	33
Royal Garrison Artillery ...	21	21	...	18	...	..
		(3 unallotted).		plus 3 unallotted		
Frontier Garrison Artillery ...	1	1	...	1	...	...
Heavy batteries (a) ...	6	...	6	(f) 1	...	3
Mountain batteries (a) ...	20	6	14	6	...	(a) 16
Field companies, Sappers and Miners (e)	19	(c) 1½	17½	1½	2	15½
Railway companies Sappers and Miners ...	2	...	2	...	...	2
Signal companies ...	4	...	4	...	...	4
Wireless Signal company ...	1	...	1	...	...	1
British infantry battalions ...	52	25	27	26	3	23
Indian infantry battalions ...	(d) 133	45	88	46	10	77

(a) Assuming that two heavy will be replaced by two mountain batteries see paragraph 413.

(b) Excluding the Deoli and Erinpura squadrons.

(c) Burma Company and Chitral Section.

(d) Excluding the 5 battalions raised for Colonial Service.

(e) Excluding Fortress Company at Aden.

(f) This battery is not detailed for any particular area but can be used as required. For purposes of calculation it has been shown in the Meerut area.

180. It may not be out of place here to explain the reasons for which the General Staff proposals of 1912 entered into details concerning the locations of specified troops for obligatory garrisons, movable columns and railway defence, such as were contained in the schemes put before Local Governments last year.

These allotments were intended entirely for the information of the civil authorities, to enable them to judge whether, from their point of view, the probable arrangements which defence commanders would make were satisfactory.

It was therefore thought desirable to show them exactly what the allotments were likely to be. These were, in every case, those of the local military commander, as already detailed in his area defence scheme. Except for this, it has been the consistent practice of Army Headquarters not to tell local commanders how to detail their troops, but to give them a free hand, in consultation with the civil authorities, which is no doubt

2605, 2607, 2613, 4106,  
5277, 5429, 7347, 14043,  
14047.

the only sound course, and one well understood by all General Officers Commanding to be the prescribed procedure. For no plans can be regarded as more than useful hints, to be accepted for guidance or to be ignored, according as the officer responsible considers them to indicate, or not, the soundest course to pursue under the conditions of the moment.

### Section VIII.—Field Army Requirements.

Maximum requirements which the Field Army should be able to meet.

181. On the assumption that the contingency of a war with Russia may safely be omitted from the present responsibilities of the Indian army, we estimate the probable maximum requirements for the Field Army, at the force which would be required to deal satisfactorily with a combination against us of Afghanistan and the independent tribes on the North-West frontier, at a time when the internal situation in India gave cause for anxiety.

Past experience.

In order to arrive at the force necessary to deal economically with such a situation, by bringing the operations to a successful conclusion with reasonable speed, our principal guide must be the experience of the past. But we have doubts whether any of our larger operations against either Afghanistan or the tribes, up to the present day, could be described by an impartial critic as having been brought to an entirely successful and speedy conclusion.

Afghan wars of 1838-42 and 1879-81.

182. It appears to us that neither of the Afghan wars could be so described, for each lasted for over two years and each was marked by one heavy defeat, and by our main forces having to stand on the defensive for a considerable time. In the last Afghan War, we suffered a severe reverse at Maiwand in the south, and Lord Roberts was compelled to act on the defensive, and had hard fighting to maintain his position, at Sherpur in the north.

Tirah expedition, 1897-8.

Our last big tribal expedition, that in Tirah in 1897-8, has been described, not only by the Amir, who spoke of it to the Dane Mission in 1905, but by our own people, in terms which leave no opening for us to regard it as a distinct success. Lord Morley, speaking at the meeting of the Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in January 1907,\* alluded to "the disastrous lines" on which the Tirah Campaign was proceeding when it was brought to a close; whilst Sir Ian Hamilton, giving evidence before the same Sub-committee, said that Tirah could be regarded as little less than a defeat. There can be little doubt that we were able to withdraw from Tirah, and end the expedition, rather because the enemy as a whole had no lasting animosity against us, than because they had been crushed; and that we had in the end to make our terms as easy as possible, in order not to be compelled to reopen hostilities. The tribesmen certainly consider that we were not the victors.

\* Page 3 of Report.

The value of prestige.

183. We mention this point, not with any desire to disparage the conduct of our troops on either occasion, or their leading, but because we regard it as important for two reasons; first, that our probable opponents may with some reason, and in point of fact do, believe that they can beat us; and secondly, that as a result of the telegraph, the spread of the native press, and other modern facilities for the dissemination of news, any check that our arms may receive will be magnified into

1203, 2824.

5373. a defeat, any reverse into a disaster, and any delay will be interpreted as a sign of inability to press on, by those whose desire it is to discredit the Government and damage the prestige of the British rule. It is an accepted principle in all warfare with semi-civilized peoples that operations, once commenced, should be carried through without a check, and we think that this principle applies with peculiar force to any operations on the frontiers of India.

184. But before we enter upon any examination of the force which would be required to meet the external situation satisfactorily, without hazarding a reverse, or so endangering our position in India by delay in dealing with our more important enemies, as to risk political complications in India itself, we desire to make our attitude in the matter perfectly clear.

It appears to us that, as the first and second terms of our reference lay upon us the duty of reporting upon the numbers and constitution of the armed forces, which should be maintained to meet the obligations due to the various circumstances requiring the use of military force, which may arise out of the external and internal situation in India, it is due to the Government which appointed us, to state fully the conclusions to which our examination has led us, leaving it to that Government to determine whether the provision of such forces as may seem to be required is practical policy or not. Moreover the Secretary of State in despatch No. 6 of 12th January 1912, under the authority of which this Committee was appointed, wrote—"The security of India is and must remain the first and most essential object of our rule, since without security the other functions of Government cannot properly be performed..... In dealing with this subject, therefore, I prefer to regard it from the standpoint of a desire to ascertain what is, and what is not, actually necessary for the security of India under existing and under probable future conditions, rather than from that of the immediate financial outlook."

Considerations which have governed our recommendations.

185. The two questions which evidently affect most closely the consideration of the size of the force which it is desirable for India to maintain for external action are:—

Probability of a combination between Afghanistan and the tribes, and its fighting strength.

*First*, whether a combination of Afghanistan and the tribes is probable; and

*Secondly*, whether the estimate of the fighting strength of Afghanistan and the tribes, upon which the plans of the General Staff for a war against them combined are based, is well founded.

We shall first deal with these general considerations and then proceed to give the reasons on which our estimate of the actual force required is founded. Finally we shall show that, under ordinary circumstances, such a force can be provided without any increase to the troops now maintained in India, and without upsetting their existing organization.

#### THE PROBABILITY OF A GENERAL COMBINATION AGAINST US.

186. As regards the prospect of Afghanistan and the tribes combining against us—the two highest authorities on the subject, Sir H. McMahon and Sir G. Roos-Keppel, both stated in their evidence that, in their opinion, this was a very possible contingency.

Chances of a general combination.

The frontier  
tribes.

187. The former said "The possibility of a large and general combination of frontier tribes against us is a contingency that must always be faced. Also, that, like the rising of 1897 in Swat, it may come about with a suddenness that surprises the tribes themselves almost as much as it surprises us. The machinery for effecting a general combination, and a simultaneous rising will be very much more complete and efficient on the next occasion than on the last." "The tribes on the North-West frontier will always be subject to incitement to *jihad*, whether it be preached from Kabul or by their own Mullahs." Again "Briefly stated the attitude of the Frontier tribes, if we were at war with Afghanistan, would be one of hostility. Much has been done of late years by Sardar Nasrulla Khan to instil into the independent tribes of the North-West frontier a national spirit, by stirring up their religious fanaticism, and teaching them that their interests and those of Afghanistan are one and the same. This policy in the event of our fighting Afghanistan will bear fruit and we must expect to have the tribes against us."

3515.

3545.

188. Sir. G. Roos-Keppel, though not so definite, said "All the tribes on the frontier are more or less hostile at heart." "The Swatis are intensely fanatical and priest ridden. They are not to be trusted and might rise at any time without cause and without warning." And that, in 1897, "There was a general belief that we had started on swallowing up the whole belt of independent territory. There was no lateral communication between the tribes then. Now there is a chain linking them up." "The Amir keeps up regular pro-Afghan agencies among the tribes and subsidises them. Anybody who is notoriously anti-British receives an allowance." "I can see no present likelihood of any large or general tribal combination against us: but were any important tribe to rise, and were prolonged operations against it necessary, the fire would doubtless spread." "The Wazirs and Mahsuds are undoubtedly hostile to us, and are subject to accesses of individual fanaticism. They are much under the influence of Kabul." "The malcontents and their Mullahs are constantly coming to Kabul.....Nasrulla Khan always points out to them that as long as they are divided they cannot stand against us, and begs them always to keep in communication with each other. The Mullahs go backwards and forwards from one tribe to another in the spring." "It would be unsafe to base any calculations regarding the number of troops required for an Afghan war upon the assumption that the frontier tribes would give little trouble."

4776.

4800.

4778.

4782.

4908.

4776.

4918.

5042.

189. Sir E. Barrow said "What will happen is, a *jihad* having been preached, the frontier will catch fire." Major-General Aylmer said—"a war against the frontier tribes and Afghanistan combined, which is a most probable contingency," and again "In a war with Afghanistan, they (the frontier tribes) are bound to go against us in a very dangerous manner."

4032.

2549.

190. If there were a large tribal outbreak, we should deal with it before invading Afghanistan in force, and this is the course proposed in the General Staff plans laid before us—provided that the tribal outbreak occurs first, which may not prove to be the case



## THE STRENGTH OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE TRIBES

191. The fighting strength of Afghanistan and the tribes may be considered under the three heads of numbers, armament, and fighting qualities.

Military  
strength of  
Afghanistan.

192. Details as to the number of troops which Afghanistan could put into the field are given in Appendix II, Volume VI, from which it appears that, with a nominal establishment of about 90,000 regulars, the actual peace strength is estimated at between 50,000 and 60,000. A rough system of reserves is in force, which would suffice to fill up the establishments in the case of a national emergency. There are also some 30,000 to 40,000 irregulars, while the fighting strength of the Afghan tribesmen is estimated at about 150,000. At the same time, the largest numbers of tribesmen who assembled at any one place to fight us during the last war were estimated as follows :—

Sherpur, December 1879	...	about	60,000
Ahmad Khel, April 1880	...	,,	15,000
Maiwand, July 1880	...	,,	25,000
Kandahar, September 1880	...	,,	12,000

The Afghan army has between 400 and 500 mobile guns, of which about 100, fairly equally divided between mountain and field guns, are of European make. The remainder were made at the Kabul arsenal under European supervision. As regards small arms, Sir H. McMahon told us that the Amir had enough rifles at Kabul to arm the whole population.

Armament.

3373.

193. In regard to the numbers and armament of the frontier tribesmen, it may be pointed out that the figures given in Annexure E, Volume I, where the fighting men are said to number nearly 350,000, and to have over 80,000 breech-loading rifles, are based on the most reliable information available, that supplied by the Foreign Department. Sir G. Roos-Keppel, who was responsible for most of it, said that his estimate regarding the strength and armament of the tribes might be relied upon as a minimum. While Sir E. Barrow and Sir J. Willcocks doubted these figures, neither had studied the question thoroughly, a fact which would discount considerably the value of their estimates.

Numbers and  
armament of  
the tribesmen.

4832.

4052.

5387.

129, 131, 505, 2573, 3501,  
3511, 4052, 4054, 4832,  
4834, 4848, 4851, 4862,  
4864, 4868, 4874, 4878,  
4884, 5387, 13887, 13921,  
13929.

194. In regard to the armament of the tribes, the Persian Gulf operations have materially diminished the rate of supply of weapons and ammunition, but they have certainly not stopped it. Great numbers of rifles were imported before these operations interfered, and these are still in the hands of the tribesmen. Full details are given in Annexure E, Volume I. There is also an arms factory at Kabul, and we know that even the factory in Kohat tribal territory recently supplied 300 rifles, in one order, to a frontier tribe.

4834.

4856.

195. Sir G. Roos-Keppel said that only arms of European manufacture were included in his report, and that every man on the frontier had a weapon of some sort. He also said that the Amir had gigantic stores of ammunition at Kabul, and that the tribesmen were perhaps ten times better armed in 1909 than they were in 1897, at the time of the Tirah Campaign.

Government of India despatch  
No. 105, of 2nd September 1909  
to Secretary of State.

196. It is true that our arms also are much better than they were 15 years ago, but we think it may safely be stated that the arms in the hands of our opponents have



improved in much more than equal proportion. Moreover, in addition to this we have to take into consideration the effect of smokeless powder when used against us.

Fighting value  
of the frontier  
tribes.

197. When we come to consider the fighting qualities of our antagonists, we find that the frontier tribesmen are universally acknowledged to be formidable opponents.

Sir Ian Hamilton, when speaking before the Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the occasion already referred to in paragraph 182, described the frontier tribes as being "some of the finest fighting men in the world." He added that he had good reason to take a serious view of the changes produced in mountain warfare by modern arms and ammunition, and that, though the tribesmen might not be able to stop a column advancing up a mountain pass, they would make everything extraordinarily difficult, and a more than usually large proportion of the troops would have to be left behind to hold the passes and lines of communication.

5042.

On the same occasion, before the Committee of Imperial Defence, Lord (then Sir William) Nicholson, said, "the Afridi force in this country was, for its size, the most formidable force I have ever seen \* \* \*. For skirmishing and taking cover, for climbing over steep hills, and for marksmanship, the Boers are not in it with them.....in fact, they are the most splendid shots I have ever seen. \* \* \* The Afridi in the first place is a born soldier; in the second place a large percentage of them, as much as 10 or 15 per cent., are glad to serve in our regiments." Speaking again of the Afridis who came to oppose us at Dargai, he remarked "I think they looked more formidable than any troops I have seen in my life." He also said "I do not think in England it was ever realised during the Tirah Campaign, what a tremendous difference in mountain warfare was made by the fact of only say 10, 15 or 20 per cent. of the tribesmen having been armed with new rifles with smokeless cartridges, which they had stolen." And, again, "Mountain fighting is very difficult. A man can keep himself concealed and, if the explosive gives no smoke, a couple of men may practically keep a regiment at bay. It is the most striking thing I have ever seen, how two men concealed in a little tower, as we were going up a small stream in Tirah, fired at and wounded our men, who got very much intimidated. Until we got rid of them it practically stopped the advance."\*

Fighting value  
of Afghan  
troops.

198. Although we consider that the Afghan regular army, as such, is probably not so formidable, on the whole, as a large gathering of the Afghan tribesmen, there is nothing in the evidence, or in recent reports from that country, to make us suppose that they are likely to be a less difficult enemy to deal with than they were in 1860. It was not tribesmen only who defeated us at Maiwand.

3317.  
3333.  
3337.

Sir H. McMahon said of the Cavalry "it would not be of much use for charging, but for rough work, getting over hills, and from the point of view of mounted infantry, I should say that they are very hard to beat." He also praised the artillery.

3333.  
3335.

\* See also remarks on pages 111 and 112 of this Report.

199. We think we have adduced enough evidence to show that the combination of the tribesmen with the Afghans would constitute a most formidable force to engage. And it must always be borne in mind :—

(i) That whenever we have undertaken military operations either against Afghanistan or against the North-West frontier tribes, the character of the enemy and the nature of the country have always compelled us to employ forces of a strength greatly disproportionate to the armed inhabitants and military resources of the country we had to deal with.

(ii) That in no instance have we ever succeeded in inflicting such a crushing defeat on the enemy, as to cause it to be remembered by them for generations, as proof of their inferiority to the British or Indian soldier.

(iii) That we have no reason to suppose that, since 1898, either the Afridis and Orakzais or other frontier tribesmen have appreciably deteriorated in courage or marksmanship; while we know that they are far better armed now than they were then.

#### FORCE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH AFGHANISTAN AND THE FRONTIER TRIBES IN COMBINATION.

200. Having dealt with the two general considerations mentioned in paragraph 185, we now proceed to discuss the strength of the force requisite, in order to cope successfully with the opposition which we may expect, in the event of our having to meet a combination between the Afghans and the frontier tribesmen.

Strength of the force required.

The paper\* given in Appendix VIII, Volume VI, is a study of the question by the Chief of the General Staff, in which an estimate of the troops necessary to engage such a combination was prepared, on the following plan :—

Plan of operations.

- “(i) To deal first with those tribes whose strength and geographical position rendered them most formidable, or who lay along our route to Kabul.
- “(ii) To defeat any Afghan forces which might appear in tribal territory, and to occupy a position from which we could prevent help from Kabul reaching the tribesmen.
- “(iii) To adopt defensive measures in less important localities.
- “(iv) Meanwhile to bring indirect pressure to bear on the Amir by occupying Kandahar, with the intention of a further advance from there should circumstances render it desirable.”

4026, 4034, 13917, 13919. 201. It is therein proposed that, as it is unwise to remove more troops from India than are really necessary, and as it is not essential to take the offensive against all the tribes simultaneously, we should at first stand on the defensive on the Waziristan border, where we could probably safeguard our border territory with the least difficulty, and, in the first instance, that we should take offensive action only against the Orakzais and

\* Some prominence was given in Committee to one of the tables in this paper (Table A, Appendix VIII, Volume VI) which gave a statement of the forces required under existing plans of operations, to deal *individually* with Afghanistan or the several frontier tribes, the expedition against each one being regarded as a separate and independent operation; but it is unnecessary to deal with it further, inasmuch as it was only inserted in order to show what force had been thought necessary formerly to cope with any particular one of the tribal divisions, and it does not directly affect the present question.

Afridis in Tirah, the Mohmands north of the Kabul river, and the tribes on the Malakand, whom we could not afford to leave alone, for the reasons given in the plan. At the same time we should endeavour to occupy the Khyber line of advance as far as Dakka, both for reasons of prestige, and because from Dakka we could intercept aid in men, rifles and ammunition intended by Afghanistan for the tribes. It is not anticipated that we could take further action against Afghanistan until we had disposed of the tribesmen.

229-35, 4944, 5044.

The forces detailed for these several operations would be as follows:—

Operations on the Malakand	...	1 Division.
„ against the Mohmands	1	„
„ in Tirah	...	2½ „
Occupation of Jalalabad	...	2 Divisions and 1 Cavalry Brigade.
„ Kandahar	...	1 Division and 2 Cavalry Brigades.
Line of Communications to Kandahar.		1 Infantry Brigade, 2½ Cavalry regiments.
Protective measures on Bannu and Derajat borders.		2 Cavalry Brigades 2 battalions and Bannu and Derajat Brigades.

And it would be advisable to hold one division and one cavalry brigade in reserve, in the 1st and 2nd Divisional areas, to provide for unforeseen contingencies.

202. In this connection it may be pointed out that the force thus proposed for the operations against the Afridis and Orakzais in Tirah amounts to 33,000 men—in 1897 we had to employ against the same tribes something over 34,000, exclusive of supporting troops in other localities. Against the Mohmands the plan proposes to employ one division (12,500 men)—against this tribe 9,400 were employed in 1897, and 13,000 in the successful expedition of 1908. For the operations on the Malakand it is proposed also to employ one division (12,500 men)—the forces employed in previous expeditions against the same tribes were, in 1895, 16,500, and in 1897, 11,600 men.

203. There is thus no appreciable increase of forces proposed for our dealings with these tribes, compared with our earlier expeditions. We rely upon our better organization, better armament and equipment, better training and better transport, to enable us to deal more satisfactorily and promptly with them than has been the case in the past, and to neutralise the advantages which they have obtained from their greatly increased supply of modern rifles and ammunition.

204. As regards the force to be employed against Afghanistan, it is considered essential, not only for intercepting aid from Afghanistan for the tribesmen, but also, as already said, for reasons of prestige and to prevent the Afghans being free to oppose us in other ways, that we should at once assert our power of holding the Khyber, and then should advance from Dakka on Jalalabad. For this purpose two divisions and one cavalry brigade are allotted. For the same purpose of keeping Afghanistan occupied and shewing our power, it is considered that we should occupy Kandahar, by one division and two cavalry brigades. It is not proposed that we should take further action against Afghanistan until we have defeated the tribes.

229, 231, 233, 235, 483,  
2549, 3419, 4008, 4040,  
4944, 5020, 5044, 5363,  
5371, 13867, 13873, 13885.

2549, 2563, 3419, 3763,  
4928, 5363, 5375, 13747,  
13857, 13909.

205. The sum of the forces which we have above mentioned in detail amounts to eight divisions and five cavalry brigades, besides some army troops, together with another division and cavalry brigade to be held in reserve in the Peshawar and Rawal Pindi areas to meet contingencies. In our opinion this force cannot be considered unnecessarily large for dealing with the problem before us. When once we have defeated the tribes and forced them to accept our terms, troops will be of course set free for an advance on Kabul, should we not have already caused Afghanistan to come to terms. But even should all go well, without a hitch, we do not think that the force named can be safely reduced. Lord Nicholson stated to the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, on the occasion mentioned in paragraph 182 that, for a war against Afghanistan and the tribes combined, India would need, in addition to her own army, 18,000 to 20,000 infantry from home.

4042. Of the various witnesses who were examined on this subject by the Committee, Sir E. Barrow estimated a force of nearly 100,000 men as being necessary to deal with a Pan-Islamic movement, but he proposed to act largely on the defensive, which appears to us undesirable if it can be avoided. Sir J. Willcocks, postulating prompt action by the Government and a free hand to the General in command, did not think 120,000 men could be required, but had not worked out plans in detail. General Aylmer thought Sir B. Duff's figure of 120,000 men not far wrong, and the estimate of the General Staff for action against the frontier tribes not excessive.

206. Taking all these factors into consideration, we consider that there are strong grounds for the conclusion that a Field Army of less than nine divisions, and five cavalry brigades, will not be adequate to deal satisfactorily with a combination against us of Afghanistan and the tribes on the North-West frontier, if any hope is to be entertained of bringing the operations to a reasonably rapid conclusion. We understand that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has signified his general acceptance of the General Staff estimate under discussion.

Strength of the  
Field Army.

#### THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING OUR FORCES AT KABUL.

5363. 207. When discussing in committee this question of the size of the force to be employed, doubt was thrown on the possibility of feeding and supplying four divisions and two cavalry brigades at Kabul. The plan now under consideration does not contemplate the occupation of Kabul itself by so large a force as this, though we believe that we could now maintain it there, for the improvements in railways and roads since the last Afghan war have made a vast difference in our powers in this respect. Owing to the extension of railways we are now in a better position for bringing supplies to the North-West frontier than we were in 1878-80 or in 1897-8; and this extension will materially help in the maintenance of our troops in the field.

Maintenance of  
forces in  
Northern  
Afghanistan.

3457, 208. We do not think that sufficient allowance has been made for the effect of this extension of the railways, or of the improvement which has taken place in the roads through and beyond the Khyber, on the transport of supplies. These roads are not yet as good and as

Roads to  
Kabul  
through  
Khyber Pass  
and in  
Afghanistan.

convenient as could be wished, but the answers given by Sir G. Roos-Keppel, and Sir H. McMahon show considerably improved conditions, and the Secretary of State has just sanctioned a project for completing the second metalled road through the Khyber, so as to permit of going and returning transport using different roads. 4742.

Sir G. Roos-Keppel said :—" During the last ten years much has been done to improve communication through the Khyber from Peshawar to the Afghan frontier at Torkham. The main road from Jamrud to Landi Kotal has been widened and well metalled, and is now in first class order. A second road has been made, of which all the difficult parts have been finished and metalled ; it could be completed at short notice. A third road has been made through the Mullagori country to Landi Kotal which would be valuable for return transport. From Torkham to Kabul the road has been improved, and between Jalalabad and Kabul it has been lightly metalled. The Amir visits Jalalabad yearly and shortly before his journey the road is repaired sufficiently to make it practicable for motors. It is possible to take motors to Jalalabad through the Khyber, but this can only be done with difficulty and with a very light load. The metalling of the road between Jalalabad and Kabul is said to be very light, and it would probably not stand the strain of heavy traffic for more than a few days." 4742.

Sir H. McMahon said :—" In 1880, there was but one road, and that an indifferent cart track, from Peshawar through the Khyber to Dakka. From Dakka there was a still more indifferent track, unfit for carts to Kabul. Now there is a broad gauge line to Jamrud ; a widened, well-aligned and metalled driving road of easy gradients through the Khyber to Dakka ; an equally good double road from Jamrud to Ali Masjid ; and an alternative road from Jamrud through the Mullagori country to Landi Kotal. From Dakka there is now a road fit for motors to Kabul. A motor has been able to go from Kabul to Landi Kotal in a day, and a few weeks ago the Amir with his suite in eight motors went from Jalalabad to Kabul in eight hours inclusive of halts." 3457.

209. In addition to the roads on our side of the frontier, there are on the Afghan side (a) a motor road to Kabul, (b) a separate road fit, or easily to be made fit, for carts, as far at least as Safed Sang, (c) a separate camel or mule track. Besides these there is a new motor road from near Jalalabad, reaching Kabul by a roundabout route north of the Kabul river. 2, 22, 1528, 1948, 3457, 4742, 5343, 13887.

Kurram Valley  
and Shutar-  
gardan route.

210. Again, in addition to the roads on the Khyber line, it would certainly also be feasible to forward to Kabul a considerable amount of supplies by the Kurram line, for although the Shutargardan pass is sometimes blocked by snow in the winter, this is usually only for short periods. 5044.

211. It may further be said that the question has been carefully studied by the Quartermaster-General's Branch, both in the light of the experience of the last war, and of the reports of trained agents sent out for the purpose of examining camping grounds and roads, and that that Branch considers that the maintenance of the proposed forces can be properly provided for. 7305-7, 7316, 7322.

5363 (i). Sir J. Willcocks may also be quoted, in regard to the question of supplies obtainable :—" You could not feed four divisions and two cavalry brigades in Kabul from local supplies for long, but I see no difficulties in doing so, once our lines of communication are open and we have light railways to assist us in our task." And, again "I was there (on the Kabul line) but do not know of any difficulty which could not be overcome. There was an immense lot of local food where we were, but we were not allowed to touch it. Had we been allowed to take it we would have fed our line of communications. I was surprised at the large amount of food available in certain parts."

Supplies in  
Northern  
Afghanistan.

5355.

212. We conclude, therefore, that though the maintenance of a force of the size contemplated would be a task demanding careful organization, it would be quite feasible.

#### COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS ESTIMATES.

213. Another point raised at the 56th meeting of the Committee, during the discussion on the Field Army, was, that the force proposed was excessive in comparison with previous estimates of the force required to meet Russia or to deal with Afghanistan and the tribes. We believe that this view is based on a misapprehension. In the first place the General Staff estimate does not in fact provide for a Field Army of the size which Lord Kitchener thought necessary to meet Russia. Appendix A of Lord Kitchener's paper on the "Preparation of the Army in India for War" gave the total number of regular troops counted upon for the Field Army as 170,000 all ranks, exclusive of Imperial Service Troops, i.e., 34,000 more than the equivalent of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades. But, as shown in the Mowatt Committee Report,\* the fact that several bodies of these troops were eventually decided not to be available, reduced the Field Army to 126,000 all ranks, excluding departments and certain details amounting to 11,000 more, or say 137,000 in all. The 11,000 Imperial Service Troops, who were also to be included in the Field Army, raised this total again to about 148,000. The Mowatt Committee Report, moreover, in paragraph 18, pointed out that this proposed strength for the Field Army assumed "that in the event of an attack by Russia, reinforcements will be received from England within six months"; and also that it was based on the assumption that we might "count on the friendship and assistance of the Amir and on comparatively little trouble from the frontier tribes." They added "but the proposals are not calculated in their present form to enable India to act, even for six months, against a combination of Russia with Afghanistan or the tribes or both." And Sir B. Duff stated to the same Committee that nothing would induce him to go to Kabul with these nine divisions against Russia, unless he was quite sure that reinforcements were coming from Home; and this he gave as Lord Kitchener's opinion.

Strength of  
force proposed  
as compared  
with previous  
estimates.

\* Paragraph 16.

Report of Mowatt Committee,  
on page xix.

214. Again Sir B. Duff's estimate of the force to deal with Afghanistan and the tribes combined, of from 100,000 to 120,000 men, included cavalry, infantry, and sappers and miners only, a point to which Sir P. Lake drew attention in Committee. If artillery and departmental services be added, Sir B. Duff's figures read from 118,000 to 140,000. The General Staff estimate,



which includes all arms and services, is 134,000, and it is proposed that 15,000 of these should be held in reserve, leaving a force beyond the frontier of about 119,000.

215. The above goes to show that the force now proposed to deal with this problem is not in excess of what previous authorities have thought to be necessary. And we have already shown (in paragraph 202) that the forces which it is now proposed to use against individual tribes are not appreciably greater than those which have been found necessary in the past.

#### OTHER POSSIBLE DEMANDS ON THE FIELD ARMY.

Other possible  
calls on the  
Field Army.

216. Before proceeding to discuss how such a force as we consider necessary is to be provided, we deem it advisable to draw attention to a further consideration, *viz.*, the possibility of additional calls upon the Field Army.

Possibility of  
Indian troops  
being sent  
overseas.

217. While we believe that the Field Army should be maintained at the strength we recommend, and while we consider it sufficient for the end in view, *viz.*, service beyond the North-West frontier, it must be remembered that it does not follow that the whole of it will always be available. We have recently, within the last few months, seen the Government of India obliged to contemplate the probability of being called upon to despatch a force of at least one complete division to Persia, the probable date of the return of which, if sent, would be difficult to forecast. And during the present war in the Balkans, there has undoubtedly existed, in the background, the contingency of India being required to send a division to assist in safeguarding Egypt.

There is at least a possibility, that, if such a force was absent from India, perhaps even in consequence of its despatch, Moslem fanaticism might bring about a combination of Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes against us, in a 'holy war,' in which the fidelity of the Musalman portion of our Indian troops must inevitably be subjected to a severe strain.

218. In our opinion, the above considerations demonstrate that risk would be involved in cutting down our Field Army to a figure which left no margin for contingencies. In further support of our views we venture to quote the following extract from the Government of India despatch of 2nd September 1909, paragraph 9:—"Remembering that during the frontier disturbances of 1897-98, it was necessary to mobilize nearly 70,000 troops, and making due allowances for the enormous accession of strength which has recently been acquired both by them and by the Afghans, owing to the arms traffic through the Gulf, we feel compelled to place before Your Lordship our deliberate and considered opinion that a force of nine divisions fully equipped and ready to take the field is essential to the security of India, and that we could not accept, without grave protest, a reduction to a seven division standard." We are not aware of any improvement in the military situation having occurred since that date, sufficient to make the above extract from the despatch of 2nd September 1909 inapplicable to-day. The accession of strength to Afghanistan and the tribes through the arms traffic has certainly continued, though we have largely reduced the volume of that traffic in the last two years. And a

3763. . regards our understandings with Russia and Afghanistan, as well as our obligations to Japan, it would appear advisable to show that we have maintained our accepted standard of military strength. It may be noted, that Sir E. Barrow in his evidence said "In my opinion nine divisions are none too many" and that Major-General Aylmer remarked that we should "want every man we have in India, in an efficient state of organization, to carry through a successful campaign" against Afghanistan and the tribes combined.
- 2549.

219. We have entered into these details at some length because, as stated in paragraph 184, we consider it our duty to lay before the Government which assembled the committee, the extent of the demands which we believe may be made upon the organized mobile forces of India—in other words, upon the Field Army.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE AVAILABLE IN INDIA.

220. It remains to consider how far the available armed forces of India, after providing for the requirements of internal security, can provide the force of eight divisions and five cavalry brigades for service on or across the frontier, with the additional division and cavalry brigade in reserve, which we have shown to be required.

Organization of  
force available.

221. We are of opinion that these nine divisions can be drawn, as now, from the nine existing peace divisional areas, each of which can provide a complete war division, with the exception of the 9th (Secunderabad), which may have to leave one brigade behind for internal security purposes; in which case, we propose that its place should be filled by a brigade of Imperial Service infantry.

Of the cavalry brigades required five are available and organized as such, in the Peshawar, Rawal Pindi, Lahore, Meerut and Lucknow Divisions. The sixth can easily be organized but need not be formed immediately, as some months must elapse before all troops can be concentrated on the frontier.

The composition of these war divisions and cavalry brigades, and the detail of the troops allotted for internal security in each divisional area, are shown in Annexure X, Table A, to this Volume of the Report.

Composition of  
the Field Army.

222. We do not think that, in order to provide these divisions and cavalry brigades, any addition to the number of units now on the establishment of the Indian Army is necessary, but whether they can all be taken across the frontier must depend, first, on the internal conditions of the time, and secondly, if these do not admit of it, on whether the Imperial authorities are able to spare us the 20,000 British infantry referred to by Lord (then Sir W.) Nicholson before the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (paragraph 205).

No addition  
necessary to  
establishment  
of Indian Army.

223. But we desire to make it clear that these nine divisions will include the division, (whichever one it may be, according to the circumstances of the moment) which will be selected to furnish the mobile brigades of all arms, if such are required for purposes of internal security\* At the same time, as already stated in paragraph 178, we regard it as quite possible that, when serious complications arise on the frontier, the feeling of the mass of the people of India may be on our side, and the internal condition of the country

Nine divisions  
to include that  
furnishing  
mobile  
brigades.

\*Paragraph 227.



may be so quiet, that both the Supreme and Local Governments may consider that one or more of these mobile brigades can be spared for service with the Field Army. A ninth division will be required in the neighbourhood of the theatre of operations only as a reserve to meet contingencies—and should all go well at the front, the whole or any portion of it could be withdrawn if required for service elsewhere in India.

We also think that, as noted in paragraph 172, conditions in the Hyderabad area might be such as to make it safe, with the consent of the Madras Government, to remove the infantry brigade detailed for Hyderabad, leaving the maintenance of order in that area in the hands of the Secunderabad cavalry brigade, which under ordinary circumstances ought to be quite competent to secure it.

224. If these should be the conditions obtaining in India at the time when the army is mobilizing for war, then our table showing the peace and war allocation of units, Annexure X to this Volume, demonstrates that there would be no difficulty in placing in the field nine organized divisions and five cavalry brigades. A sixth cavalry brigade could be easily formed when required.

225. If on the other hand the internal conditions of India were not satisfactory, so that we could not dispense either with the mobile brigades, or with the infantry brigade now allotted to the Hyderabad area, it would be necessary, (unless reinforcements were sent from home, which would at once solve the difficulty), to rely upon a more systematic use of Imperial Service Troops. Their employment is discussed below.

Employment of  
Imperial  
Service Troops.

226. In our proposals we have aimed at allotting the available troops with a due regard to probable local conditions and to economy of force, and in a manner permitting the widest elasticity and freedom of action. No increase in the number of troops is requisite; it is only necessary that the existing divisional organizations should be preserved and fully utilized.

Formation of  
mobile  
brigades.

227. So long as all of the nine divisional areas include, as they now do, war divisions organized and trained on similar lines, it appears to us that when the time comes, it will be easy to select the division which, under the circumstances of the moment, is the most suitable to allot for the purposes of internal security. There can be no difficulty in breaking up an organized and trained division into three mobile brigades; but, on the other hand, an efficient division can not be formed by simply bringing together three such brigades, however efficient they may be individually. At the present moment all the essential parts of an organization capable of producing a Field Army of nine divisions and five cavalry brigades exist in full working order.

#### THE IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS.

Policy of the  
Government of  
India regarding  
Imperial  
Service Troops.

228. The question of the employment of Imperial Service Troops in war is an important one, and so far has perhaps hardly received all the consideration it deserves. In the first place, the policy of the Government of India must be made clear.

229. Sir Mortimer Durand, in a note dated 3rd

\* Military Department, Pros. B., February 1892, stated\* :—  
March 1893, No. 1123.

“ It is of the essence of the (Imperial Service) Scheme that the whole of the Imperial Service Troops should be marched out at once on

the occurrence of a general mobilization." And the further noting on the question at the same time shows that Lord Roberts, Sir H. Brackenbury, and the Viceroy all agreed in this view.

Pros. B., October 1904, Nos.  
1522-66.

Sir E. Elles in writing on the same subject in his noting on Lord Kitchener's scheme, says (22nd October 1903) :—

"I understand Lord Kitchener would, *as now*, utilize them (Imperial Service Troops) in the Field Army to a large extent and remove the whole of them from their own States at an early stage of mobilization. This is our present policy, and there is little doubt that they may be of great use in the field and that they will always be an element of danger in India."

Finally a Committee composed of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary, Foreign Department, and the Inspector-General, Imperial Service Troops, reported in May 1911, as follows :—

"Imperial Service Troops will be withdrawn from the States at once on a general mobilization, with the exception of a considerable force retained for the defence of Kashmir, units unfit, and the men left in the depôts."

There has therefore been a consistent policy from the first, which provides abundant authority for giving Imperial Service Troops a place in our war organization.

230. No doubt, for political and other reasons, their mobilization for the field might in some cases require a little time, but this ought not to prevent proper arrangements being elaborated beforehand, so that they should fall into their places with the least possible complication. Under the conditions hitherto obtaining, no plans have yet been completed for the systematic employment of these troops. We understand that the question is engaging attention. If so, we would suggest the following as the most suitable lines for such arrangements to follow.

231. The infantry should be formed into infantry brigades, as nearly as possible after the pattern of regular organizations of the Indian army. This course offers advantages over the alternative course of utilizing units singly outside of regular formations, in that, as no doubt British officers would be appointed to the command and staff of an Imperial Service brigade, as well as British officers to accompany each unit, the different corps would at once find an authority to whom to apply for any assistance they might need, and who would form the channel of communication between them and the British Indian troops generally. This was the plan adopted in 1879, when the Punjab Chiefs' State troops were assembled as one contingent for service in the Kurram, under General Watson. Failing an arrangement such as this, Imperial Service Troops are bound to take some time to settle down into their new conditions, and would not only be at a disadvantage themselves, but might be a source of trouble and anxiety to a commander and staff, who might not be familiar with the conditions of such troops. To use them in this manner, too, will simplify all the administrative arrangements for their supply and maintenance. Once organized for war purposes into brigades, it will be a comparatively simple matter to detail these Imperial Service Troops accordingly to the requirements of the time. A brigade can either be attached to an already complete war division, or be utilized to take the place in a division of a regular brigade which, on mobilization, it has been decided to detail for special purposes,

Imperial  
Service  
Infantry.

232. The utilization of the Imperial Service cavalry to the best advantage is not quite so simple a question. In the first place, the manœuvring power required of a cavalry brigade in the field is beyond what can be expected of Imperial Service Troops, if formed into complete brigades as proposed for the infantry. It is even less desirable to employ Imperial Service cavalry corps as divisional cavalry. The experience of manœuvres shows that the work devolving on the latter demands a high degree of training, and the presence of a number of officers trained as only British officers are at present trained. It is most improbable that Indian officers of Imperial Service units will be found capable of performing the duties of officers of divisional cavalry. It is moreover essential that divisional cavalry should be in the habit of working with its own division, and, since it is constantly used in small bodies and in close co-operation with both British and Indian troops, that all ranks should both speak and understand the language in common use in the Indian army, as well as the ways of our troops. In all this, Imperial Service cavalry, who probably, also, would never have trained in peace with the division to which they were attached for war, would be much at a loss. In our opinion the best way to utilize these troops would be to attach a regiment to each cavalry brigade, detailing the remainder for use as cavalry on the lines of communication, where they might be very useful, especially on the Southern Line.

233. The various corps of Imperial Service Transport already find place in our arrangements, and the utilizing of Imperial Service troops of other descriptions will present little difficulty. But for all branches of the service alike the desideratum to be borne in mind is, that such arrangements should be elaborated in advance as will enable each unit to move into its appointed place when mobilization is ordered.

### **Section IX.—Mobilization and Concentration for War.**

234. The efficiency of the Field Army for war depends so much on the proper working of its Mobilization and Concentration arrangements that it seems desirable to explain the system somewhat in detail—more especially as the examination of witnesses showed considerable misapprehension as to the difference between past and present conditions in this respect.

Mobilization has been defined as the process by which units (regiments, battalions, batteries, etc.), pass from a peace to a war footing—*i.e.*, by which the unit completes its War Establishment with fully trained and fit men and takes on its charge the whole of the equipment, ammunition and transport which it requires for war. Concentration is the process by which mobilized units, in their proper "formations," *i.e.*, divisions, brigades, etc., are moved into the positions in which the military authorities desire to have them placed for the opening of the campaign.

235. The system of command and of responsibility for preparation for war and mobilization, which existed prior to Lord Kitchener's arrival, was overcentralized and tended to be ineffective. Under that system, which obtained until 1903, India was divided into four Commands, each under a Lieutenant-General, who had a

2359, 3909.

complete staff, and exercised considerable powers of peace administration. These powers, however, were confined mainly to matters of discipline and command, inasmuch as all the principal departmental officers, who dealt with the food, pay, clothing, transport and equipment of the troops, were responsible primarily to the Military Department, and not through the Lieutenant-General to the Commander-in-Chief.

236. In the event of mobilization, the duties of a Lieutenant-General of a command were :—

Former duties  
of Commanders.

- (a) To make good deficiencies in the units to be mobilized, as regards officers and men, from those units of his Command which were not detailed for mobilization.
- (b) To recall officers on leave on medical certificate in India, if pronounced fit for duty.
- (c) To detail officers to command depôts of Indian units.

237. Among the duties of a general commanding a 1st or 2nd class District, were :—

- (a) To make arrangements for "preliminary" movements by units and to issue orders to ensure the punctual entraining of units, when directed to do so by Army Headquarters.
- (b) Recall of detachments "on command."
- (c) Release of prisoners under certain rules.
- (d) Transfer of depôts to their reserve centres.
- (e) Report to Quartermaster-General in India, when all units were ready to move.

166, 176, 2363-71, 2455.

238. Army Headquarters were entirely responsible for every detail in the plans of mobilization and concentration, though these were "approved" by the Military Department. Army Headquarters issued the orders for the commencement of the moves and subsequently supervised all the movements, and regulated the concentration. They decided the questions of the recall of officers on leave out of India (other than privilege leave) and of the scale on which Indian depôts were to be formed, while even such details as the disposal of tindals and lascars of units were reserved for them to deal with.

Responsibility  
for details.

239. The Military Department, besides "approving" the plans of Army Headquarters on behalf of the Government, was responsible for the sufficiency and supply of all departmental services, their equipment, transport and stores, for the provision of the medical details to accompany units, and for the mobilization of medical and veterinary units. The complicated nature of the responsibility in such matters is well illustrated in the Military Department regulation which reads as follows :— "Subject to the *general control* which is inseparable from the position and functions of the Quartermaster-General in India and of general officers commanding districts, the *supreme control* over all the field hospitals in India is vested in the Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India, and no field hospitals will be mobilized or moved without reference to him." A similar regulation existed in regard to the Principal Veterinary Officer, except that the word "supervision" was substituted for "control" in the first line. Thus, while the Principal Medical Officer in India issued orders for the mobilization of field hospitals and received reports on the subject direct from District Principal

Medical Officers, the allotment of field hospitals and their movements were the subject of orders issued by the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, respectively.

**Concentration.**

240. Concentration was worked out, directed and carried out by Army Headquarters, though in some particulars, such as the timing of trains, the Staff of the Brigades concerned were previously consulted. But the units moved only on the orders received from Army Headquarters. 2399.

**Mobilization and Concentration in 1897-98.**

241. The North-West frontier operations in 1897 are an illustration of the defects due to this over-centralization, and of the disregard of the principle of organizing troops in peace as they would work in war. For these operations battalions were drawn from nine out of the twelve brigades then forming the Field Army of four divisions and of these nine brigades not one took the field in the formation in which it existed in peace time. Of the four brigades forming the main column of the Tirah Force, no two battalions in any one brigade had been trained together. The numbering and nomenclature of the divisions and brigades for the campaign had no connection with previously existing peace organizations. 165, 400, 2387, 2455.

**Arrangements for replacing units selected for active service.**

242 As no importance was attached to units having been previously associated in brigades, or accustomed to work together in peace, so no importance was attached to the then existing brigade organizations, in arranging such reliefs as were rendered necessary by the departure of units for field service. Accordingly, to avoid expense, the nearest available battalion was usually taken to form the relief. When subsequently additional troops were required for the field, further complications arose, when the areas, from which these reliefs had been taken, had themselves to be called upon later to provide troops for the front, as well as the reliefs. 3906-3923.

243. As a result the railways became congested and concentration was delayed, as the previously prepared plans of concentration were useless to deal with the entanglements which the Railway authorities were now called upon to unravel. Moreover, the movement of troops from widely separated areas to join their brigade or division, involved the crossing of many of the lines of route and added to the delay and inconvenience.

**Lord Kitchener's proposals for mobilization and concentration.**

244. Lord Kitchener's plans were directed mainly to the removal of the defects just referred to. By his redistribution scheme he attempted to allot troops in peace to the organizations in which they would work in war, and so far as financial considerations allowed, he appointed commanders (with staffs) for the higher formations of the army, who would train them in peace and command them in war, and who would be responsible that mobilization arrangements were complete or that deficiencies were brought to notice. In furtherance of the same principles, he introduced the idea of self-contained areas, so as to provide in each for definitely organized bodies of troops, in the formations in which they would take the field, and, by échelonning the divisions quartered in these areas along the main railway lines, he enabled complete formations to be moved to their places of concentration by separate lines of rail, without crossing the lines of other formations on their way to the front.

M. D. Pros. B., October 1904,  
Nos 61522-6

2331-57, 2463.

6966, 7007.

3859, 5761, 6966, 6968,  
6972, 7184.

245. Under the present mobilization regulations, the war establishment of a unit is completed locally by the elimination of unfit men and (where necessary) by the addition of fit men under the orders of the divisional commander. Most of the equipment required for war is already on unit charge, and checked indents are held ready for the remainder, which can be at once drawn from the departments concerned. Ammunition and transport are collected under similar pre-arranged orders at the bases of operations, and are ready for issue to the unit when it arrives. To put the process of mobilization in action, nothing more is required than the single order to mobilize, issued from Army Headquarters. Divisional Commanders are entirely responsible that all arrangements have been made previously, so that this order can be carried out by them when received.

2359, 6936.  
6992, 7138.  
13487.  
13503, 13505.

246. As regards concentration, plans of movement are prepared at Army Headquarters in conjunction with the Railway Board, as was done before, but the trains are now numbered and grouped in blocks, each train being calculated to convey a type of unit or part of a unit, and each block to carry out a definite portion of the whole concentration. The actual allotment of individual units to particular trains is the work of the divisional staff, who, under the divisional commander, carry the process of concentration to completion as far as their own divisional area is concerned, under the orders they have previously received. Army Headquarters direct when each block of movements is to commence, and keep touch with it subsequently, through their special railway staff.

Concentration.

8813-8848.

7001-05.

247. On the mobilization of the whole Field Army, the railway authorities will require 21 days before the concentration of the troops can be proceeded with, in which to make arrangements for collecting from foreign lines, and distributing, the necessary staff, engines and rolling stock. It is anticipated that within two years the improvements now being made on the frontier railways will admit of the period of twenty one days being reduced to ten.

During the preparatory period of 21 days, before the concentration of the army commences, the technical troops allotted to each line of advance will be railed to the three bases, Peshawar, Kohat and Chaman, in order that the work of preparing camping grounds, improving the water supply and communications may be proceeded with before the leading divisions arrive.

8840.

7134.

248. The existing concentration scheme, which was prepared for five divisions and four cavalry brigades, is now being recast. The revised scheme will be for the concentration of seven divisions and five cavalry brigades. The time required under the fresh arrangements to concentrate the first seven divisions and five cavalry brigades on the North-West frontier is shown in the Table (Annexure IV) at page 559, of Volume III, of the Report.

The reasons which have led to plans of movement for the whole of the Field Army not having been drawn up are that it is unnecessary to prepare such plans for the rearward divisions. These, as at present intended, will be moved into the areas vacated by one or other of the divisions first to cross the frontier, before it can be determined in what portion of the field of operations they



will be required. The railway plans used for the forward divisions will then be equally suitable for them when they have to move in their turn. In former days, when the Field Army consisted of four divisions and five cavalry brigades, similar considerations caused the plans for concentration to be prepared for two divisions and two cavalry brigades only.

249. General Birdwood has told us that the troops can be supplied with transport and equipment more rapidly than it will be possible to move them by rail.

7134, 15470, 15657, 16046.

We agree with him in thinking that, to facilitate the mobilization and concentration of the Field army it is desirable to complete the self-contained divisional area system which Lord Kitchener had aimed at, and we recommend that this consideration should be kept in mind whenever barracks and lines have to be rebuilt.

161-163.	5315.
396.	7148.
2329-31.	7158.
3763-3769.	7174.
3773.	7184.
5257.	7203.

Present  
systems.

250. The reforms initiated by Lord Kitchener have been steadily advanced and acted on since, with the result that while the arrangements for mobilization are far more simple and more decentralized than they were previously, alternative allotments of troops to suit the more likely plans of operations, whether singly or simultaneously, have been (in some cases) and are being (in others) worked out; in the concentration order form units are now allotted by stations, types of units being specified instead of units by name; and generally the possibility of smooth working in the process of mobilization and concentration has been greatly increased. This is largely the result of decentralization of responsibility and a more equal distribution of the heavy work involved in these operations, without any diminution of the power of general control exercised by Army Headquarters and the Government. Devolution of responsibility has also provided an incentive for divisional commanders and their subordinates to put their best energies into work for which they will be held responsible, and by which they will be judged. At the same time decentralization has diminished the temptation for higher authority, by retaining the power of detailed executive action in its own hands, to exchange at the last moment the plans which have been carefully prepared in advance, for others which under the circumstances of the moment may appear attractive, but which would in most cases be found to be inadvisable did time admit of a close investigation, and consideration of the various other consequential changes involved.

M. D. Pros. B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

161, 163, 2359, 2361, 2363,  
2455, 2622, 3873-97, 3909,  
5283, 7184, 7203, 10972,  
11374.

Lord  
Kitchener's  
scheme adhered  
to.

251. We should regard as prejudicial any interruption to this process of preparing the Army for war, and we desire to record our adherence to the main principles of command and administration introduced by Lord Kitchener. Further progress should not, in our opinion, be sought in the initiation of any great changes, but in carrying steadily through, to completion, the existing plans for the mobilization and concentration of the army for war and in making good such deficiencies as cannot be readily supplied on mobilization.

161, 381, 396, 2329, 2331,  
3763, 5257, 7184.

Summary of  
existing  
arrangements  
for  
concentration  
of Field Army.

252. It will be convenient, perhaps, in order to make our position clear, to summarise the existing arrangements for a concentration of the whole Field Army upon the North-West Frontier, for active operations against Afghanistan and the frontier tribes in combination, under the plans for such an eventuality



discussed in Section VIII, paragraphs 200 to 205, and then to show, in general terms, how far we are prepared at the present moment to mobilize and place in the field the Field Army of nine divisions, five cavalry brigades and army troops which we have recommended.

253. As already mentioned, the railway authorities will require 21 days for preparation, before they can undertake to carry through the main concentration of troops upon the three lines, Northern, Central and Southern, of advance into Afghanistan. The capacity of the railways for moving troops governs the whole question of concentration, and the extent of the demands which must be made upon the railways in this connection is not generally understood. A tabular statement of the case was given by Major-General Birdwood in his answer 7134—see Annexure IV, page 559, Volume III—but for convenience of reference it is here summarised.

254. Counting the day on which the order to mobilize is given as the 1st day of mobilization, and also as the first day of the 21 days' notice for preparation required by the railways, and taking first the Northern line of advance from Peshawar, we find that, on the 25th day of mobilization, the 1st Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade are complete at the base with their regimental transport and ready to advance. In 17 days more; on the 41st day, the whole of the transport for the line of communications as far as Dakka is also complete at Peshawar. The 2nd Division and its transport commence to move from their stations on the 42nd day and are concentrated at Peshawar on the 51st day. The 7th Division with its transport commences to move on the 56th day and is complete at Peshawar on the 65th day. Meanwhile the whole of the transport for an advance to Jalalabad has also been collected at Peshawar. Twelve days more (77th day) completes the concentration of the Imperial Service Troops and transport for the line of communications as far as Kabul.

Taking next the Central line of advance, the 3rd Division and 3rd Cavalry Brigade and their regimental transport will be concentrated at the base, Kohat, by the 43rd day. The completion of the line of communications transport as far as the Peiwar will take to the 77th day. The 5th Division with its regimental transport will commence its move on the 78th day, and will arrive complete by the 96th day. Similarly the 9th Division will commence its move on the 109th day and have completely arrived by the 122nd day. By the 129th day the Imperial Service Troops and the whole of the transport required for the line of communications as far as Kabul will have arrived.

On the Southern line of advance, the 4th Division and 7th Cavalry Brigade, with their regimental transport complete, will have arrived at the base, Chaman, by the 41st day. The Imperial Service Troops and road transport to Mel Karez will have arrived by the 58th day, the 7th Cavalry Brigade by the 64th day and the transport for line of communications as far as Kandahar, by the 72nd day. The 8th Division will be held in reserve for use according to circumstances; the railway movements for the 2nd and 8th Cavalry Brigades have not yet been worked out.

It will be seen that a considerable time elapses before the railway authorities are ready to commence moving the rearward divisions, the 7th Division starting on the 56th day, the 5th Division on the 78th and the 9th Division on the 109th day. This gives an appreciable margin of time, during which these divisions can be completed with requirements locally procurable but not kept on hand in time of peace.

255. The requirements of the Field Army upon a general mobilization can be most easily discussed under the headings of Units, Personnel, Animals and Matériel.

256. As regards Units, the following are the only serious deficiencies :—

(a) We have shown, in paragraph 221, that, if internal conditions are unsatisfactory in the Secunderabad Divisional area, at the time of a general mobilization, it may be found necessary to leave behind in the Hyderabad defence area the 26th Brigade for internal security purposes. The 9th Division would then be short of one infantry brigade, in which case we propose that its place should be filled by a brigade of Imperial Service infantry, organised for the purpose. This would supply the deficiency.

(b) We have at present fourteen batteries of mountain artillery allotted to Field Army purposes, that is, enough only for seven divisions. Under the recommendations we are putting forward in paragraphs 269 and 270, two more British mountain batteries will be found by the conversion of two of the existing heavy (bullock) batteries, which we propose to reduce. This will provide for an eighth division. The remaining two batteries will be provided for by drawing upon the occupation batteries of the 1st Division and Kohat Brigade, for, since, under the assumption upon which our plans for a general mobilization are based, active operations will be going on upon the border in both areas, there is little probability of these two mountain batteries being required for action independently of the Field Army troops. They could therefore be spared for the 9th division. So that in this case also the deficiency can be supplied.

(c) Signal companies will eventually be required in accordance with the Scheme already accepted by the Secretary of State. As explained in the Section of our Report which deals with changes in the complements of the various arms, we consider that one company will be necessary for each division of the Field Army, and recommend (see paragraph 273) that three new companies should now be raised as soon as practicable, leaving the remainder to be subsequently provided. Meanwhile companies would be improvised on the occasion arising.

(d) *Headquarters of Divisional Artillery.*—As explained in Government of India despatch No. 101, of 1911, one will eventually be required for each division of the Field Army, towards meeting which demand six now exist. The remainder can be improvised.

(e) *Infantry Brigade Headquarters.*—One still remains to be provided (Mhow Brigade) for the Field Army. We have already recommended (paragraph 127) that this be found by the transfer of the Brigadier-General and his Brigade-Major from the Mandalay Brigade, leaving the clerical establishment still to be provided.

(f) *Field Troops of Sappers and Miners.*—None are at present organized, though the personnel sufficient for two is available. They would have to be organized on mobilization.

257. As regards Personnel, the following shows the state of the case :—

(a) *British officers for Staffs and for the Indian Army.*—We have shown elsewhere (Section XIV—Supply of British officers,) that, by drawing on units allotted to internal security and other sources, we can meet our requirements on mobilization. The demands of wastage will still have to be provided for, the responsibility being divided between the Adjutant-General and the Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief.

Personnel,  
Officers for  
staff.

(b) *Officers and men for administrative services.*—We have shown in Section XX, which deals with extra-regimental requirements in the event of mobilization, that, with the exception of the Medical Services, the extra officers and men required by the various Departments for purposes of supervision can be found by drawing upon units allotted to internal security on mobilization. The provision of the subordinate personnel required, which, it is anticipated can be met from reserves and by special enlistments at the time, rests with the heads of departments concerned, the Quartermaster General, Director-General of Ordnance and Director-General of Military Works.

Officers for  
Departmental  
Services.

As regards the Medical Services, the question is an important and difficult one. We have dealt with the subject in Section XIX, paragraphs 448 to 453. The most urgent need is the provision of a sufficient number of trained bearers in war, upon which the views of the Committee have already been given separately, see item 20, Annexure B, Volume I. We understand that the Director of Medical Services, as the responsible officer, has already made proposals.

7134.

15470.

15657.

15663.

15474.

15673.

Annexure II, page 557, Volume  
III.

Annexure II, page 554, Volume  
III.

15227-39.

15261.

258. As regards Animals, General Birdwood has told us that the troops can be supplied with transport more rapidly than it will be possible for the railways to move them to the front. We have discussed the question of the supply of transport animals in paragraphs 421 to 428, from which it will be seen that we anticipate no difficulty (except as regards bullock carts and drivers, which may take time) in meeting the initial requirements of a Field Army of nine divisions and five cavalry brigades, and of providing for subsequent wastage by purchases abroad. The question of horses for remount purposes is dealt with in paragraphs 441 to 446, from which it will be seen that the existing arrangements appear adequate to meet the demands of the Field Army on mobilization. The transport requirements of troops detailed for internal security purposes are provided for in local Defence Schemes.

Animals.

259. Dealing with Matériel of all kinds, that which the army requires upon a general mobilization may be grouped under the main heads of (a) arms and ammunition, (b) equipment, (c) clothing and (d) food supplies.

Matériel.

As regards (a) *arms and ammunition*, we find that with the exception of rifles, the position is on the whole satisfactory, though considerable delay has occurred in the rearmament of the artillery, due mainly to difficulties of manufacture in England. The position of the supply of

rifles, however, is far from reassuring, and has recently been brought to the notice of the Government of India. We have adverted to this subject in Section XXXII—The Supply of Rifles and Machine Guns—but so far as mobilization is concerned it is less the pattern of the rifles than the numbers available for the troops that is in question, and although the number in reserve will by no means be what it ought to be, we entertain no doubt but that the supply will be sufficient to provide every man for whom a rifle is required on mobilization with a rifle reasonably fit for service, even if old.

With regard to (b) *equipment*, Major-General Birdwood told us that the mobilization reserves of imported articles maintained in the country were adequate for the first requirements of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades, while orders for articles required for maintenance purposes would be placed with the Director-General of Stores, India Office, as soon as mobilization on a large scale was decided on. He added that the nature of the locally procurable articles was such that first supply offered no serious difficulty, whilst, provided demands from the field were put forward without undue delay, maintenance should prove an easy matter.

7007.

As regards (c) *clothing*, he also informed us that (i) all troops British and Indian, maintained the clothing required by them in peace, (ii) that this clothing would be supplemented on mobilization by free issues of field service clothing from reserves, and (iii) that followers, who have no uniform in peace, will be provided entirely with clothing from existing reserves.

7007.

He stated that these reserves were adequate for initial requirements of a field army of nine divisions, with the exceptions given in Annexure III p. 553, Vol. III, which, it will be seen, are such that there should be no difficulty in making them good, in the interval between the order for mobilization and the dates of movement of the rearward divisions and cavalry brigades. He added that, for maintenance purposes during a campaign, stocks on hand would be supplemented to the extent necessary, by demands on the Director-General of Stores, India Office, and by purchase in India.

As concerns (d) *food supplies*, he informed us that the mobilization reserves maintained in India of imported articles were sufficient for the first requirements of mobilization, while no difficulty was anticipated in placing maintenance orders at home or in Australia. As for locally procurable supplies, small stocks are kept in hand for the concentration period for five divisions and four cavalry brigades, but no difficulty is anticipated in procuring the necessary quantities to meet all initial and maintenance requirements as they arise.

7007.

Conclusion,  
Field army  
complete.

260. We may therefore sum up the case thus : that, while there still remain sundry deficiencies to be made good before the Field Army can be considered to be in a thoroughly complete and efficient state, yet none of them, with the possible exception of the deficiencies in the Army Bearer Corps, are of sufficient importance to prevent the mobilization and concentration of the whole of the nine divisions, five cavalry brigades and army troops for service on the frontier. It must be admitted, as stated elsewhere, that the question of the supply of bearers is an exceedingly difficult and troublesome one, and we earnestly trust that it will receive at an early date the attention it deserves.

## Section X.—Possible reinforcements for India from England.

231. The question of reinforcements for India from England is so often alluded to in Lord Kitchener's papers on the defence of India, and might affect so closely our plans for action at the present day, that some reference to the subject seems to be required in this Report.

G. S., Regr. No. 296½ of 1902.

232. In June 1902 the Secretary of State requested the Government of India to furnish, for the information of the War Office, an estimate of the number of troops, guns, vehicles, etc., which would be required as reinforcements for the army in India in the event of a war with Russia.

History of the case.

The matter was referred to Lord Kitchener on his arrival in India at the end of 1902, and at his request the issue of a reply was held over until he, as Commander-in-Chief, had formulated his views, both as regards the dangers to which India was exposed and as to the means which could be made available in India to meet them.

Pro. B., January 1906, Nos. 863-900.

In January 1904, whilst the question was still under consideration, the Secretary of State informed the Government of India that an estimate prepared by the War Office showed that, in the event of a war with Russia, it would be necessary to despatch a first contingent of 30,000 men to India, as soon as the Navy could ensure their safe transport by sea, to be followed by further reinforcements amounting to 70,000 men. Information was asked for as to the best organization and composition of these contingents, which included 37,000 men to make good wastage.

*Ibid.*

The Government of India intimated to the Secretary of State, in November 1904, that in their opinion, in addition to the battalions required to complete the 9th Division of the Field Army, reinforcements would be needed aggregating the strength of two cavalry brigades and eight infantry divisions, as well as drafts to make good wastage.

263. These proposals were considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence in April 1905, who arrived at a decision that the supply of reinforcements for India from Home might be assumed to be:—

- 2 cavalry brigades.
- 8 infantry divisions of two brigades each.
- 3 battalions of infantry to complete the Field Army of nine divisions.
- 5 battalions, mounted infantry, if required.
- 2 railway companies, R. E.
- 2 telegraph divisions, R. E.

*Ibid.*

264. The above reinforcements were to arrive in India in five contingents, the last to land within eight months of the outbreak of war. The drafts, in numbers based on the percentages of wastage estimated, were to be sent out in quarterly batches. These proposals were communicated to and accepted by the Government of India.

265. These arrangements, however, no longer hold good, for in 1906, the Army Council desired that the Government of India should be informed that—

Existing position.

“Plans for the defence of India must be based upon the actual resources of the army in India, and that no more definite promise of assistance could be given than a general assurance that the Home army would be bound to support India to the utmost extent of its power.”



266. On the 30th May 1907, the Committee of Imperial Defence recommended that :—

\* \* \* \* \*

“ 4 (c) The military organization of Great Britain should be such as to enable 100,000 men to be despatched to India during the first year of war.

(d) The Indian Government should make preparations to receive the number of reinforcements specified in the evidence given by Sir Beauchamp Duff before the sub-committee.”

267. This is how the matter of reinforcements and drafts from England now stands. But, on the assumption that in the event of military assistance being applied for, the War Office would send out reinforcements on the plan outlined in the Scheme of 1905, tables have been prepared shewing what equipment those reinforcements would require on arrival, schemes have been considered for providing them with transport and followers, and plans suggested for incorporating them in the army. The scheme has not been fully elaborated, owing to the uncertainty which exists as to their exact nature and numbers but it is kept in a state admitting of rapid completion should occasion require.

Reinforcements  
for war against  
Afghanistan  
and the tribes.

268. The question of reinforcements from Home, which might be required for a war other than with Russia, has not as yet been raised by the Secretary of State, nor considered by the Government of India, but, as previously mentioned, Lord (then Sir William) Nicholson when giving evidence before the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, stated that, in the event of India being at war with Afghanistan in combination with the independent tribes on the frontier, it would be necessary to send out from Home from 18,000 to 20,000 infantry, as reinforcements. This is practically the equivalent of two divisions.

269. Reference to the preceding Section of this Report, Field Army Requirements, paragraphs 205-6 will show that we believe that a Field Army of nine divisions, (*plus* certain Imperial Service Troops) will suffice to meet a combination against us of Afghanistan and the frontier tribes. But we have also shown in the same Section, that the full nine divisions can only be available for employment on the frontier, provided the internal condition of India is quite satisfactory. If it were not so, we should have to detail one of these divisions to furnish the mobile brigades which, under such circumstances, would be pivotted upon Delhi, Allahabad and Jhansi-Mhow, respectively. Were this action necessary, then the assistance from Home of even half the number of troops referred to by Lord Nicholson would be of the greatest value to India. And, if such an emergency were to occur when perhaps a whole division of Indian troops was absent, *e.g.*, in Persia, the whole of the reinforcements which he mentions would not be too many. We distinguish between reinforcements and drafts, for the latter would be required in any case in which the British troops in India took part in prolonged field operations.

## Section XI.—Summary of the allotment of units and changes proposed in the various arms.

270. The following paragraphs give the number of units of the various arms which we have allotted, respectively, for internal security and for the Field Army, including with the latter the division, whichever it may

be, which will furnish the mobile brigades for internal security purposes if required. The changes proposed in the established number of units of each arm are also discussed.

271. Of *British cavalry regiments* there are nine in India, of which four are allotted to internal security and one to each of the five cavalry brigades.

Cavalry.

Of *Indian cavalry regiments*, excluding the local Aden troop, nineteen are allotted to internal security purposes, two to the division which will furnish the mobile brigades, ten to the five cavalry brigades, and eight to the other divisions of the Field Army.

8803.

A proposal was made in committee (57th day) that the three existing regiments of Indian non-silladar cavalry should be abolished. We are opposed to this, and consider that, in view of the requirements for internal security and railway defence, for which Indian cavalry will be extremely useful, none can be spared. On the other hand, we are inclined to think that much would be gained were it possible to convert these regiments into silladar regiments. In many of the existing silladar regiments, the amount of money which recruits are required to produce is already so much reduced for certain categories, that we anticipate little difficulty in meeting the needs of the particular classes of men who now enter these regiments.

Sir Robert Scallon considers, however, that, if reductions in the Indian army are unavoidable, it is in this direction that they can be made with the least detriment to the service. In our tables it has been assumed that the reduction will not be carried out.

Were these to be abolished there would, in three of the Field Army divisions be no cavalry for Divisional Cavalry, unless Imperial Service Cavalry were called upon for this duty—a service for which we cannot consider them to be suited in any respect.

272. Of eleven *Royal Horse Artillery batteries*, five are allotted for internal security, five for cavalry brigades and one for Army Troops.

Artillery.

273. Of *Royal Field Artillery (including Howitzer) batteries*, of which there are forty-five in all, nine are allotted for internal security, three for the division furnishing the mobile brigades, twenty-four for the other eight divisions and nine for Army Troops.

274. As regards *Ammunition Columns*, there are at present nine for Royal Horse Artillery, one being assigned to each of the present eight cavalry brigades and one to army troops. Under our proposals, as we recommend a reduction of the Field Army cavalry brigades to five, there will be three of these to spare.

There are twelve Ammunition Columns for the Field Artillery, one for each division—including the division which supplies the mobile brigades—and three for army troops.

We propose to utilize the saving in personnel, equipment and horses, obtained by the abolition of the three Horse Artillery Columns, together with that obtained by the reduction of three companies of Garrison Artillery referred to in the following paragraph, towards increasing the present establishments of horse and field batteries, and meeting the extra cost of the proposed two new mountain batteries.



275. As regards *Royal Garrison Artillery*, leaving the single Indian Frontier Garrison Artillery company out of account, there are 21 companies, of which 18 are required for internal defence.

We recommend that the remaining three be dis-established, but that an approximate equivalent of the numbers of the rank and file thus set free should be applied to strengthen the horse and field artillery, so as to render the batteries of both more capable of mobilization from their own peace establishment.

276. Of *Heavy Batteries* there are at present six, all assigned to the Field Army. We have had evidence that, having regard to the character and *terrain* of our probable operations on and beyond the North-West frontier, these are more than is necessary, and we propose to convert two of them, those which at present have bullock draught, into British mountain batteries, which will be far more useful. Of the remaining four, we propose to keep one for internal security purposes to be allotted as required, and to assign the remaining three to the Field Army, two for the northern and one for the southern line of advance.

4367-8.  
5572-5.

277. Of the twenty existing *Mountain Batteries*, six are utilized for occupation troops, and the balance, fourteen, for seven divisions for the Field Army. We have proposed above that two additional British mountain batteries should be created by the conversion of two heavy batteries. These will be allotted to the eighth war division.

We regard an additional brigade (two batteries) of mountain artillery as among the future *desiderata* of the army, so as to allow a mountain artillery brigade to each division.

Sappers and  
Miners.

278. Of the *Sappers and Miners*, one and a quarter companies of the existing field companies are assigned to occupation troops, two to the division furnishing the mobile brigades and the remaining fifteen and three quarters to the other eight divisions of the Field Army.

279. The two *Railway companies* will remain, as at present, allotted to army troops.

280. As regards *Signal companies*, we consider that one is necessary for each division of the Field Army, but, as a first step, and as the service is new, we do not propose that more than three new ones should be raised at present; we also think that, eventually, two companies (wireless) will be required as Army Troops.

The three new companies should be raised at Ahmednagar and afterwards located at Rawal Pindi, Roorkee and Secunderabad.

Infantry.

281. Of *British infantry battalions*, our internal defence proposals will take up twenty-six, the division furnishing the mobile brigades will require three, and the remaining twenty-three are allotted to the other eight Field Army divisions.

282. Of the one hundred and thirty-three *Indian infantry and Pioneer battalions*, (excluding the five on Colonial Service), forty-six are required under our proposals for occupation troops, ten are required for the division furnishing the mobile brigades, leaving seventy-seven for the other Field Army divisions.

283. We propose to allot the following units as Army Troops :— Army Troops.

- 1 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, with ammunition column.
- 6\* Batteries, (2 Brigades) Royal Field Artillery, with 2 ammunition columns.
- 3 Batteries, (1 Brigade) Royal Field Artillery, Howitzers, with ammunition column.
- 3 Heavy batteries, Royal Garrison Artillery.
- 2 Railway Companies, Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Wireless Signal company.

284. The effect of the proposals contained in the foregoing paragraphs is shown in the table below :— General effect.

Units.	ESTABLISHMENT.		DISTRIBUTION PROPOSED.			Remarks.
	Present.	Proposed.	Occupation Troops.	Division to furnish mobile brigades.	Remaining divisions and cavalry brigades of Field Army.	
British cavalry regiments ...	9	9	4	...	5	
Indian cavalry regiments ...	39*	39	19*	2	18	* Does not include Aden troop.
Royal Horse Artillery batteries ...	11	11	5	...	6	
Royal Field Artillery batteries ...	45	45	9	3	33	
Royal Horse Artillery Ammunition Columns.	9	6	...	...	6	
Royal Field Artillery Ammunition Columns.	12	12	...	1	11	
Royal Garrison Artillery (including Frontier Garrison Artillery) companies.	22	19	19	...	...	
Royal Garrison Artillery Heavy batteries.	6	4	1	...	3	
Mountain Artillery batteries ...	20	22	6	...	16	
† Field companies, Sappers and Miners.	19	19	1½	2	15½	† Excluding Fortress company at Aden.
Railway companies, Sappers and Miners.	2	2	...	...	2	
Signal companies (Divisional) ...	4	7	...	...	†7	† Plus two more eventually.
Signal companies (Wireless) ...	1	1	...	...	1	
British infantry battalions ...	52	52	26	3	23	
Indian infantry battalions ...	§133	§133	46	10	77	§ Excludes the five Colonial battalions.

\* Now being rearmed with Howitzers.

## Section XII.—Peace distribution and war allotment of units.

285. In dealing with the question of Internal Security, Section VII, we have felt ourselves constrained to enter into some detail, with a view to ascertaining as precisely as possible the conditions to be met, and laying down the force required for the purpose. And in Section VIII, Field Army requirements, we have said that the remaining units, should, in our opinion, be so organized as to permit, under favourable conditions, of nine organized divisions, with 5 cavalry brigades and army troops, being placed in the field.

286. In discussing, however, so large a subject as the general peace distribution and allotment for war of the troops available, we fully realise that this is a question which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief alone can deal with in a satisfactory manner; and that his discretion to dispose of the forces at his command in the manner he thinks best must not be fettered in any way.

When, in the following paragraphs we deal with the peace distribution of units and their allotment upon a general mobilization, for internal security and for the Field Army, we trust that it will be understood that we do so mainly in order to show that the arrangements we propose are feasible, and appear to meet the requirements which we have laid down.

As the tables attached to this Report (Annexure X) provide a ready means of seeing at a glance, the effect of our proposals for both purposes, we shall not go into details by stations, but shall confine ourselves to mentioning cases where changes in the existing distribution of units are proposed.

### *Independent frontier brigades.*

287. As already explained in Section VII, paragraph 148, *ante*, we propose that the Kohat Brigade should form an integral portion of the 2nd Division for training and in war. In the event of operations beyond the frontier, the 2nd Division will, on the 1st Division moving across the frontier, at once take its place in the Peshawar Divisional area, and become responsible for the safety of the whole of the frontier, from the Kurram to the Malakand, including the peace area of the Kohat Brigade. That brigade will thus naturally come under the 2nd Division commander, and become part of the division. It is for these reasons, as well as in order to give it that higher training which can only be given in an organized division, that we have included this Brigade in the 2nd war division.

534, 2605, 3779, 5215, 5455, 7357.

288. In paragraph 149, we recommended that the Indian infantry battalion, now temporarily attached to the Bannu Brigade, should, as soon as the reorganization of the Border Military Police as Frontier Constabulary has been carried out, become available for other purposes. This, if quartered at Belgaum, will set free an Indian battalion from Burma for Takdah eventually, where the Bengal Government has been anxious for a second Gurkha battalion to be located in peace, an arrangement which the Government of India has also advocated, in a despatch of January 12th, 1911, to the Secretary of State.

5173, 5461, 5463, 7397, 7399. The desirability of locating the Headquarters of the Derajat Brigade in the vicinity of Tank, instead of at Dera Ismail Khan, has often been urged. In this we concur, and we recommend that the transfer be carried out, as occasion arises for the construction of new lines. Derajat.

*1st (Peshawar) Divisional area.*

5271. 7361. 289. We propose to allot the Abbottabad Brigade to the 1st Division, both for peace and war. This arrangement will (a) complete the division, which more than any other division ought to be complete in itself: (b) make the divisional area correspond much better than at present with the North-West Frontier Province area, and allow the General Officer Commanding to be in the same station with the Chief Commissioner during the hot weather: and (c) bring the hill stations to which the Nowshera troops go in the hot weather into the same divisional area. Peshawar  
Divisional area.

385, 4259, 5263. We recommend that an Indian infantry battalion should be moved in time of peace from Nowshera to Peshawar, and that its place at Nowshera should be filled by the transfer of a Pioneer battalion from Belgaum.

We have assumed that the cavalry brigade at Risalpur will shortly be completed, by the transfer of a British cavalry regiment and battery of Royal Horse Artillery from Rawal Pindi, and an ammunition column from Campbellpore.

We propose to find the British infantry battalion required for occupation purposes from Meerut rather than from Chaubattia, which is four days journey farther away, as it is important that it should arrive on the spot at an early stage of the concentration.

We consider that two Indian infantry battalions in addition to those at the Malakand and in Chitral, will suffice for occupation purposes.

As a result of these arrangements, it will only be necessary on mobilization that this divisional area should receive a signal company from Rawal Pindi, and one company of sappers and miners from Roorkee for its war division, and one British infantry battalion for occupation purposes, and that it should send two Indian mountain batteries as divisional troops to the 5th Division, and one Indian infantry battalion to the Rawal Pindi Divisional area for occupation purposes.

*2nd (Rawal Pindi) Divisional area.*

290. We recommend the following alterations in the existing peace distribution of troops in this area:— Rawal Pindi  
Divisional area.

526, 4257, 5511,  
11776, 11778.

(a) That, as there are three British and two Indian battalions at Rawal Pindi and four Indian battalions at Jhelum, one British battalion should be transferred to Jhelum and one Indian battalion from that place to the barracks vacated by the British infantry in Rawal Pindi, when circumstances make it convenient.

(b) That the Field Artillery battery from Campbellpore be moved into lines which will be vacated at Rawal Pindi, by the transfer of the Horse Artillery battery, which now

occupies them, to Risalpur; and that the field battery from Jullundur should be located at Campbellpore in its place; also that, on the heavy (bullock) battery now at Campbellpore ceasing to exist, its place at Campbellpore should be taken by one of the horsed heavy batteries from Nowgong.

5573.

- (c) That the two Garrison Artillery companies, now at Attock, which are unallotted, should be included in the three which we propose should be abolished. Attock to be abandoned as a military station.

699, 4372, 5573.

- (d) We recommend the location of two Divisional Signal Companies, *viz.*, one of those now at Fatehgarh and one of the three new ones to be raised, at Rawal Pindi, in the lines about to be vacated by the British cavalry regiment, on transfer to Risalpur.

The Kohat Brigade, less one Indian infantry battalion in occupation on the Samana, and one Indian cavalry regiment, one battery mountain artillery, and the Frontier Garrison Artillery for other occupation purposes in the area, will, with a British battalion from Rawal Pindi, form the 6th Brigade for training purposes and for war.

As a result, the 2nd Divisional area will be now self-contained for war, with the exception that it will receive one Indian infantry battalion from Abbottabad for occupation purposes. On the other hand, it will give a British mountain battery (from Rawal Pindi) to the divisional troops of the 6th Division and a signal company (from the same place) to the divisional troops of the 1st Division. When the two new British mountain batteries are raised, the battery referred to above will go to either the 8th or 9th Division.

### *3rd (Lahore) Divisional area.*

Lahore  
Divisional  
area.

291. As already explained under the "Rawal Pindi Divisional area" it is proposed that the field battery now at Jullundur shall be transferred to Campbellpore, when the horse battery now at Rawal Pindi moves into Risalpur.

We recommend the following alterations in distribution, besides the above:—

- (a) that the British infantry battalion now at Subathu should be transferred to Delhi to complete the garrison proposed for the new Capital.
- (b) That the Heavy battery now at Multan, which is intended for the Southern line of advance, should be moved to Quetta, where accommodation will shortly be available.
- (c) That one of the Sapper and Miner companies now at Roorkee, for which lines there are wanting, should be moved to Jullundur, where lines are available in the barracks to be vacated by the Field artillery battery for Campbellpore. The Secretary of State has sanctioned new lines being built for this company at Lucknow, which will not now be required.

- (d) That the Divisional Signal Company intended for this division in war should be transferred from Fatehgarh to Ambala and Kasauli, where accommodation is already to a large extent available.

Location of the  
new British  
mountain  
batteries.

4144.

In the course of our deliberations in committee, the suggestion was made to locate at Subathu the two new British mountain batteries, which are to be raised in place of the two heavy batteries to be abolished. We think it desirable to record our reasons for regarding this as inexpedient. These batteries are allotted for war to the 6th Division, and they are urgently required by that division for training purposes. It is the first division for foreign service, should an expeditionary force be required to move to the Persian Gulf, or, under possible contingencies, to Egypt, and it is most desirable that it should be able to train as a complete division with its own mountain artillery brigade. This being the case, we consider it most desirable, if at all possible, that this brigade should be located at Ahmednagar. We are aware that the water supply at that station has given trouble in the past year, and we understand that an enquiry into the source of that supply is proceeding. Should that enquiry warrant the conclusion that there ought to be no water difficulties in the future, and the proposed reduction of the horse artillery ammunition column now quartered there will conduce to this—we are strongly of opinion that the brigade should be located at Ahmednagar, where, in addition to the vacant barracks and all necessary subsidiary accommodation, there is excellent training ground for mountain artillery purposes within easy reach. Failing Ahmednagar, we would recommend Deolali as a station at which the new mountain artillery brigade should be quartered. It is within the 6th Divisional area and good training ground is available.

4144.

We attach so much importance, for training purposes, to the presence of mountain artillery with the divisions in the South of India, that we think every attempt should be made to find a suitable station for these two batteries within the 6th Divisional area, rather than that they should be quartered so far away as Subathu, whence the expense of transport would make it practically impossible for them ever to train with their own division.

We have not forgotten that some accommodation for British ranks will be available at Subathu, but there are only barracks there for six companies at most, and if, as we think probable, it is decided to be advisable to send four companies of the Delhi battalion to the hills there for the hot weather, in view of the prevalence of fever in Delhi, then there will not be sufficient room at Subathu for two mountain batteries, where gunsheds, magazine and workshops, as well as lines for natives and for the mules are wanting. Nor is it clear that the present water supply there would suffice for the additional animals. It appears to us that the balance of the barrack accommodation at Subathu might with advantage be utilized to relieve those stations, such as Kasauli, Naini Tal, Ranikhet or Chakrata, where, at present, considerable numbers of convalescents, etc., are located in tents each summer.

We suggest that the Quartermaster-General's Branch should enquire as to the cost of accommodating

the batteries at Ahmednagar, Deolali, and Subathu, in the order named, and the relative advantage from that point of view of each of these places.

The 3rd Divisional area will, under our proposals, be self-contained, except in so far that it will draw one company Royal Garrison Artillery, from Roorkee, and a company of sappers and miners from Kirkee. On the other hand it will give one Indian cavalry regiment from Ferozepore for the mobile brigade pivoted on Delhi.

*4th (Quetta) Divisional area.*

Quetta  
Divisional area.

292. We recommend :—

(a) That the *Heavy Battery* now at Multan should, as already stated (paragraph 291), be moved to Quetta where it will be more conveniently situated for Field Army purposes. Such a move has already been in contemplation and the necessary lines at Quetta have been constructed.

(b) That, as there are now two garrison artillery companies at Quetta and one at Karachi, and the occupation requirements are two companies for Karachi, Quetta should furnish the second company for Karachi, and the remaining Quetta company be one of the three which we propose to abolish.

(c) That the earliest possible opportunity should be taken of transferring the battery of Field artillery, now at Karachi, to Quetta. It is a great defect in our present distribution of troops that there should be no Field artillery at Quetta for training purposes.

(d) That the Indian cavalry regiment now at Jacobabad be transferred to Lucknow and the station abandoned. This has already been approved by the Secretary of State.

The third British mountain battery at Quetta, now allotted to divisional troops, 6th Division, will, when the new mountain batteries are raised, go on mobilization either to the 8th or 9th Division. Unless it can be done with little or no expense, we hardly think it necessary to transfer the second Indian mountain battery now in Burma to Quetta in time of peace.

Under these proposals the 4th Divisional area will draw one mountain battery for occupation purposes from Burma, and one British and two Indian infantry battalions, for the 12th Brigade, from the 5th Divisional area. It will give one British mountain battery to the divisional troops of the 6th Division, until the two new mountain batteries are raised—and after that, to either the 8th or 9th Division.

*5th (Mhow) Divisional area.*

Mhow  
Divisional area.

293. We make the following recommendations :—

(a) We have an Indian battalion at Sehore, but the lines are, we understand, in a dilapidated condition. This being so, we propose that, instead of reconstructing them there, the station should be abandoned and the battalion moved to Mhow, where we have already one British and two Indian battalions. These, with the Sehore unit, would thus make up a complete Brigade, the 15th.



- (b) At Deesa there is an Indian battalion, but here the lines are in a dilapidated condition, and it is proposed to move this unit to Rajkot, where lines are now in course of construction. The Field Artillery ammunition column will be removed to Necmuch as soon as the lines there, now under construction, are finished. Deesa will then be abandoned.
- (c) That the horse artillery ammunition column at Mhow should be abolished.
- (d) That Nowgong should be abandoned as a heavy battery station, when the two heavy (bullock) batteries at Roorkee and Campbellpore are converted into British Mountain batteries and the two heavy batteries from Nowgong take their places (see paragraphs 290 and 295).
- (e) That a company of Sappers and Miners should be located at Jhansi from Kirkee, as already approved by the Secretary of State.

As a result, this Divisional area will require to draw an Indian mountain artillery brigade as divisional troops from Abbottabad, one company sappers and miners from Secunderabad and a divisional signal company from Ahmednagar, to complete the war division.

On the other hand it will furnish three Indian cavalry regiments to the Poona, Secunderabad and Lucknow occupation troops respectively, and one British and two Indian infantry battalions to the 12th Brigade of the 4th Division.

#### *6th (Poona) Divisional area.*

Poona  
Divisional area.

294. We make the following recommendations:—

- (a) There is a pioneer battalion at Belgaum which we have proposed to move to Nowshera. In its place we propose to transfer to Belgaum the Indian battalion which will soon be superfluous in Bannu. With this adjustment, we shall have at Belgaum one British and three Indian units, which will make up the 18th Brigade.
- The three infantry war brigades of the division will thus be supplied almost entirely from the troops stationed at Poona, Ahmednagar and Belgaum, respectively.
- (b) That the horse artillery ammunition column at Ahmednagar be abolished, and that their barracks together with those already available be utilized to accommodate the two new British mountain batteries.
  - (c) That, as already mentioned, a company of Sappers and Miners from Kirkee should be transferred to Jhansi.

While for the present the mountain artillery brigade is drawn from outside the area, one battery from Rawal Pindi and one from Quetta, eventually, if accommodation can be found at either Ahmednagar or Deolali, it will be drawn from within the area. Otherwise the war division is complete. The area will then only require one Indian cavalry regiment from Agar (5th Division), and one British infantry battalion from Burma to complete its occupation troops. It will

not furnish any troops to other divisions except one sapper and miner company and one signal company to the 3rd and 5th Divisions respectively.

*7th (Meerut) Divisional area.*

295. In regard to this area, we have already, in paragraph 164, made our recommendations for the allotment of troops to the permanent garrison of Delhi.

We also recommend :—

- (a) That the battery Royal Horse Artillery, required for the garrison of Delhi, should be found by transfer of a battery from Bangalore.
- (b) That the British Infantry battalion required for the garrison of Delhi should be found by transfer from Subathu.
- (c) That the second Indian infantry battalion required for the garrison of Delhi should be found from Assam (Kohima-Manipur).
- (d) That the heavy (bullock) battery now at Roorkee should be abolished, and be replaced at Roorkee by one of the heavy (horsed) batteries from Nowgong.
- (e) That the extra garrison artillery company required for Delhi-Agra should be transferred there from Roorkee.
- (f) That the two Divisional Signal Companies now at Fatehgarh should, as already indicated, be transferred to Rawal Pindi and Ambala, respectively, and that one of the new companies to be raised should be placed at Roorkee.
- (g) That, as already mentioned, a company of sappers and miners be transferred from Roorkee to Jullundur.

We adhere to the present war allotment of troops in this area; it will then provide the 7th war division and cavalry brigade complete, but will give a company of sappers and miners from Roorkee to the 1st Division; one company Royal Garrison Artillery from Roorkee to occupation troops of the Lahore area; a British infantry battalion from Meerut to Peshawar area occupation; and an Indian infantry battalion from Dehra Dun to the Lucknow area.

*8th (Lucknow) Divisional area.*

296. When the Indian cavalry regiment now at Jacobabad has been transferred to Lucknow, the cavalry brigade there will be complete. The allotment to the war division remains practically the same as at present.

We further recommend :—

- (a) That one Indian infantry battalion from Assam (probably that from Kohima-Manipur) be transferred, as already indicated, to Delhi, the battalion at Dibrugarh-Buxa being redistributed.
- (b) That the squadron of cavalry for Fort William (Alipore) be found in peace from Saugor, where there is only accommodation for three squadrons, rather than from Cawnpore, where a whole regiment can be accommodated, distances being much the same.

The result of our allotment is that the divisional area will draw for occupation purposes one British cavalry

regiment from the 9th Division (Bangalore), an Indian infantry battalion from the 7th Division (Dehra Dun, another from Burma, (Takdah eventually), the rest of the Indian cavalry regiment from Saugor (5th Division) and its two sapper and miner companies for the war division from Bangalore. It will give no troops to any other area. Until the proposed two new British Mountain batteries are raised, it will have no Mountain Artillery.

*9th (Secunderabad) Divisional area.*

297. In this area also, we prefer to leave the arrangements for the Field Army mainly as they are at present; with the exception that we have thought it legitimate, for organization and training purposes, to include as its 26th Brigade, the Secunderabad 2nd (Infantry) Brigade, with the addition of an Indian infantry battalion from the Madras area, probably the battalion which is allotted for Aden, in the event of war with a maritime power, but which cannot be permanently quartered there for some years to come.

Secunderabad  
Divisional  
area.

We are aware that previous communications\* with the Madras Government have informed them that, in the case of a general mobilization, they can count on the retention in the Hyderabad area, if required, of the British and two Indian battalions of this brigade. But we have made this allotment, first, in order to obtain for the brigade and for the 9th Division the advantage of training in peace time as a complete division, and, secondly, because it is at least conceivable that Southern India may be in such a tranquil condition at any given moment that the Madras Government may be willing to dispense with the services of this Brigade, if it is really required elsewhere in the interests of the general security of India.

On the other hand, should Government consider it unsafe to withdraw these troops from Secunderabad, when the rest of the division is ordered to the North-West frontier, then it will be possible to complete the division with a brigade of Imperial Service infantry, the removal of which from their own localities is indeed, as has been already stated, the policy of Government.

It should, moreover, not be forgotten that were it advisable at any time to despatch a division to the East, the 9th Division is the one most conveniently situated for the purpose. In such a case, the advantage of its having been trained, organized and accustomed to work as a war division would at once be apparent. The training ground in this area is exceptionally good, while the Secunderabad garrison is one of the largest bodies of troops quartered together in India.

3867.

137 written evidence, Vol. IV.

4130, 4679.

We further recommend :—

- (a) The abandonment of Bellary as a military station, as was proposed in the Kitchener scheme. We understand that the Madras Government would have no objection.
- (b) The withdrawal of the British infantry detachments from Cannanore and Calicut, so that the Wellington battalion would be concentrated at that station, and the British battalion now at Madras-Bellary would have

\* See also paragraph 172.

six companies at Madras and two at Malappuram, where the Madras Government ask for troops both in peace and war. Calicut to be abandoned as a military station.

- (c) The transfer of the Indian battalion from Cannanore to Aden, if a second Indian battalion is required there. We understand, however, that the latest memorandum of the Overseas Defence Committee casts some doubt on the present necessity for reinforcing Aden. If this be so, it is not probable that it will be thought advisable to transfer this battalion to Aden until circumstances alter. In this contingency it should go to Trichinopoly. Cannanore to be abandoned as a military station.
- (d) That the battery of horse artillery at Bangalore be transferred from that place to Delhi, as already proposed, its place at Bangalore being taken by the field battery from Bellary.
- (e) The abolition of the horse artillery ammunition column at Secunderabad.
- (f) That one of the new divisional signal companies to be raised should be placed at Secunderabad.

The Madras Government have suggested the stationing of troops in the Godavari or Kistna district, and preferably at Rajamundry, but we do not think this necessary. In the present state of railway communications, troops which might be temporarily required there could easily be drawn from Madras or Secunderabad.

Under our proposals, the 9th Divisional area will be self-contained, with the exception that it will at present have no mountain artillery brigade and will draw one Indian cavalry regiment from Neemuch for occupation purposes. Further, if, as is probable, it is found necessary to retain the Secunderabad 2nd (Infantry) Brigade for internal security purposes, it will have to draw one infantry brigade from Imperial Service Troops. It will, on the other hand, furnish one British cavalry regiment from Bangalore for occupation purposes in the Lucknow area, and three companies Sappers and Miners to the 5th and 8th Divisions.

#### *Burma Divisional area.*

298. We have already dealt with the arrangements proposed for this area, in paragraph 173 of this Report. On mobilization it will send one Indian mountain battery to Quetta, a battalion British infantry to the Poona area, and an Indian infantry battalion to the Lucknow area, if not already at Takdah.

#### *Aden.*

299. Similarly, we have already dealt with the arrangements proposed for Aden, in paragraph 174 of this Report, subject to the reservation above mentioned, *viz.*, that the last Report of the Overseas Defence Committee may have the effect of postponing the move of an additional Indian infantry battalion to Aden.

#### CHANGES IN LOCATION OF UNITS.

300. We give below a tabular statement which shows the changes in the permanent location of units necessitated by the proposals contained in the foregoing paragraphs.

136-7, written evidence, Vol. IV.

*Independent Frontier Brigades.*

The headquarters of the Derajat Brigade to be transferred from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank.

Bannu      Decrease 1 Infantry battalion      ... To Belgaum.

*1st (Peshawar) Division.*

Peshawar      Increase 1 battalion, Indian Infantry... From Nowshera.  
 Nowshera      Increase 1 battalion, Pioneers      ... From Belgaum.  
                  Decrease 1 battalion, Indian Infantry ... To Peshawar.  
 Risalpur      Increase 1 battery, R. H. A.\*      ... From Rawal Pindi.  
                  Increase 1 ammunition column, R.H.A.\* From Campbellpore.  
                  Increase 1 regiment, British Cavalry\* From Rawal Pindi.

*2nd (Rawal Pindi) Division.*

Rawal Pindi      Increase 1 battery, R. F. A.      ... From Campbellpore.  
                  Increase 1 battalion, Indian Infantry ... From Jhelum.  
                  Increase 2 Signal Companies      ... One from Fatehgarh,  
                  one new.  
                  Decrease 1 battery, R. H. A.\*      ... To Risalpur.  
                  Decrease 1 regiment, British Cavalry\*... To Risalpur.  
                  Decrease 1 battalion, British Infantry ... To Jhelum.  
 Jhelum      Increase 1 battalion, British Infantry... From Rawal Pindi.  
                  Decrease 1 battalion, Indian Infantry... To Rawal Pindi.  
 Campbellpore      Increase 1 battery, R. F. A.      ... From Jullundur.  
                  Decrease 1 ammunition column, R.H.A.\* To Risalpur.  
                  Decrease 1 battery, R. F. A.      ... To Rawal Pindi.  
 Attock      Decrease 2 companies, R. G. A.      ... To be abolished.

*3rd (Lahore) Division.*

Multan      Decrease 1 Heavy battery, R. G. A.      ... To Quetta.  
 Jullundur      Decrease 1 battery, R. F. A.      ... To Campbellpore.  
                  Increase 1 company, Sappers and Miners From Roorkee.  
 Ambala      Increase 1 Signal Company      ... From Fatehgarh.  
 Subathu      Decrease 1 battalion, British Infantry... To Delhi.

*4th (Quetta) Division.*

Quetta      Increase 1 Heavy battery, R. G. A.      ... From Multan.  
                  Increase 1 battery, R. F. A.      ... From Karachi (eventually).  
                  Decrease 1 company, R. G. A.      ... To be abolished.  
 Jacobabad      Decrease 1 regiment, Indian Cavalry ... To Lucknow, and station to be abandoned.  
 Karachi      Decrease 1 battery, R. F. A.      ... To Quetta (eventually).

*5th (Mhow) Division.*

Mhow      Increase 1 battalion, Indian Infantry ... From Sehore.  
                  Decrease 1 ammunition column, R. H. A. Abolished.  
 Sehore      Decrease 1 battalion, Indian Infantry ... To Mhow.  
 Rajkot      Increase 1 battalion, Indian Infantry ... From Deesa.  
 Deesa      Decrease 1 battalion, Indian Infantry ... To Rajkot.  
                  Decrease 1 ammunition column, R.F.A.\* To Neemuch.  
 Neemuch      Increase 1 ammunition column, R.F.A.\* From Deesa.  
 Nowgong      Decrease 2 Heavy batteries, R. G. A.      ... To Campbellpore and Roorkee.  
 Jhansi      Increase 1 Sapper and Miner Co.\*      ... From Kirkee.

*6th (Poona) Division.*

Kirkee      Decrease 1 Company, Sappers and Miners To Jhansi\*.  
 Ahmednagar      Increase 1 brigade, British Mountain Artillery. New.  
                  Decrease 1 ammunition column, R. H. A. Abolished.  
 Belgaum      Increase 1 battalion, Indian Infantry ... From Bannu.  
                  Decrease 1 battalion, Pioneers      ... To Nowshera.

\* Already sanctioned by the Secretary of State.

*7th (Meerut) Division.*

Agra	Increase	1 company, R. G. A.	... From Roorkee.
	Decrease	$\frac{1}{2}$ company, R. G. A.	... To Delhi.
Roorkee	Increase	1 signal company	... New.
	Decrease	1 company, R. G. A.	... To Agra.
Delhi	Decrease	1 company, Sappers and Miners	To Jullundur.
	Increase	1 battery, R. H. A.	... From Bangalore.
	Increase	$\frac{1}{2}$ company, R. G. A.	... From Agra.
	Increase	1 battalion, British Infantry	... From Subathu.
	Increase	1 battalion, Indian Infantry	... From Assam.
	Decrease	$\frac{1}{4}$ battalion, British Infantry	... To rejoin headquarters of battalion.
	Fatehgarh Decrease	2 signal companies	... One to Rawalpindi and one to Ambala.

*8th (Lucknow) Division.*

Lucknow	Increase	1 regiment, Indian Cavalry	... From Jacobabad.
Assam	Decrease	1 battalion, Indian Infantry	... To Delhi.
Takdah (eventually).	Increase	1 Battalion Indian infantry	... From Burma.

*9th (Secunderabad) Division.*

Bangalore	Increase	1 battery, R. F. A.	... From Bellary.
	Decrease	1 battery, R. H. A.	... To Delhi.
Bellary (to be abandoned)	Decrease	1 battery, R. F. A.	... To Bangalore.
	„	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion, British Infantry	... To Madras and Mallapuram.
Secunderabad	Decrease	1 ammunition column, R. H. A.	..... Abolished.
Madras	Increase	$\frac{1}{4}$ battalion, British Infantry	... From Bellary.
Mallapuram	Increase	$\frac{1}{4}$ battalion, British Infantry	... From Bellary.
Cannanore (to be abandoned)	Decrease	Detachment British Infantry	To headquarters of battalion at Wellington.
	„	1 battalion, Indian Infantry	... To Aden or failing that, to Trichinopoly.
Calicut (to be abandoned)	Decrease	Detachment, British Infantry	To headquarters of battalion at Wellington.

*Burma Division.*

Meiktila	Decrease	1 battalion, Indian Infantry	... To Takdah eventually.
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*Aden.*

Aden	Increase	Detachment, British Infantry	From Poona (to join Headquarters).
	Increase	1 battalion, Indian Infantry	... From Cannanore.

301. We consider that the above changes should be carried out, but that no further steps need at present be taken in the direction of any redistribution of troops, save when the lines of some units have got into such a state of disrepair as to render it necessary to rebuild them. In that case, before the reconstruction of the lines is decided on, it should be considered whether, in furtherance of the completion of the Redistribution Scheme, the unit would be better located elsewhere, and if so, the change could then be conveniently effected.

302. What we have written in the foregoing paragraphs of this Section, as well as much that we have said in dealing with Section VIII, Field Army requirements, and Section VI, Command and Administration would, we feel, be incomplete and liable to be misunderstood if we did not state clearly, at the risk of writing at some length, first, the principles upon which we have worked in the organization of brigades and divisions, including the allocation of units thereto, and secondly, our reasons for disagreeing with any system which,



would prevent proper training in peace, or break up peace organizations upon the order for mobilization.

2331, 3907, 5257, 5265,  
5303, 5315, 7164, 7229.

303. We are strongly impressed with the advantages of continuing the existing system of peace administration, under which the country, exclusive of Burma, is divided into nine divisional areas—areas which correspond in many respects to Commands\* at home—and we earnestly deprecate any departure from the principles upon which this system is applied to the organization of the army, alike for peace purposes and for war—for peace, because the organization, administration and training of the army in peace is what decides its efficiency for war, and for war, because any wide departure from these principles would be not only destructive of fighting efficiency but also uneconomical, in that it would fail to make full use of existing resources.

(See above.) We apprehend that there can be no difference of opinion upon the axiom, that the best peace system of organization and administration is that which, with due regard to economy, best trains the army for war and lends itself most effectively, and with the least possible disturbance, to the passage of the army from a peace to a war footing.

5257.  
5315. 304. The existing system of peace distribution, organization and administration, which is, in all essentials, that advocated by Sir P. Palmer but left to Lord Kitchener to elaborate and introduce, has been fully described by the latter officer in the State papers in which he laid his proposals before Government in 1903-04, and we adhere to the principles which he therein laid down, which appear to us a great advance upon those which obtained under the Command system.

M. D. Pro. B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

What is known as the Kitchener scheme is based upon two main principles in regard to peace organization:—

5257.  
5315. (a) That the country should be divided into divisional areas, each, as far as possible without undue cost, self-contained and capable of producing a complete war division, with (in most cases) a cavalry brigade and a proportion of army troops, and, in addition, such other troops as were required for the internal security of the areas, on the mobilization and departure of the Field Army.
- (b) That, so far as financially possible, brigades should be so located in peace that the units composing them could train together, and on mobilization should take the field in the same formations, each commanded by its own Brigadier.

2333, 5303, 7164, 7229.

3907.  
3919.

305. The high importance of this second principle was one of the greatest, if not the greatest, lesson of the South African war. It needed that experience to force us to adopt a system, which every first class military

\* The size of the country forbids the complete adoption of the home 'Command' system. Our experience of the Indian Command system proved conclusively that the divisional area is as large as is consistent with efficient local administration, and that the interposition of another administrative authority between divisions and Headquarters only duplicated work. The present 'Army' commanders, being relieved of administrative duties, are free to devote themselves entirely to the training of their divisions, as the Lieutenant-Generals of 'Commands' never were, and there can be no doubt of the effect this is having on the higher training of all arms, and the efficiency of the army for war.



power had already recognized as one of the main contributories to success in war. As a result the division has now been definitely adopted as the basis of the field army organization [Field Service Regulations, II, section 7 (2)].

306. The German Official Account of the South African War, Volume I, Chapter III, says—"The larger tactical units necessary to the development of combined tactics did not exist in peace time. \* \* \* \* \* The English brigade of four battalions corresponds generally to the German regiment of three battalions, with the important limitation that *it has not that cohesion* which results from the tradition of the German regiments."

The "Times" History of the war in South Africa, Volume II, page 117, says— \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

"The army corps was a mere paper organization; with the single exception of General Hildyard's brigade, *not one of its brigades, let alone its divisions, had ever worked together as a unit*, and its staffs, whether corps, divisional or brigade were extemporised from officers scraped together from every conceivable peace employment."

The following is an extract from note by Sir E. Elles, dated 22nd December 1903.

\* \* \* \* \*

"(8) That Divisions and Brigades in peace should coincide with those for war is the military ideal, and the Commander-in-Chief has endeavoured to attain this ideal as far as is compatible with financial conditions."

Proceedings B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-6.

307. That these principles are generally accepted at home will be evident from the following extracts from the Special Army Order of 28th May 1909, on the distribution of the regular troops in the United Kingdom.

"The main principles underlying this distribution are as follows:—

(i) That for cavalry, artillery and infantry of the Expeditionary Force, the brigade organisation should, as far as possible, be followed in determining the peace stations of units.

\* \* \* \* \*

(iii) That the various units comprising the six divisions should be distributed so that each division can be readily and economically concentrated for training.

(iv) That the artillery of each division ..... should, as far as possible be concentrated to facilitate its training by the divisional commander.

(v) That horse artillery and Engineer field troops should be located with or near cavalry brigades, in order that the advantages derived from the combined training of these arms may be obtained.

\* \* \* \* \*

308. These principles have therefore exceptional authority in both countries, and while precise adherence in every detail is, for financial and other reasons, probably impracticable, yet departure from them to any serious or avoidable extent is, in our opinion greatly to be deprecated. At the 57th meeting of the Committee, it was decided by our colleagues to recommend a Field Army of only seven divisions, with a spare infantry brigade, and to organize permanently three brigades of all arms for internal security purposes. This arrangement involved the breaking up of the existing 7th, 8th and 9th Divisions on mobilization and the permanent allotment of the three brigades mentioned

for internal security duties. In our opinion, to break up organized divisions and brigades on mobilization, replacing them by improvised ones, or to allot units from different divisions to the same brigades, or to form peace brigades of units quartered at great distances apart, will be seriously detrimental to peace training and to the efficiency of the Army for War. Reference to Table A of Annexure X of this Report which contains the allotment of troops to the Field Army which we propose, shows that any such breaking up of brigades and divisions is quite unnecessary ; but to make this point quite clear, it is shown below how far the nine war divisions and five cavalry brigades are self-contained under the allotment we recommend.

The 1st (Peshawar) Division and 1st cavalry brigade will be complete except for one company sappers and miners and the divisional signal company for the former, which will come from Roorkee and Rawal Pindi respectively.

The 2nd (Rawal Pindi) Division and 2nd cavalry brigade are complete.

The 3rd (Lahore) Division and 3rd cavalry brigade are complete, except for one company of sappers and miners from Kirkee.

The 4th (Quetta) Division draws an infantry brigade (except 1 Indian battalion) from Nasirabad and Ajmere, but is otherwise complete.

The 5th (Mhow) Division draws its mountain artillery brigade from Abbottabad, one company sappers and miners from Secunderabad, and a divisional signal company from Ahmednagar.

The 6th (Poona) Division, until the two new mountain batteries are raised, will draw its mountain artillery brigade from Quetta and Rawal Pindi. It is otherwise complete.

The 7th (Meerut) Division and 7th cavalry brigade are complete.

The 8th (Lucknow) Division has no mountain artillery brigade or signal company until they are raised, and draws its sappers and miners from Bangalore. The 8th Cavalry Brigade is complete.

The 9th (Secunderabad) Division has no mountain artillery brigade or signal company, and may have to leave an infantry brigade behind and replace it with an Imperial Service Troops brigade.

It will thus be seen that in the nine divisions and five cavalry brigades only about one unit in twelve is not already in the divisional area.

2341, 2343, 3907.  
5303, 5315, 7229.

309. On the general question of efficiency for war, we hold that this can best be secured by giving all commanders the feeling that they will be called upon to lead in the field the troops whom they have trained in peace, should those troops ever be detailed for field service. This applies with especial force to commanders of divisions and brigades. There is a well ascertained advantage in Generals knowing their units, units knowing their leaders and each other, and all knowing that, when the supreme test comes, they will have to depend upon each other. The natural result is mutual confidence and co-operation. To sacrifice this without urgent cause and to return to the system, or want of system, which obtained before the days of the South African

war, when the policy governing the distribution of troops in India practically rendered such conditions unavoidable, would have a regrettable effect on brigades and divisions, where units are just getting into the way of regarding themselves as integral parts of an organized whole, and are realising, in a manner hitherto almost unknown in India, the necessity for working together.

310. Again to tell off certain brigades permanently in time of peace for purposes of internal security must, in our opinion, tie the hands of the military and civil authorities. It does not by any means follow that the same brigades will always be the brigades most conveniently situated, or the most suitably composed for the purpose, should the situation to be dealt with demand such action.

It has the further objection that to exclude these troops from a war division would not only deprive them of much of the valuable experience of divisional training, as a part of the division, but would also reduce their efficiency, should it be found necessary to concentrate the mobile brigades for use as a division. It would impress on the minds of both officers and soldiers the undesirable feeling that, however efficient they might be, they would not be sent to active service beyond the frontier, in the event of a great war. The loss of that incentive to work must have the effect of lessening their enthusiasm and their keenness to make themselves as efficient as possible. The fact cannot be concealed from them, as has been instanced in the past in the case of the old Bombay and Madras armies.

5315.

3921.

311. On the other hand, if all divisional areas include, as they now do, war divisions organized and trained in the same manner, it is perfectly simple to select, when and if required, the division which under the circumstances of the moment is the most suitable for the purposes of internal security. Under the allotment which we propose, each area is so organized that it can, with the addition of an internal security regiment of cavalry, furnish three mobile brigades of all arms, all capable of being mobilized and equipped without difficulty; and the arrangements for the transport, which is not detailed divisionally, will present no difficulty.

312. There is the further advantage that the whole of the troops thus trained, *i.e.*, in war divisions, having been in the habit of considering themselves as liable to be called upon for active service, will all be equally keen to train themselves thoroughly with a view to acquitting themselves as they should in the field. There will be emulation and rivalry both in brigades and in divisions to do their best on all occasions. We consider these factors a very material asset, not lightly to be cast aside by condemning certain brigades unequivocally to protection duties.

5315.

313. Lastly it is to be remembered that "the basis of the Field army organization is the division. This is a self-contained formation comprising all arms and services in due proportion, complete in itself with every requisite for independent action" [Field Service Regulations, Part II, section 7 (2)]. Divisional training is therefore the highest form of training at present open to us. It is of a much higher description than mere brigade training. Brigades and regimental units which have only trained as such, and have not taken part in training as portions of a higher organization, have undoubtedly a more circumscribed outlook. They are not

accustomed to regard themselves as an integral portion of an organized force, nor to bear in mind the necessity of co-operating with the other troops. Their commanders are not trained by finding themselves side by side with other commanders working for a common end, and their efficiency and power of handling their troops naturally suffers. This is a distinct defect, for "the full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination, and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand the characteristics of the other arms" [Field Service Regulations, Part I, section 2 (1)]. For this reason we attach the highest importance to its being made possible for every divisional area to train the field troops in its area as part of a war division, whether primarily intended for field purposes or not.

314. Taking all these matters into consideration, we have, by adopting as economical and elastic an organization as possible of the troops at our disposal, and without asking for any increase to the Army, found ourselves able to frame an allotment of troops to brigades and higher formations, which not only maintains the existing divisional peace organization, but which admits, as will be seen from our tables attached, of the organization of the forces available into nine war divisions, in addition to the internal security troops. It is true that if the internal condition of the country is not satisfactory, it may be necessary to break up one of these divisions to provide the mobile brigades before mentioned. On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that the country may be sufficiently tranquil not to require the presence of these brigades and to allow of their removal without risk. Even if otherwise, it is to be remembered that some months must elapse before railway arrangements would permit of the rearward divisions being concentrated on the frontier. If foreign conditions were favourable, India might look for reinforcements from home or the colonies, and if such were the case, the organization of all divisional areas, so as to permit each to furnish a war division, provides at once a framework into which such portions of these reinforcements as were most suitable would fit with the least possible friction or dislocation of existing arrangements.

3907.  
3919.  
5315.

315. In conclusion, it should be added that the present divisional and brigade organization has only comparatively recently been introduced. It is an important advance upon previous conditions, and the brigade and divisional feeling is getting thoroughly established. Changes in any army organization are always undesirable unless really necessary. What in our opinion the army in India most needs, from the point of view of efficiency for war, is freedom from change, and opportunity for all ranks to train themselves for war under the conditions which are now clearly prescribed. All soldiers are aware of the marked influence upon the practical training and efficiency of the army at home, of the recognition, in recent years, of the fact that it would be employed, as organized, in the event of war. The same should be the case in India.

#### **Section XIII.--The establishment of British officers for Indian cavalry and infantry units.**

316. One of the most important questions which this Committee has had before it is that of the normal

establishment of British officers for the Indian cavalry and infantry units of the army in India.

Suggested reduction in the establishment of British officers with Indian Cavalry and Infantry.

317. In July, 1911, the Chief of the General Staff, in order to meet an urgent call for a reduction in the Military Budget, submitted proposals for an establishment of 10 British officers for all the cavalry and infantry units of the Field Army, and also of those detailed for internal security in India and on Colonial service, except in the case of certain units, for which but seven British officers were said to be sufficient. But in making these proposals the Chief of the General Staff qualified them by a very important and thrice repeated reservation to the effect that his proposals were only feasible provided that there existed a suitable reserve of British officers immediately available to take the field.

Sir Power Palmer's and Lord Kitchener's proposals.

318. In our opinion none of the schemes presented to the Committee offer a reasonable prospect of a satisfactory reserve of officers being provided for the Indian army. We endorse the view expressed in 1901 by the late Sir Power Palmer, when Commander-in-Chief in India, that what is needed on mobilization is not only an adequate number of officers, but an adequate number of *trained* officers\*. But we are unable to find any sources from which this requirement can be met, other than from the peace establishments of the British and Indian units of the army in India. This was the view held by Lord Kitchener, on whose recommendation the Secretary of State sanctioned an increase of 350 British officers in 1906, as a *first instalment* of the number required to give the majority of Indian regiments a peace establishment of 15 British officers. Lord Kitchener proposed to retain 12 of these in each regiment taking the field, and 10 in each regiment detailed for Internal Defence, utilizing the balance towards completing the deficiencies of the Field Army and to meet the requirements of the depôts of units on service. The full increase of 350 officers has not yet been worked up to.

\* See also Reply No. 7421.

Reduction regarded as a suicidal measure.

319. We fully realize that, to-day as in 1905-06, financial considerations may not admit of a peace establishment of British officers which will meet all demands on mobilization. But, in the absence of any practical scheme by which essential requirements of units can be met, other than by drawing on other units, we consider that it would be suicidal to reduce the present establishment of officers (*viz.*, 14 per regiment of cavalry, or battalion of infantry) in the Indian army, which has been accepted as being necessary for the requirements of both peace and war.

626, 4426, 5643, 7421, 7423, 7425, 7427, 8579, 8595, 11066, 11074, 11076, 11418, 10492, 11064, 11853, 12211, 12615, 12621, 12975, 12979, 12997, 12999, 13046.

Reserves of officers at present available.

320. We are of opinion that the few individuals who may be available, among those retired officers who remain on retirement liable to recall, and also those gentlemen who are on the rolls of the present Indian Army Reserve of Officers, cannot be regarded as being likely to do more than to help to fill up vacancies in the Occupation Troops, or possibly to be employed with the maintenance services in rear of the army, after the campaign had been some time in progress.

Sources from which officers can be obtained to meet extra regimental requirements on mobilization.

321. It must be remembered that officers, without knowledge of the language or of the country, would be practically useless for employment with Indian troops, and we therefore believe that the only two sources of supply, on which reliance can be placed to meet the numerous demands for officers on mobilization, are (a) officers of

681, 4434, 5621, 7429, 8593,  
11088, 11458, 11893, 12296,  
12637.

7429, 10492-98, 10564,  
11064, 11076, 11418, 11420,  
11853, 11857, 12211, 12975,  
13012.

329. We do not agree with those officers who think that the duties in the field of Quartermaster and Transport Officer can be efficiently performed by one British officer, assisted by an Indian officer. We believe that during the period of mobilization and concentration, and also during the earlier days of a campaign, such an arrangement would result in inconvenience, if not worse. We do not consider it to be essential that the Indian Adjutant in the infantry should be seconded in peace-time, (as is the case on active service) although we recognise that there are advantages to be gained by his ceasing to be a company officer.

Indian officer  
as assistant to  
the  
Quartermaster.

Indian  
Adjutant.

330. With reference to paragraph 322 of this Report, we attach a few extracts giving the views held by Lord Roberts; Sir E. H. H. Collen; Sir W. S. A. Lockhart; Sir Power Palmer; and Sir E. R. Elles, together with an extract from Lord Kitchener's Memorandum on the Preparation of the Army in India for War.

#### LORD ROBERTS.

*Extract from Confidential letter No. 2193-A., dated Simla, 6th April 1887, from Colonel P. H. F. Harris, C.B., for the Adjutant-General in India, to Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. H. Collen, Offg. Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.*

\* \* \* \* \*

M. D., Pros. A., November 1887,  
Nos. 444-47.

2. I am directed to state that the Commander-in-Chief\* concurs in the recommendation of the Committee that the complement of British officers of a Native infantry battalion in the field should be 12 instead of 8 at present, and that this number should be made up by the linked battalions, each sending two wing officers to the battalion proceeding on service. In the case of more than one battalion of a linked regiment being detailed for service, the officers should be sent from a linked regiment which has no battalion in the field.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Extract from letter No. 4609-A., dated Simla, 20th June 1887, from Major-General W. K. Elles, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. H. Collen, Offg. Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.*

\* \* \* \* \*

2. I am directed by His Excellency to state in reply that the officers furnished by the linked regiment to their sister regiments proceeding on service would ordinarily be of the grade of wing officer, and that the manner in which the 12 officers of the augmented service battalion would be employed is as follows, *vis* :—

- 1 Commandant.
- 2 Wing commanders.
- 1 Adjutant.
- 1 Quartermaster
- 7† Wing officers.

—  
Total ... 12  
—

† If a ninth officer is added to the establishment, this number will be 8.

*Extracts from despatch No. 203, dated Simla, 31st October 1887, from the Government of India, to the Secretary of State for India.*

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Under the arrangements now introduced for linking regiments of Native infantry, it is contemplated that on mobilization



being carried out, the number of British officers with the battalion selected for active service should be increased from 8 to 12.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. The strain placed on the establishment of British officers with the Indian army which may be expected to take place in war is indicated by what has happened lately in the operations in Burma. The number of Native regiments employed in Upper and Lower Burma is about equal to that required for two army corps; yet although the losses in action have not been exceptionally heavy, and the extra duties calling for the transfer of officers from regimental employment are not so numerous by a good deal as they would be in the case of two army corps being mobilized on the frontier, with perhaps a long line of communication to keep up and a much larger transport service, nevertheless the average number of their permanent officers left with regiments of the Madras Army was, in May last, only 155 out of an establishment of 290, or little more than 4 per regiment.

\* \* \* \* \*

SIR E. H. H. COLLEN.

\* \* \* \* \*

I fear the demands cannot be minimised; I hold the very decided opinion that the establishment of British officers in India is totally inadequate to stand the stress of a war with a European power, and that even for peace training, for frontier warfare and for ordinary expeditions the establishment of officers must be increased. We have no means of doing this without denuding our regiments in garrison to a dangerous extent. \*

M. D., Pros. A., November 1899,  
Nos. 2148-2151.

2. The only fault I have to find with the despatch is that it does not state the case strongly enough.

3. My predecessors, General Wilson, Sir George Chesney, and Sir Henry Brackenbury held equally strong opinions on the subject, and if the Secretary of State in Council chooses to disregard the views of the responsible military authorities, the latter will at least know that they have done their duty in warning Her Majesty's Government of the danger.

E. H. H. C[OLLEN],—27-10-99.

SIR W. S. A. LOCKHART.

\* \* \* \* \*

2. News from South Africa shows that in a recent engagement a half battalion of the Gordon Highlanders lost practically every officer in a couple of hours, and now that the Afghans are (thanks to ourselves) armed, like the Boers, with long range, flat trajectory rifles, we may expect an unprecedented number of casualties among British officers when next we go to war with them.

3. In Tirah, 1897-98, the enemy had obtained possession of about 100 Lee-Metford rifles and several thousand rounds of ammunition, whereby our casualties were very greatly increased. During that expedition the 36th Sikhs had nearly all their officers either killed or wounded, all but one as far as I remember.

W. S. A. L[OCKHART].

*Extracts from confidential letter No. 3618-A., dated Simla, 13th September 1899, from Major-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.*

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The proposed establishment, viz., ten and twelve officers for corps of Native cavalry and infantry respectively, is the present war establishment which was fixed after exhaustive enquiry and careful consideration as the minimum required to enable these units to take the field against a European enemy, this being the contingency contemplated by the Government of India. As 29 officers are allotted to a battalion of British infantry, it is not

\* We had 400 officers extra-regimentally employed in Afghanistan, a campaign with ill-armed bodies of men.



unreasonable to suppose that a battalion of Asiatic troops of equal strength would be rendered more efficient as a fighting unit if an equal proportion of British officers were attached to it. This indeed was recognised when the Native Army in this country was first organized. After the Mutiny, the irregular system of officering Native regiments was adopted, and for frontier warfare it has hitherto met the requirements of the case. But to face a European enemy or even a Native *enemy as well armed and trained as the frontier tribesmen*, more British officers are required than are perhaps absolutely necessary for the purpose of peace administration, and arrangements must be made for maintaining increased establishments of British officers as long as hostilities continue.

As to the manner in which the extra British officers are to be suitably employed, without interfering with the duties and lowering the position of the Native officers, many occasions will arise on service, when these extra officers can be employed, without in any way affecting the position of Native officers. Asiatic warfare, especially in mountainous countries, and whether against a European or an Asiatic enemy, renders the frequent employment of small detachments necessary. A Native officer may be fully competent to command a detached company of 100 men in peace, and also on service in a plain country, when personal courage, capacity to understand and carry out orders, and influence over his men are the principal qualifications demanded of him; but where the occasion requires initiative and the assumption of responsibility he is not unlikely, owing to the circumstances of his training, education, and general intellectual powers, to be found wanting.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Extract from despatch No. 196, dated Simla, the 2nd November 1899, from the Government of India, to the Secretary of State for India.*

\* \* \* \* \*

9. Before quitting this part of the subject, we would observe with reference to paragraph 6 of Your Lordship's despatch, that the establishments of 10 and 12 officers for the Native cavalry and infantry regiments, which have been accepted, is intended to be the strength with which regiments shall take the field. We do not consider that, in the present day, even when the hostilities we are engaged in are with frontier tribes, it is desirable to send Native regiments on field service with a smaller number of officers. In this connexion we entirely concur in the Commander-in-Chief's views as expressed in paragraph 9 of the Adjutant-General's letter herewith forwarded.

SIR POWER PALMER.

M. D., Pros. A., April 1902,  
Nos. 1386-1389.

*Extracts from despatch No. 64, dated Fort William, the 20th March 1902, from the Government of India, to the Secretary of State for India.*

\* \* \* \* \*

2. In the despatch above quoted, it was stated that in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, an establishment of fifteen British officers per regiment is necessary for efficiency in war, and that even with this number, the regiments left in India will be reduced to the minimum strength of the British officers required for ordinary duties.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Re measures proposed by the Government of India to supply the deficiency of British officers with the Indian army criticised by the Secretary of State for India.*

\* \* \* \* \*

9. Paragraphs 12 to 16 of the despatch deal with the question of the number of British officers required with Native regiments

in peace and war, and the Secretary of State quotes opinions expressed on this subject so far back as 1875 and 1881. It will, however, be recognized that of late years the conditions of the military problems have greatly changed. As regards war requirements the demand for more British officers is likely to occur at a time when our field army has to undertake operations against a European power—or, in a lesser degree, whenever we may next be involved in hostilities in Afghanistan, or have to meet a possible combination of Afghans and frontier tribesmen. It is true, as the Secretary of State says (paragraph 15 of the despatch), that the experience of the last Afghan War did not cause the Government of India to recommend an increase in the total establishment of British officers, and that in the case of other expeditions also (excepting those of the North-West frontier in 1897-8) no complaints were made regarding the insufficiency of British officers. But the reason for this is that during the last Afghan War our troops encountered bodies of ill-trained and badly armed men, who could only inflict trifling damage at a distance, and who, if kept from closing, were defeated with heavy loss to themselves and trifling loss on our side. The same condition held good until very recently in all our minor expeditions. Losses were generally slight, and the existing establishment of the British officers was found to be reasonably adequate. But since 1881, Russia has advanced from the Caspian to the borders of the Herat Province, and is now within striking distance of points which we might be called upon to occupy for the political and strategical security of India. France is established close to the Eastern borders of Burma while in Afghanistan also the Amir is turning out large numbers of breech-loading rifles and guns, with ample supplies of ammunition and other munitions of war. And within the past two years we have learnt that the frontier tribesmen are able to meet us with firearms of the latest patterns, which they well know how to use, and with which they can pick off British officers at a long range.

M. D. Pros., November 1899,  
Nos. 2148-2151.

The opinions as quoted by the Secretary of State which were given under totally different conditions cannot therefore be held to apply to the existing situation. Since they were written and as a result of the rapid advance of Russia, the Government of India since 1886 have undertaken systematic operations for mobilization, which previously had not been considered essential. One result of the recommendations of the Mobilization Committee was an increase in the war establishment of British officers with Native corps and this increase has been shown in the Field Service Equipment Tables for the past eight years. The paucity of British officers has been repeatedly dwelt upon, and recent experience rather points to the question, not whether in our arrangements for a war with a European power we should revert to a system based on the opinions and conditions of the past, but rather whether we may not be forced in future operations against the tribesmen on the North-West Frontier to adopt a higher war establishment of British officers than is at present authorized.

10. As regards requirements in peace, and with reference to the opinions quoted that the present complements of British officers is sufficient, that more would not have enough work to do, and that any increase would injuriously affect the position and duties of the Native officer, I am to remark that with the change in the condition under which the Native Army will in future have to fight, a change in the training of this army has become necessary. The standard of efficiency now required from Native regiments is much higher than what was demanded from them eighteen years ago. To attain such a standard, which is equal to that of British corps, the supervision of a sufficient number of British officers is essential. While for purposes of instruction and training there is ample occupation for two British officers per squadron, or three per wing. His Excellency has no intention of interfering, directly or indirectly, with the duties or position of Native officers as troop or company commanders. The question whether the present Native infantry organization might not be improved by the introduction of a double company system will be dealt with in a separate communication.

11. With regard to paragraph 17 the Commander-in-Chief would point out that the point at issue is not the securing of an adequate number of officers, but of an adequate number of *trained* officers, on mobilization.

*Extract from letter No. 3123-A., Staff Corps, dated the 7th August 1901, from the Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.*

\* \* \* \* \*

3. In regard to paragraph 10 of the despatch, the Commander-in-Chief\* desires to place

\* Sir Power Palmer.

on record officially his opinion that the increase in the number of British officers with Native regiments has in no way affected the position and duties of the Native officers. On the contrary, concurrently with the increase of British officers, measures have constantly been taken to raise and improve the status of Native officers and to render their duties more important, and with such good effect that a very marked improvement has been brought about in their social, educational and military qualifications. British and Native officers in the Indian army occupy distinct spheres and fulfil differing and clearly defined functions. His Excellency would strongly oppose any measure which tended to lower the position of Native officers; but, speaking from an exceptionally long and intimate acquaintance with the Native army, he can confidently assert that the increase of British officers which has taken place since 1861 has not had this effect and that no such result need be apprehended from any such further increase as he advocates.

\* \* \* \* \*

SIR E. R. ELLES.

\* \* \* \* \*

M. D., Pros., November 1902,  
Nos. 711-718.

My view of practical politics is 13 officers per regiment; 15 is the ideal.

E. R. E[LLLES],—26-9-02.

SIR POWER PALMER.

*Extract from a letter No. 3968-A, dated 22nd August 1902, from the Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.*

I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to submit again, for the consideration and orders of the Government of India, the question of a further increase to the establishment of British officers of Native regiments.

No. 461-Camp., dated 9th  
January 1901.

2. The views of His Excellency on this subject are so fully recorded in this office letter marginally noted, that it is unnecessary to now say more than that the experience of the last two years has amply confirmed His Excellency's opinion that Native corps should have an establishment of 15 combatant officers to ensure their proper training and instruction up to the high standard now required, as it is no economy to keep up a Native army during times of peace, which, owing to its being under-officered, will be unfit to efficiently meet the numerous demands, on the outbreak of war.

*Vide* Indian Army Circulars,  
clause 51 of 1900 and No. 97 of  
1901 and of 1902.

3. On the representations submitted by the Government of India from time to time, the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State has sanctioned certain additions to the number of British officers and the permanent authorised establishment of corps is now as shewn in statement\* attached, but it is beyond dispute that even this increased establishment is wholly insufficient even for peace training, and His Excellency is more than ever convinced that the matter can never be considered to be on a sound footing until each corps has an establishment of 15 British officers.

*Extract from Lord Kitchener's Memorandum on the Preparation of the Army in India for War.*

\* \* \* \* \*

M. D., Pros., B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

12. In Adjutant-General's No. 3968-A., dated the 22nd August 1902, it was shown that on the mobilization of four divisions there would be a deficiency of 265 British officers of the Indian army. This is without taking into consideration the

\* Not reproduced.

question of wastage in the field, and only provides for a complement of twelve British officers with each Native regiment or battalion in the field. It has, however, been pointed out that fifteen British officers\* per Native regiment or battalion will be required for peace training and for efficient leading under the changed and trying conditions of modern war. Moreover, as soon as mobilization occurs for a great war, recruiting will be extended, bringing large numbers of men to regimental centres who will have to be trained and disciplined; and on the reservists being called out, additional officers will also be required for them. There will thus be a very heavy strain on the officers with non-mobilized units, and, if possible, there should be at least twelve British officers with each such unit.

13. It is recognized, however, that, in addition to the numerous other measures which are needed to prepare the army for war, it will be prohibitively expensive at present to add sufficient officers to the Indian Army to enable regiments and battalions to take the field with fifteen British officers apiece and to have twelve British officers with each unit remaining in India. And the most that seems possible now is to try partly to supply the smaller number which will be required to ensure that each Native regiment and battalion taking the field shall have twelve combatant British officers—which is the present authorized field service establishment—and that the units remaining in India shall each have ten British officers, to perform efficiently the numerous duties connected with internal defence and the training of recruits, reservists, etc., etc.

\* \* \* \* \*

16. The gravity of the position is such that it cannot be ignored. At all times it has been recognized that British leading is essential for our Indian troops; and under the more trying conditions of modern war such leading is even more important than it ever was before. If, therefore, we are to be in a position to make the best use of our existing material, and be able to place a much larger force in the field—complete in the necessary staff organization, and with a sufficient number of British officers with each Native regiment or battalion so as to ensure that they will render the best account of themselves under the trying ordeal of fire from modern weapons—the first essential requirement is to increase largely the number of British officers in the Indian Army.

17. It is realized that financial considerations will render it impossible at present to add the whole of the 938 British officers who will be required, on mobilization, even to provide a complement of twelve officers with the mobilized units and ten with those allotted for internal defence. But it is essential that the deficiency should be reduced as much as possible; and for this purpose it is desirable to add as many more British officers as financial considerations will permit, so as to work towards having a peace complement of fifteen officers with each Native Cavalry regiment and Infantry battalion.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Section XIV.—Supply of British officers on Mobilization.

331. Our estimate of the number of British regimental officers who will be required for the Indian units of a Field Army of five cavalry brigades and nine divisions, assuming that the present establishment of

The number of regimental officers required for the Field army.

\* These are :—

Commandant	...	...	...	...	1
Adjutant	...	...	...	...	1
Quartermaster	...	...	...	...	1
Squadron or double-company commanders, and officers at 3 per squadron or double-company	...	...	...	...	12
Total					15

British officers is adhered to, as we recommend, is as under:—

Detail.	Peace establishment at 14 British officers per unit.	MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS.			
		With units, 12 officers.	For depôts.	Total.	Balance.
INFANTRY, 133 BATTALIONS.					
Required for 9 divisions—					
9 × 10 = 90 minus 3 short and 10 in 3 mobile brigades = 77 battalions.	1,078	924	154	1,078	...
Occupation troops in India and Aden—					
43 plus 10 in mobile brigades = 53 battalions.	742	636	...	636	106
For Chitral (1) and Aden (2) = 3...	42	42	...	42	...
Total ..	1,862	1,602	154	1,756	106
CAVALRY 39 REGIMENTS plus ADEN TROOP.					
Required for 9 divisions and 5 cavalry brigades—					
5 × 2 plus 9 = 19 units ...	266	228	38	266	...
For occupation troops— 20 units ...	280	240	...	240	40
Total ...	546	468	38	506	40
	2,408	2,070	192	2,262	146

332. The General Staff have given the peace establishment of British officers of the Indian Army doing regimental duty as 2,439, including 12 for the four Divisional Signal Companies. The present establishment is thus sufficient to provide each regiment of Indian cavalry and infantry with 14 officers, leaving 31 in excess. This surplus will provide for the Signal Companies and the Wireless Section, even should the number of the former be raised to 11 and of the latter to 2, requiring about 30 officers from the Indian army.

The number of Indian army officers available.

333. But this establishment leaves no margin to cover the number of officers of Field Army units, *i.e.*, 7 per cent., who will be unfit, or otherwise not immediately available on mobilization, *viz*; about 95 officers. As however the actual number of officers doing regimental duty is usually slightly in excess of the authorised establishment of the Indian army and some of the officers not fit for field service will be fit for dépôt work, we may assume that this deficiency will not in fact be more than can be met by the officers who will probably be obtainable from British units in India (see paragraph 338).

334. The transfer from British to Indian units of young officers anxious to join the Indian army is the best and most reliable source of supply for this purpose on mobilization. As their places will have to be filled up by the War Office, either by the promotion of

Transfer of officers from the British to the Indian service.

647, 650, 652, 4555, 4557, 4569, 7431, 7439, 7451, 8597, 8618, 9332, 9334, 11418.

non-commissioned and warrant officers, or otherwise, some delay may occur in replacing them. But a British regiment, or battalion, could temporarily remain short of officers, even in the field, without serious loss of efficiency, whilst an Indian unit could not.

Requirements  
on mobilization  
of the Supply  
and Transport  
Corps.

335. As regards other demands on the supply of British officers, if, for purposes of calculation, we accept Lord Kitchener's estimate that, on a general mobilization, a total of 400 officers in all will be required for Supply and Transport Corps duties, then with a peace establishment of 224, less 7 per cent. unfit, or, 208 officers available, we shall have a deficit of 192 officers for this service.

M. D., Pro. B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

Requirements of  
Indian army  
officers for Staff.

336. The requirements for Staffs needed on mobilization will make a demand upon the Indian army for some 250 officers,\* or, if 30 officers be retained for duty with Imperial Service Troops, 280 in all; of whom 152 are available in peace, leaving a balance of 128 to be found on mobilization; against which 45 officers may be recalled from the two Staff Colleges, leaving a net deficit of 83 officers.

* Total number required	...	314
<i>Deduct—</i>		
With Imperial Service Troops	..	27
Recruiting Staff	...	10
Imperial Cadet Corps	...	1
Frontier Militia	...	31
1 divisional and 3 cavalry brigade staffs at $\frac{1}{2}$	...	12
Total	...	81
Balance remaining	...	233
Allow 7 per cent. for unfit	...	17
Total	...	250

These 83 officers, *plus* the 192 needed for Supply and Transport Corps purposes, or 275 in all, can be provided for as follows:—

Available from occupation troops (Indian army, 53 infantry, 20 cavalry units at 2 per unit)	...	146
Transfers from British corps, say	...	69
Further drafts on Indian occupation troops	...	60
Total	...	275

337. Other demands upon British service officers will probably prevent more than the 69 officers above-mentioned being drawn from that service.

Requirements  
for Staff of  
British service  
officers.

338. Besides the demand already mentioned, 222,† or, with 7 per cent. allowance for sick, 238 British service officers will be needed for staffs, etc., of whom only 128 are available in peace.

Probable  
extent of  
demands on  
British units.

There would thus be a demand on British units for 179 officers (110 for staff and 69 to replace British officers in the Indian army). And these would all require to be officers of some experience.

339. There are 52 battalions infantry, 9 regiments cavalry, and 82 mobile batteries artillery, which give a total, excluding Royal Engineers and Garrison Artillery, of about 2,100 British service regimental officers. We do not think that it is safe to reckon upon much more than two officers per unit of cavalry and infantry and 1 per brigade of artillery, say 155 in all, coming from this source; of whom 69 would be needed for Indian army purposes, leaving 86 available for staffs. As 24 officers would still, however, remain to be found, the best way would be to take them from British battalions detailed as occupation troops. The 179 officers of British service units will have to be replaced in their units, (the 90 who should be available from the Unattached List will all be required for Indian units to replace

unfits—see paragraph 333) so that at least this number must be found by promotion of non-commissioned officers or from outside sources—the reserve of officers, officers training corps, transfers from corps outside India, new gazettes, or colonial forces, or a combination of all.

340. There will still be no reserve to replace wastage of officers of both the British service and the Indian army other than one-half the 7 per cent. left behind as sick, while about 3,000 officers will be on field service, at an average wastage of probably 40 per cent. per annum. This demand also can only be met from the above sources. The position is not satisfactory, but if England is at peace in Europe at the time, it should be feasible to meet this, and we know of no other source of supply.

There will be some deficiency of officers on mobilization for the various Departmental Services. These requirements are discussed in the several Sections of this Report which deal with those Services.

341. This question of the deficiency in officers is governed by the accepted requirements of the Indian army. We have resisted the temptation to reduce this deficiency by diminishing the demands for officers. We feel very strongly that any reduction in the present establishment of British officers doing regimental duty with Indian units is likely to have disastrous effects. We would point out that lower establishments for units in the field would be too small to allow any margin for casualties or sickness, whilst any serious reduction of the numbers doing duty with occupation troops will make it impossible for them to afford appreciable assistance towards replacing officers who may be killed, wounded or invalided from regiments at the front; while it must not be forgotten that there may be other heavy demands upon the officers of units allotted to internal security.

Disastrous effects which may result from any reduction of officers of the Indian army.

If regiments go on service with less than 12 British officers, many units in the field will find at a very early period that the number of their British officers has fallen below the effective minimum, with no possibility of losses being made good until the process has been gone through of applying to Army Headquarters for the services of others. A reduction of the establishments of internal defence units would deprive the army of the most suitable and the quickest means of finding the officers required—and thus increase the risks of employing Indian troops in the field without an adequate number of British officers.

342. We would submit that our proposals, not only enable units to go into the field with a sufficiency of officers to prevent normal casualties seriously affecting their war value for some time, but also make it possible for the troops detailed for internal security to find officers to replace wastage at the front during the earlier months of a campaign, without rendering the regiments from which they are drawn altogether ineffective.

Until means have been devised to provide a sufficiently numerous reserve of trained officers for the Indian army we do not think that a reduction in the establishment of regimental officers can be safely considered.

343. We consider that steps should be taken to encourage civilians, whose vocations in ordinary life would fit them for work in the technical and administrative branches of the army, to join the Indian Army Reserve

Reorganization of the Indian Reserve of officers.



of Officers. The present system, which only takes into account a reserve for regimental duty in cavalry and infantry units, does not offer attractions to the class of individuals above mentioned. We recommend that civilians joining a 'Technical Reserve' should undergo a course of preliminary training at such places as the Supply and Transport School at Rawal Pindi, the Sapper and Miners Corps headquarters at Roorkee, Kirkee, or Bangalore, or at the headquarters of the Signalling Companies for inter-communication duties, and that their subsequent training should be on lines that will facilitate the application of their special knowledge to military purposes.

Officers of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers should, we think, receive an outfit allowance on joining, but no retaining fee. When embodied for training they should receive the pay of their military rank, and such allowances as will fully cover their out-of-pocket expenses.

Civil officers to be trained and made liable for employment with the army on an emergency.

344. Further, though this suggestion will have more practical effect in regard to internal security duties than in supplying officers for the Field Army, we consider that all civil officers recruited from England should be liable to undergo a certain amount of elementary military training with regular or volunteer units at the stations in which they are working, if they have not already undergone training at home. It would also be advisable to require all civilians destined for India who have to undergo a course at a University at home, to join the Officers Training Corps there. We further recommend that steps be taken to secure, for the service of the army on an emergency, all civilians in India, both official and non-official, so far as their duties may admit, who have served at home in an Officers Training Corps, or in the Special Reserve, or the Territorial Forces, or in similar organizations in any of our Colonies, and that their names and whereabouts be annually shown in the Indian Army List.

9233, 9326, 9332.

#### Section XV.—General proposals in respect of British officers of the Indian army.

Proposals to facilitate promotion, etc.

345. In order to promote general efficiency, and to ensure to officers a reasonable prospect of promotion to regimental commands and higher appointments, we recommend that:—

(a) The tenure of regimental commands should hereafter be limited to four years.

685, 4446, 8669.

(b) All infantry regimental officers not holding the appointment of commandant should be struck off the cadres of their units on attaining the age of 50.

7499.

(c) Cavalry commandants should be required to vacate at 50 instead of at 52, and cavalry officers not holding the appointment of commandant should be struck off their cadres on attaining the age of 48.

4474, 4478, 7499, 8671.

(d) The tenure by officers of brigade commands, whether in the category of "Colonels on the Staff" or of "General Officers Commanding Brigades," should not exceed six years in all.

3946, 3948, 4481.

(e) Substantive colonels should be retired after four years unemployment.

4480-81.

(f) An officer extra-regimentally employed should on promotion to the rank of substantive colonel *ipso facto* cease to be eligible for subsequent regimental employ.

4448, 4450.

(g) An officer appointed to the command of a regiment of Indian cavalry or infantry before having

4545.

attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel should not be promoted, but should be given temporary rank only, until he becomes entitled to that substantive rank in accordance with the time scale.

With reference to (b) and (c) we would suggest that the Commander-in-Chief should be empowered in exceptional cases to retain a cavalry Commandant up to 52 years of age, and an officer of either cavalry or infantry, who is not holding the appointment of Commandant, after attaining the age of 48 and 50 years respectively, but always subject to the approval of His Excellency the Viceroy, and to a report being made to the Secretary of State explaining on what grounds the exception has been made.

4559-63, 5659, 5665, 6455-59, 7504, 7516, 7635, 8641, 10598, 10604, 11100-04, 11116, 11406, 11460, 11484, 11895, 12298, 12639, 12655, 13042.

4563, 7504, 8641, 10604, 11100, 11116, 13042.

4563, 7504, 10600, 10602, 10620, 11100 11116, 11895, 13042.

7504, 11100, 11116, 11484, 11920, 11922, 12641, 13042.

10582, 10590, 13042.

10574, 11460.  
11468, 11895.  
12127, 13052.

11310, 11316, 12932.

11730-36.  
12119-27.  
12490-96.  
12864-72,  
13193-7.

346. We have been much impressed by the practical unanimity of opinion that the present leave rules permit of British officers being absent more frequently than is to the advantage either of the State, or of the individuals concerned.

Leave Rules.

We recommend—

- (a) That combined leave be open throughout the year.
- (b) That the maximum amount of combined leave which may be granted to an officer be increased from eight to twelve months.
- (c) That the minimum number of British officers to be present for duty with units (i) during the training season, (ii) at other times, be fixed by regulation.
- (d) That the maximum number of British officers of a unit permitted to be absent out of India on combined leave be fixed by regulation.
- (e) That officers granted leave out of India for special causes in excess of this number, (d), be usually restricted to a period of not more than six months combined leave.
- (f) That, except in the case of leave granted on medical certificate or on account of very urgent private affairs, no British officer be granted combined leave out of India (i) until he shall have served a certain period (say four years) in the country, of which half must have been put in with an Indian unit, (ii) until he shall have put in a certain period (say three years) of duty, subsequent to return from the last combined leave taken out of India.

347. Having regard to the enormous importance of the personal factor as it affects the war efficiency of Indian troops, we strongly recommend that the transfer of British officers from one unit to another should be closely restricted.

Transfer of British officers.

348. Lastly, as regards the language examinations, we would draw attention to statements made by witnesses that the present tests are not of a sufficiently practical character. We are not prepared to offer a definite opinion on this point, but we think that it is one which merits careful consideration. In this connection we would remark that we regard it as of more importance for the war efficiency of the army that every possible encouragement and facility should be given to the Indian ranks to learn "Urdu," rather than that the British officers should be required to learn one, or more, local tongues in addition to "Urdu."

Language tests for British officers.

## Section XVI.—War and Peace establishments of Indian units.

349. In the following discussion, we have throughout confined ourselves to Indian officers, non-commissioned officers and men, under the title "Indian ranks," omitting British officers of the Indian army, the establishment of whom is considered elsewhere.

### War Establishments.

350. We do not propose any alteration in the existing war establishments of Indian units, for, while we regard those of cavalry and infantry as being lower than is desirable, from the view either of tactical requirements or economical administration, we see no prospect of their being raised to a suitable figure without such an addition to existing expenditure as, in view of other needs, seems at present to be prohibitive.

### Peace Establishments.

351. The question of peace establishments, however, is one which demands careful consideration, in which certain principles should be borne in mind from the points of view of recruiting, peace and war efficiency, and economy. From an examination of the peace establishments at present obtaining in Indian units, we are not clear that these principles have been kept in view, *e.g.*, there is doubtful economy in maintaining units, such as the Carnatic regiments, at such an establishment that they cannot efficiently take the field in war.

### Recruiting.

352. In regard to recruiting, the peace establishment should be such that the recruiting area is able to supply a sufficiency of recruits of the right stamp of the required classes. By this is meant a supply adequate to keep the ranks of the regiment filled, after allowing for all normal depletions, including the passage of enough men to the reserve to keep it, too, up to its authorised strength. The peace establishment should also, as far as possible, be constant, and not liable to fluctuations which vary the recruiting demands on the area.

The underlying principle of any sound system of recruitment is the maintenance of a uniform and constant intake and outflow into and from the ranks. Sudden spurts and sudden reductions, entailing varying demands on recruiting areas, are disconcerting to those affected, and, in a voluntary army, prejudice supply. Excessive recruiting in any one year or years entails corresponding abnormal departures more or less simultaneously in some year or series of years in the future, and so a vicious state of affairs, once initiated, recurs at cyclic intervals for a long period of time. A similar argument applies to the effect of any large increase to the reserve in any year or series of years.

Any measures which contravene the principles enunciated above contain, therefore, an obvious element of complication and difficulty, and cannot be regarded without grave uncertainty as to their effect upon problems of recruiting and organization in the future.

### Training and normal duties.

353. In order to obtain peace efficiency, the peace establishment must be such as to permit of the unit being properly trained for war, of its satisfactorily performing its peace duties—*e.g.*, furnishing enough men for guard duties on the frontier, or in ordinary cantonments, repression of civil disorder, etc.—and of its carrying these duties out without laying too heavy a burden on the men in the ranks, or interfering with customary privileges such as leave.

354. To meet the demands of war efficiency the peace establishment must be such as to permit of an easy transition from a peace to a war footing, in which the war establishment of the unit should be completed with men in every respect fit for field service, of maintaining a reserve sufficient to replace war wastage and of the provision of a depôt able to meet the needs of the unit in the field.

Mobilization.

355. Economy demands that the unit should be effective for the purpose for which it is maintained and that no higher peace establishment should be kept up than is necessary to meet the requirements already mentioned.

Economy.

#### THE INDIAN ARMY RESERVE.

356. The question of establishments is so bound up with that of reserves for war that, before entering upon a discussion of the establishments required by the several branches of the service, it will be well to discuss the question of Reserves.

Reserves for War.

An Indian army reserve was first formed in 1886, as a result of the Ashley Eden Commission, there being then two separate classes, one an Active Reserve, for men whose total service with the colours and in the reserve did not exceed 21 years, and the other a Garrison Reserve, for men with service over 21 years but under 32 years. A Reserve of 23,000 was contemplated, to be increased if thought desirable.

The Garrison Reserve was abolished in 1891, the effect being that there remained only one Reserve, in which men might serve until the completion of 25 years total service. They were to train for one month every year, drawing a monthly pay of Rs. 3. On completion of 25 years service, a man was entitled to pension, the monthly rate for cavalry and infantry being Rs. 3, and that for artillery and sappers Rs. 3-8.

357. In 1903 (the reserve strength then being 23,000) it was decided to raise the establishment, by an annual increase of 2,500, to 50,000 men, which total, had the hopes entertained been realised, would have been completed in 1914. This total of 50,000 was to be made up as follows :—

Cavalry	...	...	8,000
20 Gurkha battalions	...	...	2,000
Remaining infantry battalions	...	...	35,900
Indian mountain artillery and Indian ranks with British artillery.			2,600
Sappers and Miners	...	...	1,100
Railway companies	...	...	400
			<hr/>
			50,000
			<hr/>

In the same year the reserve rate of pay was reduced to Rs. 2, and training was to be for two months every other year.

Reservists however were not forthcoming in the numbers anticipated (the conditions of service possibly not being sufficiently attractive) and the present total is only 34,600. No doubt financial reasons have also militated against completing the required total.

358. Under present conditions, a man may leave the colours after completing three years service, either on discharge or on transfer to the Reserve, though, to qualify for pension as a reservist, he must have served five years with the colours. A man cannot transfer to the Reserve after he is 32 years of age.

In the Infantry generally, regiments with high peace establishments have usually, also, a large reserve, an instance of this being the 74 battalions (exclusive of Gurkhas) whose peace establishment is 912, who nearly all have a reserve strength of between 300 and 350. Some regiments on a lower peace establishment, however, have a reserve of only 50, whilst others have no reserve at all.

In the Silladar Cavalry, the average reserve per regiment is only about 32, whereas it should, under the 50,000 scheme, be something over 200, but this may be accounted for by the fact that, in the majority of cases, the men serve on for pension, to make good the expenditure they incur on joining.

As regards Indian Mountain Batteries, the average present reserve per battery is 74, as against the 79 which had been taken originally as the strength required; and the aggregate reserve of Indian ranks with British artillery batteries and ammunition columns is 960 instead of 1,652. As regards also the 19 companies of Sappers and Miners, the 50,000 basis worked out to 58 per company, whereas the present actual reserve strength is only 40 per company.

359. Reservists are primarily intended to make good wastage in war, a highly important question which has been considerably misunderstood, in consequence of a failure to differentiate between gross and net wastage. The figures usually referred to in the examination of witnesses were those given in the Field Service Regulations for *gross* wastage, *viz* :—

4469.

Infantry	...	...	...	80 per cent.
Cavalry	...	...	...	70 „
Artillery	...	...	...	60 „
Engineers	...	...	...	40 „
Headquarters and Administrative Services			30	„

360. These figures, as is specifically stated in the Regulations, represent the drafts which must be sent to the front during a year of war, to replace men who have disappeared from the fighting strength (gross wastage). These drafts may include a proportion of the men previously invalided, or sent down wounded from the front, who have since recovered and become fit to return there. The net wastage, *i.e.*, the permanent loss of men, is not given, since it varies widely according to the campaign and climate, which also affect the number of men who recover and become fit to return to the front; 20 per cent. of the gross wastage may, however, be taken as a fair average for these men.

If this percentage be applied to the figures given above, we get the following percentages to represent the *net* wastage :—

Infantry	...	...	...	64 per cent.
Cavalry	...	...	...	56 „
Artillery	...	...	...	48 „
Engineers	...	...	...	32 „
Headquarters and Administrative Services			24	„

361. The figures given in the Field Service Regulations represent the probable average gross wastage in a European war. For a campaign against Afghanistan or the frontier tribes, even allowing for the climate, we do not think, that such heavy casualties need be provided for, and we have therefore adopted the following figures as a basis for calculations :—

				Gross wastage per cent.	Recoveries at 20 per cent of gross wastage.	Net wastage per cent.
Infantry	...	...	...	65	13	52
Cavalry	...	...	...	50	10	40
Artillery, Engineers and Departmental services.	...	...	...	40	8	32
Staff	...	...	...	30	6	24

362. Applying these figures to the war establishments of the several arms, we find that the following net wastage requires to be provided for, exclusive of men who have been sent back sick or wounded and recover :—

				War establishment.	Net wastage.
Infantry battalion	...	...	...	752	391
Cavalry regiment	...	...	...	500	200
Indian mountain battery	...	...	...	294	94

This can only be met from the following sources (a) recruits who have become fully trained since mobilization took place, (b) reservists, (c) men left behind medically unfit at the depôt on mobilization, who afterwards recover; for although recruiting will be vigorously pressed, the men thus obtained are primarily intended to provide for drafts after the reserve has all been used up, and will in any case not be fit for duty on field service until they have had nine or ten months of training.

#### PEACE ESTABLISHMENTS.

363. Reverting now to the question of peace establishments, and dealing with infantry first as representing the bulk of the army, an examination of the existing establishments of infantry shows remarkable variations.

Peace Establishments of Indian Infantry.

As matters at present stand, out of 138 infantry battalions (including the five raised for Colonial service), 93 have an establishment of 912, and 31 are on the 832 scale; 3 battalions (116th Mahrattas, 119th Infantry, and 129th Baluchis) have an establishment of 816; 3 others (42nd, 43rd and 44th, representing the old Deoli, Erinpura and Merwara Corps) have one of 712; while, in order to raise other units to the 912 establishment the 8 Carnatic battalions were, in 1906, reduced to a peace establishment of 600 only.



It is evident that, if all these battalions are liable to be called upon to perform similar duties, some of these establishments must be unreasonable. We shall now, assuming that all ought to be fit to take the field, consider what is the minimum peace establishment, which will meet our requirements.

Recruiting  
areas.

364. From the evidence we have received, we have formed the conclusion that, generally speaking, the recruiting areas assigned to regiments are able to supply sufficient recruits of the desired classes to enable the present establishment of the unit and its reserve to be kept filled, except in the case of some Sikh regiments, where it appears that a shrinkage in the source of supply has made it necessary to accept recruits not up to the desired standard. We have however made recommendations elsewhere, with a view to reducing the number of Sikhs in the army, which ought to meet any difficulty of this nature.

2750.  
4282.  
11234.

Establishment  
necessary for  
mobilization.

365. Assuming the capabilities of the recruiting area to be satisfactory, the most important consideration is the ability of the regiment to mobilize at the authorised war establishment, which is 752 of all ranks. In itself it is obviously desirable that every unit should be able to mobilize from its own peace establishment. But in view of the cost of high peace establishments, European Powers are content with comparatively low ones, capable of being completed on mobilization to war strength by reservists; and in a modified form the same principle has been applied to the British army on the Home establishment.

In the Indian army it would not be wise to have a short service system with a large mass of reservists, as on the continent of Europe; and however attractive such a scheme might appear, to rely largely upon the reserve for the purpose of filling up the ranks on mobilization, is a course which presents so many drawbacks that we have no hesitation in recommending that it be not adopted.

366. Put shortly, the main disadvantages, for India, in a peace establishment which is so low that the unit cannot mobilize without calling on the reserve, are the delay in mobilization, the prejudicial effect on the efficiency of the unit, and the possible injury to the popularity of the reserve, if it is to be called out, wholly or partially, for every expedition for which India is responsible.

#### MOBILIZATION BY CALLING UPON RESERVES.

Mobilization  
by use of  
Reserve.

367. The necessity for calling out the reserve, before a regiment can complete its war establishment, must obviously delay mobilization, because the reservists will have first to be warned for service (they will usually not be expecting a summons) and provided with railway passage to their reserve centre, where they will be partly equipped and clothed, and then forwarded to the station of the regiment, where their equipment and clothing will be completed. It does not of course follow that the reservist will, or indeed always can, turn up promptly. He will have some affairs to settle, he may (not expecting a summons) be away from home. If he is a trans-frontier reservist, and the mobilization is for war against the frontier tribes or Afghanistan, it may be impossible to get a notice to him at all, even if it be assumed that



in such a case he would be willing to obey the call, which is doubtful. Meanwhile the regiment has to wait for its reservists to join.

368. In addition to the delay to the progress of general mobilization and concentration, involved by the necessity for first calling up a large number of men of the reserve, before units can mobilize, another important drawback to this use of the reserve has to be considered, *viz*, its effect on the efficiency of the units engaged at the outset. It will probably be readily admitted that the troops who first meet the enemy in the field should be as efficient as possible. The prospects of victory and early termination of the war will certainly be enhanced thereby, and since in India we depend largely on prestige, the chances of sedition or disturbances behind the troops, in India, will be minimised.

369. There is some cause for doubt whether the average reservist, on rejoining the ranks, will be physically fit to go at once upon active service. Speaking generally, Indian soldiers deteriorate physically and professionally very rapidly in comparison with Europeans after leaving the colours, and a large proportion of reservists, on being called up for service would not at once be fit to take their places in the ranks both for reasons of inefficiency as soldiers and on physical grounds. As to age, practically no European army takes men of over 31 into the ranks for service in the first line, while the Indian army takes them up to 40 certainly, and, at present, to 45.

370. The following evidence given before the Committee shows the opinions of commanding officers and others, from which it will be seen there is clearly ground for misgiving. Differences in the views expressed will often be found traceable to the classes of troops of whom the witness has had experience.

Opinions of  
officers upon  
reservists.

SIR JAMES WILLCOCKS.  
5593.

5581.

GENERAL AYLMER.  
8471.

GENERAL BIRDWOOD.  
7401.

COLONEL HOGHTON, 69TH  
*Punjabis*.  
10799.

COLONEL DUNSTERVILLE,  
*20th Punjabis*.  
11609.  
11593.

When reservists come up for training they are not as a rule physically fit for active service. Has recommended getting rid of an enormous number. Good ones are very good but there are others absolutely useless.

Reservists, do what you will, rapidly deteriorate. Has seen practically the whole of the reservists of the Northern Army.

Reports show that some of the reservists on arrival are weak and underfed.

Probably 75 per cent though not having so much to go on as men with the colours, are physically fit immediately on re-joining.

When reservists first come up, not many more than 50 per cent. of them would be fit to go on a campaign.

Commanded the reserve depôt at Peshawar for three years. When reservists first come up, 15 to 20 per cent. are physically unfit from underfeeding, except Pathans. The others were Sikhs, Dogras and Punjabi Musalmans. On the whole, two months' training required to make them fit for the ranks.

Reservists, if carefully weeded out periodically (about 10 per cent. per annum), are mostly physically fit for service, but they require at least one month's training to render them fit for the ranks. Perhaps 50 per cent. would turn up punctually, the rest later on.

Seventy per cent. of Sikh reservists would have been fit to take the field at once, 10 per cent. in a fortnight, 20 per cent. never.

Reservists are not in any way fit when they first come up. One month is required to make 80 per cent. physically fit, and another month to make 80 per cent. fit to take their places in the ranks.

It requires two months to make reservists in every way fit to take their place in the ranks.

Has seen two periods of reserve training, and thinks 30 per cent. altogether unfit for active service, remainder fit after three months.

371. Owing to their age and the conditions which obtain in their homes, as well as to their having on return to civil life acquired family and other interests, many reservists will not have regained the true military spirit until they have been back to duty long enough for habits of discipline to replace the ties of home, nor will they be fit for the hardships of war until they have been a sufficient time at the depôt to enable training and a return to a proper diet, to have had effect on their physique. We cannot expect Indian reservists to rejoin the colours animated by the spirit which enables reservists of the British army at home so quickly to fall again into their old places when recalled for active service.

372. We should like to make it clearly understood that we are only opposed to the use of a reserve to fill up the ranks of the fighting units on mobilization, not to a reserve for the purpose of replacing wastage in the field. We regard the latter as indispensable, and it was in fact the principle on which the formation of the reserve was first sanctioned, *viz.*, "That the reservists should belong to the battalions from which they came, or to the linked battalions, and *that they should be used to replenish their ranks in the field*" (Extract from note by the Adjutant-General in India, in M. D. Pros., November 1899, No. 2150.)

We shall recur to the question of the reserve later, for the present we shall dismiss it as a source from which to fill the ranks on mobilization.

Minimum  
establishment  
required to  
provide war  
establishment  
on mobilization

373. We have carefully considered the strength of the minimum peace establishment, from which a battalion could mobilize at war establishment in an efficient condition for the field. When a regiment mobilizes it has to leave behind it, (a) a depôt staff to receive and train recruits and reservists, to prepare drafts for the regiment at the front, to form a home for the sick and wounded until they are again fit for service, to manage the regimental business, and so on: (b) recruits not sufficiently trained to be fit to take their places in the ranks: (c) men in hospital or not fit for active service. The minimum establishment capable of carrying on the business of the depôt of a battalion on field service is 54 of all Indian ranks. The number of insufficiently trained recruits will vary slightly but will average about 55. The number unfit for active service will vary from 34 in a battalion of 752 establishment to 42 in one of 912 establishment, but of these an average of 9 may be taken as fit for service at the depôt though not in the field, and may therefore be included in the depôt strength.

MAJOR HILL,  
15th Sikhs.  
11211.

COLONEL CREAGH,  
128th Pioneers.  
12021.

COLONEL MEAD,  
116th Mahrattas.  
12408.

COLONEL GRAHAM,  
80th Carnatics.  
12752, 12766.

Allowing for these, the total number of men which a battalion will necessarily leave behind on taking the field varies from 134 to 142. To find a war establishment of 752 Indian ranks, this means that a regiment on mobilization must have a strength of  $752 + 142$  or 894 Indian ranks, and some allowance must be made for its actual strength being below its establishment. This naturally varies slightly but we may safely say that an establishment of about 900 will be required.

#### ESTABLISHMENT NECESSARY FOR TRAINING.

374. Turning next to the question of training, it is evident that the peace establishment of a battalion should be such as to enable it to be efficiently trained for the duties it will be called upon to perform in war. Working out the numbers required, upon the principles laid down in "Infantry Training 1912," *viz.*, that good section, half company and company training is the essence of efficient training generally, we need for a battalion a strength of rather over 600 men, actually present on parade, exclusive of Indian officers.

375. But in any discussion on the peace establishments of military units, it must be borne in mind that the peace establishment is far from representing the actual number of men whom the Commanding Officer can ordinarily expect to find available, at any one time, for military training. Guards, garrison duties, sickness, specialist classes (such as machine gun, signalling, telephone, etc.), untrained recruits and their instructors, and short leave are the main causes which reduce the number of men on an infantry battalion parade; but the proper administration of a unit also necessitates the detailing of clerks, police, school-masters, armourers, etc., etc., who likewise go to swell the number of men away from parade. It is estimated that, of a battalion of 912 Indian ranks, 240 men may, even during the non-furlough season, legitimately be absent from parades owing to the above causes, while incidental demands on the regiment tend to swell the numbers. To this 240 non-commissioned officers and men, must be added at least 2 Indian officers, giving a total of 242. Adding this number to the 600 mentioned in the preceding paragraph, we get a minimum establishment to permit of effective peace training of 842 *plus* 14 Indian officers or 856 Indian ranks.

376. We also see that 670 Indian ranks (912—242) represent the theoretical maximum number of men present on parade with a battalion of 912 Indian ranks, turning out for a single day's training at its own station. For any work, such as regular battalion training or manœuvres, which involves some days absence from cantonments, the numbers will fall considerably lower, because, although guards and other duties in the station are reduced to a minimum, it then becomes necessary to leave behind men enough, not only to find the guards and unavoidable duties, but to provide reliefs for them, so as to allow of men having at least two "nights in bed" to one "on guard."

It is not generally realised how much these demands reduce the strength of battalions attending manœuvres, but it is no exaggeration to say that Indian battalions with an establishment of 912 all ranks can seldom leave much less than 300 men behind, when

going into camp for brigade or divisional training. During the inter-divisional manoeuvres near Delhi in 1912, the average strength of Indian battalions was under 550, though battalions had been directed to turn out as strong as possible.

377. The fact that, as seen above, even with the highest establishment of 912, commanding officers do not get much more than the minimum number of men required for efficient battalion training, is probably one of the causes for the backwardness of the Indian army section commander, as compared with his confrère in the British service. In the latter, when men are once fully trained, section training can sometimes be lightly passed over. But the British non-commissioned officer can always read, is fairly well educated and possesses some imagination, whereas the Indian section commander can seldom read without difficulty, has but an elementary education, and lacks imagination, whilst his ideas of field service, in the majority of cases, are of the vaguest.

It follows that we cannot trust much to his imagination or powers of inference, and when we attempt to teach the Indian non-commissioned officer, we must give him an adequate and actual command to handle at training, whose numbers he can see and appreciate; while on the other hand the men of the same section cannot be used over and over again for the training of a succession of leaders. If this is done too much, the men get bored and tired, and the work does not advance. The establishment ought therefore to provide sufficient sections and squads to enable their leaders to be trained properly. And it is quite as necessary for a section leader in the field to know his men well, as it is for an officer. Efficient section training is all the more desirable, in that so large a proportion of our probable area of operations consists of mountainous country, where commands are rapidly split up and officers find it very difficult to exercise control, and where, in consequence, a great deal depends on the efficiency of the leaders of small bodies.

378. The statements laid before us by the various commanding officers, whom we have examined, show how largely the numbers of men available for duty, or present on parade, fell short of the establishments of the various units on the dates named—see pages 865, 867, 839, 918, 946-7, 978-9, 1007 Volume III.

In view of this, it was suggested in Committee that as, in consequence of furlough and leave rules, units in any case go down to a relatively low strength for several months of the year, it would not matter if they were at a low strength for the training season also, which only lasts for a few months. The answer to this argument is, that it is just those few months of full strength which enable training as a battalion to be practised and save the situation. During the rest of the year training which does not require the presence of full numbers is carried on.

It has also been suggested that reservists should, where possible, join their own regiments for training, which regiments would then have a largely increased strength. This is a proposal with which, so far as it is feasible—and there are some serious difficulties in the way—we are quite in accord, but this would not meet the difficulty of low numbers because, in any event, reservists would not be able to fire their course of

musketry, and pick up their individual training sufficiently for them to take their places in the ranks, in less than five to six weeks, so that at most three weeks would be all the time available for battalion training, and this would be quite insufficient.

379. Even in England, where the reserve system is in full operation, the establishment of an infantry battalion is 802 of all ranks, and it has in addition a "Reserve battalion," the regular establishment of which is 98, to train its recruits for it; and these also are under training for a much shorter period than Indian recruits. Not only is the British soldier far more intelligent and better educated than the Indian one, not only is he being instructed in his own language by his own countrymen, but in addition training practically all the year round which can be, and is, carried on in England, is forbidden by the climate in India. Lastly, even at Home the weakness of units for company and section training is a source of constant complaint.

380. The following evidence given by various officers bears on this subject. All were asked whether a smaller peace establishment could be made to work.

Opinions of  
officers on peace  
establishments  
for training.

GENERAL AYLMER.  
820s.

SIR E. BARROW.  
4712.

SIR J. WILLCOCKS.  
5581.  
5601.

COLONEL DUNSTERVILLE.  
(912 battalion.)  
11530, 11534, 11538.

11550.

COLONEL GRAHAM.  
(600 battalion.)  
12721.  
12932.

COLONEL HOUGHTON.  
(912 battalion.)  
10671.

MAJOR HILL.  
(912 battalion.)  
11175.

COLONEL MEAD.  
(800 battalion.)  
12348-52.

COLONEL CREAGH.  
(816 battalion.)  
11948-50.

The battalion (of 712 all ranks) could only parade with 400 to 450 men and the training would not be very efficient.

800 the minimum peace establishment for a battalion having regard to its training in peace.

Reduction of peace establishments is a mistake, for you do not then get proper war training.

I would reduce no battalion below what it could train with for war.

Training would lose half its value if the strength were seriously reduced. Present peace establishment is sound. You cannot train sections with a weak establishment.

Any reduction of the present strength would have a most prejudicial effect on the winter training.

The reduction of the Carnatic regiments to 600 has made it practically impossible to train and prepare them for field service as they should be. Strength should be increased to 850.

For training, 550 men on parade is the minimum for efficiency. This is all that a battalion of 912 can produce.

Present strength is correct and it would not be possible to carry on with fewer men than we have at present.

The minimum peace establishment having regard to training is 828.

Establishment should be raised to 896. It would not be in the interests of efficiency to reduce the peace establishment.

381. Lastly, in considering this question it must be borne in mind that the training of the Indian army is already carried out under difficulties unknown at home—or probably in any other regular army. The liberal leave rules (which are a necessity), and the climate, combine to prevent a progressive course of training throughout the year—limiting the time available to little more than the five months of the cold season. The nature



of the Indian is such that he quickly forgets the knowledge he has acquired, necessitating a "refresher course" on return even from ordinary leave, before he is fit to take his place in his section. His instruction is given to him in a tongue which is foreign to his officers and often also to himself, and the commands he receives are in a language of which he is ignorant. In our opinion any measure which militates against the thorough training, on proper lines, of the Indian soldier is fraught with danger—nor can we regard it as being economical, as it must result in the men failing us when put to the test of war.

382. The considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraphs lead us to the conclusion that for efficient training purposes the establishment of an infantry battalion should be between 850 and 860 ( $600 + 242 + 14$ ) Indian ranks. We did not take any specific evidence upon the point whether an establishment of this size would provide satisfactorily both for the proper performance of peace duties, and for giving the sepoy the amount of furlough and leave to which he is accustomed, but the general trend of the opinions expressed would seem to show that it would be so.

#### PEACE ESTABLISHMENT RECOMMENDED.

The most suitable establishment for an Indian battalion.

383. We are now in a position to arrive at a conclusion as to what the most suitable peace establishment for a battalion should be. We have said that we attach the highest importance to the maintenance of battalions at a fixed establishment, for we regard a steady and constant flow of recruits into the ranks as almost vital to the well being of our recruiting system, and this can only be obtained by adherence to the same establishment through a number of years. We also attach an almost equally high importance to a regiment being able to mobilize at war establishment, without having to call upon the reserve, or to draw upon its linked battalion to an extent likely to cripple the latter.

384. As we have shown in paragraph 373, the lowest peace establishment which would enable a battalion to mobilize at the present war establishment of 752 Indian ranks is one of about 900. Did we feel that we had a free hand in this matter, we should recommend that all Indian infantry battalions should have a uniform peace establishment of not less than 900. The existing highest peace establishment of 912, which allows a small margin for contingencies, appears to be a very suitable one.

At the same time we are impressed by the difficulties under which the existing lower establishment regiments labour, and believe that many advantages would follow from raising these battalions to an equality with the rest.

At present there are thirty one battalions at 832 each, three at 816, three at 712, and eight at 600 Indian ranks. It is clear from what has been already said, that the fourteen last-named battalions not only cannot mobilize without heavy demands on other battalions, or on the reserve (which some do not possess), but are severely handicapped in the attempt to train up to a satisfactory state of efficiency.

385. We therefore strongly advocate that the peace establishments of all battalions, (including the Carnatics) other than Gurkhas, and the Hazara Pioneers to whom

we shall refer again presently, should be fixed at a uniform figure throughout.

Excluding Gurkhas, and the 106th Hazara Pioneers, we find that the total existing establishment of the remaining 117 regiments is 100,920, which works out to an average of 861 of all Indian ranks per unit, with 183 over, which is more than sufficient to raise the single Gurkha battalion now at 832 to 912 all ranks. Had we, as we have already remarked, a free hand, we should have preferred to raise all these regiments to a uniform establishment of 904 Indian ranks. But this would mean an increase to the present total establishment of some 5,000 men, and in view of the many demands for money for other requirements of the army, we are not prepared to press for this. We therefore recommend that a uniform establishment should be adopted for all regiments of Indian infantry, and be fixed at 861 Indian ranks.

Peace  
establishment  
recommended.

1309-23.  
4337-44.

140-6 written evidence.

From the evidence given before us, especially in the case of the regiments recruiting in Madras, we do not anticipate any difficulty in filling up the ranks of the lower establishment regiments to the extent required

336. This establishment will enable all these regiments to train at a suitable strength, and thus be made thoroughly efficient for field service. Further, though it will not permit them to mobilize at war establishment without assistance, yet they will not require more than from 30 to 40 additional men each, according to whether the peace establishment is at the time complete or not. This number can be drawn from the linked battalion allotted to internal security purposes without crippling it.

For a regiment with an establishment of 861 Indian ranks, a reserve of 350 men will suffice to replace wastage (at the rate mentioned in paragraph 362) during a year of war, and we propose that the reserve should be placed at that figure.

Strength of  
Reserve.

3584-93.

Vol. II, Annexure, p. 267.

387. We have referred to the Gurkhas and the 106th Hazara Pioneers as requiring special treatment. Taking the Gurkha battalions first, these, with one exception, have at present a peace strength of 912, but the sanctioned reserve is, as a rule, only 100 per unit, and the actual strength at present averages about 78. We have been informed that the Nepal Government have hitherto objected to allowing a larger reserve strength than 100, and that it would be inexpedient to raise the question again at present. We propose therefore that the Gurkha battalions should remain on the 912 peace establishment, the unit which at present has 832 being raised to the same figure, with a reserve of 100 men each.

Gurkha  
battalions and  
the Hazara  
Pioneers.

The same considerations will apply to the Hazara Pioneer battalion which is recruited from Afghanistan, and in the case of which also a sufficient reserve can not be relied on.

We may mention here that, in a case which was referred to us recently (see Annexure B, item 18, Volume I) the Adjutant-General proposed to strengthen the Gurkha reserves, by seeking permission to enrol as reservists Gurkhas serving in the Burma military police. The Committee were unable to support the proposal in its original form, but we do not think that the question of providing an adequate reserve should be dismissed as

Reserves for  
Gurkha  
battalions.



insoluble, and we recommend that it receive further investigation.

Some discussion took place in Committee on the question of whether Gurkha battalions, with their small reserves, could be satisfactorily maintained in the field, and it was suggested that it might be well to allot only half of the Gurkha battalions to the Field Army. It is true that the Gurkha reserve is but 100 men per battalion, but a Gurkha battalion can mobilize immediately from its peace establishment and take the field in a highly efficient condition, while its resources are sufficient to maintain it in the field for at least six months. In addition to this, we have the power, exercisable in time of war, of transferring men within each group of linked Gurkha regiments, which should sufficiently obviate any serious difficulty in keeping the ranks of battalions on service properly filled. Moreover Gurkha regiments are just those for whom it is permissible to rely upon plenty of recruits coming forward in time of war.

#### ESTABLISHMENT WITH PERIODICAL VARIATION, PROPOSED IN COMMITTEE.

establishment  
with periodical  
variations.

388. This discussion of the question of peace establishments would not be complete, did we not refer to a proposal which was accepted by our colleagues in Committee, and which contemplated a large reduction in the peace establishments of Indian infantry, accompanied by a considerable increase in the Reserve.

389. The general system proposed was, that all infantry battalions, excluding Gurkhas and the Hazara Pioneers, whose conditions were peculiar to themselves, should have a uniform peace establishment of 752 Indian ranks. It being evident, however, that so low an establishment as this would not provide for the ordinary requirements of duties on the North-West frontier, where regiments detailed for movable columns, etc., have to be prepared at all times to move at a sufficient strength at short notice, units serving in the North-West Frontier Province, or at Fort Sandeman, or Loralai were to have a peace establishment of 912 all ranks.

390. The same establishment was also to be adhered to for the five battalions which are employed under the War Office on colonial service. The effect of this arrangement was that, excluding these five battalions, there would be one regiment, the Guides (which is localised in the North-West Frontier Province) with a permanent establishment of 912, and 22 other infantry battalions with a temporary establishment of that number. It may be noted however that, in addition to the foregoing, it would be necessary for the two Indian battalions for Aden, and one for the Persian Gulf, also to be on the higher establishment, while the two Garhwal battalions, being localised outside the North-West Frontier Province, would be permanently on the lower establishment.

Reliefs were to be arranged so as to give each regiment to be moved to or from the frontier, a year's notice. A regiment notified for frontier service was at once to commence extra recruiting towards the 912 establishment, and transfers to the reserve were to be suspended; similarly a regiment notified for relief from the frontier would at once stop recruiting, till it had got down to the 752 establishment, and, when relieved, was to encourage men to go to the reserve.

391. This proposal was attractive on the score of economy, which was considerable in spite of the large reserve which it entailed. But, after full consideration we are of opinion that it would be unwise to adopt it, in view (a) of the impracticability of giving an efficient training for war to regiments on the lower establishment proposed, (b) of the impossibility of mobilizing such regiments without calling upon the reserve, and (c) of the serious danger to our recruiting system which would be involved by the changes of establishment from low to high and *vice versa*, which were involved.

392. We have already shown in paragraph 382 that, in order to give efficient training, a minimum establishment of about 850 or 860 all ranks is necessary; and we have in paragraphs 367-71 pointed out the drawbacks involved by a regiment being unable to mobilize without calling up reservists. Allowing for a dépôt, and for men left behind as unfit from sickness or as not being fully trained, a regiment on the establishment of 752 would, assuming, say, 10 per cent. of reservists to be unfit on rejoining, have to call up some 150 reservists in order to mobilize. It is true that a linked battalion is liable to be called upon, but it could not supply such a large number of men as this, without rendering itself inefficient for service.

393. As regards the recruiting question, we find that, with 24 battalions (20 Gurkhas, 1 Hazaras, 1 Guides, 2 Garhwalis) not liable to change of establishment, and with 30 battalions\* on the higher establishment, the change from lower to higher would come round about every fourth relief or oftener. We have carefully worked out its effect on recruiting and we find it would be, generally, as follows:—

There would be, from the time the battalion is warned for higher establishment service—

1 year's very heavy recruiting	...	...	258 recruits
1 " low "	...	...	76 "
1 " low "	...	...	76 "
1 " no "	...	...	none "
1 " medium "	...	...	84 "
1 " very high "	...	...	170 "
6 " normal "	...	...	99 "

after which the cycle would begin again—indeed sooner if the regiment had to go to the frontier, or other higher establishment station, oftener than every fourth relief.

It is clear that such a system would be dangerous to the recruiting of the army. Battalions would risk their recruiting connection, for some men finding they could not go to the battalion of their choice would not join the army at all. The one year of heavy recruiting would certainly result in an inferior class of man having to be taken. Good recruiting is, as is well known, a most delicate process; we have already pointed out, in paragraph 352, the principles on which it is based and the danger of departing from them, and past experience in England of the enormous difficulties entailed by sudden variations in the rates of recruiting serves as a warning to India to avoid similar troubles.

394. From the Reserve point of view also, the results would be bad, for we find that, in a twelve year cycle, the strength of the reserve would for one half the time vary from 36 to 180 below its establishment, while passage to the reserve would be wholly stopped for four years.

\* See paragraph 390.

395. The result of these irregularities, as affecting recruiting and reserve service, would be to endanger to a serious extent the popularity of the army. Recruiting could hardly fail to be prejudicially affected. For we are dealing with men and not automata, and it is the great elasticity in existing conditions which renders military service now so popular as it is. No one, who has had experience of the difficulties of the recruiting problem and the danger of interfering with its even progress, could regard a system which involves raising and lowering establishments periodically, otherwise than with disfavour. We therefore are of opinion that it would be impossible to adopt such a system, even if it did not involve some serious administrative difficulties, such, as, an average permanent excess of about 1,000 men above establishments, which would result from recruiting additional men as soon as the 10 regiments for annual relief were warned for higher establishment, and from the presence of surplus men in the ranks of the 10 regiments on being relieved from that establishment. 8452.

396. The number of men in the reserve who should be maintained for each battalion at the peace establishment which we recommend is 350. This should be quite sufficient to meet the net wastage already referred to in paragraph 362, and to leave a small margin for contingencies. The number of reservists proposed for the battalions at the 912 and 752 establishment referred to in paragraphs 389-90 was 450. We should doubt whether a reserve of this size would be found quite sufficient to meet the demands made on it by a lower establishment regiment.

Special  
enlistment of  
recruits on  
mobilization.

397. It seems desirable to refer here to the fact that authority is given in the Field Service Manual, "Indian Infantry and Pioneers," for the enlistment of an additional number of recruits (256 for about two-thirds of the regiments and 128 for the remainder), on the outbreak of war, by regiments ordered to mobilize.

Sir Malcolm Grover and Major-General Aylmer have expressed doubts as to whether recruits would be readily forthcoming in the event of war on a large scale in certain directions, especially in Afghanistan; while Sir James Willcocks and Colonel Hoghton held that we should get recruits without difficulty, unless and until we had sustained serious reverses. We are inclined to share the doubts of the two officers first named, for we do not see how, from an area which usually produces about 100 recruits a year, two-and-a-half times that number is to be obtained during war, without lowering the standard for recruits. Still, however this may be, recruiting should at once be pressed and any success which might attend such efforts would automatically put us in a better position.

615-24.  
2808.  
5627.  
5634-41.  
10860.

Cavalry  
establishment  
and reserve.

398. Turning next to the cavalry, we are of opinion that the existing peace establishment of the silladar cavalry is sufficient for their efficient training in peace. It also appears to be clear that a regiment can mobilize at war establishment from its present numbers, and that a reserve of 100 men per regiment should suffice to maintain it in the field during a year of war.

We consider that certain definite advantages would follow, were the linking system which has been applied to Indian infantry units also made applicable to Indian cavalry regiments. It would be necessary to take care that regiments were of the same class composition, and as

far as possible that the linking should be agreeable to the units concerned. Were this course adopted, there should be no difficulty in maintaining regiments in the field by transfers, should unexpected casualties cause the reserve to prove insufficient.

We recommend that the same system and establishments should be applied to the three non-silladar cavalry regiments.

399. For the Indian mountain batteries, we recommend adherence to the existing peace establishment, and consider that a reserve of 100 per battery will be adequate.

**Artillery—  
Establishments  
and reserves.**

As regards native ranks of British artillery, we think it undesirable to make any reduction in their peace establishment, but are of opinion that a total of 1,500 in the reserve will be sufficient.

400. Touching the field companies of Sappers and Miners, we agree with Major-General Aylmer that the peace establishment may be reduced to some extent, provided the reserve is proportionately increased. The present peace establishment is 172, as compared with a war establishment of 192. It would therefore in any case be necessary, if a general mobilization were ordered, to complete companies from the reserve. We recommend a reduction of the peace establishment to 148 per company concurrently with an increase to the reserve, which we would place at 95 per company. We propose that the reduction should be only tentatively adopted at first, and carried out in proportion as the reserve is found to increase.

**Sappers and  
Miners—  
Establishments  
and reserve.**

401. Signal Companies are of such recent institution that it is not possible to express any decided opinion as to what their future peace establishment should be. It is probable that experience will show that some development of their present establishment is necessary, and we have been informed that this question has already been submitted for consideration. These proposals will have to be decided on their merits, but it is clear that Signal Companies stand on a different footing to other units in regard to reserves, and that they should not rely upon filling up their ranks on mobilization from that source, unless in the few exceptional cases where a reservist might be pursuing an employment which kept up his technical knowledge. The efficiency for service of these companies depends so largely upon the men being kept in constant practice, that reservists in their ranks would do more harm than good. We are of opinion that these units therefore must be capable of mobilizing from their peace establishments. We see no reason to alter the existing peace establishments of Railway companies; or the reserve arrangements in connection therewith.

**Signal  
companies.**

8469.

**Railway  
companies.**

402. We consider that the present establishments of Indian officers and non-commissioned officers of the various arms should not be reduced.

**Indian officers  
and non-  
commissioned  
officers.**

403. The following statement shews for the several arms :—

- (a) The existing peace strength of units.
- (b) The existing reserve, and
- (c) The position, as it would stand if the total of 50,000 men contemplated by Lord Kitchener for the reserve had been reached.

In parallel columns we shew our proposed peace and reserve establishments, the net result of which is that,

whereas the peace establishment is practically the same as at present, the reserve will be about 2,000 in excess of the 50,000 contemplated under the Kitchener scheme.

We shall refer to the financial results involved in Section XLI of our Report.

*Comparative statement of the present and proposed establishments of Indian units and their reserves.*

Branch.	Detail of units.	PRESENT.			PROPOSED.		
		Peace establish- ment.	Reserve establish- ment.	Intended reserve.	Peace establish- ment.	Reserve establish- ment.	
Cavalry ...	35 Silladar regiments at 625 each ...	21,875	1,140	7,280	21,875	3,500	} Para. 398.
	3 Non-silladar „ „ 602 „ ...	1,806	87	624	1,875	300	
	1 regiment Guides cavalry at 469 ...	469	32	208	469	75	
Artillery (exclud- ing Frontier Garrison artil- lery).	12 mountain batteries at 323 each ...	3,876	881	948	3,876	1,200	} Para. 399.
Indian ranks, with Royal artillery units.	Batteries, ammunition columns, siege and garrison companies.	6,122	960	1,652	6,290	1,500	
Sappers and Miners.	19 service companies at 172 each ...	3,268	769	1,095	2,812	1,805	} Paras. 400-1
	2 railway companies at 196 each ...	392	343	400	392	400	
	4 divisional signal companies at 88 each	352	...	...	616*	...	
Infantry ...	19 Gurkha battalions at 912 ...	17,328	1,529	1,900	18,240	2,000	} Paras. 387 and 396.
	1 Gurkha „ „ 832 ...	832	32	100			
	1 Hazara pioneer battalion at 912 ...	...	...	...	912	100	
	117 battalions at 861 each ...	...	...	...	100,737	40,950	
	74 battalions at 912 each ...	67,488	20,878	24,150	...	...	
	30 battalions at 832 each ...	24,960	6,457	8,200	...	...	
	3 battalions at 816 each ...	2,448	670	950	...	...	
	3 battalions at 712 each ...	2,136	...	...	...	...	
	8 battalions (Carnatic) at 600 each ...	4,800	455	584	...	...	
Unallotted reserve	Taken as infantry ...	...	...	1,909	...	...	
Total ...		158,152	34,293	50,000	158,094	51,830	
					209,924		

\* For seven companies.

## TERMS OF SERVICE IN THE INDIAN ARMY RESERVE.

8505.  
10719.  
11583.  
11975.  
12394.  
12758.

404. The evidence we have received tends to shew that there is cause for doubt whether the terms of service in the reserve are sufficiently attractive to ensure the passage into it of the number of men required, and we therefore believe it may be necessary to increase the pay of reservists from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 a month, the rate at which it stood prior to 1903.

Terms of  
service in the  
Reserve.

8223.  
8497.

A proposal, initiated by the Adjutant-General, has been laid before the Committee, which advocates the reduction of the qualifying service for reserve pension to a total of 21 years colour and reserve service, in place of 25 as at present. While we do not regard this reduction as a matter of immediate necessity, we agree in its eventual desirability. The older men, though not effective for field service, would still be useful for garrison duty, and it is better to have men of this class than none, until we are in a position to replace them by younger men. We therefore recommend that the existing conditions in regard to service for pension should be adhered to for the present, but that in the case of units where the full reserve strength which we have proposed has been reached, and where there are other applicants for the reserve, the oldest reservists with over 21 years' and under 25 years' service, should be permitted to take their full pension. Eventually, when the reserve is filled, we consider the limit of 21 years' colour and reserve service should be introduced.

405. We further recommend that in view of the necessity for the reservist being as fully trained and as efficient as possible before he leaves the ranks, no man should hereafter be entitled to transfer to the reserve until he has put in at least five years service with the colours. Further, in order to avoid injury to the reserve and diminish the loss caused to the State by men leaving the ranks at an early period of their service, we think that no man should be allowed to take his discharge until after five years service. On the other hand we would allow men to pass into the reserve up to 15 years service with the colours, and would substitute this limitation for the present 32 years of age limit.

## TRAINING OF RESERVISTS AND MOBILIZATION ARRANGEMENTS.

14515-23.  
14561-14675.  
14589-99.  
14625-33.

406. The existing system for the training of reservists is as follows:—

Training of  
Reservists and  
mobilization  
arrangements.

- (i) Cavalry reservists are trained with their own regiments.
- (ii) Indian mountain artillery reservists are trained with their own batteries, except those of batteries quartered in Burma, who train at Abbottabad.
- (iii) The Indian reservists of British artillery units are trained under special arrangements.
- (iv) The reservists of Sappers and Miners are trained at Corps headquarters.
- (v) Reservists of the 20 Gurkha battalions are all trained at Gorakhpur.
- (vi) The reservists with the remaining infantry battalions are trained under arrangements which require consideration in detail.



Except for this (*vi*), the arrangements mentioned above appear to be, on the whole, satisfactory. It would be preferable that Gurkha reservists should train with their battalions, but in view of the extra expense involved and the fact that they are trained by officers and non-commissioned officers detailed for the purpose from their own battalions, we consider that the system in their case may remain as at present.

407. For the other infantry corps the basis of reserve training is, generally speaking, the linked regiment system, under which each group of linked units has its regimental centre where the reservists are trained. These regimental centres were originally fixed with reference to the recruiting areas of the regiments forming the link, the general rule being laid down that one of the linked units should be stationed at the regimental centre. The principle underlying this system was that the reservists should be trained not far from their homes and with a battalion to which, if they did not originally belong to it, they were liable to be sent should it go on field service, under the rule that one linked unit should draw from another for field service purposes. While this system remains unchanged for the majority of infantry units, some complication has been caused by the recent reconstitution of Madras and Burma regiments into units recruited mainly from Northern India; a change which was not accompanied by a corresponding change in the locality of the regimental centres. The case of the 62nd, 66th and 84th Punjabis may be quoted as an example. These were originally Madras battalions, whose regimental centre was at Secunderabad; they now consist of Punjabi Musalmans, Sikhs and northern Rajputs, but their regimental centre has not yet moved to a station near the new recruiting areas.

14241.  
14523.

14527.

Changes in distribution have also, in some cases, made it impossible to place one of the linked battalions at its regimental centre, as, for instance, at Trichinopoly which, though it still remains normally the centre for two groups, is a single battalion station.

408. Financial considerations have been mainly the cause of the delay in rearranging regimental centres in accord with the new conditions, but the result has been that the arrangements for training the reservists of a considerable number of regiments are not at present satisfactory. This was brought out in the evidence of commanding officers and of Brigadier-General Hamilton. The awkwardness of existing arrangements is especially exemplified in the case of reconstituted Madras regiments, where the old regimental centre is obviously useless for training purposes, in view of the expense which would be incurred if the men were brought there from their homes in the North. For economical reasons, in these cases, the reservists are trained at those regimental centres which are most conveniently situated to their homes; the result of which is that, while a regiment may be training the reservists of another regiment not belonging to its own link, its own reservists are being trained by other than its linked units. We recommend that this system should be altered, with a view to ensure that, wherever possible, reservists should be trained by one of the regiments of the link to which their own regiment belongs.

10766.  
11981.  
11621.  
12752.  
14589 99.  
14626-37.



409. Proposals for a new system which are embodied in Army Department letter No. 9954-1-A. G. of 25th July last, have been laid before us. In this system it is proposed to revise the regimental centres, which are now to be called reserve centres, so as to bring them into harmony with existing conditions. If these proposals be approved, the result will be that with some few exceptions, reservists of each group of linked battalions will be trained at one place, as conveniently situated as possible to the recruiting areas. It is impossible to avoid the drawback that in certain instances the men will have some distance to travel, but we have no doubt that, on the whole, the new system will be a material advance on the old.

410. We make in this connection the following recommendations :—

**Recommendations.**

- (i) That the linked battalion system should be adhered to in future, and that the allotment of battalions to the field army should, as far as possible, be arranged so as to avoid detailing all the units of a group for field service. It may not be possible to avoid this entirely, but where it can be arranged, this should be done.
- (ii) We recommend the adoption of the reserve centres mentioned in the Army Department letter of the 25th July 1912, already referred to, which appear to us to be generally suitable for the purpose, except that Bangalore seems preferable to Trichinopoly for the reserve centre of the 61st, 64th and 81st Pioneers.
- (iii) In order that, as far as possible, infantry reservists should train with their own units or with a linked unit, endeavours should be made to station one battalion of each linked group at the regimental, otherwise the reserve, centre, or within its recruiting area.
- (iv) Where regiments can be stationed at their own regimental centre, or within 500 miles of it, their reservists should go to their own unit to be trained ; but where the unit is more than that distance from the reserve centre, its reservists should train with one of its linked battalions.
- (v) The present arrangement that reservists should be called up for two months' training biennially should be adhered to, half the quota of each unit being called up annually.
- (vi) So far as is possible, the periods of regimental training for reservists should be so arranged as not only to fit in with the time of year at which they can best get away from their ordinary avocations, but also with the training period of a unit which best admits of the reservists being exercised with it.

411. We are generally in favour of carrying out the arrangements proposed in the letter of 25th July 1912, referred to in paragraph 409, with the exception that the possibility of its being found desirable to move the dépôt

from the station where it was first formed should be recognised.

As regards Gurkha battalions, and the other units, excepting cavalry, referred to in paragraph 406, we consider that the existing arrangements for the training of reservists should continue, and, consequently, they should join on mobilization at the centres where they have been trained. Where these coincide with the peace location of their units no further move would be required. Where the unit was elsewhere they would proceed to join its dépôt.

412. We have in a previous paragraph proposed the linking of cavalry units. If this be approved, it will be necessary to fix reserve and regimental centres for these also.

### Section XVII.—Artillery Organization.

Artillery requirements.

413. In considering the artillery requirements of the Army for war, it appears to us that, owing to the nature of the country and the use for which the guns are likely to be required, should the Field Army be mobilized for service beyond the North-West frontier, mountain, rather than heavy artillery is needed. We believe too, that should a call be made for mobile artillery for expeditions out of India, the probable demand will be rather for pack than for wheeled artillery, should the scene of operations be China, Persia, Asia Minor, or Egypt. We therefore recommend that two (bullock) of the six existing heavy batteries be reduced, and that two British mountain batteries be raised in their place to complete the mobile artillery of the 6th (Poona) Division. Should our proposals, made in paragraph 415 below, to reduce three Horse Artillery ammunition columns be accepted, there will be available at Ahmednagar barracks, followers' lines, stables, gunsheds and workshops, etc., for these two new batteries.

4368, 5573.  
5575, 5882.  
13994, 13996.  
13998.

Fewer heavy and more mountain artillery batteries required.

4144, 4160.

Reduction in the number of companies Royal Garrison Artillery.

414. As we can see no useful purpose that is likely to be served by the retention of the two companies of Garrison Artillery now stationed at Fort Attock, or of the second company of Garrison Artillery at Quetta, and on the assumption that no addition to the permanent fortifications of India is contemplated for the present, we recommend that these three companies be reduced.

699, 2794.  
2796, 2798.  
4372, 5573.

Reduction in the number of ammunition columns.

415. If the number of cavalry brigades for the Field Army is reduced from eight to five, there will be three Horse Artillery ammunition columns in excess of requirements, and we recommend that these be abolished.

Establishments of Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery batteries to be augmented.

416. We however realise that it is highly undesirable to reduce the British personnel now serving in India and we therefore recommend that the cost of the personnel, vehicles and horses set free by the reduction of the Garrison Artillery and ammunition columns be utilized to raise all Horse and Field Artillery batteries, respectively, to uniform establishments of men, horses and vehicles, sufficient to enable Field Army batteries to be mobilized without having to draw unduly upon the batteries allotted to internal security duties.

417. The British establishments we accordingly propose for Horse, Howitzer, and Field Artillery batteries, respectively, are :—

Horse Artillery and Howitzer batteries	...	180
Field Artillery batteries	...	179

2605.  
2700.

418. As regards Indian personnel, we propose that all the batteries and ammunition columns be brought up to the standard establishment for each class of unit. Allowing for the reduction of three ammunition columns and of two heavy batteries, as well as for the requirements of the two new batteries of British mountain artillery, there will be a total increase of 13 to the Indian establishments of the artillery as is shown below.

Indian  
establishments  
of artillery  
units.

(a) *Additions.*

2 horse artillery batteries, (augmented) at 7 drivers	14
6 howitzer batteries, (converted) at 20 drivers	120
3 field artillery batteries, (augmented) at 12 drivers	36
2 British mountain batteries, (raised) at 195 drivers	390
2 howitzer ammunition columns, (converted) at 142 drivers	284
Total increase	844

(b) *Reductions.*

9 field artillery batteries, (converted) at 7 drivers	63
2 heavy batteries, (reduced) at 110 drivers	220
3 horse artillery ammunition columns, (reduced) at 56 drivers	168
2 field artillery ammunition columns (converted) to howitzer ammunition columns at 190	380
Total decrease	831

Net increase = 844—831 = 13 drivers.

419. The additional wagons required, three each for the lower establishment batteries, allowing for the three per battery in arsenal charge, can be found from those in the ammunition columns which will be superfluous under the new organization.

Additional  
wagons for  
lower  
establishment  
batteries.

420. The net result of abolishing the three garrison companies and three ammunition columns will be that the British establishments of all horse and field batteries can be brought up to strengths which will very nearly enable them to take the field unaided, and that the internal defence batteries will be in a position to meet the calls which will be made on them on mobilization to complete the field army batteries, without being rendered inefficient. This will be seen from the following table, which also includes the six Royal Field Artillery batteries and their ammunition columns which, with

General result  
of the  
Committee's  
proposals.

the sanction of the Secretary of State, are about to be reorganized as Howitzer batteries and columns.

PRESENT.			PROPOSED.			Remarks.
Detail of units.	British non-commissioned officers and men.*	Indian ranks.*	Detail of units.	British non-commissioned officers and men.*	Indian ranks.*	
9 Horse Artillery batteries at 175 British ranks and 15 Indian ranks each.	1,575	135	11 Horse Artillery batteries at 180 British ranks and 15 Indian ranks each.	1,980	165	† This takes into account the rearmament of 6 batteries with howitzers, which has been accepted by the Secretary of State.
2 Horse Artillery batteries at 152 British ranks and 8 Indian ranks each.	304	16				
3 Field Artillery (howitzer) batteries at 180 British ranks and 20 Indian ranks each.	540	60	† 9 Field Artillery (howitzer) batteries at 180 British ranks and 20 Indian ranks each.	1,620	180	
33 Field Artillery batteries at 174 British ranks and 12 Indian ranks each.	5,742	396	36 Field Artillery batteries at 179 British ranks and 12 Indian ranks each.	6,444	432	
9 Field Artillery batteries at 148 British ranks and 7 Indian ranks each.	1,332	63				
9 Horse Artillery ammunition columns at 18 British ranks and 56 Indian ranks each.	162	504	6 Horse Artillery ammunition columns at 18 British ranks and 56 Indian ranks each.	108	336	
11 Field Artillery ammunition columns at 64 British ranks and 190 Indian ranks each.	704	2,090	9 Field Artillery ammunition columns at 64 British ranks and 190 Indian ranks each.	576	1,710	
1 Field Artillery (howitzer) ammunition column at 52 British ranks and 142 Indian ranks.	52	142	3 Field Artillery (howitzer) ammunition columns at 52 British ranks and 142 Indian ranks each.	156	426	
3 British Mountain batteries at 129 British ranks and 195 Indian ranks each.	1,032	1,560	10 British Mountain batteries at 129 British ranks and 195 Indian ranks each.	1,290	1,950	
4 Heavy batteries at 91 British ranks and 104 Indian ranks each.	364	416	4 Heavy batteries at 91 British ranks and 104 Indian ranks each.	364	416	
2 Heavy batteries at 89 British ranks and 110 Indian ranks each.	178	220				(a) Includes the 268 men who have been reduced from the Indian establishment in anticipation of the reorganization of Royal Garrison Artillery.
21 companies of Royal Garrison Artillery at 140 British ranks each.	2,940 (a)	...	18 companies of Royal Garrison Artillery at 140 British ranks each.	2,520	...	
Total ...	14,925	5,602	Total ...	15,058	5,615	

\* Excludes Artillery Brigade staffs.

#### Reorganization of ammunition columns.

421. As regards the reorganization of ammunition columns which we have already touched on, we discussed the scheme put forward by the Army Department in our minute dated the 17th January last (Annexure B, Item 24). Our main suggestions (paragraph 24 of the minute) were as follows :—

(a) That the proposed increase of mountain gun ammunition to be carried in the field should be adopted.

(b) That the proportion of horse and field artillery ammunition should not be increased as proposed, but should be provided on the existing scales.

7062, 14000, 15419, 15425, 15431, 15433, 15437, 15462, 15466.

(c) That of the horses replaced in ammunition columns by mules, sufficient should be returned to the reserve of artillery horses from which they were withdrawn, to maintain the reserve at the strength of 1,200 horses which we propose, the balance being utilized as far as possible to replace aged or unfit horses in the artillery or other branches.

422. We may sum up the arrangements proposed in the foregoing paragraphs, as follows :— Summary.

(a) the conversion of six existing field batteries into field howitzer batteries, already sanctioned ;

(b) the raising of two horse and nine field batteries from the lower to the new higher establishment ;

(c) the conversion of two field artillery ammunition columns to field howitzer columns ;

(d) the abolition of three horse artillery ammunition columns ;

(e) the reorganization of all ammunition columns, involving a smaller establishment of horses :—

Vol. III, Annexure II, page 555,  
(which omits heavy batteries).

423. As regards horses on the peace establishment, the total number required for existing horse, field, and heavy artillery batteries and ammunition columns, is as follows :—

Artillery  
horses.  
Existing  
establishment.

9 batteries, horse artillery	... @ 220	1,980
2     "             "	... @ 164	328
3     "     field howitzers	... @ 167	501
33     "     field artillery	... @ 168	5,544
9     "             "	... @ 115	1,035
9     "     horse artillery ammunition columns	... @ 101	909
11 field artillery ammunition columns	... @ 348	3,828
1 howitzer ammunition column	... @ 238	238
4 heavy batteries	... @ 112	448
2     "             "	... @ 5	10
12 field artillery brigade staffs	... @ 2	24
		14,845

424. The following shows the establishment of horses which will be required if our proposals are sanctioned.

Proposed  
establishment.

11 batteries, horse artillery	... @ 220	2,420
9     "     field howitzers	... @ 167	1,503
36     "     field artillery	... @ 168	6,048
6 horse artillery ammunition columns	... @ 67	402
9 field artillery ammunition columns	@ 162	1,458
3 howitzer ammunition columns	@ 162	486
4 heavy batteries	@ 112	486
15 field artillery brigade staffs	@ 2	30
		12,795

The total requirements of horses are thus 14,845—  
12,795=2,050 less than at present.

Distribution of:  
artillery horses  
to the Field  
Army and  
internal  
defence units.

425. The distribution of the 12,795 horses between (a) the Field Army and (b) internal security troops will be as follows:—

(a) 12 field artillery brigade staffs .. @ 2	...	24
6 batteries, horse artillery ... @ 220	...	1,320
9 „ field howitzers @ 167	...	1,503
27 „ field artillery ... @ 168	...	4,536
6 horse artillery ammunition columns ... @ 67	...	402
9 field artillery ammunition columns ... @ 162	...	1,458
3 howitzer ammunition columns @ 162	...	486
3 heavy batteries ... @ 112	...	336
		<hr/> 10,065
(b) Internal security ...	...	<hr/> 2,730

Should the Horse Artillery ammunition column now located at Mhow be reduced, we recommend that the Field Artillery ammunition column, at present temporarily stationed at Deesa, be transferred to Mhow until the lines now being built for this column at Neemuch are ready for occupation.

Ordnance  
mules for  
Mountain  
Artillery.

426. The existing establishment of mules and ponies of Mountain Artillery is as under:—

*Mules.*

For 8 British batteries @ 188 per battery	1,504	} 3,760
For 12 Indian „ „ 188 „	2,256	

*Ponies.*

For 8 British batteries @ 6 per battery	48	} 120
For 12 Indian „ „ 6 „	72	

The addition of two British batteries will necessitate the provision of 376 mules and 12 ponies, thus bringing the total establishments up to 4,136 mules and 132 ponies.

### Section XVIII.—Supply, Clothing, Transport, Veterinary and Remounts.

Supplies for the  
Army.

427. The Quartermaster-General is responsible for supplying the army with what it needs in the way of clothing, food, forage, remounts and transport. He deals with these services through a Director of Clothing, a Director of Supplies and Transport and a Director-General of Remounts. The second of these officers administers the Supply and Transport Corps.

Clothing.

It is only since 1911, that the Director of Army Clothing and all matters pertaining to the dress of the army, formerly under the Adjutant-General, have come within the Quartermaster-General's Branch.

8729, 14947.

Mobilization  
reserves.

428. The Quartermaster-General is responsible for the provision of all necessary reserves of "clothing" required for active service, both those to be issued on mobilization and for subsequent renewals. The extent to which existing stocks fall short of the requirements of a Field

7007.

7007.

7043—7100.

7007, 11050, 11388, 11818,  
11838, 12187, 12199, 12591,  
12607, 12609, 12955, 12961.

Army of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades is shewn in Annexure III page 558, Volume III of the Committee's Report. It will be observed that, with the exception of boots, all the articles specified are such as are readily procurable in India. Of boots, the supply for British troops will, however, suffice for six divisions and six cavalry brigades. In any case there will be ample time to arrange for the requirements of the rearward divisions and cavalry brigades since railway facilities do not admit of the whole army being placed on the frontier in less than four months.

429. Under the existing system, while Indian units obtain their cloth or serge uniforms from the Clothing Department, the remaining articles of their outfit known as "half-mounting" or "necessaries" are purchased privately under regimental arrangements. This system has certain disadvantages which appear to us to outweigh the advantages claimed for it. It imposes upon a Commanding Officer and his Quartermaster the responsibility of purchasing articles of good quality and moderate cost and of retailing them to their men. Many of the articles are necessarily of a description of which few British officers have any knowledge, either as to quality or price. The Quartermaster is usually a young officer who has had no experience in trade methods, in valuing stocks, or in keeping accounts. He is consequently very much at the mercy of his subordinate staff and of the various contractors with whom the regiment has dealings. Money to finance transactions being obtainable only by recoveries made either from the men's pay or from the special grants they receive to enable them to keep up their kits, it is impossible for units to keep on hand stocks sufficient to meet urgent demands on mobilization, even were it desirable to incur the risk of deterioration involved in doing so. When an Indian unit takes the field it is unable to continue to make private arrangements for its supplies, and it has then to depend on the Supply and Transport Corps.

Method by which Indian units obtain their "half-mounting" or "necessaries," etc.

430. The present system is, therefore, unsound, in as much as it imposes duties and responsibilities on British officers for which they are not in all cases fitted, it occupies in office time which should be devoted to preparation for war, and it affords no security that in the end the sepoy will benefit by obtaining good articles at a fair cost. It fails to provide a reserve for mobilization and at once has to be abandoned when war breaks out.

We therefore strongly recommend that steps be taken to introduce a system which will be equally workable in peace and war, and which will place the provision of these articles so far as is feasible, in the hands of departmental officers who have had the necessary experience and training to deal with them.

7007, 7122, 7128, 7305, 7316,  
15808, 15812, 15816, 15824.

431. Turning now to the question of food and forage, it appears to us from the evidence given to the Committee that the whole question of the mobilization reserve stocks of food supplies should be investigated with a view to obtaining some uniformity in the scales maintained of the various articles (which does not appear at present to be the case), and that precise information should be recorded as to where and at what rate it will be possible to obtain such articles as it is undesirable to hold in reserve, owing either to their perishable nature, or to the want of an adequate turnover.

Reserves of food supplies.



## TRANSPORT OF THE ARMY.

### Transport.

432. The animal transport of the army consists of bullocks, camels and mules. 15833-51.  
15902-70.

433. A system of enumerating the bullocks, camels and mules available in case of war has been in operation over a great part of India for several years past, and a more elaborate system of registration in regard to mules and camels obtains in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. This latter system is now, however, to be replaced by one of simple enumeration.

434. No special provision of transport appears necessary for internal security units, as they would find bullocks and other transport animals in the country, and arrangements for their supply are dealt with in local defence schemes. 5295.

### Bullocks.

435. As regards bullocks, Major-General Birdwood informed the Committee that, for the existing Field Army about 104,000 would be required, of which some 4,000 are maintained in peace and 62,000 could be at once raised on mobilization, leaving a deficit of 38,000, which, however, he anticipated no difficulty in making good by purchase. Since practically all Indians, other than the higher and trading classes, are accustomed to the use of bullocks, we need anticipate no insuperable difficulties in obtaining drivers, provided that suitable rates of pay are offered. 7007-7035.  
16111.

### Camels.

436. As regards camels, Major-General Birdwood has told us that the existing Field Army requires 28,710 camels for regimental, and 11,650 for maintenance transport, or in all 40,360. 7007.

Against this we have available on the peace establishment:—

(a) From 8 silladar camel corps	...	7,776
(b) From 4 silladar corps which it is proposed to raise in place of the present 4 grantee camel corps in the Punjab Canal Colonies	...	3,888
Total	...	11,664

On present calculations, there would also be available 17,496 Ghilzai camels, which it is proposed to form into 18 corps in time of war, and 30,132 camels to be drawn from other private sources, as well as 929 maintained in Imperial Service Transport. We should thus have nearly 60,000 camels or more than sufficient to meet our mobilization requirements even if the Ghilzai camels turned out not to be available in the case of a war with Afghanistan, a point on which there is some doubt. We are in favour of the scheme which is now under consideration for converting into regular silladar corps the 4 grantee camel corps, which are not working satisfactorily owing to existing agricultural conditions in the Punjab.

2411-5, 3341, 3421, 3898,  
5028, 5030, 5032, 5287,  
7037, 7039.

Annexure B. Item 16.

### Mules.

437. The mule requirements on general mobilization, upon the existing Field Army basis, come to something under 39,500, of which about 31,750 would be available immediately or in a short space of time, while the balance could be found from registered mules. Further, allowing for other mules and ponies obtainable in India, sufficient exist in the country to meet half a year's war wastage; and others could be imported from abroad. 7007.

15474.  
15673.  
Vol. III, Annexure II, p. 557.

438. A scheme, drawn up under the orders of the Quartermaster-General for the reorganization of the existing mule corps and cadres was referred to us for consideration. It did not however commend itself to the Committee, who recommended that the reorganization should be made on the following lines:—

Reorganization  
of mule  
corps and  
cadres.

- (a) The existing organized mule transport (excluding the 'local' mules required for frontier duty) to be formed into 39 corps.
- (b) Each corps to consist of either three or four service companies, there being 125 such companies in all.
- (c) The strength of corps to vary according to the area in which they are located, so as, for instance, to provide that those required for the two leading divisions of the Field Army (say the Peshawar and Lahore Divisions), should have a larger establishment than corps stationed elsewhere, and thus be capable of taking the field rapidly without requiring any additions to their strength not immediately available.
- (d) Each corps to include also a depôt company, the mules in which should number about 8 per cent. of those in the service companies. Unfit mules would be transferred to this company on mobilization, and it would serve as a feeder to the corps when the latter is in the field.
- (e) Each depôt company to be in charge of a kot-dafadar in peace time, but on mobilization to be placed under the command of a British warrant or non-commissioned officer.
- (f) Each of the 125 service companies to be commanded by a British warrant or non-commissioned officer. As there are at present 156 of these European subordinates with the existing mule corps and cadres, the foregoing proposals would seem to allow of some reduction of their peace numbers, but bearing in mind the addition which will be required on mobilization to provide for command of the depôt companies, we recommend that the present establishment be retained.
- (g) The 39 British officers at present commanding mule corps and cadres to be retained for the command of the 39 corps proposed.

This reorganization will provide 39 mule corps, which, with the three corps of Imperial Service Transport, will suffice for the Field Army of the strength which we consider to be essential, *viz* :—

Mules required  
for the Field  
Army.

				Mule corps.
Eight divisions less one brigade (Kohat brigade having its own transport) require, at 4 per division				31
The division furnishing 3 mobile brigades requires				4
Five cavalry brigades require				5
Army troops require				2
Total				42

In mules and riding ponies our requirements on mobilization for nine divisions and five cavalry brigades, with army troops amount, including the requirements for ammunition columns, to 39,344.

To meet this we have—

Peace organization (39 corps or 125 companies, each consisting of 168 mules)	...	21,000
Imperial Service Transport	...	2,943
Mules available from silladar cavalry regiments		7,714
Registered mules fit for immediate work	...	5,522
Total		37,179
Mules and ponies required	...	39,344
„ available	...	37,179
Deficient		2,165

The total of 39,344 animals includes 1,848 riding ponies, of which there are 3,500 registered. The net deficiency of mules is therefore 2,165—1,848=317 mules.

To meet this there are—

Registered mules, 2nd class	...	2,700
Registered draught ponies	...	6,756
Balance of ambulance riding ponies	...	1,652
Mules and ponies		11,108

439. Our conclusion is that the initial mobilization requirements in mules of a Field Army of nine divisions with army troops and five cavalry brigades can be met from existing sources. There should be no real difficulty in meeting subsequent wastage by suitable arrangements for purchase abroad.

Mechanical  
Transport.

440. We regard as a matter of importance the introduction of motor transport for the army, and we recommend that steps be taken to enter into communication with the leading representatives of the mercantile and trading communities, with a view to evolving standard patterns of motor lorries which will be equally suitable for the ordinary requirements of business in India and for our army in the field, and arriving at some arrangement for their introduction into the country under a system which will make them available for military purposes in peace and war, if required.

2447, 7106, 7112.

Roads.

441. We have referred elsewhere to the desirability of at once making the surface of the roads leading through the Khyber and on the frontier suitable for motor lorry traffic, and we have no doubt that, with the great experience gained in recent years in Europe, America and elsewhere, means can be found to make existing roads beyond the frontier suitable for this traffic, for a distance sufficient to admit of considerable progress towards the solution of the problems connected with the maintenance of an army in Afghanistan.

13853, 13887.

442. We have considered the number of officers required as a peace establishment for the Supply and Transport Corps, and recommend that this be fixed at 224, distributed as follows:—

Establishment of officers for the Supply and Transport Corps.

Army Headquarters (including one additional officer)	...	...	7
Assistant Director of Supplies (in 5 divisions)	...	...	5
„ „ Transport ( „ )	...	...	5
Assistant Directors of Supply and Transport (jointly in 5 divisions)	...	...	5
Divisional Contract Officers	...	...	10
„ Store „	...	...	9
Assistants to Divisional Store Officers	...	...	4
Store Officer, Cawnpore	...	...	1
Officers in charge of Supplies (Station duties)	...	...	34
Assistants to officers in charge of Supplies (Station duties)	...	...	18
Officers Commanding transport units, etc.	...	...	52
Deputy Assistant Directors of Transport at Lahore and Rawal Pindi	...	...	2
Registration Officers	...	...	12
Probationers...	...	...	8
Additional Supply and Transport Officers, at Aden, Allahabad, Madras, Jubbulpore, and at Delhi	...	...	5
Instructors at Supply and Transport School, Rawal Pindi	...	...	4
Leave reserve	...	...	43
Total			224

15760, 15762, 15764.

15770, 15778, 15782, 15784.

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443. As regard war requirements, General Birdwood has discussed those at considerable length, and we are not in a position to criticize his figures in detail.

War requirements of Supply and Transport officers.

15760.

We observe, however, that Lord Kitchener in his Memorandum on the preparation of the army in India for war (paragraph 122) estimated that 300 Supply and Transport officers would suffice for a Field Army of 9 divisions and 8 cavalry brigades employed in holding the Kabul-Kandahar alignment and the lines of communication leading thereto, and 100 for internal defence. Major-General Birdwood on the other hand, for a smaller Field Army (7 divisions and 5 cavalry brigades) estimates an immediate requirement of 378 officers for the field and 120 for internal defence.

For the Field Army of the strength we recommend we anticipate a deficiency of 192 officers for the Supply and Transport Corps on mobilization and we have indicated in paragraph 333 of this Report the sources from which we believe that this shortage can be made good.

14889.

444. We are adverse to placing Departmental officers, with honorary rank, in actual responsible command of Mule Corps.

Departmental officers in command of Mule Corps.

15045 (p. 1171), and Volume IV  
Annexure III, of the Report.

445. The Committee have had under consideration the necessity or otherwise for retaining a special officer in charge of contracts for each division of the army. We believe that the present system has been found to work well in practice, bringing contractors into more direct personal relations with the officers of the Supply and Transport Corps, opening up new sources of supply, and tending to break down the old established rings and

Contract officers.

consequently to reduce rates. We therefore recommend that no change be made in the existing arrangement.

Civilians in lieu of military in the Supply and Transport Corps and Army Clothing Department.

446. We have had before us a proposal to make the personnel of the Supply and Transport Corps and of the Army Clothing Department more civil in character. We can see no sufficient advantage likely to be gained and we do not recommend a change in the present systems for officering these services.

670, 4594, 5677, 6280,  
15045, 15063, 15069.

Transport Registration.

447. We have also dealt with a proposal to reduce the number of officers employed in the registration and enumeration of animals required for the army on mobilization. We do not think that this valuable work can effectively be performed by less than twelve (12) officers and we recommend that this number be so employed.

6291, 15516, 15518, 15524,  
15835, 15928.

### Veterinary Services.

Mobilization requirements of officers.

448. The estimated requirements of Veterinary officers on mobilization were placed by Lord Kitchener at 67, but General Birdwood told us that at least 108 would be required, and recommended that the peace establishment be increased by 32 officers, all of whom could be economically employed.

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Nos. 1522-66.  
15608.

449. We are not prepared to put forward any definite proposals, but we recommend that steps be taken to ascertain whether any appreciable saving from a reduction in the death rate of Government animals might reasonably be anticipated from an increase in the present establishment of Veterinary officers, as we think that establishment should be fixed at the number which can be advantageously employed in peace. General Birdwood informed the Committee that on an emergency we might possibly be able to obtain ten Veterinary officers from the Civil Veterinary Service, two who have retired, and six from Calcutta and Bombay, that is eighteen at the outside. We anticipate that some relief may be found at a moderate expense by developing the Civil Indian Veterinary Assistant class, and by increasing the standard of education and training of the military "salutris."

15608.  
15627.

Mobilization reserves.

450 We understand that at present no mobilization reserves have been formed of imported veterinary stores and instruments. We recommend that a sufficient supply for six months' requirements should be provided.

Annexure C, Item 17 (d) of the Report.

### The Remount Department

Remount Department.

451. The Remount Department consists of a Director-General, 16 Superintendents, (Army officers), 10 Veterinary officers and 6 Indian officers. Since 1903 the Department has controlled the breeding of horses and mules for military purposes, in addition to its normal duties connected with the provision of remounts. General Birdwood has shown the Committee that the results have proved the wisdom of the new arrangement.

717, 6301, 15285, 15318,  
15322, 15474.

452. The existing arrangements for the supply of remounts for the British cavalry, the artillery and transport services are satisfactory.

Volume III, Annexure II, p 556.

Reserve of cavalry horses.

453. A reserve of 500 horses is maintained for British cavalry, partly in the remount depôts, and partly at the cavalry school at Saugor where they are trained by the students under instruction. We consider that this number of horses is sufficient.

15261.

M. D. Pros. B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

7076.

Volume III, Annexure II, p. 554.

15227, 15235.  
15239, 15261.

Volume III, Annexure II, p. 556.

15281.

6038, 10303, 10356, 10363,  
10450.

10452.

454. In accordance with Lord Kitchener's proposals the artillery reserve of horses was fixed at 2,500, but when the number of ammunition columns was increased in 1908, they received the trained and acclimatized horses belonging to the reserve, which were to have been replaced by the purchase of remounts. For financial reasons the reserve has not been fully completed, the number of horses in it being at present 500 only.

Reserve of  
artillery horses.

455. Of the 10,065 horses required on mobilization by the artillery we think it safe to reckon that not more than 12 per cent, or 1,208 will be found to be unfit, so that 1,200 will suffice to meet initial requirements, and we recommend that this be the future establishment of the reserve of artillery horses. General Birdwood informed the Committee that, to meet the estimated wastage of horses during a year's campaign, there would be from 2,400 to 3,500 horses fit for issue at the remount depôts, and that 2,600 would be obtainable in India under an impressment act, and about 2,400 more from Australia under agreements which have been entered into with the shippers who usually supply us with remounts. These numbers will suffice for the requirements of a Field Army of the strength we have proposed. Arrangements have also been made to meet requirements should the campaign be prolonged over a year.

Horses  
required on  
mobilization  
for artillery.

456. A reserve of 200 ordnance mules is maintained for the Mountain Artillery. This reserve, together with the young stock reared in the remount depôts is considered sufficient to meet requirements on mobilization, but will have to be supplemented by local purchases and by importation to replace fully the estimated wastage of a year's campaign.

Ordnance  
mules.

457. For silladar cavalry remounts are obtainable in India in sufficient quantities to make good a year's wastage, and further requirements can be met by importing horses from Australia and elsewhere.

Silladar  
cavalry.

458. The arrangements for the supply of mules for transport purposes have been dealt with in paragraphs 437-9.

Mules.

### Section XIX.—Medical Services.

459. We cannot recommend that any reduction be made in the existing peace establishment of the Royal Army Medical Corps in India, for although the numbers of British soldiers under treatment have been greatly reduced in recent years, this result is mainly attributable to the greater attention paid by the Medical Services to preventive medicine and measures which must be persevered with in order that the improvement in the health of the troops may be maintained.

Officers of the  
Royal Army  
Medical Corps.

460. Surgeon-General Sloggett submitted a proposal to the Committee to substitute for the present Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service, separate Civil and Military Medical Services for India. We are not in favour of this scheme, which we think would be attended by two grave disadvantages :—

- (a) A local Military Medical Service, deprived of those prospects of civil employment which attract many good officers to the Indian Medical Service, would not be so efficient as the latter is at present.

- (b) The constitution of a Civil Medical Service, without military ties would, in the event of war, add to the difficulties of utilizing medical officers who are in civil employment.

**Mobilization  
requirements**

461. For the Field Army it will be necessary to provide on mobilization about 381 medical officers, 158 Assistant Surgeons, 22 Sub-Assistant Surgeons, 632 ward servants, 467 ward orderlies, and 18,750 bearers, according to the figures presented to the Committee by Surgeon-General Sloggett. It is hoped to make good these deficiencies from Home for the European medical officers and subordinates, and to be able to obtain and train the natives required, before the whole army has taken the field. The steadily decreasing number of candidates for medical degrees makes it uncertain whether, England will be able to meet our demands for the medical officers required for a big war.

10175.

10175  
10191.

**Army Bearer  
Corps.**

462. Many witnesses testified before the Committee as to the difficulties which may be expected owing to the deficiency in the numbers now available of trained bearers. In this connexion it has been alleged that Lord Kitchener not only did not take steps to obtain the number of bearers required for the Field Army, but, on the contrary, effected a reduction of the sanctioned establishment of bearers from 6,000 to 1,500. His action was, as we understand, due to the Commander-in-Chief having satisfied himself that the existing rate of pay was not high enough to attract men in sufficient numbers to complete the establishment, and, also, that of the men who joined the Army Bearer Corps, many were unfit for duty even at manœuvres. He therefore came to the conclusion that it was wrong to maintain a supervising staff, accommodation and other expensive details for a paper establishment of bearers, which was not likely to be kept complete, or to pay men in peace time who on mobilization would be pronounced to be medically unfit for active service, and who would have therefore to be replaced by the same class of man as had been obtained in all past mobilizations, but whom it had been hoped that the Army Bearer Corps would have supplanted. To raise the pay of the bearers sufficiently high to fill the then existing establishment with a suitable class of man was in Lord Kitchener's opinion an expense he was not justified in asking Government to incur.

3810, 5289, 10335-41,  
13574, 13582.

10342.

7110.

13575.

463. We understand that proposals are now under consideration to raise the present peace establishment of the Army Bearer Corps to 4,500 with a reserve of 1,500. We trust it will be found possible for Government to accept these proposals and that they may prove to be feasible in practice. The medical manœuvres held in the Rawal Pindi Division in March 1913 have accentuated the necessity for remedying the present unsatisfactory condition of the Army Bearer Corps before occasion arises to mobilize even one division of the Field Army

10337.

**Proposal that  
the A. B. Corps  
should be  
administered  
by the S. and  
T. corps.**

464. The Committee, (who have already submitted their recommendations on the subject), with the exception of Sir Robert Scallon, favoured a suggestion made that the Army Bearer Corps should be administered by Supply and Transport corps. The consideration on which Sir Robert Scallon bases his objections, are given in the following extract from his note of dissent:—

Vol. I, Annexure B, Item 20.

• \* \* \* \*



2. I consider it very necessary that the Army Bearer Corps should be administered and trained in peace by the Medical Authorities under whom they will serve in time of war.

3. The companies are at present commanded by Assistant Surgeons, of whom the greater number have been born and educated in India.

4. A very satisfactory standard of efficiency and *esprit de corps* has been attained in the Army Bearer Corps, especially in those Divisions in which it is possible to keep the men together in fairly large numbers. The companies are up to strength.

5. No practical difficulties would appear to have arisen owing to officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps being unacquainted with Hindustani and with the customs of Indians. But were such difficulties to exist, it appears to me to be desirable that they should be encountered and overcome in peace time and not be first met with on active service.

\* \* \* \* \*

8. I believe that if the proposal of the Committee is given effect to, the men now serving will take their discharge at the earliest opportunity, and that the numbers of men of the classes required to again bring the Army Bearer Corps up to even its present establishment will not be obtainable at the existing rate of pay. Also I feel sure that there will be a loss in efficiency which will be felt on active service.

\* \* \* \* \*

704, 5931, 6417, 10395,  
10410.

10411. 465. In questions put to certain witnesses, it was suggested that the present field medical requirements of the army are open to the charge of being extravagant. The history of the case, as we understand it, is that, experience in China in 1900-01 having shown that the medical and surgical equipment of the Indian Army Field Hospitals was to a great extent obsolete, and generally behind the times, revised scales and later patterns were sanctioned by Government in February 1903. This was followed by the assembling of a Committee to consider what changes were necessary in regard to the Base Hospitals. The scheme prepared by this Committee was sanctioned in 1906, and has been worked up to gradually as funds have been made available. The ideas which underlay these schemes can hardly be characterised as extravagant, because they were based upon the percentage of sick and wounded which was the accepted rate at the time when these plans were drawn up. A lower percentage (due to improvement in preventive medicine) has now been adopted at Home. It was with reference to this that Surgeon-General Sloggett could not go further than to say that the present organization of the line of communications is "wasteful under present ideas." He also pointed out that the Medical Branch at Army Headquarters in India could not be blamed for extravagance in previous arrangements, which were made on the advice of the Surgeon-General of the day, Surgeon-General Sir Thomas Gallwey, following what was then considered by the War Office to be necessary and suitable.

Field Medical  
requirements.

10396. 466. The new arrangements proposed are anticipated to result in a saving of about 4 lakhs of rupees and are therefore recommended by us for consideration, as likely to produce economy without loss of efficiency.

Annexure B, Item 15.

467. The Committee have had before them proposals tending to improve the pecuniary and other conditions of service of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department, which we consider to be reasonable and deserving of sympathetic consideration.

Indian  
Subordinate  
Medical  
Department.

468. We understand that, owing to want of supervision, some of the pupils when under training at the Medical Schools for appointment as Military Sub-Assistant Surgeons, imbibe ideas which are not altogether conducive either to good discipline, or to loyalty. We recommend that a carefully selected Indian officer should be appointed to each school to supervise the military, physical and moral training of the students and to instil into their minds a spirit of loyalty and *esprit de corps*. We do not recommend the employment of pensioners for this duty, but that the officers who are selected for these appointments should be seconded from their corps for a limited term of years.

469. We also suggest for consideration that it may result both in economy and in raising the standard of instruction given, were the number of schools at which candidates for military sub-assistant-surgeonships are trained reduced to two, one each for the Northern and Southern Armies.

Station  
Hospitals  
for Indian  
units.

470 Surgeon-General Sloggett recommends that the medical requirements of Indian regiments should be dealt with under a station hospital system similar to that applied by the Royal Army Medical Corps to British troops, instead of by the regimental system which now obtains. We are not prepared to make any definite recommendations on this subject, but we are strongly of opinion that the introduction of such a system would tend largely both to the greater efficiency of the military branch of the Indian Medical Service and to the comfort and welfare of the Indian troops and followers. It would therefore be to the advantage of the State.

10442-10448.

Nursing in  
Military  
Hospitals.

471. We consider that the arrangements for nursing the sick in both British and Indian Military Hospitals are unsatisfactory. They take from their legitimate duties men who have been trained as soldiers in order to employ them as nurses for which they are not suited. We recommend that this question be considered, both from the view of advantage to the sick and the gain to the fighting strength of the army.

10482.

## Section XX.—Demands on Cavalry and Infantry units for Departmental Services on mobilization.

Calls on units  
to meet extra-  
regimental  
demands for  
non-  
commissioned  
officers and  
men on  
mobilization.

472. Lord Kitchener's scheme, like any other scheme for a general mobilization of all our forces, involved heavy drafts on internal security units, to meet the numerous extra regimental requirements, almost entirely for the departmental services, which would need to be supplied in such an eventuality, and for which no special arrangements have hitherto been made.

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Nos. 1522-66.

473. We attach two statements, A and B, which show these requirements for the Field Army of nine divisions, five cavalry brigades and army troops, which we advocate, and the manner in which they would be met as regards non-commissioned officers and men, those of officers having been already discussed in Section XIV, paragraphs 331-344. Although there can be no doubt that, on general principles, it is undesirable to draw so largely on internal security units, yet as it is clear that the numbers required can be found without crippling the units from which they are drawn, we are not prepared, in view of other needs of the army, to recommend the expenditure which would be involved by maintaining this large extra number of men in peace.

*A.—Extra-regimental requirements for departmental and miscellaneous services upon a general mobilization.*

Detail.	BRITISH.		INDIANS	Remarks.
	NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.		ALL RANKS.	
	Mounted.	Dis-mounted.		
For medical units (a) ...	...	...	...	(a) New medical reorganization.
20½ British field ambulances ...	...	243	...	
34½ Indian field ambulances ...	...	...	138	
2½ British clearing hospitals ...	...	27	...	
6½ Indian clearing hospitals ...	...	...	27	
34 British station hospitals ...	...	102	...	
40 Indian station hospitals ...	...	...	40	
4 British general hospitals ...	...	84	...	
8 Indian general hospitals ...	...	...	40	
For 12 sanitary sections (b) ...	...	120	168	
For supply and transport corps ...	...	486	4,154	
For veterinary units ...	28	...	99	
For remounts ...	(c) 435	...	(c) 838	(c) Assumed in General Staff Branch.
For base conservancy establishments (d) ...	4	8	120	(d) Only figures for Kohat are laid down. These have been multiplied by four to allow for Peshawar, Quetta and Chaman.
For military base depôts and base record offices. ...	...	30	18	
For rest camps and halt stations ...	...	49	124	
Total ...	467	1,149	5,766	
	1,616			

*B.—Surplus from internal security cavalry and infantry units, over and above war establishments, available to meet extra-regimental requirements given in A.*

Detail of units.	ESTABLISHMENTS OF UNITS.			DEDUCT PER UNIT UN-AVAILABLE.				Balance of establishment.	Deduct war establishment similar to field army.	Balance available.	Total available.
	Peace.	Reserve.	Total.	Depôt, drill and riding establishment.	Recruits unit for service.	Medically unfit at 5 per cent.	Total.				
British cavalry	598	...	598	20	...	30	50	558	448	108	432
19 Indian cavalry	625	100	725	45	40	32	117	608	500	108	2,052
26 British infantry	1,004	...	1,004	7	...	35	42	962	815	147	3,822
46 Indian infantry	(a) 870	350	1,220	54	53	56	163	1,057	752	322	13,110

(a) About average strength.

Ordnance  
requirements.

474. From the foregoing two tables, it will be seen that all requirements, except 35 British mounted non-commissioned officers and men, can be met from cavalry and infantry units allotted to internal security. There is in addition a demand for 68 non-commissioned officers and men for Ordnance purposes. These can all be supplied without difficulty from the artillery units allotted to occupation duties, which number five horse, nine field and one heavy artillery batteries and the eighteen garrison companies.

### Section XXI.—Proportion of British to Indian Troops.

Ratio between  
British and  
Indian troops.

475. The accepted proportion between British and Indian troops in India is as 1 to 2·5, but under arrangements arrived at between the Secretary of State and the Government of India, the following are omitted from the calculations, *viz* :—

- (a) Artillery.
- (b) Volunteers.
- (c) Indian army reservists.
- (d) Imperial Service troops of the Kashmir State.
- (e) Imperial Service troops of the Rajputana States, if recruited within their State areas.
- (f) Frontier Militia and Levies, so long as they are not armed with a small bore magazine rifle.
- (g) Military Police, so long as they are not armed with a small bore magazine rifle.

476. On the other hand the following are to be included :—

- (a) The Meywar and Malwa Bhil Military Police Corps.
- (b) Imperial Service troops, other than those referred to above.

477. We consider that the above conditions are still suitable and recommend that they should hold good.

Appendix I, 139 (d) Vol. VI.

478. The proportion of British to Native troops, as it stands at present with existing establishments, is well within the approved limits, and it will not be materially affected even should three companies of Garrison Artillery and three Horse Artillery Ammunition Columns be reduced, in accordance with our proposals, as existing artillery units will be strengthened proportionately.

275, 432, 2700, 4239, 5495, 13235, 13239, 13237, 14201, 14210.

Alleged danger  
in sending  
British troops  
to the hills.

479. The Committee have had under consideration the question as to whether the proportion of British to Indian troops is not unduly reduced, during the hot and rainy seasons, by the numbers of the former who are sent up to the hills. During the period when British troops are in the hills, a very large proportion of the Indian troops are on leave, and the majority of other natives are too busily employed in preparing and sowing their fields and in the cultivation of their monsoon crops to give trouble; we therefore think no great risk is involved. Such risks as may exist are in our opinion outweighed by the improvement in the health, and consequently in the efficiency, of the British troops, who escape by going to the hills the enervating effects of a

4241, 4255.  
5497, 5503, 6058, 7550  
7556, 8563, 10241, 10257-71  
10297, 10318.

hot and rainy season spent in the plains. Should the circumstances of the moment call for any alteration in existing arrangements, we feel that it may safely be left to the military in communication with the civil authorities to do what may be necessary.

### Section XXII.—The Class Composition of the Indian army.

480. The following table shows the principal classes of which the Indian army consisted in 1912 (taking† the actual strength, not the sanctioned establishments) with the corresponding figures for 1885.

Classes serving in the army in 1885 and 1912.

CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY IN 1885 AND 1912.

Classes.	1885.		1912.	
	Number.	Percentage (to nearest $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.)	Number.	Percentage (to nearest $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.)
Pathans ...	5,765	4.25	12,201	7.75
Punjabi Musalmans ...	8,779	6.75	25,299	16.00
Hindustani Musalmans ...	21,196	16.25	9,054	5.75
Other Musalmans ...	9,529	7.25	8,717	5.50
Sikhs ...	17,774	13.75	32,702	20.50
Gurkhas ...	6,684	5.00	18,100	11.50
Dogras ...	3,934	3.00	8,566	5.50
Garhwalis ...			1,855	1.00
Rajputs ...	8,291	6.25	12,051	7.75
Jats... ..	9,246	7.00	9,670	6.00
Marathas* ...			5,685	3.50
Brahmans ...	6,163	4.75	2,636	1.75
Other Hindus† ...	24,898	19.00	10,252	6.50
Christians ...	3,304	2.50	1,491	0.75
Jews ...	224	.25	18	0.01
Burmese, Assamese, Karens, etc.	5,202	4.00	306	0.24
Total ...	131,019	100.00	158,603	100.00

\* Included Purwaris in 1885.

† The term 'Other Hindus' now includes Kumaunis, Ahirs, Gujars, Mers, Mians, Bhils, Tamils, Pariahs, etc. In 1885 out of 24,898 'Other Hindus' 13,490 were Telugus and Tamils.

481. The evidence received by the Committee has convinced us that it will be advisable to reduce the number of Sikhs in the Army, both because Sikhs of the right stamp are not procurable in sufficient numbers, and because this class of soldier has shewn a tendency to what may be termed "swollen head." We believe that the large increase in the numbers of Sikhs recently entertained for the army is to a great extent due to classes of Sikhs being now accepted who, in former days, were not considered suitable material for the army, recruiting being then practically restricted to Jat and Mazbi Sikhs. And we would suggest that any reductions made should affect the Jat rather than the other classes of Sikh soldiers.

The number of Sikhs in the army larger than is desirable.

353, 355, 357, 414, 574,  
1260, 1702, 1710, 1738,  
2751, 2757, 4274, 4282,  
4318, 5216-21, 5413, 5533,  
7584-6, 10960, 11234,  
11408, 13254, 13256.

Class  
composition of  
units.

482. With but one exception, all witnesses who spoke on this subject agreed that except in the case of Gurkhas, Garhwalis and Hazaras and other special races, class units are a mistake.

483. We realize both the difficulties and the drawbacks of making any alteration in the existing class constitution of units, but we consider that it is a matter which calls for serious consideration. The class composition of units of the Indian army must necessarily be a compromise, striking the mean between what is necessary to safeguard the State against mutiny, or sedition, and requirements for war. Probably for the former purposes it would be best were the men of all classes mixed, without regard to religion, race or class, the only consideration for advancement being merit as a soldier. This system has however too many disadvantages to be seriously considered. The next is the class unit system, which, except in the case of certain races, is also open to the obvious objections which so many witnesses have presented to the Committee. There therefore remains only the third, the class squadron or double-company system.

Considerations  
affecting class  
composition of  
units.

484. In determining the classes of which an infantry "link" of three regiments should be constituted, the following points have to be considered, *viz* :—

- (a) Any class selected must be sufficiently large to ensure the supply during peace and war of men of suitable age and physique to maintain the equivalent of at least six companies (*i.e.*, one double-company per regiment) at the full establishment.
- (b) The classes of which the unit is composed should have so little in common, as ordinarily to preclude the probability of their conspiring together against Government, whilst not being mutually so antagonistic as to cause a doubt to exist whether the men of one class will be willing to risk their lives to support the men of another class when in difficulties under fire.
- (c) Not to have so many classes as to limit unduly the field of selection for promotion, or to add on active service to the difficulties of meeting the caste requirements of food, water, etc.

485. Sir Robert Scallan is of opinion that, on the whole, the composition most suitable for both peace and war is for each unit to consist of only two classes, and that this sub-division should be carried down to the squadron and double-company, each half-squadron and company being of a different class. This system he recommends to be adopted whenever it is feasible to do so, though he realizes that it cannot be universally followed, since it would result in closing recruiting for the infantry to all those classes of the Indian community which may be unable to maintain at least 12 companies up to strength in time of war.

Sikhs, Pathans,  
Jats.

486. We do not favour placing such antagonistic elements as Sikhs and Pathans in the same unit, for although as a safeguard against mutiny this combination has its advantages, it may weaken the strength of the unit as a whole in war. Nor would we combine Jats and Jat Sikhs, since they have too much in common to make the combination any safeguard against conspiracy.

2737, 3609, 4278, 5525,  
11512.

4286, 5219, 5409, 5417,  
5523, 10635, 10641, 10643,  
11123, 11125, 11498, 11510,  
11924, 11938, 11940, 12316,  
12667, 13062, 13262.

Paragraph 23. Annexure I, page  
207, Volume II.

353, 379, 414, 574, 1260,  
1702, 1710, 1737, 2731,  
2749-53, 3029, 3033-43,  
3049, 4274, 4280, 4286,  
5215-17, 5409, 5419, 5435,  
6626, 7584, 7592, 10635,  
10960, 11123, 11234, 11408,  
11924, 12316, 12667, 13062,  
13254.

5523.  
11151, 11157, 11510, 13062,  
13064.

5221.

5537.

487. Although we are inclined to exonerate the Rajputs, and to a great extent also those Jats and other classes recruited in the Native States of Rajputana, from the imputation of having as yet been much affected by a spirit of unrest, we doubt if the numbers of these classes now obtainable can be appreciably increased. We regard it as inadvisable to mix Rajputs and Jats of the United Provinces and from the Eastern Punjab Districts, with men of those classes whose homes are in the Native States of Rajputana.

Rajputs and Jats.

Vol. VI, Appendix I, paragraph 139.

1316, 1320, 4626, 5095, 5205, 5533, 7590, 10864, 11008, 11234, 11246, 11248, 12440, 12813.

488. Without being in a position to make any definite recommendations, we agree with those witnesses who have expressed the opinion that if races exist suitable for military service, it is desirable on political (if not on other) grounds to broaden the basis of recruitment, when it can be done without sacrifice of efficiency. We recommend that special efforts be made in this direction, should the establishment of the Carnatic Regiments be increased in accordance with our proposals.

Races not now enlisted to be considered when opportunities offer.

### Section XXIII.—Pay and Pensions of the Indian (Native) Army.

5629, 6399, 8555, 8805, 11219, 11672, 12786.

489. However desirable it may be to raise the pay and pensions of the Indian ranks of the army, which Major-General Aylmer laid much stress on, we do not consider that, at present, circumstances justify our making any recommendations to this effect, except in the case of the pensions of Indian officers, duffadars and havildars.

An increase to the rates of pay not at present necessary.

4722, 5205, 5629, 5844, 5846, 6399, 6955, 8534, 3506, 10823, 11219, 11226, 12420, 12786.

490. Having regard to their social position, and to the influence, for good or evil, which the pensioned Indian officer has in his own community, we regard the present rates of pension as being altogether inadequate, and we recommend that the pensions of the several grades of Indian officer should be increased as shown in paragraph 491. Sir Robert Scallon would, however, go further, and he strongly recommends that the lowest rate for a jemadar's pension be Rs. 25 and the highest Rs. 30 *per mensem*. He would point out that there are many Indian officers who are unable to rise to higher rank than that of a jemadar, owing to the class squadron and double-company system, and not because they are not efficient. He also considers that the highest rate for the rank of subadar should be increased to Rs. 60 *per mensem*.

Pensions for Indian officers.

13132.

The requirements of modern training have so greatly raised the standard of knowledge required by section commanders and equivalent ranks, and have added so much to their responsibilities, that we consider that the pension of duffadars and havildars should be so increased as to admit of their being able to enjoy a living wage on retirement.

Pensions for Duffadars and Havildars.

#### 491. Increases recommended :—

Increases.

		Present rate of pension. Rs.	Proposed rate of pension. Rs.
<i>Subadars.</i>			
After 21 years' service	...	30	40
After 24 years' service	...	35	45
After 28 years' service	...	40	50
After 32 years' service	..	50	55
<i>Jemadars.</i>			
After 20 years' service	...	16	24
After 24 years' service	...	20	28
<i>Duffadars and Havildars.</i>			
After 18 years' service	...	7	9
After 21 years' service	...	8	10
After 24 years' service	...	9	10



492. These proposed increases of pension should apply also to officers and non-commissioned officers of corresponding rank, in other arms.

Good-conduct pay.

493. If, hereafter it should be found necessary to increase the emoluments of the other ranks of the Native army, we think it is desirable that the present system in regard to good-conduct pay should be modified, so that it would depend not merely on good-conduct and length of service, but also on the efficiency of the soldier as judged by a prescribed standard.

Pay of Syces in Silladar Cavalry.

494. We consider it necessary that measures should be taken which will ensure that syces in silladar cavalry receive an adequate wage, as it is important for the requirements of the Field Army that these syces should be maintained at their full establishment, and that they should be men who will be available and fit for active service.

13132, 13138.

Pay and Establishments of followers.

495. We also recommend that steps be taken to standardise the establishments and the pay of all classes of followers attached to the various units of the army throughout India.

12518, 12526, 12786.

Firewood allowance.

496. On the 1st January 1909 a free issue of firewood was sanctioned as a concession to the Indian ranks of the Army. The arrangements under which this wood is obtained and issued are neither convenient nor satisfactory, and we recommend that the issue of firewood in kind be discontinued, and the compensation granted monthly for the dearness of food increased by the estimated value of the firewood ration. We believe that this will conduce to economy.

15641.

#### Section XXIV.—The Volunteers.

Strength of the Volunteer force.

497. The approximate strength of the Volunteer force in India is as shown in the table below :—

Detail of units.	Number of units.	STRENGTH.		Remarks.
		Officers.	Other ranks.	
Artillery (including electrical Engineers).	5	91	1,324	} Adjutant General's return showing the actual strength of the armed forces in India, dated 1st August 1912.
Naval ...	2	46	957	
Light horse and mounted rifles.	11	299	3,868	
Rifle ...	30	725	17,128	
Railway ...	17	560	13,983	
Reservists ...	...	...	3,046	
Total ...	...	1,721	40,306	

Volunteers increasing in numbers and efficiency.

498. The Volunteers are a steadily expanding body, and it is greatly to the credit of the European and Anglo-Indian population that nearly two-thirds of the whole male population of these communities between the ages of 15 and 50, excluding those who form part of the regular army, are enrolled in this force.

2678, 2961, 5472-3.  
9227-29, 9245.  
9263-65, 9277-83, 9291-93.  
9344, 9348, 9352, 9718-24.

499. As regards efficiency, too, the force appears to be steadily improving ; its chief defect at present lies in the unserviceable character of a number of its weapons, a matter we have touched on in paragraph 640 of this report.

500. We have recommended (paragraph 643), that, in the distribution of maxim guns, Volunteer corps should receive preference over the bulk of the Indian units allotted for occupation purposes.

Maxim guns.

2684-86.  
4216-21.  
5475.  
9359-61.

501. As we have already remarked in paragraph 25, the evidence given before the Committee tends to indicate that a misconception exists as to the aid the Volunteer force will be able to give to the Regular Army and the civil administration when trouble arises.

Rôle assigned to Volunteers in security schemes.

502. The Volunteers may be divided into four main groups according to the duties for which they are intended :—

Volunteers divided into four main groups.

- (a) Coast Defence.
- (b) Railways.
- (c) Presidency and other large towns.
- (d) The remainder.

9382.

503. The units specially raised and trained for Coast Defence have attained a satisfactory degree of efficiency, and are capable of rendering very useful service in providing relief crews for the heavy guns, in assisting to man the mobile armament, in working the electric light installations of the Coast Defence works, and in other duties connected with the protection of the defended ports.

Coast defence.

6731.  
8997-9005.  
9085.  
9245.  
9358.

504. The Railway Volunteers are for the most part practically obliged to become Volunteers by the terms under which they are employed. They serve as Volunteers under those who control their work as railway employés. Their discipline is in consequence good ; their training is carried out on practical lines suited to fit them for their rôle which is to protect life and property at railway centres and to provide armed force in sufficient strength, and at the right time and place, to keep the railway service running when the danger is not so serious as to necessitate the employment of regular troops.

Railway.

6711.  
9155-57.

505. The Volunteers serving in cities naturally contain a large percentage of men whose physical condition leaves something to be desired, but on the whole these corps are fit for the purpose for which they have been raised, *viz.*, to assist the civil administration in maintaining order, so that neither war nor rebellion may unduly interfere with the normal trade and business of the country, to release regular troops for more active service by finding guards over Government banks, treasuries, and other important buildings, and when possible, by holding points which assist to localise outbreaks, to prevent ingress into the city of bodies of undesirable characters from outside districts, and generally to protect life and property.

City.

164 written evidence.

9362.

506. The other corps, such as are to be found " up-country," vary in regard to their character, as much as they do in regard to their strength and efficiency. Generally speaking, they are serviceable bodies, well fitted to assist the civil authorities in upholding their

" Up-country."

position and in giving confidence to the loyal and well-disposed inhabitants. They are useful to release regular troops for employment with mobile columns by safeguarding treasuries and localities, (the loss, or destruction of which might seriously damage our prestige), and to enable normal conditions of administration to continue during abnormal times. Some of the "up-country" corps, more particularly the mounted ones, are capable and well suited for the service of active defence, the breaking up of marauding gangs, the capture of leaders, and the temporary strengthening of outlying places when threatened, and generally speaking to represent the "long arm" of the civil government within the areas to which they belong.

2313, 2315.  
5473-9265.  
9362.

507. All Volunteer Corps in the country include amongst their members many men who are capable of acting as guides, scouts, interpreters, or intelligence agents, or of performing communication duties both for the civil administration and the army, irrespective of the positions they hold in the force.

9331.

Administration,  
training and  
discipline.

508. The force is trained and administered, under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, by the divisional and brigade commanders within whose areas they are located, but for discipline and for many administrative details corps are under the Local Governments. We consider this dual control to be open to many obvious objections, and we recommend that the Statute Law as applicable to Volunteers be revised, particularly in respect to the conditions under which Volunteers can be called out for service which are unsatisfactory at present; and the convening and composition of Courts-Martial. We are of opinion that such Courts should be convened and their sentences confirmed under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, or of General Officers duly authorized to act for him, and that the members of such Courts should be officers, and not, as at present, Volunteers of any rank.

9269-73.  
14413-14443.

509. We also recommend that the restrictions which now obtain in regard to local limits of service should be revised, and that all authority in respect to the Volunteers such as is now vested in Local Governments, should be transferred to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, or to such General Officers as may be authorized to act in his behalf.

Finance.

510. Volunteer corps are financed by grants made by Government and expended by commanding officers, in most cases the amount of the grants depending on the individual efficiency of the members. In view of the increasing demands now made on volunteers more especially on the officers and senior non-commissioned officers, and the greater necessity which now exists for raising the average efficiency of the force, we are of opinion that the present grants do not suffice, either to meet the necessary expenses without unduly taxing the pockets of the members, or to provide the systematic training which modern ideas require.

9251.  
9364-68.

Primary object  
for which the  
force exists.

511. The conditions which obtain in India are peculiar, in that the fundamental function of the Volunteer force is to train to arms all adult Europeans and Eurasians in the country, in order that they may be able to protect their families, their property and themselves, without having to look to the regular army to provide either protection, or rescue parties for people unable to defend

themselves, but whose massacre would be a serious blow to the prestige of the ruling race.

9249-53.  
9372-74. 512. The above considerations entail men being necessarily accepted as Volunteers who individually are unable to do much to gain financial grants for their corps, and who thus impose an extra burden on the other public spirited and more efficient members. We therefore strongly recommend that the whole question of grants to the Volunteer force should be carefully looked into, the following requirements being kept in view—

Increase  
necessary to  
Government  
grants.

9364. (a) To minimise the expenses gentlemen are put to in purchasing outfits on first being granted commissions, and subsequently, as officers, in providing money for bands, prizes, etc., for all of which purposes the present grants are insufficient.

(b) To enable officers and the senior non-commissioned officers to be trained at Military Schools of Instruction and with regular troops, both at Home and in India, without being put to financial loss.

9364. (c) To increase the grants for training, including the practice ammunition for artillery units.

(d) To increase the number of subjects for which efficient can earn extra grants for their units, (layers, scouts, machine gunners, first aid and stretcher men, telephone workers and signallers, etc., etc.).

513. We commend, for the consideration of Government, means for increasing the popularity of the force and thereby its value to the State by the grant of such concessions as can be made without imposing undue burdens on the revenue of the country.

Concessions.

514. We recommend that Volunteer corps should be required to obtain their requirements of clothing from Government factories rather than from private firms, so far as these factories can meet their demands without an increase to their normal establishments and working machinery.

Provision of  
clothing.

5479, 6737, 9201.  
9213, 9219, 9223.

515. As under the instructions of the Secretary of State, Volunteers are held to balance Indian reservists in the matter of the proportion between British and Indian troops, we agree with those witnesses who have deprecated any material increase in the present number of natives of India enrolled in Volunteer corps.

Enrolment of  
Indians.

M. D. Pros. B., April 1901, Nos.  
1176-78.

516. We may add that in a despatch of 7th March 1901, No. 28, the Government of India proposed to the Secretary of State that legislative action should be taken, when circumstances might warrant it, for the compulsory enrolment of all able bodied Europeans and Anglo-Indians between the ages of 16 and 55, not being already soldiers or volunteers. A bill with this object was intentionally drafted in general terms, no special reference being made to Europeans and Anglo-Indians, though it was designed for them primarily. The Secretary of State, however, disapproved this project on the ground that it would be undesirable to apply such a measure to natives of India, while in a serious emergency all fit Europeans and Anglo-Indians whose services could be profitably utilized would probably volunteer.

Compulsory  
enrolment of  
Europeans and  
Eurasians.

M. D. Pros., July 1902, Nos.  
2571-5.  
(Despatch No. 16, dated 31st  
January 1902.)

517. Rifles are stored at convenient centres throughout the country, to arm on an emergency Europeans and Eurasians who are not Volunteers. 9342.

### Section XXV.—Frontier Militias, Levies, Military Police, and Yeomanry.

Strength of  
Frontier  
Militias, etc.

518. The strength of the Frontier Militias, Levies and Military Police is shown in the following table. These amount to about 34,000 men in all.

Detail.	Number of units.	STRENGTH.		Remarks.
		European officers.	Indians.	
Militia, mounted ...	3	34	344	Armed with Martini-Henry Rifles.
Militia, foot ...	3		4,375	
Levies, mounted ...	12		2,808	
Levies, foot ...	14		3,516	
Military police, mounted	5		526	
Military police, foot ...	27		22,821	
Total ...	...	34	34,390	

Policy as regards the employment of the North-West frontier Militias, etc.

519. During Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty the regular troops on the North-West frontier were concentrated within our administrative border, all the duties of watch and ward beyond that line being entrusted to Militia and Levies. The protection of life and property immediately within the border line was to be the duty of the Border Military Police. From the evidence given this system has proved to be a successful one, except as regards the Border Military Police, who are now about to be reorganized as a Frontier Constabulary on lines which ought to provide a really efficient force.

2648, 2652, 3469, 3473, 4756, 5097.

The roles assigned to the Militias, Military Police, etc., under Lord Kitchener's scheme.

520. Lord Kitchener's Redistribution Scheme contemplated employing the Militias and Levies of the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan to hold posts and forts, to find guards for the blockhouses and other works provided for the defence of the railways within their areas, and to assist generally by releasing the regular troops to act as movable columns for dealing with serious inroads and raids. The only exception was the Khyber Rifles, whose duties and location would naturally lead to their inclusion amongst the communication troops holding the Khyber Pass.

Redistribution Scheme 1903, paras. 30, 37, 40-44, 57 and 64. M. D. Pro. B., October 1904, Nos. 1522-66.

Military Police in Assam and Burma.

521. To the Military Police in Assam the duty was allotted of dealing with raids made by the hill tribes from beyond that border. The Burma Military Police were likewise to be used to watch the Burma frontier, to check raiding, and generally to maintain order within the districts where they were quartered.

522. We see no reason why these arrangements should not still hold good, although we realise that, so far as Assam and Burma are concerned, the responsibility of the Military Police, in respect to the duties of watch and ward on the frontier, have considerably increased owing to the action of the Chinese.

523. We recommend that efforts should be made to increase the numbers of the local inhabitants now serving in the Frontier Battalions of Military Police in Assam and Burma. We attach importance to this, as being a means of reducing the drain on the limited recruiting areas for Gurkhas and Sikhs, of having in our service men who know the country and can keep us informed of what is going on in the vicinity of our frontier, and also of bringing home to the peoples of the districts which have recently come under our administration the advantages to be gained by serving the British Raj.

Advantages of local recruitment for police corps on the Eastern Frontier.

524. We think that, for the effective administration of the frontier, it is advisable that the Militia and Levies should maintain their present character and remain under the direct control of the Civil authorities, and that no useful purpose would be served by placing these forces, or the Military Police, under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, except only when they are employed on active service in co-operation with regular troops.

Militia and Police to remain under the civil administration.

2650, 3471, 3563, 4688, 5059, 5075, 5796, written evidence 223 page 1320, Vol. IV.

2674-6, 5225, 5636, and para. 37 of the Redistribution Scheme of November 1903. M. D. Pros. B., October 1904, Nos. 1522-66.

525. We believe that, on an emergency, it would be possible to raise in the North-West Frontier Province, in Rajputana and in certain districts of the Punjab, corps of Yeomanry, or irregulars, as Lord Kitchener suggested, and that their services might be of very material value.

Yeomanry.

## Section XXVI.—The Imperial Service Troops and the Armed Forces of Native States.

526. The strength of the Imperial Service Troops at present amounts to about 22,000 of all ranks, as shewn in the statement below :—

The strength of the Imperial Service Troops.

Detail of units.	Number of units.	STRENGTH*		Allotment on the mobilization of the Field Army.†	Units.	Strength.	Remarks.
		Indian.					
				(I) Detailed for the Field Army if required :—			
Artillery ...	3	457	Cavalry and Camel Corps ...	16	5,443	} 34 units totalling 13,094 Indian ranks.	
			Infantry ... ..	8	4,495		
			Sappers ... ..	4	580		
			Transport Corps ...	6	2,576		
Cavalry ...	20	7,566					
			(II) Detailed for internal defence, Kashmir :—				
Infantry ...	16	10,405	Artillery ... ..	3	457	} 8 units totalling 3,545 Indian ranks.	
			Cavalry ... ..	1	152		
			Infantry ... ..	4	2,936		
Sappers ...	4	744					
Camel corps ...	3	879	(III) Unallotted (a) ... ..	2	284	(a) 3 squadrons Bhopal Lancers. Khairpur Transport Corps.	
Transport corps...	7	2,277	(IV) Classed as unfit at present (b)	9	3,028	(b) Bhopal Infantry Bikaner " " 3rd Gwalior Lancers 3rd " Infantry Rampur Infantry Udaipur Lancers Idar Despatch Riders Rotlam Despatch Riders Jangira Signallers.	
			(V) Depôts of mobilized units ...	...	2,377		
Total ...	53	22,328	Total ...	...	22,328		

\* Adjutant-General's return showing the actual strength of the armed forces in India on the 1st August 1912.

† Allotment of units on mobilization 1912-13.

**Regulations.**

527. The Imperial Service Troops are administered under Rules and Regulations approved by the Government of India and adopted by the various Darbars, and incorporated to the extent necessary, in the penal laws of the States. On active service they remain amenable to their own Regulations and Laws.

1413, 3631, 5465.

**Inspection Staff.**

528. In their relations with the Supreme Government, the affairs of the Imperial Service Troops are dealt with in the Foreign Department. To assist the Darbars with expert advice in connexion with their training, equipment and management, and to enable the Government of India to be kept informed of all pertinent details regarding these troops, a special staff of regular officers is employed under the Foreign Department consisting of an Inspector General (usually a General Officer), 11 Inspecting officers, 9 Assistant Inspecting officers, and 3 officers in charge of the Schools for Musketry and Signalling.

**Command and Administration.**

529. The Imperial Service Troops are under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief only when voluntarily so placed by the Darbars concerned in peace, or in war. The force is commanded, administered, and trained by Indians, aided by such advice as they may require and be willing to accept at the hands of the Inspecting Staff.

1381.

**Arms and Equipment.**

530. Guns, rifles and pistols, ammunition and equipment are obtainable from the Ordnance Department, and are therefore of the patterns in use with our regular army: the guns, rifles and pistols are issued on loan, all else on payment. The amount of all descriptions of ball ammunition allowed to be held in possession is limited. Swords, lances, saddlery, harness, clothing, necessaries, etc., are usually obtained by the Darbars from private firms.

1441.

**Efficiency.**

531. The efficiency of the units varies, being as a rule more or less satisfactory in accordance with the interest taken in the troops by the head of the State. Some have attained to a remarkable standard of efficiency in drill and administrative details, but owing to want of higher military education on the part of their leaders, even the most efficient lack the power to apply their knowledge to the practical purposes of war. It will therefore be essential that each unit taking the field should be accompanied by one or two capable British officers to supervise, to prompt and to assist, but not to command.

Vol. II, Annexure, page 90.

1357, 1365.

1466.

**Various arms of which the Imperial Service Troops are composed.**

532. The only units of Imperial Service artillery are the two batteries of the Kashmir Darbar, who take it in turn, as do the infantry of that State, to find the troops required to garrison Gilgit and to safeguard our Northern frontier in that neighbourhood. The Imperial Service Troops of the Kashmir State are the only ones who do permanent service of real, if indirect, value to the Government of India.

533. Of the Imperial Service Troops of other States, the units which are perhaps the most useful to us are the Transport Corps and the Sappers. Several of these corps have, like the Kashmir Troops, already proved their worth on active service, as well as in peace.

534. One of the three Camel Corps has also done good service in Somaliland and China. These special units will be valuable in the Quetta Division which is flanked



on the north-west and west by country particularly suitable for infantry mounted on camels.

M. D. Pros. B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

535. We have already referred at some length in Section VIII of this Report to the employment in war of the Imperial Service Troops, and we endorse the opinion expressed in the following terms by the Military Member, Sir E. Elles, in 1903, who remarked that Lord Kitchener would "utilize them in the field army to a large extent and remove the whole of them from their own States at an early stage of mobilization. This is our present policy and there is little doubt that they may be of great use in the field and that they will be always an element of danger in India."

Employment of  
Imperial  
Service Troops  
on mobilization.

536. In order that the Imperial Service Troops may be the more easily incorporated in the regular organizations of the army on mobilization, we recommend :—

Organization of  
Imperial  
Service Troops  
for war.

- (a) That the establishments of units should be assimilated to the corresponding units of the Regular Native army. For infantry, the unit establishment should be equal to our highest, *viz.*, 912, *i.e.*, that for the Gurkhas and Hazaras, who, like the Imperial Service Infantry do not possess complete machinery for replacing wastage in war.
- (b) That corps which, for financial reasons, cannot be maintained as recommended above, should adopt an establishment equal to one half, or one quarter, so that units may be conveniently grouped together on service as a provisional regiment, battalion, etc.
- (c) That arrangements be made and skeleton establishments be provided in peace, capable of expansion on mobilization, to deal with the obtaining and training of recruits, the replacement of wastage in war and for the conduct of the ordinary business of a dépôt.
- (d) That so far as this can be done without raising their efficiency to a degree which may be a danger to the peace of India, the local forces, police, etc., of Native States be made use of to provide occupation for men of the Imperial Service Troops transferred from the colours in order to build up a reserve for war.
- (e) That Darbars should be encouraged to deal with Government factories, rather than with private firms, for clothing and other articles required for Imperial Service Troops, so that existing establishments and machinery may be kept employed in peace to meet demands similar to those which will necessarily be made on the factories during war.
- (f) That, in dealing with applications to increase numbers, our policy should be to advise the Darbars to aim rather at making the organization of their existing units more suitable for our purposes on mobilization, than to raise new corps.

537. We doubt whether the local troops of the Native States are quite as innocuous as some witnesses have told the Committee. In some cases their standard is

Local troops in  
Native States.

probably on a par, or but a little lower than that of the Native States' contingents who served under General Watson in the Kurram Valley during the second Afghan war. They are armed with firearms and, in some States, the artillery includes a battery of 9-pr. R. M. L. guns, as well as a certain number of serviceable smooth-bore guns, with supplies of ammunition. It is true that the guns and arms are old fashioned, but having regard to the fact that the inhabitants of British districts bordering Native States are unarmed, and that the weapons in the hands of our police are, for the most part, only capable of firing buckshot, we do not think that the power for evil of these irregular forces should be overlooked, or that efforts should be relaxed to bring about their reduction to the minimum strength necessary for palace guards, and for the maintenance of law and order within the States, at a time when the Imperial Service Troops have been placed at the disposal of the Crown.

422, 442,  
Vol. II, Annexure, page 91.  
1500, 1986, 2068.  
2638, 2642.  
3631, 3665.  
3666, 3668.  
3676, 4185.  
5469.  
68, 94, 96 (Written evidence,  
Vol. IV).

### Section XXVII.—Civil Police.

The Civil  
Police.

538. We have already referred at some length in paragraphs 25 to 30 of this Report, to the part assigned in Lord Kitchener's scheme to the Civil Police. These proposals seem to us to be practical and feasible, provided that the details are clearly understood by those who will have to give effect to them (which is apparently not the case at present), and that local conditions at the time admit of their being put into practice, though we realise that this may not always be possible.

2152, 2175.

Their role.

539. Paragraphs 30-37 of the Redistribution Scheme deal with this subject, the purport of the proposals being that—

M. D. Pros. B., October 1904,  
Nos. 1522-66.

"The duty of preserving order, protecting property, and quelling disturbances, rests in the first instance with the police, the troops being an armed reserve which should be collected at convenient central stations, and kept in the background till required. Under suitable arrangements, the police should usually be able to secure the internal security of British India with little assistance or intervention on the part of the regular army.

*	*	*	*	*	*
*	*	*	*	*	*

"Such a system of being able to group police together for collective action could only tend to strengthen the hands of the civil authorities, while it need not interfere with the duties or distribution of the police in ordinary times; and the knowledge of where such police bodies could be formed would be of great assistance to the military authorities, if ever they were called upon to put the military forces into motion to maintain order and suppress rebellion."

540. The following statement gives the approximate strength of the Civil Police in India. Strength of the Civil Police.

	Province.	STRENGTH (EXCLUDING GAZETTED OFFICERS).			Remarks of Local Governments and their witnesses.
		No. of men.	Firearms.		
			Revolvers, pistols, etc.	Rifles, etc.	
	1	2	3	4	5
1671-8.	Punjab ... ..	20,169	(396)	(9,930)	<i>Punjab.</i> —The whole of the police are trained; the upper subordinates with the revolver, the lower with the rifle.
5102-9.	North-West Frontier Province.	4,075	133	3,241	<i>North-West Frontier Province.</i> —All the police are trained to use buckshot, etc.
2897-8. Annexure I, p. 203.	United Provinces ...	35,832	(2,196)	(9,407)	<i>United Provinces.</i> —The armed police (7,372) are trained to arms regularly, the unarmed police are given some comparatively simple instruction for a year after joining and a short annual training.
594-610.	Bengal ... ..	22,784	(96)	(5,933)	<i>Bengal.</i> —The force in Eastern Bengal is under reorganization and when this is given effect to the total strength will be 24,433. Of the existing number 3,157 are usually armed, but it is proposed to have 3,238 so armed under the reorganization scheme. With the exception of the police in Calcutta, all the police are trained to arms but the musketry course is a very indifferent one. In Calcutta only those armed (213) are so trained.
305(v).*	Bihar and Orissa ...	12,785	...	3,925	<i>Bihar and Orissa.</i> —On recruitment such constables as are suitable are passed through the special armed reserve the strength of which is 839.
	Assam ... ..	(1,709)	...	(550)	
2.*	Central Provinces ...	11,800	...	3,932	<i>Central Provinces and Berar.</i> —All are trained in the use of firearms, with the exception of about 100 to 150 who are employed as personal orderlies. The special armed reserve, which is composed of picked men specially trained and drilled in the use of the M. H. Rifle, numbers 400 men and 32 head-constables.
	Baluchistan ...	(1,416)	...	(20)	
490-513.	Bombay ... ..	28,523	8,375		<i>Bombay.</i> —The force is under reorganization and it is proposed to increase it, but the exact extent of the increase was not stated by the Bombay Government witnesses. The armed police are trained to the use of arms and provided with them. The unarmed police are however trained to hit a target six or more times out of ten.
3059-61.	Central India Agency ...	527	...	314	<i>Central India Agency.</i> —The force is divided into two branches, the district and the criminal. The district do ordinary watch and ward work at various places; the criminal carry on the work of the old Thagi and Dacoity Department.
74.*	Ajmere-Merwara ...	286	...	286	<i>Ajmere-Merwara.</i> —About half the number of the Ajmere-Merwara police (214) are located in formed bodies, the remainder are scattered at various places in the two districts of Ajmere-Merwara.
104.*	Madras (including Coorg)	30,396	531	9,524	<i>Madras.</i> —The whole force is trained to the use of arms.
213.*	Burma ... ..	16,576	...	3,691	<i>Burma.</i> —All head-constables and constables are trained to arms.
	Total ...	1,86,878	62,480		

\* Written evidence.

NOTE.—The figures shewn in parenthesis were compiled from information furnished by the Home Department, the information not being given by the Local Governments or their witnesses.

The Armed  
Police.

541. The majority of the Armed Police are supplied with bored-out Martini-Henry rifles firing buck-shot, which are suitable weapons for the purposes for which these arms are required.

436, 4374, 5577, 6608,  
14127, Written evidence 250  
page 1329, Vol. 1V.

The reliability  
of the Police.

542. The experience of the past decade has shewn that, on the whole, the Civil Police of the country are a reliable force, who have come out of a period of great trial with credit. Witnesses have testified to the manner in which they are identified with Government, and that, in spite of unjust attacks, they have striven to do their duty.

277, 284,  
1231, 1262,  
1266, 1268,  
1270, 2908,  
2910, 2568,  
6570, 6576,  
6586, 6590,  
6618, 7648,  
7657, 7662,  
7689, 7765,  
7766.

But, like the Indian ranks of the army, the Police are of the country, and must be more or less swayed by whatever affects their own people. In cases where it is a question of the maintenance of law and order, and the enforcement of orders, human nature will as a rule place the policeman on the side of Government. But where caste and religious matters are involved, we must be prepared to find that the same human nature will affect the policeman and make him less ready to act against those with whom these ties connect him.

At the present moment the misfortunes which have befallen Musalmans in Europe, Northern Africa, and Persia, are widely attributed to the desire of Christian nations to supplant Muhammadan rule, and such thoughts can hardly fail to affect Musalman policemen, should they be called upon to act against their co-religionists under circumstances when their alleged offence might be imputed to sympathy with, for instance, Turkey and Persia, or be otherwise connected with their religion.

We can hardly blame the Police, and as we are unable to administer the country without their assistance, we must seek to find the remedy in an increase of sympathetic intercourse between the European officers of Government and the Police, in order to keep in touch with their feelings, to acquire a personal influence for good, to realize their difficulties, and to do all that can be done to protect them from themselves, should any individuals show indications of going astray. We attach very great importance to a strong European element being maintained in the senior grades of the Police Force.

### Section XXVIII.—Organization and duties of the Headquarters Staff.

543. In the course of the evidence taken by the Committee, several witnesses were questioned:—

(a) On the subject of the relations obtaining between the Headquarters Staff and General Officers Commanding Armies and Divisions.

(b) On the duties falling to the various Branches of Army Headquarters, and the adequacy of their establishments.

(c) On the existing organization of the Branches of Army Headquarters, and their relations to each other and the Army Department Secretariat.

776, 3834, 4173, 5447-9,  
5864-74, 6185, 6205, 6464,  
8703, 8719-29, 8745, 13316-  
32, 13362, 13369, 13382,  
13392, 13639, 14029, 14168-  
72, 14285, 14323, 14352-  
14382, 14475-83, 14947,  
14971-3.

Relations  
between Army  
Headquarters  
and General  
Officers  
Commanding.

544. Dealing first with the relations between Army Headquarters and General Officers Commanding Armies and Divisions, both Sir E. Barrow and Sir James Willcocks were of opinion that it would be desirable that they should be consulted officially to a greater extent than at present is the case, in regard to questions

3834, 4173.  
5447-9.  
5864.  
8703.

4632. of field operations, though both had been consulted un-  
 5723. officially. The former would have liked to have been  
 charged with more administrative work. The latter on  
 the other hand, said that his inspection and training  
 duties took up his whole time, and that it would be  
 impossible to extend his administrative duties, which are  
 at present mainly cases of discipline. Neither expressed  
 5713-23. the opinion that there was any undue centralization,  
 5870. except that Sir J. Willcocks thought that he had not  
 enough freedom in disciplinary cases. It was however  
 8719. shown that the necessity for referring such cases to Army  
 Headquarters was largely due to the requirements  
 of the Government of India and of the Indian Army  
 Act. In other respects he expressed himself as  
 perfectly satisfied with the present position.

545. Having been acquainted with the working of  
 the Command system as it existed before 1903, we are  
 of opinion that the Divisional system which has replaced  
 it has been a distinct improvement, and we agree with  
 5713. Sir J. Willcocks in thinking that it would be a grave  
 5719. mistake to charge General Officers Commanding Armies  
 with more administrative duties than at present. The  
 proper discharge of their inspection and training duties  
 are enough to occupy their whole time. We are further  
 persuaded from our personal experience, both as divisional  
 commanders and as staff officers at Headquarters, that  
 little unnecessary centralization exists, and that the  
 increase of work in the Adjutant-General's and Quarter-  
 master-General's Branches of late years has been mainly  
 due to their having had to take up work which had been  
 previously dealt with by the Military Department,  
 as well as some quite new subjects.

546. We pass now to the subject of the duties fall-  
 ing to the various Branches of Army Headquarters, and  
 the adequacy of their establishments, both in staff  
 officers and clerks. The principal Branches are the  
 General Staff, the Adjutant-General's, the Quarter-  
 master-General's, Medical, Ordnance and Military  
 Works Branches.

Duties of the  
 Branches of  
 Army Head-  
 quarters.

547. Dealing first with the General Staff Branch, to  
 which the greater part of the examination into the duties  
 at Headquarters was devoted, it may be noted that the  
 suggestions made in the examination of the Adjutant-  
 General and other witnesses, that all the duties now  
 performed by the General Staff and other Branches were,  
 2378. previously to Lord Kitchener's time, performed by  
 8738. the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's  
 14383. Branches, cannot be sustained.

548. When the "Division of the Chief of the Staff"  
 was formed in 1906, it took over intelligence and mobili-  
 zation from the Quartermaster-General's Division,  
 and combined training and military education from the  
 Adjutant-General's Division, though regimental training,  
 musketry and signalling were left with the latter. It  
 was also made responsible for military policy, a subject  
 which formerly belonged essentially to the Military De-  
 partment, and for the preparation of plans of operations,  
 for which the Quartermaster-General had nominally  
 been responsible, but which, through the pressure of  
 administrative business, had been usually left to be  
 worked out when the occasion arose.

549. The establishment of staff officers assigned to  
 the Division consisted of two Brigadier-Generals, four  
 Assistant Quartermaster-Generals, and seventeen.

junior staff officers, making, with the Chief of the Staff, a total of 24 officers. But the condition of the work which they then had to take over could in no way be considered as being up to the standard which modern war requires, as the following paragraphs will show.

Comparison  
between the  
present position  
in India and  
that which  
obtained prior  
to 1906.

550. We are most anxious not to be supposed to criticise the work of the former Mobilization and Intelligence Sections of the Quartermaster-General's Department. We know enough of the distinguished officers who had been connected with them, and of the results of their labours, to be certain that they would do good work according to the standard of the time, and subject to the limitations imposed by their inadequate numbers.

14354.

551. As regards mobilization and plans of operations, it would appear that a scheme for mobilizing three or four divisions had been drawn up in consequence of the tension with Russia in 1885, which was no doubt taken as the basis for further work when, in 1890, an officer was appointed for mobilization purposes, and the Mobilization Section was formed; but so far as we can ascertain no plans of operations, as such, were worked out until the occasion for them arose.

13933.

In 1900, when an attack by Russia was apprehended and the Defence Committee was assembled, no plan of operations appeared to exist; and Sir B. Duff told the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907, that so far no plan of operations for a campaign against Afghanistan had come before him.

13933.

552. The work of preparing plans for mobilization (which then also included concentration) was far too heavy for any one officer, however able, to cope with effectively single handed, even if he had not been severely handicapped by existing conditions, under which "the larger units of brigades and divisions had no organization in peace, but were paper bodies dispersed often over large areas, even in different districts and commands, and never brought together under their commanders in peace time." (See paragraph 11 *ante*.)

553. The result was seen in the working of the mobilization and concentration arrangements for the frontier risings of 1897-8, when the difficulties of the Quartermaster-General's Department and Mobilization Section were enhanced by many of their plans being changed by superior authority at the last moment. It was these arrangements which Major-General Aylmer in his evidence characterized as chaotic, or at least very complicated, and no one who experienced them could agree that they were satisfactory. The system then in force caused the whole country to be called upon to provide officers, offices, units, etc. The concentration was chiefly remarkable for its want of method. The following extract, from the Reports of the Railway authorities, shows the defects of the arrangements for railway movements:—

2359.  
2387.

"In many cases the notice was so short that timings had to be advised to Station Masters by wire \* \* and in some cases trains that were ready could not be run to the timings arranged, in consequence of the troops not being able to get ready in time."

\* \* "The difficulty experienced in successfully conducting this troop movement was very greatly increased by the almost entire absence of a programme, forecast, or understanding of any kind. We were called upon to supply stock and engine power for a very great number of trains for men, animals and an enormous quantity of stores, on the shortest possible notice, I may say no

See enclosures in Report of  
Manager, North-Western Rail-  
way of January 31st, 1898.

notice, the wire to run the trains often leaving insufficient time to get the engine ready, and this continued throughout the movement."

554. The Intelligence Branch, also, was admittedly quite undermanned. Noting, in 1903, on a proposal to increase its establishment, Sir Edmond Elles, then Military Member of Council, remarked :—

The  
Intelligence  
Branch.

"I fully agree that an increase is required in the Intelligence Branch; ..... At the present time the Intelligence Branch is little more than a recording office, and we do not get the full value of the information so recorded because there is no one with sufficient authority to work it up into schemes for active operations. As drill is the means to an end, *viz.*, tactics, so the collection of information is the means to an end, *viz.*, the formulating of schemes of active operations."

4659.  
14354.

555. Our own experience, which is corroborated by Sir E. Barrow, has also shown us that the Intelligence Branch, up to 1907 at least, was too shorthanded to deal with all the work which required attention. As an example, it may be noted that, up to about three years ago, no reasonably good military reports existed upon internal India itself. The only substitutes were the Quartermaster-General's Route Books, which were practically nothing but accounts of the main roads between stations, with descriptions of camping grounds and local supplies, compiled from the point of view of troops marching in relief, and were quite inadequate for military purposes proper. Even these Route Books were so much out of date that it was found necessary to revise them thoroughly. Similarly, there existed no account of areas in India suitable for training purposes, no record of the transport and other resources, etc., of Indian rivers such as the Indus, Ganges and Irrawaddy, or of the landing and shipping facilities at ports such as Karachi, Bombay and Calcutta, which would be the shipping places of expeditionary forces, and the landing places for reinforcements from Great Britain and the Colonies. Other deficiencies were numerous.

556. In drawing attention to these facts, we are far from suggesting that the officers responsible at that time were in any way to blame. They had an enormous amount of work to cope with and very inadequate means of dealing with it. They naturally had first to deal with what pressed for immediate attention from day to day. The point we wish to make is that the departments charged with these important duties have always been shorthanded, and have never had a chance of bringing their work up to date.

557. Such was the position as regards Intelligence duties, the preparation of plans of operations, and the arrangements for mobilization and concentration. A similar condition of affairs existed in regard to training. It must, we think, be admitted that much of it perforce was left undone, as the time of the Adjutant-General's officers was so absorbed in administrative duties that little leisure was left to them for work connected with training. Staff duties and the training of the staff, as a subject of instruction, can hardly be said to have been recognised.

558. Thus, writing on the subject in 1905, the then Adjutant-General, Sir B. Duff, made the following remarks :—

"Hitherto, such portions of the duties of a General Staff as have been performed have been carried out without proper collation or co-ordination, and, although much has been done through the



zeal and efficiency of individual officers, it has not been possible, owing to the absence of a suitable organization and want of sufficient establishments, to prepare comprehensive plans of operations, or to provide adequate supervision for the higher training and preparation of the army for war, which is essential if the best use is to be made of the material at our disposal."

Brigadier-General (now Major-General) Mullaly wrote in May 1906, that an officer was required "to deal with strategical questions, plans of operations and all matters of defence—essential requirements which have hitherto never been properly considered or co-ordinated"—a second to deal with "the higher training of the army, manœuvres, camps of exercise, etc., which have hitherto been dealt with spasmodically and disjointedly"—a third to deal with "Staff Training and formations, the Staff College, etc., so as to secure an adequate staff machinery, the want of which has hitherto been publicly pronounced as being one of the prominent defects of the army in India."

Colonel Cowans, (now Major-General Cowans, Quartermaster-General to the Forces) who was then officiating in charge of Training and Staff Duties, wrote at the same time "there are innumerable questions pending, of the most pressing importance regarding the training of the army, and the reorganization of the army, etc., etc., which are at an absolute standstill."

And Sir B. Duff wrote "we have to start three new branches—a Strategical Branch, a War Training Branch, and a Staff Duties Branch. There are no officers or clerks available for any of them."

Thus it had early been recognised that the Chief of the Staff's Division, as constituted in 1906, was undermanned for the work imposed upon it.

559. In 1907, the abolition of the three Commands, which had been under discussion for some time previously, was carried out, and the Divisional system inaugurated. The savings resulting from the abolition were partly utilized to meet the cost of the additional staff, which, as above shown, was urgently required in the Chief of the Staff's Division. The establishment of Staff Officers, as reorganized, stood at—

- 1 Chief of the Staff.
- 2 Brigadier-Generals.
- 5 Assistant Quartermaster-Generals.
- 21 Junior officers, of whom 3 were temporary.

560. In March 1910, the General Staff Branch was formed out of the Chief of the Staff's Division, and the Chief of the Staff became the Chief of the General Staff. The duties with which the General Staff Branch and the Branches of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General were concerned were then re-arranged as follows :—

'Concentration' (which had previously been included as a part of 'mobilization') was handed over to the Quartermaster-General, with the one officer who was then employed on that work. Only a small part of the subject of mobilization, *viz.*, the issue of the actual orders for mobilizing, was handed over to the Adjutant-General; on the other hand, regimental training, including musketry, gunnery, and signalling, were received over from him by the General Staff Branch, as well as all business connected with religious or political movements in the army.

14291.

14291. Nearly all the more important functions of the old Mobilization Branch, *viz.*, principles of mobilization and maintenance in the field, composition of forces, co-ordination of proposals and arrangements for war, distribution of the army, mobilization regulations, war regulations, mobilization requirements and war establishments, were retained in the new General Staff Branch. As it was recognized, by the then Adjutant-General, that the re-arrangement of duties allotted to the General Staff more work than the Chief of the Staff's Division had been responsible for before, while it relieved the Adjutant-General of more duties than he took over, an officer from the Adjutant-General's Branch was handed over to the General Staff.

561. At the same time the following important new duties were added to those which had formerly been performed by the Chief of the Staff's Division :—

- (a) Inter-communication, including wireless telegraphy.
- (b) Co-ordination of war regulations and training manuals, and the publication of Indian supplements to war manuals.
- (c) Supervision of training at the Cavalry School.
- (d) Higher training of General Staff officers.
- (e) Supervision of the translation of training and war manuals into Urdu, Hindi and Gurmukhi.

The supervision of aviation is just about to be added.

562. The establishment\* of the General Staff Branch at present (1913) is :—

- 1 Chief of the General Staff.
- 2 Directors (Brigadier-Generals).
- 6 General Staff Officers, 1st grade.
- 12 General Staff Officers, 2nd grade.
- 6 General Staff Officers, 3rd grade.

It will therefore be seen, in comparing the present establishment of staff officers with that of the Chief of the Staff's Division in 1907, that one General Staff Officer 1st grade (the equivalent of an Assistant Quartermaster-General) has been added, while the three temporary junior officers have been dropped.

563. From the foregoing paragraphs it will be seen that, if it can be assumed that the Division of the Chief of the Staff, as re-organized in 1907, was no more than adequate for the duties imposed upon it, then the General Staff Branch as at present organized is not overmanned, inasmuch as important extra duties have been entrusted to it, and the establishment has not been increased.

14345-56. 564. In Brigadier-General Headlam's examination it was suggested that the duties performed by the General Staff at the War Office were so much greater than those carried out by the General Staff at Army Headquarters in India. that the staff at the latter was proportionately too large. We have thought it right

Duties of the General Staff at the War Office and at Headquarters in India compared.

\* NOTE.—It should be explained that in Annexure I to Brigadier-General Headlam's evidence, 1 General Staff Officer, 3rd grade, who is special Intelligence officer at Peshawar and in command of the Intelligence Section there, is included as at Headquarters. The correct number at Headquarters is 27 not 28.

to go into this question somewhat in detail, in view of the importance of a clear understanding of the case.

As regards the work to be performed, it must at once be admitted that the work falling on the Imperial General Staff at the War Office has a wider scope. On the other hand the corresponding duties of the Indian General Staff are often far more complicated.

565. At the War Office as in India, the General Staff work is divided into three main sections, *viz* :—

- (a) Military Operations, including Intelligence ;
- (b) Military Training, and
- (c) Staff duties.

Military  
operations and  
intelligence.

566. As regards (a) Military operations and Intelligence, the War Office of course deal with a far larger portion of the globe, while their plans of offensive and defensive action have a necessarily wider outlook. On the other hand the army at home is not quartered in the midst of an alien population of 315 millions, with many independent or semi-independent foreign states within its area, and semi-barbarous tribes round its border. Nor is it charged with the duty of keeping the border at peace, maintaining information concerning these States and the tribes, and guarding against sedition in its own country.

The intelligence duties in regard to India alone, an area of about 1,800,000 square miles, are very heavy, and there appear to be no areas, with which the home General Staff is concerned, where intelligence duties are so difficult and dangerous as they are on our North-West and North-East frontiers, where our agents literally take their lives in their hands.

Moreover these agents are of necessity natives, many of whom have had little education to supplement the technical training they receive from our officers. The scrutiny and collation of their reports is therefore a matter of some difficulty, as besides collation it often involves translation from Pashtu, Persian, or Chinese. Though similar intelligence work at the War Office may perhaps have a wider scope, the material available for the purpose is generally easier to handle, and its accuracy and value can be more readily checked and assessed. Moreover the bulk of this scrutiny, for the War Office, is done by the fourteen General Staff Officers, employed as Military Attachés abroad; India, on the other hand, has only two Military Attachés (at Meshed and Teheran respectively) and two Intelligence officers, one at Peshawar and one on the Mekran coast for the arms traffic, so that, almost the whole of this work has necessarily to be done at Simla itself. To arrive at a sound conclusion, therefore, account should be taken of the difficulties under which the General Staff in India labours in regard to intelligence duties, as compared with those at home.

567. Even as regards what are known as 'Defence Schemes,' the duties of the General Staff in India do not suffer much by comparison with those of the General Staff at home. The number of local 'Defence Schemes' for Great Britain is something under 30, while those for India (though not perhaps on such a large scale) number between 50 and 60. It is the case, of course, that the General Staff at the War Office is also concerned with the Defence Schemes of Imperial fortresses

and coaling stations abroad, as well as with Overseas Defence Schemes. But for these latter the primary responsibility rests with the Overseas Defence Committee, the military secretary of which should really be counted with the General Staff. So indeed to a considerable extent should the military secretaries of the Committee of Imperial Defence, five in all, for it is by that Committee that the greater questions of imperial strategy and defence are dealt with.

568. Similarly, for operations overseas, while the War Office has to keep touch with the Admiralty War Staff, the Indian General Staff also has to keep close touch with the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies and the Director, Royal Indian Marine, *e.g.*, in the case of the arms traffic operations of 1909-10-11-12 on the Mekran coast; projects for the despatch of expeditions to the Persian Gulf, or of reinforcements abroad, as was the case in 1899 to South Africa, in 1900 to China, and in 1901 to Somaliland; communications between His Majesty's ships and the shore; also Port Defence Schemes, and buoyage, lighting, etc. in connexion therewith. The work of the Indian General Staff in these matters is considerable.

569. For Geographical and Survey work the War Office maintains a larger staff and in some cases reproduces its own maps. This latter is however a comparatively small portion of the business of the geographical section, and all other descriptions of its work are undertaken by the Indian General Staff.

570. So far as the Military Operations and Intelligence Directorate, therefore, is concerned, it may be said that precisely similar duties are performed, differing only in degree, and not so widely in amount as might at first be imagined.

571. As regards (b) Military Training, which in India is combined with (c) Staff Duties, and which we therefore treat together, we may point out that, whereas the General Staff at the War Office has to deal with the various armed forces maintained at home and, to a small extent, with those in the Dominions and Colonies, it may well be doubted whether the Indian General Staff has not the more difficult task. India, as well as England, has a regular army, but this army, in place of being homogeneous as at home, has an Indian force (in no way under the War Office) twice the size of the British portion, a force which comprises some 12 different races, many of them actually foreign subjects, speaking at least ten distinct languages, and whose officers communicate with them in a language often as foreign to the men as it is to themselves. The 9,000 non-British troops employed by the War Office, of whom more than half are battalions from India, become a negligible quantity in comparison. India, like Great Britain, has its Army Reserve, and its Volunteers as against the Territorial Force, though in each case in much smaller numbers. It has no Special Reserve (the old Militia) it is true, but to set against this it has to deal with Imperial Service Troops, Frontier Militia, Frontier Constabulary, Local Levies, Military Police and Armed Police, in regard to all of which the Indian General Staff has advisory duties of considerable importance.

Military  
Training and  
Staff Duties.

The heterogeneous character of the armed forces of India is exemplified by the fact that the training manuals of the Indian army are published in three

different languages, and more varieties are frequently asked for. The special work which the preparation of these manuals entails, in the way of translating and checking proofs printed in various characters, is work quite outside the experience of the War Office. Proof reading of this description must necessarily be entrusted to specially qualified officers, and, owing to the inefficiency of Indian compositors, five or six revisions are usually necessary.

No doubt certain work in connection with the armed forces of the Overseas Dominions falls upon the War Office, but the officers attached from those Dominions deal largely with such questions, and the work does not, we believe, press heavily on the General Staff proper.

War  
organization  
and training.

572. As regards the questions of war organization and training, the War Office General Staff has no doubt the more important and difficult work, in that it has to decide and lay down the general principles on which these are based, though it does not follow that this entails the greater labour. The General Staff in India follow and adapt the imperial field service manuals, war establishments and similar handbooks to Indian conditions. Where the difficulty and labour come in is in the details. Take 'War Establishments' for example. The General Staff at home publishes the war establishment of a cavalry regiment; India has to adapt it to Indian conditions, and not only to British cavalry but to Silladar and Non-Silladar Indian cavalry. Similarly as regards the war establishment of an infantry battalion. India has to adapt it to British Infantry, Indian Infantry and Pioneers, all differing considerably. As regards artillery, India has to prepare all its own War Establishments, because all branches of artillery in India include Indian soldiers.

Transport in England is mechanical or horse-drawn, with a certain number of pack horses or mules. Indian transport may be horse, mule, camel, bullock, or coolie, according to the nature of the country to be operated in and the time of the year. Alternative War Establishments have therefore to be issued. Transport for the sick and wounded varies nearly as widely. In the matter of food supply, the need for respecting racial and caste differences complicates War Establishments in regard to all medical and ration questions, as practically all arrangements have to be duplicated, so as to provide, not only for Europeans, but also for natives differing from them and from each other in their diet. Owing to the variety of transport animals employed, a similar difficulty exists in regard to veterinary and animal ration questions.

As regards training, we may also point out that local conditions necessitate many modifications of the Imperial regulations. It must also be remembered that the Field Service Regulations and Training Manuals are all sent to India for comment and examination before they are published, and that in some cases portions of them are actually written by the Indian General Staff. For example, all the sections dealing with Mountain Warfare in Field Service Regulations, Part I, were written in India, while the new issue of Field Service Regulations, Part II, has been largely modified in accordance with recommendations sent home from India.

573. As regards Staff Duties, those performed at the War Office and at Army Headquarters in India do not differ greatly. In each case the organization and training of the General Staff, and instruction at the Staff College, questions of foreign languages, war organization, co-ordination and revision of training books and manuals, war establishments and communication services are dealt with.

574. In the foregoing remarks we have discussed the points in which the duties of the General Staff at the War Office may be thought to be more onerous than those of the General Staff in India. But it remains to add that there are several questions which require far more attention from the General Staff in India, than do corresponding questions from the General Staff at home, while there are other important matters which have no counterpart at home at all. The following are the more noticeable :—

Additional subjects dealt with by the Indian General Staff.

14100.

- (i) The elaboration of the schemes of operations prepared in India often demands more frequent attention than would be the case at home; for some of them are under constant revision and alteration, to accord with the developments of policy of the Home or Indian Governments in the areas which, for the time being, are absorbing their attention—whether the Persian Gulf, Persia, Tibet, Western China or the tribal districts immediately adjacent to our North-West and North-East frontiers, which are liable to periodic and sudden outbreaks.
- (ii) As regards these outbreaks, the frontier districts referred to are the scene of frequent raids\*, which are of course dealt with primarily by the local military or police authorities. They may at any time, however, lead to larger developments, necessitating the application of a definite scheme of operations, and in any case have to be reported on for the information of the Commander-in-Chief. This involves an amount of work from which the sea frontier of the United Kingdom entirely relieves the War Office and the home army, which never fires a shot in anger in time of peace.
- (iii) Internal sedition and the keeping watch on movements tending to endanger the loyalty of the Native army. This is a matter of ever growing importance, in regard to which the closest touch has to be kept with the Criminal Intelligence Department, so that dangerous movements may be frustrated. The forces in the United Kingdom happily require no such constant attention.
- (iv) Questions of armament and other military matters relating to Native States; the maintenance of Imperial Service Troops; the working of the Arms Act; armament of frontier levies and the armed police. These

\* On the North-West frontier and in Baluchistan the number of these raids, during the last three years, has been as follows :—

1910	...	...	...	136
1911	...	...	...	134
1912 (returns still incomplete)	...	...	...	90



are all matters which lead to considerable work and correspondence and have no counterpart in the work of the War Office.

- (v) The proportion of British to Indian armed forces; the proportions of the various classes recruited for the Native army; the protection, against possible revolutionary attacks, of arsenals and of volunteer armouries and magazines; military questions affecting the construction of bridges, railways and telegraphs in India, and their protection in peace and war; also the development of radio-telegraphic communication between the principal strategic centres. These again are all duties peculiar to the Indian General Staff.

Officers employed on General Staff duties at home and in India compared.

575. Brigadier-General Headlam's comparison between the duties falling to the General Staff at the War Office and those of the General Staff in India would therefore appear to be sound. On the other hand, in his replies regarding the number of officers employed, he underestimated the assistance received by the General Staff at the War Office in the performance of their duties, as will be seen later. It may be useful first to compare the numbers of the Staff Officers employed, by each, in the three main divisions of General Staff work.

14347-50.

14346.

These are given in the following table:—

				General Staff War Office.	General Staff India.
Military Operations and Intelligence	...			37*	15
Military Training	...	...	...	19*	} 11
Staff Duties ...	...	...	...	10*	

The Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff and of the General Staff India are not included above.

576. A further consideration is, that the General Staff at the War Office receives a good deal of external assistance, which is not at the disposal of the Indian General Staff. The most important aid is, of course, that received in London from the Committee of Imperial Defence, which assists the former in dealing with great questions of Imperial Strategy, on which His Majesty's Government may wish for advice, and with the compilation of military histories of campaigns, (which is in India carried out by the General Staff), and with the Defence Schemes of the United Kingdom, and fortresses and defended ports at home, as the Overseas Defence Committee does for those abroad. The five military secretaries of the former Committee and one secretary of the latter are all styled General Staff Officers and should really be counted as part of Headquarters. The corresponding duties in India are performed by the General Staff unassisted.

577. Notice should also be taken of the fact that the General Staff at the War Office employs a retired

\* These figures are taken from Army Estimates 1912-13, which include certain officers whose names, on account of the Secret duties on which they are employed, are purposely omitted from the Army List.



\* The General Staff in India has also a translation officer, but the latter is employed solely upon the translation of the Training Manuals into Urdu, Hindi, and Gurmukhi.

officer as translation officer\*, and that three (according to the Army List, though the Army Estimates only notice the presence of two) officers of the Overseas Dominions forces are attached for duty to the General Staff at home. No doubt they are employed mainly on questions affecting the Dominions; but, even if this is so, they at any rate take over a good deal of work which would otherwise have to be done by General Staff officers proper. In India there are also officers from the Dominions; but these are sent over for training only, and are seldom attached to the General Staff at Army Headquarters, and then only for instruction and for short periods.

578. Again, the editor of the official military publication at home, the 'Army Review,' though not an officer of the General Staff, is paid from its vote and relieves the General Staff of that work. It may here be mentioned that, besides contributing to the contents of the 'Army Review' the General Staff in India do a large amount of editorial work for this journal, the Director of Staff Duties acting as its assistant editor for India—numerous articles have been sent home, while others, which are now in course of preparation, will follow in due course. This does, and will, involve considerable work.

In India a military publication, *viz.*, the 'Fauji-Akhbar,' is edited and managed by an officer of the General Staff. As in each case the General Staff is responsible, it would seem fair that the editor of the 'Army Review' should be counted with the General Staff at home. It is of course recognised that in neither case does the editor give his whole time to the work; but the 'Army Review' only appears quarterly, whereas the 'Fauji-Akhbar' appears weekly and in three languages.

579. There are in addition two medical staff officers at the War Office, shown in the statement in Annexure II, page 1113, Volume IV, who are attached to, and assist the General Staff in their work. One of them is in the Military Operations, the other in the Training Directorate.

The War Office General Staff is also assisted by a librarian and a map curator, who are not officers but officials of good standing, members of the Civil Service; each has an assistant, also a member of the Civil Service; and their pay is charged to the General Staff in Army Estimates\*. As there are no equivalent officials at Army Headquarters in India, their duties are there performed by officers of the General Staff.

\* See Army Estimates for 1912-13.

580. Thus we see that, whereas the number of officers employed on the Headquarters General Staff at the War Office is, in Annexure II, page 1113, Volume IV, given as only 71, a complete comparison would show 67 actual General Staff Officers, *plus* 3 officers regularly attached for duty from the Dominions, *plus* 2 medical officers, 2 librarians and 2 map curators, *plus* the editor of the 'Army Review,' *plus* a retired officer specially retained for translation duties, *plus* the secretary of the Overseas Defence Committee, *plus* the 5 military secretaries of the Committee of Imperial Defence. All these officers are employed to a greater or less degree, on duties which,

in India, are performed entirely by the General Staff at Headquarters.

531. The conclusion we draw from this, we fear, somewhat lengthy comparison is that, considering the very important and far reaching duties with which it is charged, the General Staff at Army Headquarters in India is not overmanned, and we do not think that the number of Staff Officers employed could safely be reduced. Certainly no evidence in support of such a view, based upon examination into the nature of those duties, was brought before the Committee, and Brigadier-General Headlam's evidence was emphatically to the contrary effect.

14352.

14382.

The suggestion, made in a question to Brigadier-General Headlam, that when the primary intelligence required about a given country or area, and the schemes of possible operations have been made up, an equally large establishment is not needed to keep them up to date, is based upon the assumption that the establishment available has been sufficient to bring all the intelligence required, or all the schemes of operations, to a complete state. We have reason to believe that the staff available never has been adequate for this purpose. It can and does only deal with the most pressing and important items; and by the time these have been completed or nearly so, others have become more pressing in their turn, and the former ones have to be left alone while these others are attended to, and this process goes on indefinitely. In any case the argument used only applies to intelligence and plans of operations, and not to such subjects as training, staff duties and war organization which are almost entirely current work.

14353-4.

582. Reference was also made in Brigadier-General Headlam's examination to the questions of (a) clerical establishment, (b) attached officers, (c) noting by clerks. We do not consider that, unless a central registry system be introduced for the Army Department generally, any reduction can safely be made in the establishment of clerks any more than in that of Staff Officers.

14401-11.

14285-89.

14320-23.

As regards attached officers we think there has been a good deal of misapprehension on the subject and have annexed a note\* thereon, from which it will be seen that we regard the system as a cheap and generally efficient method of getting certain special work done.

\* Annexure Y.

On the question of noting by clerks which was referred to in Brigadier-General Headlam's examination, it will perhaps be sufficient to say that the practice in the General Staff Branch is in accordance with Secretariat Instructions, as interpreted in a note\* by the Joint Secretaries in the Army Department, dated August 8th 1910.

14320.

14402.

\* See Annexure Z.

Adjutant-General's Branch.

583. Passing now to the work of the Adjutant-General's Branch; Major-General Aylmer gave interesting evidence as to the duties with which that Branch is charged. He stated that, on the abolition of the Military Department, the work in his Branch was changed to a large extent in its nature and scope. The Adjutant-General was charged with dual functions and not only remained a Headquarters Staff Officer with the functions appertaining to him as such, but became also a Secretariat Officer with certain functions as a member of the Army Department.

8729.

We believe that much correspondence, which is now necessarily dealt with in the Branches of Army Headquarters, was conducted between the Secretary to Government in the Military Department and Local Governments, Lieutenant-Generals of Commands, etc. It was only when the Military Department considered a reference to be necessary, that such correspondence was seen, officially or unofficially, by the Army Headquarters staff.

When the Army Department was created, the various offices of Army Headquarters became Divisions (now termed Branches) of the new Department. Each Branch was made responsible for its own cases, until finally recorded, and all action in connection therewith now devolves on the Branch concerned, involving labour which under former conditions would have fallen wholly, or partially on the Military Department.

Each paper under disposal has now to be 'referenced' and to be carefully noted up, not, as in former days, from the purely military point of view only, but also from the aspects of finance as well as of Government expediency and policy. In many instances cases must be prepared in a form suitable for submission to the Governor-General, or to His Excellency's Council. This calls for a careful examination of past records—often necessitating search for those which go back for many years, and are not in the record room of the Branch concerned.

The Army Department Secretariat took over from the Military Department and retained in its own hands the following subjects, *viz.*, the Royal Indian Marine, the Indian Medical Service, Ecclesiastical business and Medals. The office staff was organized with a view to cases connected with these headings being dealt with wholly within the Secretariat. But, in practice, much of this work is passed by the Secretariat to the Branches of Army Headquarters for disposal.

In former days comparatively few of the despatches received from the Secretary of State were seen in the Army Headquarters offices, and those were noted on and 'referenced' before leaving the Military Department. Now every despatch is dealt with and disposed of by the Branch of Army Headquarters concerned.

584. General Aylmer added that the fact that nearly half of the cases with which his Branch had to deal were Army Department rather than Headquarters cases (that is, cases which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief could dispose of as Commander-in-Chief) involved much work which had never been done before by the Branch, but that unless the Government of India were prepared to concede the disposal of Army Department cases to lower Administrative Organizations—that is of cases which are not now within the powers of even the Commander-in-Chief to dispose of,—there did not remain much room for further decentralisation. Army Headquarters were, he thought, already decentralised as far as was possible.

585. He further pointed out that—

8719. (a) a large number of pay and pension cases, which were beyond the powers of General Officers Commanding, now came up to the Adjutant-General's Branch; which were

dealt with in that Branch, not as part of Army Headquarters but in the exercise of its functions as an integral portion of the Army Department—these cases, being beyond the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, as such, had to be passed to the Army Secretariat or the Military Finance Branch;

- (b) that a vast number of disciplinary cases were received, which were beyond the powers of Divisions;
- (c) that a great many comparatively insignificant cases, under paragraph 150, Indian Army Regulations, Volume II, part of which refers to affrays between soldiers, whether British or Indian, and civilians, now came up to him, and that even where cases had been regarded by the local General Officer Commanding as too trivial to report, they often were referred to his Branch by the Army Department, on report from the Home Department, who might have taken a more serious view of the matter from the civil side—these of course had to be enquired into;
- (d) that the necessity for reporting the loss of arms or ammunition for the information of the Commander-in-Chief and Government of India (which he thought was overdone) was the cause of a great deal of clerical work.

To these cases might be added such matters as the central administration of the Regimental Institute Funds, which is an entirely new class of work of late years.

583. He concluded that no reduction of the Adjutant-General's Branch, as regards Staff Officers, was possible—they had more work to do, as records and experience went to show, than in 1898, with three officers less, and he had no hesitation in saying that the Branch was under-manned in this respect, and that it was only by working overtime and on holidays that the ordinary work could be kept going. There was no reserve of power.

8729.

587. The state of the case was much the same as regards the clerical establishments—if compared with those in England, it would be seen that they were weaker in every way. And it must be remembered that in India they had to deal with two completely different sets of rules, for British and Native troops respectively.

745.

Quartermaster-  
General's  
Branch.

588. Considering next the question of the Quartermaster-General's Branch, Major-General Birdwood gave us a full account of the duties of the Branch, the practical effect of which was that, whereas, in 1898, the Quartermaster-General dealt only with Intelligence and the work now carried on in the Movements and Quartering Directorate, he now has, in addition, the Supply and Transport, Remounts, Clothing, Veterinary and Farms Directorates. He further discussed the question of the administration of these different sections and the possibility of retrenchment in connexion therewith in Answers 15031 and 15341. His answers are too long to quote here but they give a clear idea of the heavy duties falling upon the Quartermaster-General.

14947.

14331-44 ]

589. In regard to both the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Branches the report of Major-General Hamilton Gordon's Committee, which was appointed in 1911 to consider the organization of Branches of Army Headquarters, gives valuable information. As the questions put to Brigadier-General Headlam reveal a considerable amount of misapprehension on the subject of this Committee, it may perhaps be well to state that the whole of the action taken was in accord with the instructions given by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity of Army Member.

Major-General  
Hamilton  
Gordon's  
Committee  
on the  
reorganization  
of Branches at  
Army Head-  
quarters.

590. After considering the report of Major-General Hamilton Gordon's Committee, in regard to the establishments of the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Branches together with Major-General Birdwood's views in regard to the Quartermaster-General's Branch, we are of the opinion that, when the present system of army administration was introduced, the establishments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General were not sufficiently strengthened to enable them to deal with it. The result is that officers and clerks are overworked and the time of the senior officers is so occupied with routine matters that they have not the necessary leisure to enable them to consider more important matters concerned with the preparation of the army for war.

We recommend :—

(a) That, in accordance with the proposals of that Committee, the following increases be made to the Staff of the (i) Adjutant-General and (ii) Quartermaster-General, *viz* :—

(i) One Director and two Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals.

(ii) One Assistant Quartermaster-General, one Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, and one Staff Captain to become a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

(b) That a Central Registry for the Army Department and Army Headquarters be established.

10430.

591. As regards the Medical Branch, it consisted in 1898 of the Principal Medical Officer, a Medical Officer as Secretary, one Sanitary Officer and an Assistant Secretary of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department, to whom was added, on the abolition of the Commands, a Deputy Principal Medical Officer. In the interim a permanent Sanitary Officer has been added and again abolished. The present staff consists of a Director of Medical Services, one Deputy Director, and two Assistant Directors, with, as before, an Assistant Secretary from the Indian Subordinate Medical Department. We recommend no change in the existing establishment.

Medical  
Branch.

C3637.

592. In the Ordnance Branch, in view of the widespread and important nature of the work carried out in the Ordnance factories and Department, we think that the present directing establishment of the Director-General, one Deputy and one Assistant Director-General, is the minimum with which the duties can be carried on.

Ordnance  
Branch.

**Military Works Branch.**

593. The Military Works Branch has a directing staff consisting of the Director-General, a Deputy Director-General, two Assistant Director-Generals and two Deputy Assistant Director-Generals, a small increase on the staff existing in 1898. In view of the additional work thrown on this Branch of late years, we do not think that any reduction can be made.

6369.  
6385.

**Organization and relation to each other of the Branches at Headquarters.**

594. The organization of Army Headquarters, and the relations of its different Branches to each other and to the Army Secretariat, were discussed in the examination of several witnesses. From many of the questions put and answers given, especially in the case of Major-General Hamilton Gordon and Brigadier-Generals Headlam and Hamilton, it was evident that serious misapprehension existed as to the duties with which the several Branches of Headquarters are charged, and their relationship to each other, more especially as between the General Staff Branch and the Administrative Branches of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General.

776, 6184-226, 6464, 8719,  
8729, 8741-5, 13328-72,  
13381-2, 13401-26, 13446-  
83, 13592-612, 13638-643,  
13999-14004, 14167-81,  
14334-44, 14733-52, 14836-  
7.

595. The duties entrusted to each are given in India Army Orders Nos. 202 and 203 of April 1910, as amended by India Army Order of April 1st 1912 and are as follows:—

**DUTIES OF THE GENERAL STAFF.**

Military policy. Organization and distribution of the army for internal security and external war in accordance with the policy of the Government. Plans of operations for the defence of India. Collection of intelligence. Supervision of the training of the military forces for war. Their use in war. War regulations. Organization and administration of the General Staff in India, and recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief of Officers for General Staff appointments. Education of officers. Inter-communication services.

The duties are divided and dealt with by two Directors (*i*) Military Operations, (*ii*) Staff Duties and Military Training, who are charged with—

**(i) Military Operations.**

Plans of offensive and defensive operations, and plans of concentration and reinforcement in connection therewith. Selection of war and concentration stations. Organization and distribution of the army in India for internal security and external war. Strategic considerations affecting the improvement or extension of communications. Defence schemes. Naval considerations affecting the defence of India.

Co-ordination of all proposals and arrangements for war, including arms and equipment, affecting the fighting efficiency of the military force. Principles on which the army is to be mobilized and maintained in the field. War formations and establishments.

Collection, preparation (including strategical and tactical consideration), and distribution of information concerning the military geography, resources, and armed forces of India and the countries for which India is responsible. Correspondence with military attachés. Examination of foreign journals and literature generally.

Submarine cables and wireless telegraphy. Aviation. Censorship. Ciphers.

Collection of topographical information, and compilation, and preparation of all maps required for military purposes, in co-operation with the Survey of India. All matters connected with frontier questions, boundary delimitations and demarcation commissions. Selection of officers for Survey and geographical work. Issue of maps for war.



*(ii) Staff Duties and Military Training.*

Organization and training of the general staff, and appointment and attachment of officers thereto. Confidential reports on general staff officers. Entrance to and instruction at the staff college. Examinations for promotion and in foreign languages. Divisional and brigade libraries.

Adaptation of the Imperial Regulations and Training Manuals to Indian conditions. Co-ordination of peace and war publications, and preparation of the latter in collaboration with other branches. Study of inventions and new equipment affecting the fighting efficiency of the military forces. Advice as to the initiation of experiments for war purposes. Inter-communication services. Central Library at Army Headquarters.

Training of all arms for war. Manœuvres, criticism of reports thereon. Allotment of funds for training. Appointment of instructional staff and supervision of instruction at schools for war training. Instructional exercises without troops.

**DUTIES OF THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S BRANCH.**

Raising and organizing the military forces. Maintenance of the Army in personnel, exclusive of that for which responsibility rests with heads of departments. Recruiting and reserves. Organization of drafts. Discharges.

Mobilization of units, and co-ordination of mobilization arrangements and orders. Issue and transfer of mobilization equipment. Depôts. Organization of new and provisional units.

Administrative matters connected with training. Physical training and training of recruits. Army schools.

Ceremonial. Guards and escorts. Honours and salutes. Rank and precedence. Colours and standards. Honorary distinctions. Rewards.

Interior economy. Bands and messes. Regimental institutes. Soldiers' libraries.

Discipline. Furlough and leave (except individual cases of leave of officers dealt with by the Military Secretary).

Pay and pensions. Estates (British service warrant and all non-commissioned officers and men).

Unattached List. Military prisons and detention barracks. Asylums.

Horses, equipment and other matters special to Silladar Cavalry.

**DUTIES OF THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S BRANCH.**

All movements by land and sea, and regulations relating thereto. Questions connected with communications of all kinds, the necessity for which has been accepted. Reliefs. Concentration.

Encampments and regulations relating thereto.

Preparation, in conjunction with the general staff, of plans for war so far as they affect supply and transport.

Scales of accommodation for troops, and all questions relating to cantonments and the quartering of troops. Types and scales of barrack furniture. Administration of cantonments, military land, and conservancy. Scales of ecclesiastical accommodation. Organization and administration of the cantonment magistrate's department.

The organization and administration of the Supply and Transport Corps and the Farms department. The equipment, training and efficiency of all transport, both in peace and war, and the preparation of all regulations relating thereto. The scales and issue of all provisions, forage, fuel and such other supplies, stores and equipments for the troops as are administered by the Quartermaster-General, and the fixing of scales of reserves. Questions connected with compensation for dearness of provisions and forage. Regulations relating to supply in peace and war. Questions regarding cooks and cooking. Dress and clothing, including clothing establishments.

The organization and administration of the Army Veterinary Service. Veterinary requirements of the army, inspections, reports and returns. The preparation of field veterinary hospitals, stores



and offices for mobilization; and veterinary equipment of units. Veterinary regulations. Shoeing.

The organization and administration of the Remount department. Provision of remounts for the army. Questions *re* horses and mules generally.

596. It will be seen from the foregoing detail that the General Staff Branch is concerned with the consideration of all questions of general policy, of organization for war and distribution of the army, of preparation for war, including information and the education and training of the Staff and the army generally, and with co-ordination of all measures to this end. It does not deal with administration of any sort, except that of the General Staff itself.

On the other hand, the Adjutant-General is charged essentially with the provision and administration of the personnel of the army, and its discipline.

And the Quartermaster-General is responsible for its food, clothing, quartering, supplies and transport, for the provision of animals and for the administration of the services dealing with these duties.

597. It is clear that the relations between the three Branches must be of the closest, not only in virtue of the General Staff being charged with 'policy,' which must necessarily involve constant consultation with the other two, but because its duties of co-ordination of all proposals and arrangements for war, and of war organization, involve constant reference to it by the Administrative Branches. The duty of dealing with war preparation and organization means, in this country, preparation and organization for war on or beyond the Indian frontiers, as well as for internal security; and from these points of view there is hardly any administrative proposal which does not demand careful consideration by the General Staff. Such consideration occupies much of the time of the Chief of the General Staff and his subordinates, who have, in addition, their own special work in preparing war plans, collecting military intelligence, and directing the training of the army and the higher education of its officers—subjects again which require constant communication with the Administrative Branches. The dividing line between the General Staff and Administrative duties is therefore fine, but it is clearly drawn and every effort is made to observe the distinction, which is of great importance for the efficient conduct of business at Headquarters.

598. Previously to 1910, in view of the position of the Chief of the Staff, it had been the custom to refer many questions affecting administration to his Division, and the distinction just mentioned had not been very strictly observed. With a view to making it quite clear that the newly constituted General Staff Branch was not intended to deal with administrative questions, Sir Douglas Haig, in a long note upon a case\* dealing with the effect of the abolition of the Commands upon the various administrative services, ended by saying—“In the definition of a General Staff adopted by the Imperial Conference of 1907, it is particularly insisted that it should carry out its duties without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration. This appears to be a case where the despatch should be drafted by the Army Department,”

\* *Proc. A.*, April 1911, No. 1901.

This was written in May 1910, very shortly after the General Staff was formed. Subsequently the General Staff Branch frequently called attention to the fact that it was not intended to deal with administration, with the result that the reference to it of such questions has now practically ceased.

599. We have thought it desirable to refer to this subject, because the tendency of a large part of Major-General Hamilton Gordon's examination was to suggest that it was the duty of the General Staff to intervene in administrative matters.

13450-85.

Thus in his examination it was suggested that the General Staff had failed in its duty, because, on being asked to give details as to how each of the nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades of the field army stood at the moment, in regard to their transport, clothing, equipment and supplies generally, the General Staff Branch referred to the various departments concerned for up to date information. As the witness told the Committee, a definite question could, in general terms, have been answered in the course of a few hours, but the question as put demanded reference for details to the other Branches, and numerous assumptions as to conditions, before an answer could possibly be given. He informed the Committee that information as to the state of preparation for field service was obtained from the other Branches periodically, but not from day to day. Had the General Staff been in the habit of constantly questioning other Branches as to the state of the work for which they and not the General Staff were responsible, the latter would rightly have been accused of interfering in administrative questions.

13451, 13457-61, 13473-5.

13573.

600. Again the President asked the same witness. "It is understood that the condition of the Army Bearer Corps for some years past has made it absolutely inadequate for work with any large force. How does the General Staff propose to meet this state of affairs?" As the witness pointed out, the General Staff could not deal with such a matter and had done its duty when it had drawn the attention of those administratively responsible to the deficiency, and had urged that steps should be taken to remedy it.

13592-610.

In the same examination it was suggested that the General Staff ought themselves to have made inquiries into the working of the rifle factory at Ishapur, and into the condition of the rifles in the hands of the troops, instead of relying upon the reports of the officials responsible.

13639.

601. This line of examination tended, in our opinion, to show a misconception of the duties of the General Staff and administrative Branches at Headquarters, and we consider that the witness was right when, subsequently, he said in regard to mobilization, that it was merely the duty of the General Staff to be aware in general terms how far the field army was in a position to take the field, and that more detailed information was essentially the province of the Adjutant-General, who was responsible for mobilizing the army.

602. Were any other course of action to be pursued, and were Branches to investigate each other's business, as suggested in this examination, it would lead to endless friction and confusion among them, whereas we believe

that, at the present moment, all Branches of Headquarters are working harmoniously and with an almost total absence of friction.

The  
Mobilization  
Committee.

603. In the examination of the same witness and Brigadier-General Headlam, the "Mobilization Committee" was referred to, and comment was made on the fact that it had apparently fallen into abeyance.

13351-63.  
14176-81.

So far as we can ascertain from the records, the Mobilization Committee has not met since May and July 1906, while a batch of papers was circulated once, without a meeting, in 1907. It has not therefore met since a date long anterior to the formation of the General Staff—so that its non-assembly can hardly be said to be concerned with the functions of that body. The facts of the case would seem to be, first, that the subjects of policy and co-ordination (which seem to cover all the questions the Mobilization Committee was meant to deal with), having been assigned as subjects to the Chief of the Staff and later to the General Staff, presumably with intention, the discussion of questions of principle connected with mobilization, preparation of the army for war and military operations, which had been at one time the special duty of the Mobilization Committee, was otherwise provided for; and, secondly, that, as practically every question with which the Mobilization Committee could deal came also under the functions of the Advisory Council, which had the additional advantage of the presence of the Secretary for Army Finance, to assemble the former as well would mean merely a duplication of work.

Relations of  
Branches of  
Army Head-  
quarters to  
the Army  
Secretariat  
and His  
Excellency the  
Commander-in-  
Chief and Army  
Member.

604. We feel some doubt whether the relations of the Heads of Branches at Army Headquarters to the Army Department and Secretary, and the position of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as such and as Army Member, as laid down in the "Compendium of Office Rules, 1909," fall within our terms of reference, but in view of the fact that they were discussed in the examinations of Mr. Brunyate and General Hamilton Gordon we have thought it right to refer to them. In these discussions two propositions were suggested, the first, that members of the Headquarters Staff were precluded from submitting to the Commander-in-Chief, otherwise than through the Army Secretary, any questions upon which the orders of the Government of India might afterwards be required, and the second, that the Commander-in-Chief could not cause his views as such to be communicated by his chief staff officers to the Army Department, because the question involved would afterwards come before him as Army Member.

6186-97.  
13417-26.  
13444-7.

605. In these suggestions, however, as it seems to us, two separate functions of heads of Branches of the Headquarters Staff were confused; (a) that of ascertaining from the Commander-in-Chief whether proposals which are deemed advisable by one of them are, *primâ facie*, in agreement with his views and should be discussed further; and (b) the subsequent elaboration and working out of such proposals, with a view to their further consideration from the Financial and Army Department point of view, before final submission to His Excellency as Army Member. The suggestion seems to be that the Commander-in-Chief cannot, without either binding or stultifying himself, desire one of his Chief Staff officers to consider, from the purely military and technical point of

view, a question which will necessarily afterwards require further consideration from his financial and political advisers; and that one of the chief staff officers of the army in India must not ask the opinion of the highest military authority in the country whether he thinks a question should be taken up, because, if he agrees to its being examined, it will eventually come before him for decision in its wider aspect.

606 If this were the fact, it would seem to follow that an officer in the position of the Commander-in-Chief is not capable of differentiating between the military and administrative aspects of a case, and cannot hold an open mind until it has been considered in all its aspects.

In practice, both the past and the present Commander-in-Chief have in fact considered themselves capable of looking at the matter from both points of view. As an instance of the former's attitude, we find that in February 1907, when a proposal regarding the training, employment, and remuneration of officers as interpreters in Russian, which had been initiated by the Chief of the Staff's Division, was first submitted to him as Army Member by the Army Secretary, Lord Kitchener minututed as follows:—

\*Pros. A., August 1907, Nos. 3280-3285.

"I should have seen these proposals as Commander-in-Chief and am not prepared to forward until matter has been put before me by Chief of the Staff's Division."

Notes A. D. Register No. 376.

And the present Commander-in-Chief has given distinct orders, that officers of the Headquarters Staff shall not take up cases for eventual submission to the Army Department, till they have received his approval as Commander-in-Chief,

607. This appears to us to be consistent with business principles. There is nothing to be gained by Branches spending time and labour in working out military proposals, before ascertaining whether they would be agreeable to the Commander-in-Chief, who, in giving sanction for the proposal to be examined, does not in the least pledge himself to accept it afterwards. It may be remarked that, so far as we are aware, this procedure works satisfactorily.

Pros. A., July 1906, No. 1351-56.

It may also be added that it is the procedure laid down by paragraph 43 (b) of the 'Compendium of Office Rules,' which appears to be in accord with the Secretary of State's orders in despatch No. 18 (Military) of 9th February 1903.

608. We do not find that, in acting as they have hitherto been accustomed, heads of Branches have done more than the Compendium of Office Rules lays down, in first ascertaining "whether the Commander-in-Chief considers the measure one which should be proceeded with" [Rule 43 (b)]; nor do we find that any difficulty arises in practice from the subordination of heads of Branches, in their capacity as members of the Army Department, to the Army Secretary; and we feel bound to record the opinion that, so far as we are aware, no practical difficulty in working the system has shown itself, nor do we think that work in the Army Department has suffered. We have reason to believe the contrary to be the case.

As the result of our investigation into the organization, duties and working of the Branches of the Headquarters Staff and their relation to the Army Department, we do not recommend any alteration

further than the establishment of a Central Registry, in existing arrangements, which appear to be working satisfactorily.

## Section XXIX.—Ordnance Establishments and Personnel.

The Ordnance factories.

609. The Committee was directed to enquire into the working of the Factories Branch of the Ordnance Department, more especially with reference to the question of the retention or otherwise of these factories. The recommendations of the Committee have been already submitted to Government, and it is not necessary to reproduce in this Report all the considerations which led up to them.

Annexure B., Item 21.

Factories which the whole of the Committee concur in considering as essential.

610. The Members were in agreement as to the advisability of retaining the following establishments, viz:—

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| (a) The Cordite factory near Wellington in the Nilgherries.    | 9579, 9611, 10153.                              |
| (b) The Gun and Shell factories at Ishapur and Cossipore.      | 1902, 1910, 1912, 9417, 9467, 9471, 9567, 9569, |
| (c) The Small Arms Ammunition factories at Dum Dum and Kirkee. | 9579, 9785, 9990, 10091, 10097, 10103, 10141.   |
| (d) The Gun Carriage factory at Jubbulpore.                    | 715, 9579, 9839, 10163.                         |

Committee's proposals.

611. The Members were also in agreement in making the following proposals—

- |  |                                     |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| (a) That the repair of arms, which cannot be effected regimentally, be carried out in the Rifle factory, all arsenal workshops now maintained for this purpose being closed.   | 9638.<br>9644.<br>9831.<br>9307.    |
| (b) That the conversion of all non-charger long Lee-Enfield Rifles to charger loading be expedited.  |                                     |
| (c) That the petty manufactures now undertaken in arsenals be curtailed, so far as may be feasible.  | 6357.<br>9924-9934.                 |
| (d) That the Director of Factories be located in Calcutta.   | 9947, 9950.                         |
| (e) That the present system of factory accounts be given a fair trial before it is altered.  | 9938, 9978.                         |
| (f) That the present detailed audit of arsenal accounts by the Military Accounts Department might be curtailed.  | 9964.                               |
| (g) That, within reasonable limits, Government Departments should be required to obtain from Ordnance factories such articles as they require, which are procurable, and can be produced in the factories without an increase to the normal establishments and working plant.  | 1902, 1912, 6359, 9909.<br>9911-22. |
| (h) That the proposals made by the late Director-General of Ordnance and the Unattached List Committee in 1906, in regard to the systems now obtaining for the seconding and promotion of subordinates in the Stores and Factory Branches be reconsidered, with a view to amending certain anomalies which cause an unreasonable flow of promotion and consequent unnecessary expense. | 10002, 10010.                       |
| (i) That the arsenal at Rangoon be reduced to the status of a depot, for the storage of ammunition and such mobilization and other   |                                     |

war stores as are not maintained in regimental charge; the Burma Division being made otherwise dependent on India.

612. On the following points we were unable to agree with our colleagues, Lord Nicholson and Sir William Meyer, *viz* :—

The Rifle factory at Ishapur, and the Harness and Saddlery factory at Cawnpore.

709, 6309, 6315-21, 6323,  
9579, 9607, 9621, 9638,  
9650.

(a) That the manufacture of rifles, and to a great extent also of component parts, by the Rifle factory at Ishapur should be discontinued.

(b) That steps should be taken to compare the accounts of Messrs. Cooper, Allen and Co.'s leather factory at Cawnpore and the Government Harness and Saddlery factory there on a like basis; and that, if this examination showed Government factory work to be more expensive, the question of disestablishing it, or reducing its sphere of production should be considered.

700, 714-15, 6038, 6351,  
9385, 9897, 9922, 9990.

9584, 9890,  
9897.

613. Our reasons were fully given in the papers submitted to Government from which the following extracts are taken.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The arguments in favour of the abolition of Ishapur as a factory depend entirely on the assumption that the War Office, on receiving reasonable notice, can guarantee to supply India's demands. On other occasions, even in time of peace and with ample notice, the War Office has not always found itself able to meet the demands made on it."\*

\* \* \* \* \*

"It is clear that before the advisability of dispensing with even the present small producing power of our Ishapur factory can be thoroughly considered, we must know as definitely as possible what the War Office can, or cannot do for us, for our demands will be large."

\* \* \* \* \*

"General Stuart appears to consider that, now that the initial difficulties have been disposed of, and those caused by the introduction of the new system of inspection are being overcome, the Ishapur factory should have no difficulty in future in turning out some 20,000—25,000 new short rifles a year. Assuming even a reduced figure of, say, 15,000 a year, we are of opinion that, in view of the present position at Home, and of the wastage already alluded to in India—to meet which we have *no* reserve in hand—the power of manufacturing even this number of rifles a year should not be lightly given up. It, at worst, will go far to replace wastage."

\* \* \* \* \*

"We feel obliged to disagree with our colleagues so far as they recommend the curtailment of the manufacture in India of 'component parts' of arms. It is by no means certain that such component parts for the obsolete pattern rifle will for long continue to be manufactured at Home, when the manufacture of the new rifles has once begun. We now have the appliances and it would be much safer to be able to make them here."

"Our colleagues propose, apart from the conversion of long Lee-Enfield rifles to charger-loading weapons (which conversion will shortly be completed), to confine the work of the factory in future to repairs only, and would forbid any production of new weapons, even when such production could be carried out in the intervals of repair work and be used to supplement that work."

\* As an example of this we quote the following:—In 1911, the Secretary of State for India approved of the proposal of the Government of India to obtain 16 000 rifles per annum, in the years, 1911-12, 1912-13, and it is understood, so informed the War Office. In February and March 1912, the War Office was notified that 16,000 would be required on this account in 1912-13, and also, unofficially, that 73,000 more would probably be asked for in the same year. The despatch asking for the 73,000 left India on May 23rd 1912. But no contract for the supply of any rifles at all was made until late in October 1912, and the first batch of 1,500 rifles did not leave England until January 31st 1913.



We should disagree with this, even if it were found that the War Office could meet all our requirements in the supply of rifles, for experience shows that, if repairs are to be properly carried out, the factory must be capable of, and have some experience in the manufacture of the complete weapon."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Turning now to the question of the Harness and Saddlery factory, Cawnpore.

"The majority of the Committee do not, indeed, make any definite recommendation in favour of giving the contract for harness, etc., to Messrs. Cooper, Allen and Co., unless it should appear on investigation that they could manufacture more cheaply than the Government factory. But unless there was a considerable difference in their favour, we should regard it as doubtful policy for us to place ourselves in the hands of any single firm of contractors, for harness and saddlery, as we have done in the case of boots.

"The maintenance of a Government factory has certain well established advantages, apart from the actual matter of cost, and we incline to the opinion that the question of stopping the Government manufacture of harness and saddlery should be postponed until there exists in India a sufficient number of reliable firms to afford a reasonable prospect of our being able to procure from them adequate supplies in time of war at fair rates."

\* \* \* \* \*

614. Other points considered by the Committee were:—

- (a) Whether the higher posts in the manufacturing branches should be open to civil officers of the Department.
- (b) Whether in the case of officers, the higher posts should be reserved for the Royal Artillery.
- (c) Whether the rules regarding the guarding of arsenals and magazines, and for the security of arms and ammunition in transit from and to factories, arsenals and units, are adequate and observed.
- (d) The possible reduction of the large sums now expended on tents for the use of troops in the hills, by the provision of permanent huts and the reduction in the numbers of convalescents and soldiers' families ordered up to the hills.

714.

10066 (ii).

Suitability of civilians for administrative appointments.

615. In regard to (a) and (b), we are of the opinion that for these administrative appointments military officers are more suitable than civilians, more especially as those now serving are for the most part specialists. If however, in the future, civilians with all round qualifications should become available, they should not be debarred from these posts.

6280.  
9990, 9996, 10000.

Enlargement of the field from which officers are obtained for the Ordnance Department.

616. We further think that the Stores Branch of the Ordnance Department will gain if it is opened to all arms of the service, and if arrangements can be made for officers of the Ordnance Corps at home to do duty in this country, under conditions analagous to those which govern the temporary employment of officers of the Army Service Corps with the Supply and Transport Corps in India.

Annexure B, Item 14.

The safe-guarding of arsenals, also of arms and ammunition in transit.

617. We have had no evidence to show any marked want of care or disregard of orders in the guarding of arsenals, etc. Allusion was made during the course of our proceedings to a Sikh guard having been furnished for the arsenal at Ferozepore, but we did not understand, from the information furnished to the Committee by the Army Department, that the arsenal at Ferozepore had

2716, 2718, 2729, 5513, 5517, 9300-02, 9853, 10112-123.



ever been entrusted solely to an Indian guard, and we know that for the past twenty years this has not been the case; but that, whereas up to 1907 a Native infantry guard was mounted in the Fort at Ferozepore in addition to the British infantry guards, from that year the former guard has been discontinued. The Committee was also told of the case of the 10th Jats, who, at a time when the conduct of that regiment was under investigation, found the guard over a magazine (not arsenal) on the banks of the Hooghly, south of Ishapur, in which cordite was stored to meet the working requirements of the small arms ammunition factory at Dum Dum. But this magazine is in an isolated situation, hardly suitable for a guard of British infantry, and we are inclined to think that the danger in this case was somewhat over-estimated; though we consider that no regiment under suspicion should find a guard over explosives.

2725.  
2729.  
9855.  
9857.

618. We recommend that the arrangements for safeguarding arms and ammunition in transit should be enquired into, as the economical methods which have hitherto been followed may not, under present conditions, afford a satisfactory margin for safety.

4241, 4255, 6042, 6058,  
7253, 7546, 8563, 10066,  
10241, 10257, 10261, 10265,  
10269, 10271, 10297, 10299,  
10303, 10318, 14053.

619. We recommend that huts be built in the hills for the usual complement of men and families who, having been sent up from the plains for the hot weather, are now accommodated in tents, so that the present loss on tentage may be minimised. With the knowledge we have of the immense benefits men and families gain by going to the hills, and of the consequently increased efficiency and contentment of the troops, we deprecate any reduction being made in the numbers now admitted to these benefits.

Huts to be substituted for tents, for troops and their families sent up to the hills.

620. As regards reserves of artillery ammunition (*vide* Annexure C, Item 4), we are satisfied with the present position, and we do not think it will be necessary to expand the gun and shell factory at Cossipore.

Reserve of artillery ammunition.

621. In regard to Ordnance field parks (item 5 in above Annexure) the present position is that, with the exception of stores for one cavalry brigade, four parks are completely provided with a six months' supply of imported as well as local stores; while the other five have a six months' supply of imported stores.

Ordnance field parks.

622. We consider that all the field parks should be provided with imported stores; but only with such articles of locally obtainable stores as cannot be procured on mobilization, or within a reasonable time after mobilization has been ordered. We also consider that the existing Tables of mobilization stores for Ordnance Field Parks should be revised, in order that articles may be eliminated, which are not really essential, and other reductions be considered.

623. We somewhat doubt whether the arrangements at present in force for keeping the Director-General of Ordnance informed of the progress of supplies by the India Office Store Department meets requirements in the case of urgent or important demands. A "quarterly return" of stores under supply to India, dated on the 1st of each quarter and published about three weeks later, reaches India some five or six weeks after the date it bears. This suffices in the case of ordinary supplies, but where it is desirable to have earlier or more frequent intimation of shipments, something more is necessary, and a monthly statement would

more nearly meet requirements. Such a return might have reference only to items specially notified for inclusion at the time of demand or subsequently at the request of the Director-General of Ordnance. Such items as guns, carriages or mountings, small arms, machine guns, ammunition, or experimental equipments would usually be so notified. We recommend this point for consideration.

### Section XXX.—Military Works Services.

Mobilization requirements.

624. In case of mobilization there will be a deficiency of about 191 Royal Engineer officers and we see no other course than to trust to sources outside of India, as well as to whatever may be made available within the country, to complete the requirements of the army. We hope that it may be found possible to create, from gentlemen and others employed under civil and municipal administrations and in private firms, a reserve of officers and subordinates for engineering duties in rear of the army, or with the troops detailed for internal defence, which may assist to meet the existing shortage.

1962, 1964.

Subordinate establishments.

625. In regard to the subordinate establishments, we have considered whether, with a view to economy, civilians might not be substituted for military employés; but having regard to the fact that the service brings the subordinates into frequent contact with the troops, and not feeling certain that appreciable economy would result, we do not think it advisable to suggest any change in this respect.

739, 1816.  
1822, 1841.  
4598, 5679.  
6280.

Barrack Department.

626. We have also considered whether the subordinate establishment of the Barrack Department might not be recruited from military pensioners instead of from men on the active list; and, though Major-General Dickie was opposed to the idea generally, he thought that it might be worth trying in one or two places as an experiment, an opinion which is also shared by Sir James Willcocks. We recommend that this experiment be tried, as if successful it may conduce to economy.

1838, 1846.

4602.

5683.

Barracks and Indian army lines.

627. In connexion with the Redistribution Scheme it has been stated that barracks have been built which subsequently proved not to have been required. So far as we are aware this has been the case in but one instance, viz :—at Ahmednagar. These barracks, too, would have been occupied, had not the Government of India decided, in consequence of a change in the local political conditions, to cancel the withdrawal of a British battalion from Dinapore, which had been previously determined upon.

2867, 3964.  
3968, 4143.

The present Commander-in-Chief inaugurated schemes for the acquisition by Government of the lines of Indian Silladar Cavalry, and for the improvement in the standard of accommodation provided for all native troops. We attach much political importance to these measures and trust that it may be found possible to complete them at an early date.

1848-1866.  
6385-6397.  
13132, 13134.

Accommodation in hill stations.

628. We have recommended in Section XXIX, paragraph 619 of this Report that, on economical grounds, buildings should be substituted for tents in which many British troops and families are accommodated when sent to the hills.

6042, 7546, 10066.

Electric fans and lights for British troops.

629. Having in view the importance of maintaining in good health those British soldiers who are stationed in the plains during the hot and rainy seasons, we strongly

1882-1888, 1896-1900.

recommend that steps be taken to substitute electric fans for hand-impelled punkahs and to provide electric lights in the barracks, institutes and Government quarters, at all stations where connection can be made with existing installations, or where an installation can be introduced at a not excessive cost.

### Section XXXI.—Military Finance and the Military Accounts Department.

630. The Military Accounts Department is a branch of the Finance Department (Military Finance) of the Government of India.

Military  
Accounts  
Department.

6068.

631. For purposes of financial administration, India is divided into three Circles and two independent divisions, the former being each under a Controller, the latter each under a Deputy Controller. At the head of the Department is the Military Accountant General who is also, *ex officio*, a Deputy Secretary to Government in the Finance Department.

A fourth Controller deals with the accounts of the Royal Indian Marine and Military Supply Services (Ordnance, Clothing, Supply and Transport, etc).

632. Up to 1909 the Department was essentially military in its character, as it is still in the highest classes. From that year civilians have been appointed by the Secretary of State as Military Accountants, and there are at present 12 of these gentlemen in the 2nd class of that grade. It is too early as yet to form a definite opinion as to the advantages gained by substituting civilian for military officers in the department.

Civil officers  
as Military  
Accountants.

15642.

6124, 6134.  
6165.  
15641.

748 and 750.

6066-6104, 6138.  
6150, 6165.

633. The methods followed by the Military Accounts Department aim at safeguarding the financial interests of the State, by a system which attempts to bring every item of expenditure under audit and to disallow all expenditure which is not specifically authorized by the Regulations. This system whilst, generally speaking, meeting the objects for which it has been framed, tends to be unduly costly, and by inclining some of the officers of the department to interpret the letter rather than the spirit of the regulations in a somewhat narrow manner it adds to the office work of the army at large, without always ensuring commensurate economy to the State. But even with its present limitations the system of decentralization introduced at Lord Kitchener's instance has resulted in officers of the army, generally, taking much more personal interest in their financial responsibilities, and has therefore conduced to economy.

System.

634. The whole system is now under revision, and it is hoped that the new rules will much simplify the disposal of military accounts business, and that they will cause a reduction in the cost of administering financial control without unduly relaxing it; that they will result in a more real system of decentralization than has as yet been effected, and a better understanding on the part of general and other officers as to their financial powers and responsibilities.

635. We understand that a scheme for altering the status of the Military Finance Secretary and his immediate subordinates is under the consideration of the Government of India. With the details of that scheme we are not concerned; but we desire to express our decided opinion that the existing system has materially

Military  
Finance.

6185.  
6254-6278.

promoted economy, by affording the Army Member and Army Department skilled financial assistance, and strengthening financial control. We hope that, whatever changes may be introduced, these will be such as will conduce to the closest co-operation between the Army Finance Branch and the various Branches of Army Headquarters, without diminishing the efficiency of the control in question or weakening the position of the Commander-in-Chief as Army Member, in regard to the provision of funds for the purposes of the army.

6254-6266.

**Army Budget.**

636. We recommend that Mr. Brunyate's proposals for obviating the inconveniences caused by the present system regarding lapses, and for the preparation of the Army Budget should receive careful consideration. In our opinion they are sound in principle and likely to prove a convenience both to the Finance Department and to the Army.

5978, 5984.  
5922, 5994.  
6020, 6024.  
6028.**Financial advice for the Branches of Headquarters.**

637. We attach great importance to the provision of financial assistance for the Branches of Army Headquarters which have to prepare projects involving considerable expenditure, so that either they may be worked up from their inception on lines which are in accordance with the policy and requirements of the Finance Department, or that they may be dropped at an early stage if for financial reasons they are unsound.

6229-6245.  
6254.**Section XXXII.—The supply of Rifles and Machine Guns.**

638. The situation as regards the supply of rifles has we believe recently engaged the attention of the Government of India and cannot be described as satisfactory. We understand that, on April 1st 1913, over 80,000 rifles were still required in order to be able to ensure that, on a general mobilization, every man of the regular army and volunteers could be supplied with either a "short Lee-Enfield" rifle or a "charger loading Lee-Enfield" rifle. We are informed that orders for these 80,000 rifles have been placed, but that it is not likely that all will be supplied much before December 31st, 1913. The "charger loading" Lee-Enfield rifles are converted rifles of the earlier long Lee-Enfield pattern and can hardly be described as modern rifles. We regard it as most important that the earliest opportunity be taken to re-arm the army in India with the new small bore rifle, recently approved for adoption at home, for even the short Lee-Enfield rifle will shortly be obsolete.

**Reserve of rifles.**

639. The reserve of rifles which Lord Kitchener considered to be needful has not yet been formed, owing to reasons which it is unnecessary to discuss in this Report. We strongly recommend that a reserve should be built up, and maintained, of 122,000 rifles, on the basis of one-third the rifles in ordinary use, including those in the hands of the Volunteers, in addition to a provision for the extra recruits of the Indian army to be enlisted on mobilization, care being taken to ensure that a proper proportion of each pattern of rifle in the hands of the troops is always included in the ordnance reserve. This point should be borne in mind when the next rearmament is being made.

**The arms of the Volunteers.**

640. The Committee have been informed that the condition of the rifles and carbines in possession of the volunteers urgently calls for their replacement, and we recommend that this matter be given early attention.

Vol. II, Annexure I, page 206,  
9169, 9277-9287, 9350,  
9352, 9718, 9720, 9724.

10091.

641. We agree with General Stuart that the amount of ball ammunition in the actual charge of British units should be increased.

Ball ammunition with British units.

642. It is somewhat difficult to follow the figures regarding machine guns which have been submitted to the Committee. We understand that the Secretary of State approved of the number 540, which had been entered in the Schedule of 1909-10, as the establishment of machine guns to be maintained. But from this figure 40 guns which then formed part of the armament of various posts were omitted, probably owing to their being on parapet, and not tripod mountings. The total number should properly have been stated as  $540 + 40 = 580$ . It is now proposed further to increase the sanctioned establishment of machine guns to 620. In October, 1912, of this number—

Machine guns.

(a) Establishment.

510	were in hand
47	had been ordered
23	others had been already sanctioned
<hr/>	
580	
<hr/>	

leaving 40 machine guns for which the sanction of the Secretary of State has still to be obtained.

But in view of the impending introduction of a rifle of smaller calibre than that now in use, we would suggest that any further demands for machine guns, other than replacements, should not be submitted until the issue of the new arm has been sanctioned.

(b) Distribution

643. We recommend that, in allotting machine guns, the following order of issue should be adopted :—

- (1) To all British units in India and Indian units of the Field Army.
- (2) To units of the Frontier Brigades at Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan.
- (3) To the Indian regiments of the mobile columns in Upper Burma.
- (4) To those Volunteer corps for which machine guns are suitable.
- (5) To Indian regiments detailed for internal security duties, in the order of the importance of the area in which they are located.

6054, 9291.

644. The above recommendations do not refer to the machine guns of the mobile armament of coast defences, or of inland forts.

### Section XXXIII.—Strategical Railways and Frontier Roads.

645. In regard to the development of frontier railways, which would be of great advantage from the supply and concentration point of view in time of war, the present position is as already described in paragraphs 207 to 211. We now desire to make the following recommendations :—

Extension of the Kabul river and Kohat-Thal railways desirable.

495, 1924, 2597.  
4070, 5163.  
5405, 7324-34.

- (a) From the point of view of the defence of India, and expeditionary action across the frontier, we are of opinion that it is very desirable to extend the Kabul river railway to Smatzai, and the Kohat-Thal line to Parachinar, as already recommended by an India Office

Committee in 1901, and the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907. The Kabul river railway, which in our opinion should follow the river and not the Shilman Gakke route, could not be completed to Smatzai in less than approximately three years; if therefore its construction is deferred till the outbreak of hostilities, or till hostilities appear imminent, the line would not be available for use during the operations. The Thal-Parachinar extension could be made more rapidly; but if field operations were being carried on at the time, work on the railway would be greatly hampered, as the Kohat-Thal portion of the line would be required for the transport of troops and stores, so that the material for extending the line could only be brought up with difficulty. We are therefore of opinion that the extension of both these lines should be gradually made in peace time, and not postponed until operations are actually undertaken.

- (b) We regard the construction of the Kabul river railway as the more important of the two projects, because the Peshawar-Kabul line of advance is not only the more direct, and open throughout the winter, but by it our forces would pass through Jalalabad, the occupation of which would be essential in operations in northern Afghanistan. Moreover, the Kabul river railway would take very much longer to construct.

- (c) We consider that both lines should, as recommended by Sir T. Wynne, be constructed on the 2' 6" gauge, which would suffice for military purposes, and cost considerably less than the broad gauge.

8902-14.  
8933.

- (d) If for political reasons the Government of India are disinclined to push the line to Parachinar at present, we consider that it is desirable to construct a cart road to the foot of the Paiwar, suitable to take a 2' 6" line of railway as suggested by Sir T. Wynne.

8928.

- (e) Meanwhile we strongly recommend the construction of two good roads, capable of carrying heavy motor traffic, through the Khyber to Torkham. It is understood that the second road has already been commenced.

1940.  
4742.

646. We regard the provision of direct railway communication between Bombay and Sind as being essentially desirable, but not of great urgency.

2599, 4078, 5407, 7336,  
8976.

Improvement  
of frontier  
roads.

Bombay-Sind  
railway.

Other  
connexions.

647. Generally speaking we advocate the extension of the railway communications on the frontiers, such as the connection of the Quetta-Pishin and Kohat-Thal railways with the Bannu-Tank line, and between Upper Burma and Assam, both as a means of rapidly moving troops and stores when required, and on account of the civilizing influences which such lines cannot fail to exert on the people of the areas served. For the same reasons we recommend that roads should be constructed in the eastern and north-eastern frontier districts of Upper Burma and Assam.



## Section XXXIV.—Training and Manœuvres.

618. The Committee have had under consideration the question of the adequacy of the annual grant for Training and Manœuvres.

The Training Grant.

3974.

649. In former days, before the abolition of the Command system, the periodical assembly of troops for manœuvres was intended to serve as a counterpoise to the drawbacks of their distribution in cantonments, which had no connection with the organizations of which they would form part in war. But although stress was laid by the army authorities on such periodical concentration of troops for manœuvres, the money available for the purpose precluded such concentrations from being frequent, or from their being held equally often and on an equally large scale in all four of the Commands.

2337, 3906, 3982,  
7229, 7243, 7247.

650. The training grant was limited to one lakh of rupees up to 1899-1900, when it was doubled. In 1907-08 it was further increased to three lakhs, and in 1912 it reached its present figure of four lakhs. In addition to the normal annual grant, sums were occasionally provided for special concentrations. The grant covers all expenses incurred in connexion with regimental, brigade, and divisional training, artillery practice camps and coast defence rehearsals, which would not have otherwise had to be met. Up to 1907 the training grant was evenly distributed amongst the divisions for divisional and other training. In 1908-09, this system was altered and the 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions carried out special divisional training under grants made by Army Headquarters. In 1909-10, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th were also exercised. In 1910-11, the 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions trained as such, and the 1st and 2nd held inter-divisional manœuvres. The Delhi Darbar precluded any divisional training being carried out in 1911-12. In 1912-13 inter-divisional manœuvres for the 3rd and 7th Divisions took place in the vicinity of Delhi.

651. We desire to urge that the annual training grant be increased from four to six lakhs as a matter of the highest importance. On the grant of four lakhs sanctioned during the current year, it was only possible to hold one set of inter-divisional manœuvres, and these were for those two of the nine divisions, the 3rd and 7th, which were most conveniently situated for holding such manœuvres at comparatively small expense. In the case of almost any other pair of divisions the cost must have been considerably greater and beyond our means without stopping other training; even to allow of these inter-divisional manœuvres, the training of other units had to be undesirably curtailed.

The reasons why the present grant is not sufficient, an increase recommended.

652. We would point out that, since there are nine divisions in India proper, if only two divisions each year engage in inter-divisional manœuvres, it follows that the turn of any given division will not come round oftener than once in four years at best. Four years is the length of tenure of a divisional command. Therefore, at most, a divisional commander could only hope to have an opportunity of learning the art of handling a division against an opponent, as he would in war, once in the whole tenure of his appointment. And it will easily be understood that the proper handling of a large body of troops, such as a division of 13,000 men, is an art which requires considerable practice. At the present



moment there are only two of the nine divisional commanders in India, who have ever had any such experience.

653. The object aimed at in recommending the increase of two lakhs in the annual grant, is first to provide for the systematic training of all troops, from the individual up to the division, and next to permit of two pairs of divisions being exercised against each other each year; so that every divisional commander should have the opportunity at least once, and possibly twice, during his tenure of command, of practising himself in the art of working his division in the field. He can no more be expected to do this properly without practice, than a man could be expected at once to drive a motor car, who had never studied one except in the shop. It is a mere truism to say that on the General Commanding depends the success of an army in the field. It cannot therefore be wise policy to spend money on obtaining good men as recruits, on clothing, equipping, arming, and training them for the work they are expected to do, in short on perfecting the machine and then to stop short at spending the comparatively small further sum of money required to train the man who is to work that machine when the time comes.

654. Conditions in England, no doubt, differ to a considerable extent from those in India, but it is a remarkable fact that the training grant for the regular troops on the home establishment, who number less than three-fifths of the regular troops in India, is nine times as great as the training grant for the latter.

655. We, therefore, feel strongly that this increase of the training grant, as proposed, is really among the matters of the highest urgency. We also think that extra funds should occasionally be provided (a), for inter-divisional manœuvres of two divisions actually mobilized and concentrated as for field service, so that the commanders, staffs, and troops may obtain practice in their duties on mobilization, or, (b), alternatively, for army manœuvres in which more than two divisions should take part on their peace footing.

### Section XXXV.—Reliefs.

Considerations  
which govern  
the system of  
reliefs.

656. The relief system, under which British and Indian units periodically change their stations, requires three main considerations to be kept in view :—

(i) That certain stations, or areas, should have certain classes of Indian troops.

(ii) That units should not be kept in an isolated station or be broken up into detachments for too long a period.

(iii) That all should have a fair share of healthy and of pleasant stations and that the stay in unhealthy stations should be comparatively short.

657. Under the Presidential Army system, Indian units circulated within the Presidency areas, which was also the case to a great extent when those armies were replaced by Commands, the abolition of which has much widened the relief circle.

658. Owing to the necessity for limiting tours in the hills and in unhealthy stations, and to other causes, the periods of relief for various units differ widely, and this inequality adds considerably to the difficulty of drawing up the annual relief programmes on a satisfactory system.

184, 1292, 1716, 2814, 2818,  
4604, 4624, 5303, 5685-9,  
7569, 7578, 7580, 8677-95,  
10874, 10876, 10882, 10884,  
11262, 11264, 11268, 11272,  
11274, 11350-52,  
11650-11686, 11794, 12071,  
12081-3, 12080, 12175,  
12458, 12464, 12466, 12470,  
13775, 13080, 14053.

659. The general tenour of the evidence shows that the number of reliefs cannot be materially curtailed, since troops are apt to stagnate if kept too long in one place, especially if it be an isolated one, while the occupation of hill stations ought not to become the monopoly of specially favoured units. There is further the political argument that, in an area where disturbances may be apprehended, it is undesirable that the garrison should be too largely composed of men drawn from that area.

660. Whilst we think that it may be possible to simplify the present system, we realize that the whole question is a difficult and technical one into which many considerations enter, upon which we did not receive enough evidence to enable us to formulate an authoritative scheme.

The system calls for examination and improvement.

We desire to commend the whole matter to the attention of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with a view to the Quartermaster-General's Branch undertaking an enquiry into the general system of reliefs. We cannot but realise that, however well thought out any regular system may be, it is always liable to be completely upset by such circumstances as those which affected the reliefs of the last year, when shortness of funds led to the cancelling of all reliefs not absolutely unavoidable. Were it possible in such cases to cancel all moves without exception, the check might be merely temporary, the system being simply in abeyance for one year, but some reliefs each year, *e. g.*, those from and to England or the Colonies, are unavoidable, and these exceptions disorganize the whole system.

1292, 2818, 5303, 5711,  
6624, 10874, 10876, 11268,  
11386, 12458, 13175.

661. We trust that, in formulating any roster of reliefs, care will be taken to avoid any arrangements which will tend to revert, even indirectly, to the former system under which some Indian regiments were practically localised within certain areas, (paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Report).

A return to the localization of Indian units is to be deprecated.

5303.

662. We also recommend that an endeavour should be made to ensure that not more than one unit (regiment, company or battalion) should be removed at one time from the organization to which it belongs, (Cavalry, or Infantry brigade, Coast Defence Artillery command) and that British units moving in relief should do so by route march rather than by rail, in order that British soldiers may be seen occasionally in areas where such troops are not quartered, or trained.

5425, 7578, 7580, 8677.

### Section XXXVI.—Dairy and Grass Farms.

663. The administration of Military Dairies and Grass Farms is dealt with by a Directorate of the Quartermaster-General's Branch of Army Headquarters. The superior staff consists of the Director at Headquarters, 14 Assistant Directors for Grass Farm duties and 2 Assistant Directors for the Dairy Farms.

Administration of dairy and grass farms.

6297.  
15091, 15095.

664. The Grass Farm Branch is organized on a divisional basis and is essentially military in its character. We think this is necessary, as the duties of both officers and subordinates bring them into close touch with troops. The Dairy Farm Branch on the other hand is organized on a plan which divides India into two circles, each under an Assistant Director, and is practically civilian in its character, all soldiers being required to take their discharge from the army on being permanently appointed to the department.

6293.  
15091.

6299.

665. We have taken evidence as to the desirability of placing the grass farms on the same footing as the dairies, but have come to the conclusion, as we have already stated in a separate minute, that this would not be desirable, since grass farm managers deal more directly with the troops.

Annexure B, Item 22.  
6038, 6297.  
6401, 6405.  
15091, 15095.  
15099, 15103.  
15123, 15125.

666. The administration of both Grass and Dairy Farms was recently examined by a committee consisting of Mr. S. H. Fremantle, I.C.S., and Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Henderson of the Military Accounts Department, and we see no reason to differ from the favourable opinion expressed in their Report.

6038, 15165-73.

Their extension  
to the whole  
army.

667. Their introduction and development have materially reduced the sick rate and casualties both of the troops and the Government horses and mules, and we recommend the gradual extension of these arrangements to the whole army. The Grass Farms have enabled grass-cutters of British mounted units to be dispensed with.

15165.

Revision of  
establishments  
and rates of  
pay.

668. The Committee have had under consideration the establishment required for the Farms. We recommend that the total number be fixed at 84,—*viz.*, 44 for the Grass and 40 for the Dairy Farms. In regard to pay, we are of opinion that the rates proposed by the Quartermaster-General for the subordinates of the Dairy Farm Branch are reasonable, but for the Managers and Assistant Managers of Grass Farms we consider that the following scale is adequate, having regard to the duties and qualifications of the men employed.

Annexure B, Item 22.

	Rs.	Rs.
2 Superintendents	... 500—25—650	... 1,200
2 Managers, 1st class	... 450	... 900
4 „ 2nd „	... 400	... 1,600
4 „ 3rd „	... 350	... 1,400
4 „ 4th „	... 300	... 1,200
7 „ 5th „	... 250	... 1,750
7 „ 6th „	... 225	... 1,575
7 Assistant Managers, 1st class	175	... 1,225
7 „ „ 2nd „	150	... 1,050
44	Total	... 11,900

Average pay per man, Rs. 270.

### Section XXXVII.—Miscellaneous.

669. We may here deal with a few matters which have not been fully dealt with in the foregoing Sections.

Mobilization  
equipment for  
troops in  
Burma.

670. In view of the possibility of small expeditions on the Burma frontier for which troops should be fully prepared, we suggest the provision of mobilization equipment on a reduced scale for three local mobile columns of the marginally noted strength, the equipment for two of the columns being issued to units, that for the third to be stored either at Rangoon or Mandalay. We also recommend the issue of mobilization equipment for the Burma company of Sappers and Miners.

1 section, mountain artillery.  
50 mounted infantry.  
2 companies, British infantry.  
8 companies, Indian infantry.

Photo-  
lithographic  
sections.

671. There are at present five photo-lithographic sections of Sappers and Miners, which Lord Kitchener desired to raise to twelve (Annexure C, item 23). We are of the opinion that eleven (not twelve) will ultimately be required.

672. With reference to the question of aviation, we recognize that, as the science at present stands, aviation would present many difficulties in a mountainous country such as the North-West or North-East frontier. At the same time we have no doubt that progress will be made and these difficulties overcome as time goes on. Moreover, aeroplanes might prove of great value for internal security purposes under certain contingencies. We are therefore glad to know that money has been provided in the military estimates for 1913-14, for the establishment of a school of aviation in India.

Aviation.

673. We attach considerable importance to the organization of an Intelligence Section for the North-East and Eastern frontier, similar to the sections which are now working at Peshawar and Quetta. Apart from the fact that these sections are making a systematic study of the probable areas of operations, and are training agents whose services would be most useful in war, the information they collect would be of the highest value to the Government under present conditions, now that the Chinese are showing signs of encroaching on our Burma and Assam frontiers.

Intelligence Section for the N. E. and E. frontier.

5731.

674. Sir J. Willcocks told us that he regarded the provision of a Manœuvre Act for the purpose of securing training facilities over ground in the vicinity of cantonments, and the reservation of other land in certain areas for the training of the troops, as of high importance. Our experience leads us to agree in the view which he expressed, that, as land in the vicinity of cantonments rises in value, it is year by year becoming more difficult to find ground over which the troops may move freely for training purposes, and that the charges for compensation for damage to crops are steadily growing. We recommend that the subject should receive early consideration.

Need for a Manœuvre Act, or equivalent legislation.

675. In paragraph 56 of this Report we have expressed the opinion that it is in education that the means will be found to remedy those conditions which have lately arisen in India, which are as injurious to the general well-being of the country at large, as they are to the interests of good government. We wish to recommend that the Indian (Native) army should be allowed to share in the benefits which Government propose to confer on the people, by the introduction of a scheme of education based on lines which will improve their moral and their intellectual condition. We believe that one of the best means for safeguarding the Indian troops from contamination is to ensure that each regiment is provided with thoroughly reliable and properly trained teachers, and we believe that this condition will best be ensured by the establishment of one or more Normal Schools under European management, for the education and special training of young soldiers and others, with a view to their being appointed Native Army Schoolmasters.

Education.

676. The question of the desirability of dismantling the Fort at Satara (Question 6677) was considered by the Committee. We recommend that this Fort should be dismantled, since, if it is allowed to remain in existence, it will be necessary to occupy it with troops in time of trouble, not on account of its intrinsic value but because the sentiments which the Marathas associate with the place cannot be lightly disregarded.

Satara Fort.

677. We recommend that the present practice under which Indian Army Regulations are drawn up and periodically amended, should be carefully considered, with a view to their simplification. Whilst the responsibility for the preparation and correction of the various volumes should remain in the hands of the Branch of the Army Department most concerned with the matters dealt with in each, no new edition and no amendment to current editions should be submitted to Government for sanction until after scrutiny by a Standing Committee formed for the purpose, whose duty it should be to ensure that regulations are framed on broad, commonsense lines, and that amendments to meet special and peculiar circumstances are avoided.

6177.

### Section XXXVIII.—Future needs of the Army.

678. In Appendix XVII of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, which was laid before the Committee, a list was given of "important needs of the army, upon which expenditure will have to be incurred in the near future."

679. We have already made recommendations in various parts of this Report in regard to some of the items therein included, but we feel that it would not be complete did we not make some specific reference not only to the subjects mentioned in that list, but to other important future requirements of the army which have come under our notice.

680. Sir Edmund Barrow, Sir James Willcocks and Major-General Aylmer also gave the Committee statements of what they considered to be the pressing needs of the army. The two last named officers placed their lists in an order of urgency; but we are inclined to agree with Sir E. Barrow that any hard and fast classification is inexpedient, and that sometimes one requirement, sometimes another, is the more pressing need. New and unforeseen measures may come on the scene and the relative order of those on the list may vary through change of circumstances, while a large number of measures are practically of equal importance, and placing them in a particular order is apt to convey a false impression of the importance of those lowest on the list.

4665 and Annexure I, page 323,  
Vol. II,  
5731.  
8805.

Moreover an order of relative urgency tends to imply that funds should be provided in that order, whereas some measures, *e.g.*, the housing of Indian troops, may require several years to complete, or their completion at an early date may not be essential, though it may be urgent that a commencement should be made. Others, though their commencement might be deferred for a time, should, when once begun, be pushed through as rapidly as possible, *e.g.*, rearmament.

681. We think it preferable, therefore, to classify the various measures under some such headings as the following:—

- (a) Items essential to the successful conduct of operations in the field, *e.g.*, arms, ammunition, transport.
- (b) Preparatory measures in peace time, conducive but not essential to success in war, *e.g.*, improvements in railways and roads.
- (c) Measures for improving the efficiency of the army in peace time, *e.g.*, increase of practice ammunition, training grant, manoeuvres, education.

- (d) Improvements in the mechanism of administration, or in the administrative services, *e.g.*, increased Staff at Headquarters or elsewhere, or improved machinery in factories.
- (e) Improvements in the conditions of life for the personnel, *e.g.*, movement to the hills, better barracks, electric fans and lights, pay and pensions of troops or followers, dairies, sanitation, etc.

682. In such a classification, items would be considered on their merits, no relative order of urgency or importance being given. The only occasion when an order of importance has any practical value is when the time comes for the allotment of a specific sum of money for the ensuing financial year. Even then, it may have to be entirely reconsidered when His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with the help of the Advisory Council, has to decide which items are to be included in the annual schedule and budget, and how much money is available and can be allotted to each. There are many reasons which may influence such a decision, which may not be apparent at an earlier stage, *e.g.*, sufficient money for some small measure may be available, but not for a larger one.

683. In submitting the following recommendations we have not included among them any in regard to which we have submitted recommendations elsewhere, and we adhere generally to the classification mentioned above, but do not place the items in order of urgency :—

A.—Measures essential for the successful conduct of operations in the field :—

Rearmament of the artillery, especially as regards a satisfactory mountain gun, and ammunition.

Provision of modern accessories to efficient artillery fire, *e.g.*, panoramic sights, directors, observation ladders, conversion of fuzes to latest pattern.

Completion of the equipment of infantry with intrenching tools.

Provision of 'one man' rangefinders for infantry.

Completion of defences Bombay, Aden and Rangoon.

Provision of modern maps for internal security purposes.

All the above are of great importance : several are already in progress : we consider that all should be carried through without avoidable delay.

B.—Preparatory measures in peace time conducive to success in the field :—

Provision of mechanical transport.

Formation of an adequate military Veterinary corps in India.

Introduction of the cold shoeing system into India.

Replacement of aged horses in British cavalry.

Appointment of sergeant master shoemakers to British units in India.

Siding and platform accommodation at Kacha Garhi.



Completion of the web equipment for infantry.

C.—Measures for improving the efficiency of the army in peace time :—

Increase of practice ammunition for horse and field artillery batteries.

Increase of practice ammunition for infantry, sufficient to allow them to fire the regulation course of musketry.

Increase of practice ammunition for machine guns.

Provision of new military steam launch at Rangoon in place of one which was wrecked.

Provision of prismatic binoculars for mobile artillery.

D.—Improvements in administration and the Administrative departments :—

Additions to complete the requirements of the Staff College.

Additions to complete the requirements of the Cavalry School, Saugor.

Establishment of a farm reserve of hay to be accumulated in good years.

Electrification of the ammunition factory, Dum Dum, and other factories.

E.—Improvement in the conditions of service of the personnel :—

Provision of piped water supplies in stations at present supplied direct from wells.

Completion of proper line accommodation for Indian units.

Standardization of native establishments and followers' pay.

Electric installations for punkah-pulling and lighting in barracks of British troops.

684. The foregoing do not complete the list of requirements of the army which will need attention in the near future, but they comprise the most important. None of the others can be reckoned as demanding immediate attention, or as being of urgent necessity, and we consider that it will be sufficient to provide for them in the ordinary budget as circumstances permit.

685. The following proposals, which do not appear in the foregoing list and have not been dealt with elsewhere in our Report, were put forward by Sir E. Barrow.

Annexure I, page 328, Vol. II.

(a) Increase of British mountain artillery by four batteries.

We think it sufficient for the present to provide for two extra batteries, by the conversion of two of the existing heavy (bullock) batteries—see paragraph 413.

(b) Improvement in pay and status of transport followers.

We do not think this necessary at present.

(c) Initiation of a donkey breeding scheme for transport purposes.

We are not in favour of this proposal,



(d) Addition of one squadron to the Guides cavalry.

We do not think this necessary.

(e) Addition of eight Indian battalions to the army.

We do not think this necessary at present.

(f) Delocalization of Burma regiments.

This is being gradually carried out.

(g) Provision of travelling field kitchens for British regiments and of travelling boilers for Indian regiments.

While this proposal has much to commend it, we do not regard it as a matter of immediate importance.

(h) Provision of mounted sections of 25 men each for all British infantry battalions allotted to internal security duties.

We do not regard this as necessary.

686. All the measures which Sir James Willcocks and Major-General Aylmer included in their lists of urgent requirements of the army have been considered in various parts of this Report and are therefore not referred to here.

5731.  
8805.

### Section XXXIX.—Summary of recommendations.

Section VII, paras. 175-179.

687. (i) In the event of a general mobilization being ordered, one of the nine divisions of the Field Army to be detailed (if, and as may be, required) to provide two or three mobile brigades of the three arms. In addition to these mobile brigades, the detail of troops at present allotted to internal security duty to be increased and brought up to a total strength of—

Section VII.  
Internal  
Security.

4 Regiments, British Cavalry.

19½ Regiments, Indian Cavalry (including the Aden Troop).

5 Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery.

9 Batteries, Royal Field Artillery.

18 Companies, Royal Garrison Artillery.

1 Company, Indian Frontier Artillery.

1 Battery, Heavy Artillery (for use as required).

6 Batteries, Mountain Artillery.

1¼ Companies, Sappers and Miners (excluding Fortress Company at Aden).

26 Battalions, British Infantry.

46 Battalions, Indian Infantry.

*Ibid*, para. 11, (c).

(ii) Three small mobile columns to be organized for the protection of Burma and the Eastern Frontier.

*Ibid*, para. 174.

(iii) The garrison of Aden to be increased by bringing the British infantry battalion up to full strength, and possibly by the addition of one regiment of Indian infantry, if recommended by the Overseas Defence Committee.

(iv) Brigadier-Generals and Staffs to be provided to command— Section VI, para. 133.

(a) The garrison of Delhi. *Ibid*, para. 131.

(b) The internal security troops and Volunteers (other than units allotted to coast defence) in all the divisions of the army except the 9th (Secunderabad) and the Burma Divisions. Section VI, para. 130.

(c) Royal Artillery of the 5th, 8th and 9th Divisions of the Field Army; when funds are available. Section VI, para. 138.

**Section VIII.  
The Field  
Army.**

(v) The cavalry brigades of the Field Army to be reduced from eight to five. The divisions to be nine, as at present, but of this number one, *i.e.*, the 9th (Secunderabad) Division, may have to leave one brigade behind in the Secunderabad Area on mobilization. Section VIII, paras. 206 and 221.

(vi) The 1st (Peshawar) Division to be completed by the transfer of the Abbottabad Brigade from the 2nd (Rawal Pindi) Division. Section XII, para. 289.

(vii) The 2nd (Rawal Pindi) Division to be completed for training and war by the inclusion of the Kohat Brigade. Section VII, para. 148, and Section XII, para. 287.

(viii) The 15th Brigade, 5th (Mhow) Division, to be completed by the transfer to Mhow of the Brigadier-General and Staff of the Mandalay Brigade. Section VI, para. 127.

(ix) The artillery of the 6th (Poona) Division to be completed by raising two British mountain batteries, [in lieu of two heavy (bullock) batteries to be reduced], the brigade thus formed to be staffed by the transfer of the Lieutenant-Colonel and Adjutant, Royal Garrison Artillery, no longer required for Hooghly defences. Section XVII, para. 413.

Section VI, para. 139.

*Reductions.*

**Section XI.—  
Changes in  
organization.**

(x) The following units to be disbanded, *viz* :—

(a) The cavalry of the Deoli and Erinpura regiments. (*Sanctioned by the Secretary of State*). Vol. I, Annexure B, Item 1.

(b) Three companies, Royal Garrison Artillery. Section XI, para. 275 and Section XVII, paras. 414 and 420.

(c) Two (bullock) batteries, Heavy Artillery. Section XI, para. 276 and Section XVII, para. 413.

(d) Three Royal Horse Artillery ammunition columns. Section XI, para. 274 and Section XVII, para. 415.

(xi) Lieutenant-Colonel, Royal Garrison Artillery, Commanding the Heavy batteries at Nowgong and his staff. Section VI, para. 139.

*Additions.*

(xii) The following units to be raised, *viz* :—

(a) Two batteries, British Mountain Artillery. Section XVII, para. 413.

(b) Three signalling companies now, and a further two in the near future. Section XI, para. 280.

(c) Six photo-lithographic sections. Section XXXVII, para. 671.

(d) Five Field Troops, Sappers and Miners, two now, and three in the future. Vol. I, Annexure B, Item 26.

*Other changes.*

Section XVI, para. 398.

Vol. I, Annexure B, Item 24 and Section XVII, para. 421.

Vol. I, Annexure B, Item 23 and Section XVIII, para. 438.  
Section XXXI, para. 436.

Section XIV, para. 343.

Section XII, para. 289.

Section XII, para. 289.

Vol. I, Annexure B, Item 3 and Section VII, paras. 164 and 295.

(xiii) Indian Cavalry regiments to be linked.

(xiv) Ammunition columns to be reorganized.

(xv) Mule transport units to be reorganized.

(xvi) The grantee camel corps to be reduced and four silladar camel corps raised in their place.

(xvii) Indian Army Reserve of Officers to be reorganized.

(xviii) The Abbottabad Brigade to be transferred to the 1st (Peshawar) Division.

(xix) The 1st Cavalry Brigade to be completed by the transfer to Risalpur of the British cavalry and Royal Horse Artillery from Rawal Pindi and of the Royal Horse Artillery ammunition column from Campbellpur, (as sanctioned under Lord Kitchener's scheme).

(xx) The future garrison of Delhi to be :—

1 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.

1 Company, Royal Garrison Artillery.

1 Battalion, British Infantry.

1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.

2 Regiments, Indian Infantry.

(xxi) The following transfers of units to be made :—

Section XII.  
Changes in the  
distribution of  
the army.

Transfers of  
units.

(a) *Indian Cavalry.*

A regiment from Jacobabad to Lucknow (*sanctioned by the Secretary of State*).

(b) *Royal Horse Artillery.*

A battery from Bangalore to Delhi.

(c) *Royal Field Artillery.*

A battery from—

Bellary to Bangalore.

Campbellpur to Rawal Pindi to complete the Royal Field Artillery brigade  
Jullundur to Campbellpur.

Karachi to Quetta.

(d) *British Mountain Artillery.*

Two batteries to be stationed at Ahmednagar, or Deolali, when raised.

(e) *Royal Garrison Artillery.*

(a) Half-company from Agra to Delhi.

(b) One company from Roorkee to Agra.

(f) *Heavy Artillery.*

A battery from—

Multan to Quetta.

Nowgong to Campbellpur.\*

Nowgong to Roorkee.\*

(g) *Indian Mountain Artillery.*

A battery from Burma to Quetta, provided that no expense will be entailed for the provision of quarters, lines, etc., at Quetta.

\*To replace the Heavy (bullock) batteries which are to be reduced.

Section XII, paras. 292 (d) and 296.

297 (d). „ 295 (a) and

„ „ 297 (d).

291. „ „ 290 (b) and

„ „ 292 (c).

Sections XII, para. 294, and XVII, para. 413.

Section XII, para. 295 (e).

292 (a). „ 291 (b) and

(d) and 295 (d). „ 290 (b), 293 (c)

Section XII, para. 292.

(h) *Ammunition Column.*

Royal Field Artillery Ammunition Column from Deesa to Mhow (temporarily, pending the completion of accommodation at Neemuch).

Sections XII, para. 293 (b) and XVII, para. 425.

(i) *British Infantry.*

The wing now at Bellary to Madras and Malappuram

Section XII, para. 297 (b).

The detachments at Calicut and Cannanore to Wellington.

„ „ „

A battalion from—

Rawal Pindi to Jhelum (when barracks have to be rebuilt).

„ „ para. 290 (a).

Subathu to Delhi.

„ „ para. 291 (a), and 295 (b).

(j) *Sappers and Miners.*

A company from—

Kirkee to Jhansi (*sanctioned by the Secretary of State*).

Section XII, paras. 293 (e) and 294 (c).

Roorkee to Jullundur.

Section XII, paras. 291 (c) and 295 (f).

(k) *Signalling Companies.*

A company from—

Fatehgarh to Ambala and Kasauli.

Section XII, paras. 291 (d) and 295 (e).

Fatehgarh to Rawal Pindi.

Section XII, paras. 290 (d) and 295 (e).

(l) *Indian Infantry.*

A battalion from—

Assam area to Delhi.

Section XII, paras. 295 (c) and 296 (a).

Bannu to Belgaum.

Section XII, paras. 288 and 294 (a).

Belgaum (Pioneer regiment) to Nowshera.

„ „ 289 and 294 (a).

Burma to Takdah.

„ „ 296 and 298.

Cannanore to Aden (or Trichinopoly).

„ „ 297 (e).

Deesa to Rajkot (when barracks are ready).

„ „ 293 (b).

Jhelum to Rawal Pindi (when barracks have to be rebuilt).

„ „ 290 (a).

Nowshera to Peshawar.

„ „ 289.

Sehore to Mhow.

„ „ 293 (a).

Stations  
abandoned.

(xxii) The following to be abandoned as military stations:—

Attock.

Section XII, para. 290 (c).

Bellary.

„ „ 297 (a).

Calicut.

„ „ 297 (b).

Cannanore.

„ „ 297 (c).

Deesa.

„ „ 293 (b).

Jacobabad.

„ „ 292 (d).

Sehore.

„ „ 293 (a).

Thayetmyo.†

Garrisons  
reduced.

(xxiii) The garrison of the following stations to be reduced, as shown:—

Ahmednagar ... 1 Royal Horse Artillery ammunition column.

Section XII, para. 294 (b).

Assam ... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

Section XII, para. 296 (a).

Bannu ... 1 Indian infantry battalion (there temporarily).

Section XII, para. 288.

Campbellpur ... 1 Royal Horse Artillery ammunition column.

Section XII, para. 289.

Fatehgarh ... 2 signal companies.

Section XII, para. 295 (f).

Jhelum ... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

Section XII, para. 290 (a).

Jullundur ... 1 Royal Field Artillery battery.

Section XII, para. 291.

Kirkee ... 1 company, Sappers and Miners.

Section XII, para. 293 (e).

Karachi ... 1 Royal Field Artillery battery.

Section XII, para. 292 (c).

Meiktila ... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.

† On transfer of the military prison and detention barracks to Rangoon, or elsewhere.

Section XII, para. 293 (c).	Mhow ...	... 1 Royal Horse Artillery ammunition column.
Section XII, para. 291 (b).	Multan ...	... 1 Heavy battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Section XII, para. 293 (d).	Nowgong ...	... 2 Heavy batteries, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Section XII, para. 292 (a).	Quetta ...	... 1 company, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Section XII, para. 290 (d).	Rawal Pindi ...	... 1 regiment, British cavalry.
Section XII, para. 290 (b).		1 battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
Section XII, para. 290 (a).		1 battalion, British infantry.
Section XII, para. 295 (e).	Roorkee ...	... 1 company, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Section XII, para. 295 (g).		1 company, Sappers and Miners.
Section XII, para. 297 (e).	Secunderabad ...	... 1 Royal Horse Artillery ammunition column.
Section XII, para. 291 (a).	Subathu ...	... 1 battalion, British infantry.

(xxiv) The garrison of the following stations to be increased :—

Garrisons increased.

Section VII, para. 174 and Section XII, para. 297 (c).	Aden (or Trichinopoly) ...	1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Section VII, para. 174.	Aden ...	... Detachment, British infantry from 6th (Poona) Division.
Section XII, para. 295 (e).	Agra ...	... ½ company, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Section XII, para. 294 (b).	Ahmednagar ...	... 1 brigade, British mountain artillery.
Section XII, para. 291 (d).	Ambala ...	... 1 signal company.
Section XII, para. 295 (a).	Delhi ...	... 1 battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
Section XII, para. 295 (e).		½ company, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Section XII, para. 295 (b).		¾ battalion, British infantry.
Section XII, para. 295 (c).		1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Section XII, para. 293 (e).	Jhansi ...	... 1 company, Sappers and Miners.
Section XII, para. 290 (a).	Jhelum ...	... 1 battalion, British infantry.
Section XII, para. 291 (c).	Jullundur ...	... 1 company, Sappers and Miners.
Section XII, para. 296.	Lucknow ...	... 1 regiment, Indian cavalry.
Section XII, para. 297 (b).	Madras and St. Thomas' Mount.	British infantry withdrawn from Bellary, less 2 companies detached to Malappuram.
Section XII, para. 297 (b).	Malappuram ...	... 1 company, British infantry.
	Meiktila ...	... 1 company, British infantry, withdrawn from Thayetmyo.*
Section XII, para. 293 (a).	Mhow ...	... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Section XII, para. 293 (b).	Neemuch ...	... 1 ammunition column, Royal Field Artillery.
Section XII, para. 289.	Peshawar ...	... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Section XII, para. 292 (a).	Quetta ...	... 1 battery, Heavy artillery.
Section XII, para. 292 (c).		1 battery, Royal Field Artillery.
Section XII, para. 293 (b).	Rajkot ...	... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
		1 battery, Royal Field Artillery.
Section XII, paras. 290 (a), (b) and (d).	Rawal Pindi ...	... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
		2 signal companies.
		1 regiment, British cavalry.
Section XII, para. 289.	Risalpur ...	... 1 battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
		1 ammunition column, Royal Horse Artillery.
Section XII, para. 295 (f).	Roorkee ...	... 1 signal company.
Section XI, para. 297 (f).	Secunderabad ...	... 1 signal company.
Section XII, para. 296.	Takdah ...	... 1 battalion, Indian infantry.
Section XII, para. 297 (b).	Wellington ...	... Detachments, British infantry withdrawn from Calicut, Cannanore and Malappuram.

Section XII, para. 301.

(xxv) If any lines have to be reconstructed, then the question of erecting new buildings in another station

\* On transfer of the military prison and detention barracks to Rangoon, or elsewhere.

should be considered in furtherance of Lord Kitchener's Redistribution Scheme.

Section XIII.  
Establishment  
of British  
Officers for  
Indian cavalry  
and infantry  
units.

Section XV.  
British officers  
of the Indian  
army.

(xxvi) The peace establishment of British officers for all regiments of Indian cavalry (except the cavalry of the corps of Guides) and for each battalion of Indian infantry to be fourteen.

(xxvii) The following measures are recommended, viz.:—

(a) The present leave rules to be revised.

(b) The transfer of officers between units to be restricted.

(c) The tenure of regimental command to be limited to four years.

(d) The continuous tenure of Brigade Commands, whether as Colonel on the Staff or General Officer, to be limited to an aggregate period of six years.

(e) Substantive Colonels to be retired after being unemployed for four years.

(f) Officers promoted to the substantive rank of Colonel when extra-regimentally employed, to be *ipso facto* ineligible for subsequent regimental employ.

(g) A major appointed to the command of a regiment or a battalion, before he is entitled to the rank of lieutenant-colonel under the time scale, to be given temporary and not permanent promotion to that rank.

(h) Except in special cases, cavalry commandants to be required to vacate at the age of fifty, instead of fifty-two, and cavalry officers not holding the appointment of commandant to be struck off the strength of their regiments at the age of forty-eight.

(i) Except in special cases, infantry officers, not holding the appointment of commandant, to be struck off the strength of their regiments on attaining the age of fifty.

Sections XI and  
XVI.  
War and peace  
establishments  
of units.

(xxviii) All batteries of Royal Horse and Field Artillery (including Howitzer batteries) to be raised to a uniform establishment (according to the class of battery) of British and Indian ranks and horses.

(xxix) The present war establishments of all units to remain unchanged.

(xxx) The present peace establishments of Indian officers and non-commissioned officers of units not to be reduced.

(xxxi) The peace establishment of Indian cavalry to remain at 625 Indian ranks; the 3 regiments of non-silladar cavalry—if not disbanded—to be brought up to 625.

(xxxii) The peace establishment of Indian mountain batteries, and Native ranks of British artillery, to remain as at present.

(xxxiii) The field companies of Sappers and Miners to be reduced to a peace establishment of 148 Indian ranks.

(xxxiv) The peace establishment for Gurkhas and the Hazara Pioneers to be 912, the battalion of Gurkhas on the lower establishment of 832 to be increased to that figure.

(xxxv) All other battalions of Indian infantry (including the Carnatic battalions) to have a uniform establishment of 861 Indian ranks.

Section XIII, para. 323.

Section XV, para. 346.

„ para. 347.

„ para. 345 (a).

„ para. 345 (d).

„ para. 345 (e).

„ para. 345 (f).

„ para. 345 (g).

Section XV, para. 345 (c) and last sub-para.

Section XV, para. 345 (b) and last sub-para.

Sections XI, para. 275 and XVII, paras. 416-418.

Section XVI, para. 350.

*Ibid*, para. 402.

*Ibid*, para. 398.

*Ibid*, para. 399.

*Ibid*, para. 400.

*Ibid*, para. 387.

*Ibid*, para. 385.

<i>Ibid</i> , para. 403.	(xxxvi) The establishment of Indian reservists to be:—	Indian Army Reserves.
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 398.	*Cavalry—100 per unit (75 for the Guides) = 3,875	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 399. {	British Artillery (a decrease of 152) ... = 1,500	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 400.	Indian Artillery (a decrease of 252) ... = 1,200	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 396.	Sappers and Miners—95 per service company } = 2,205	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 387.	200 „ railway „ }	
	Infantry—117 battalions at 250 each ... }	
	21 „ (Gurkhas and Hazara Pioneers) at 100 each. }	= 43,050
	GRAND TOTAL ...	51,830
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 405.	(xxvii) No sepoy to be allowed to be transferred to the reserve until he has completed five years service with the colours.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 405.	(xxviii) No sepoy to be allowed to claim his discharge until he has completed five years with the colours.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 404.	(xxix) Existing conditions of service for pension to be adhered to; hereafter, as the reserve establishment of a unit is completed, men with over 21 years' service to be permitted to go to pension. Eventually when the reserve is complete, combined colour and reserve service for pension to be limited to 21 years.	
Section XVI, para. 410, (i).	(xl) The linked battalion system to be adhered to, and arrangements made to avoid detailing all battalions of a group for service.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 410, (ii).	(xli) Reserve centres recently proposed in A. D. No. 9954-1-A.G., dated 25th July 1912, should be adopted, except that Bangalore should be substituted for Trichinopoly for the 61st, 64th and 81st Pioneers.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 410, (iii).	(xlii) Infantry reservists should, if possible, train with their own units or with a linked battalion, and one battalion of a link should be at the reserve centre or within the recruiting area.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 410, (v).	(xliii) Reservists should be called up for 2 months biennially and the training period so arranged as to fit in, if possible, with the time of year most convenient to the reservists and to the training period of their units.	
Section XVIII, para. 431.	(xliv) The question of the Supply and Transport Mobilization Reserve stocks to be re-examined.	Section XVIII. Supply Clothing, Transport, Veterinary and Remounts.
Section XXIII, para. 496.	(xlv) The issue of a firewood ration to Indian soldiers to be discontinued. The amount of the cash value of the ration to be added to the allowance payable as compensation for dearness of food.	
Section XVIII, paras. 429-30.	(xlvi) The present arrangements in regard to the provision of articles of half-mounting, or necessities for Indian units, to be revised in order to ensure an adequate supply on mobilization and during war.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 440.	(xlvii) Arrangements to be made for the provision on mobilization of mechanical transport.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 442.	(xlviii) The peace establishment of Supply and Transport officers to be fixed at 224.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 449.	(xlvix) The establishment of Veterinary officers to be enquired into	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 450.	(l) Six months' reserves of Veterinary stores, etc., to be provided.	
<i>Ibid</i> , para. 455.	(li) The nominal reserve of Artillery horses to be reduced, and the actual reserve raised, to 1,200.	

\* If the three regiments of non-silladar cavalry are disbanded the number will be 3,575.



**Section XIX.  
Medical.**

(lii) The Army Bearer Corps to be strengthened.

(liii) The scales of Field Hospital and other Field Medical requirements to be revised.

(liv) The proposal to introduce the Station Hospital system for Indian troops to be dealt with on its merits, and not solely from a financial point of view.

(lv) The proposals to improve the training and prospects of the Indian Subordinate Medical Service to be dealt with on their merits, with due regard to the direct and indirect advantages an efficient medical service secures for the army.

(lvi) A nursing service to be introduced for British and Indian Hospitals.

**Section XXII.  
Constitution  
of Indian units.**

(lvii) No more "class" regiments to be raised, other than of Gurkhas, Hazaras, Garhwalis, or special races.

(lviii) The question of altering the composition of existing class regiments to be considered.

(lix) The numbers of Jat Sikhs in the army to be reduced.

(lx) The increase to the establishment of Carnatic regiments to be effected by entertaining men of suitable classes not now enlisted.

**Section XXIII.  
Pay and  
pensions.**

(lxi) The pensions of Indian officers and of dafadars and havildars to be increased.

(lxii) The syces of silladar cavalry to receive an adequate wage.

(lxiii) The establishments and pay of followers to be standardised.

(lxiv) The pay of Indian army reservists to be increased from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 per mensem.

**Section XXIV.  
Volunteers.**

(lxv) Increased financial assistance to be given to the Volunteer force.

(lxvi) The Statute Law governing the Volunteer force to be revised and all authority now vested in Local Governments to be transferred to the military authorities.

(lxvii) The grant of concessions to Volunteers with a view to popularising the force.

(lxviii) The Volunteers should as far as possible obtain their clothing from Government factories.

**Section XXVI.  
Imperial  
Service Troops.  
Section  
XXVIII.  
Army  
Headquarters**

(lxix) Recommendations in regard to the organization of Imperial Service troops.

(lxx) The following additions to be made to the staff of Branches of Army Headquarters, viz :—

(a) *General Staff Branch.*

An Intelligence Section for the East and North-East frontier.

(b) *Adjutant-General's Branch.*

One Director and two Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals.

(c) *Quartermaster-General's Branch.*

One Assistant Quartermaster-General.

One Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

One Staff Captain to be raised to the grade of Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

(lxxi) A central registry to be provided for the Army Department and the Branches of Army Headquarters.

Volume I, Annexure B, Item 20 and Section XIX, paras. 462-463.

Section XIX, paras. 465-466.

Section XIX, para. 470.

Volume I, Annexure B, Item 15 and Section XIX, para. 467.

Section XIX, para. 471.

Section XXII, para. 482.

*Ibid*, para. 483.

*Ibid*, para. 481.

Section XXII, para. 488.

Section XXIII, paras. 490-491.

*Ibid*, para. 494.

*Ibid*, para. 495.

Section XVI, para. 404.

Section XXIV, para. 512.

*Ibid*, paras. 503-9.

*Ibid*, para. 513.

*Ibid*, para. 514.

Section XXVI, para. 536.

Section XXXVII, para. 673.

Section XXVIII, para. 590.(a)

Vol. I, Annexure 6, Item 25, and Section XXVIII, para. 590. (b)

Section XXIX, paras. 611 (a),  
6.

(*lxxii*) All the Ordnance manufacturing establishments to be maintained on their present footing, including the Rifle Factory at Ishapur, which should continue the manufacture of complete arms and their component parts, and, in addition, undertake the repairs of arms which are at present dealt with in arsenal workshops.

Section XXIX.  
Ordnance  
Department.

Section XXIX, para. 613.

(*lxxiii*) The Harness and Saddlery Factory at Cawnpore to be maintained on its present footing until a number of private firms of repute have been established in India, sufficient to ensure an adequate supply at fair rates of the requirements of the army in peace and war, but the basis of contracts to be widened.

Section XXIX, para. 611 (d).

(*lxxiv*) The Director of Factories to be located at Calcutta.

Section XXIX, para. 611 (h).

(*lxxv*) The system of departmental promotion of the British warrant and non-commissioned officers of the Ordnance Department to be revised.

Section XXIX, para. 611 (i).

(*lxxvi*) The arsenal at Rangoon to be reduced to the status of a Depot.

Section XXXII, para. 639.

(*lxxvii*) An adequate Supply and reserve of rifles to be obtained and maintained.

Section XXXII, para. 641.

(*lxxviii*) The amount of ball ammunition in the hands of British troops to be increased.

Section XXXII, para. 643.

(*lxxix*) The order in which troops, etc., should obtain machine guns.

Section XXIX, para. 611 (g).

(*lxxx*) Government departments to obtain as many articles as possible from Ordnance factories provided such demands do not involve an increase to establishments or plant.

Volume I, Annexure B, Item 19.  
Sections XXIX, para. 619, and  
XXX, para. 623.

(*lxxxi*) No decrease to be made to the numbers of British soldiers and their families sent to the hills during the hot weather, but huts to be provided in lieu of tents for their accommodation.

Section XXX—  
Military Works  
Services.

Section XXX, para. 629.

(*lxxxii*) Electric fans and lights to be provided for the barracks, etc., of British troops in the plains.

Section XXX, para. 627.

(*lxxxiii*) The present policy of improving the hutting of Indian troops to be continued.

Section XXX, para. 626.

(*lxxxiv*) An experiment to be made of replacing Military Barrack Masters by pensioners.

Section XXXI, paras. 634-637.

(*lxxxv*) The existing systems for affording financial assistance to the Branches of Army Headquarters and to Divisional Commanders to be improved, and the methods now obtaining for the audit of the accounts of the army, including the departmental services, to be simplified.

Section  
XXXI—  
Army Finance.

Section XXXIII, para. 645.

(*lxxxvi*) The Kabul River railway to be extended to Smatzai, and the Kohat-Thal railway to Parachinar. In the event of the latter line not being constructed, then a good road should be made to the foot of the Paiwar suitable to take a 2' 6" line of railway on emergency.

Section  
XXXIII—  
Communica-  
tions.

Section XXXIII, para. 646.

(*lxxxvii*) The connection between Bombay and the Karachi-Sibi railway to be proceeded with, but not as a work of great urgency.

Section XXXIII, para. 647.

(*lxxxviii*) Railway connections to be made between Thal, Bannu, Tank and the Quetta-Peshin line, and also between Upper Burma and Assam.

Section XXXIII, para. 645 (e).

(*lxxxix*) Important roads on the North-West Frontier leading into Afghanistan to be made suitable for mechanical transport. Particularly the two roads through the Khyber to Torkham.

	(xc) Roads to be constructed in the Eastern and North Eastern frontier districts of Upper Burma and Assam.	Section XXXIII, para. 647.
Section XXXIV— Training.	(xci) The annual training grant to be increased from four to six lakhs of rupees.	Volume I, Annexure B, Item 10, and Section XXXIV, para. 651.
	(xcii) Extra funds also to be provided occasionally for inter-divisional and army manœuvres.	Section XXXIV, para. 655.
Section XXXV— Reliefs.	(xciii) The present arrangements for the relief of units to be revised, with a view to their being carried out in a more economical and systematic manner, but in dealing with the relief and location of the Indian units of the army, whilst endeavour should be made to station units periodically within their recruiting area, care to be taken not to localise regiments in certain Provinces.	Section XXXV, para. 660.
	(xciv) British troops to move by road rather than by rail.	Section XXXV, para. 662.
Section XXXVI— Dairy and Grass Farms.	(xcv) The present arrangements for Dairy and Grass Farms to be gradually extended to the whole army.	Volume I, Annexure B, Item 22, and Section XXXVI, para. 667.
	(xcvi) Revision of establishment of Dairy and Grass farms, and the rates of pay for managers and assistant managers of the latter.	Section XXXVI, para. 668.
Section XXXVII— Miscellaneous.	(xcvii) Mobilization equipment to be issued to the local mobile columns in Burma and to the Burma Company of Sappers and Miners.	Section XXXVII, para. 670.
	(xcviii) The question of a Manœuvre Act to be considered.	Section XXXVII, para. 674.
	(xcix) The provision of arrangements for training school masters for Indian regiments.	Section XXXVII, para. 675.
	(c) Fort Satara to be dismantled.	Section XXXVII, para. 676.
	(ci) The present system under which Indian Army Regulations are corrected, to be improved.	Section XXXVII, para. 677.

#### FUTURE NEEDS OF THE ARMY.

Section XXXVIII.  
Future needs of the Army.

*A.—Measures essential for the successful conduct of operations in the field :—* Section XXXVIII, para. 683.

Rearmament of the artillery, especially as regards a satisfactory mountain gun, and ammunition.

Provision of modern accessories to efficient artillery fire, *e.g.*, panoramic sights, directors, observation ladders, conversion of fuzes to latest pattern.

Completion of the equipment of infantry with intrenching tools.

Provision of 'one man' rangefinders for infantry.

Completion of defences Bombay, Aden and Rangoon.

Provision of up to date maps for internal security purposes.

*N.B.*—All the above are of great importance : some are already in progress : we consider that all should be carried through without avoidable delay.

*B.—Preparatory measures in peace time conducive to success in the field :—*

Provision of mechanical transport.

Formation of an adequate military Veterinary corps in India.

Introduction of the cold shoeing system into India.

Replacement of aged horses in British cavalry.

Appointment of sergeant master shoemakers to British units in India.

Siding and platform accommodation at Kacha Garhi.

Completion of the web equipment for infantry.

*C.—Measures for improving the efficiency of the Army in peace time:—*

Increase of practice ammunition for horse and field artillery batteries.

Increase of practice ammunition for infantry, sufficient to allow them to fire the regulation course of musketry.

Increase of practice ammunition for machine guns.

Provision of new military steam launch at Rangoon, in place of one which was wrecked.

Provision of prismatic binoculars for mobile artillery.

*D.—Improvements in administration and the administrative departments:—*

Additions to complete the requirements of the Staff College.

Additions to complete the requirements of the Cavalry School, Saugor.

Establishment of a farm reserve of hay to be accumulated in good years.

Electrification of the ammunition factory, Dum Dum, and other factories.

*E.—Improvement in the conditions of service of the personnel:—*

Provision of piped water supplies in stations at present supplied direct from wells.

Completion of proper line accommodation for Indian units.

Standardization of native establishments and followers' pay.

Electric installations for punkah-pulling and lighting in barracks of British Troops.

## PART IV.

## Third Term of Reference.

688. Under the third of the terms of reference the Committee is called upon:—

*“To consider and report whether any, and if so what, measures for the reduction of military expenditure are compatible with the efficient maintenance of the army in India.”*

## Section XL.—Military Expenditure.

689. We have already indicated that, in making our recommendations in the preceding parts of our Report, considerations of economy, where compatible with the maintenance of the efficiency of the army, have consistently been borne in mind. It only remains now to refer to certain other possible savings, brought to notice in the evidence before us, but not so far discussed in the Report, and to show as far as possible the financial bearing of those measures of economy which we recommend, and those measures involving increased expenditure which we consider to be necessary.

690. The Committee were informed by Mr. Brunyate that, owing to the action taken by the late and the present Commanders-in-Chief to reduce expenditure, the stage has been reached at which further economies are in most cases impossible without administrative reorganizations. At the same time Mr. Brunyate suggested various means by which he thought that some savings might be effected, provided that administrative considerations permitted, and that on a further consideration of each case his views were confirmed. 6038.

691. Mr. Brunyate's long connection with the Finance side of the Army Department gives great weight to his recommendations and opinions. We will therefore first refer to the suggestions put forward by him, to which we have alluded above. 6038.

*(i) Reorganization of the Military Accounts Department.*

Military  
Accounts  
Department.

We agree that a reorganization of the Military Accounts Department is desirable, and also that some modifications are necessary in the present system of audit. 6065-6103.

*(ii) Lower peace establishments of Indian units with larger reserves, a measure to look into.*

Small peace  
establishments  
and large  
reserves for  
the Indian  
units of the  
army.

We have considered the question of small peace establishments for Indian units, with a largely increased reserve, in paragraphs 383-403 of this Report, and are of opinion that such an arrangement is dangerous under the conditions obtaining in the Native army, and having regard to our position in India.

*(iii) Discontinuance of the rifle factory, and placing of leather contracts in the hands of private firms.*

Rifle and  
harness and  
saddlery  
factories.

We are not in agreement with Mr. Brunyate as to the discontinuance of the Rifle Factory at Ishapur, or as to placing in the hands of private firms the provision of the leather work of the army, for the military and economic reasons already given (paragraph 613). 6319-21.

(iv) *No necessity for a special Contract officer in each division.*

6038.

We do not think that Government will gain by a decrease in the number of Contract officers in the divisions of the army ; or

Divisional  
Contract  
officers.

(v) *Large reduction of Transport Registration Staff possible.*

6038.

By any reductions in the present transport registration staff beyond those effected during the last year.

Transport  
Registration  
Staff.

(vi) *Reduction of establishment of horses of British cavalry.*

The Committee did not consider the question of a lower establishment of horses for British cavalry, but it is a proposal of which we should doubt the advisability, unless the present scale of castings and remounts be increased, in which case the economy would be doubtful.

Reduced  
establishment  
of horses for  
British cavalry.

(vii) *Doubts necessity for present number of Grass Farm officers.*

6038.

Certain economies in the organization of the Grass and Dairy farms have been already dealt with by us in Section XXXVI of this Report.

Grass and  
Dairy farms.

(viii) *Possibility of reducing establishment of Royal Army Medical Corps officers.*

6038.

We agree with Mr. Brunyate in his view that there must be a stage beyond which the expense of preventive medical measures ceases to be an actuarial economy. But we doubt whether this stage has yet been reached in India, or whether Government would regard the value of the life of a British soldier as no more than the cost to the State of replacing him when dead. We do not consider that the present establishment of officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps is susceptible of reduction, even if war requirements only be considered.

Reduction of  
R. A. M. C.  
officers.

(ix) *Arrangements with regard to contracts and food supplies to be frequently examined.*

6038.

The existing arrangements made by the Supply and Transport Corps for contracts and for food supplies are a great advance on what formerly obtained. But we agree with Mr. Brunyate that these are matters which call for frequent consideration, in order that the State may fully profit by the experience gained from year to year.

Supply and  
Transport  
Corps  
contracts,  
etc

(x) *Cash allowance for clothing granted to British Troops might be reduced.*

6038.

The cash allowance granted to British soldiers for the provision and maintenance of their clothing and necessities may perhaps under normal conditions put money into the pockets of those men who are careful. But we would regard the contract as one-sided and not altogether fair to the soldier were not this to be the case. We understand that the State has profited considerably by the present arrangement, it being more economical than the previous system under which many articles were issued free.

Clothing  
allowance,  
British troops.

*(xi) Construction of huts for troops and families at hill stations would lead to economy.*

British soldiers and their families in the hills.

We agree with Mr. Brunyate that a saving should be possible by substituting huts for tents for the accommodation of troops and families at hill stations. We have in paragraph 619 expressed our opinion that the numbers of troops and families sent up to the hills for the hot season should not be reduced, as we do not consider it would prove to be a real economy in the long run to do so.

6042.

*(xii) Provision of financial advisers for spending Branches of Army Headquarters would prevent duplication of work.*

Financial assistance for Branches of Army Headquarters.

We are in entire agreement with Mr. Brunyate as to the desirability of giving the spending Branches of Army Headquarters financial advisers.

6226.

*(xiii) No scope for introducing larger civil element into the Supply and Transport Corps.*

Civil in lieu of military officers in Departments of the Army.

We also agree with him that no advantage is likely to be gained by introducing more civilians into the establishments of the Supply and Transport Corps.

6280.

*(xiv) Employment of Civil officers in Ordnance Factories, and possibly in the Clothing Department.*

We have in paragraph 615 of this Report expressed our concurrence in the proposal to appoint fully qualified Civil officers to the higher administrative posts in the manufacturing establishments of the Ordnance Department, but with certain reservations, in view of the fact that many large private firms prefer to place military officers rather than civilians in the administrative control of their works. We also are in accord with Mr. Brunyate in thinking that but little financial advantage is likely to be gained by substituting civilians for military officers in the Army Clothing Department.

*(xv) Employment of Army officers in the Remount Department advantageous.*

*(xvi) Administration of Military Works Services shows economy and careful control.*

Remount Department.

We share Mr. Brunyate's views as regards the advantages gained by the employment of military officers in the Remount Department. We also agree with him that from a financial point of view the Military Works Services are administered economically.

6301.

Military Works Services.

6369.

*(xvii) Improvement in recent years in working of system under which compensation for dearness of food and forage is granted.*

Compensation for dearness of food and forage.

We believe that Mr. Brunyate is correct in thinking that the defects in the arrangements for fixing the rates of compensation for the dearness of food supplies, which previously caused a loss to the State, have been to a great extent removed, owing to the close control now exercised by the Quartermaster-General.

6413-15.



*(xviii) Officering of Branches of Army Headquarters.*

6464.

Mr. Brunyate placed before the Committee his views in regard to the establishments of the Branches of Army Headquarters. We have dealt with this subject in Section XXVIII and would only add here that we do not think it possible further to reduce the existing establishment of the Judge Advocate General's Department, so long as the two Army Commanders are required to deal with matters of discipline.

Army  
Headquarters.

6468-70.

**Section XLI.—Economies and increases in Military Expenditure.**

692. We consider that the main directions in which substantial economies can be effected are those shown in the table below:—

Economies  
contemplated.

	Lakhs. Rs.
Disbandment of the silladar cavalry squadrons of the 42nd (Deoli) and 43rd (Erinpura) regiments† ... ..	1.25
Reduction of 3 companies, Royal Garrison Artillery ... ..	5.69
Reduction of two heavy (bullock) batteries, Royal Garrison Artillery ... ..	4.30
Reduction of 3 Royal Horse Artillery ammunition columns ... ..	2.79
Reduction of 1 Lieutenant-Colonel and Adjutant, Royal Garrison Artillery and their establishments ... ..	0.20
Reorganization of ammunition columns ... ..	10 00 <sup>25</sup>
Reorganization of mule corps and cadres ... ..	0.70
Reduction of peace establishments of field companies of Sappers and Miners ... ..	1.20
Change in the system for the provision of reserves of food and medical comforts ... ..	0.50
Modification of the system of promotion of the subordinate establishment of the Ordnance Department ... ..	Uncertain.
Reorganization of the Military Accounts Department ... ..	5.00
Employment of two Royal Indian Marine Transports for Home trooping, as recommended by the Lake Committee on economies in the Army Budget of November 1911 ... ..	17.00

693. In addition, there will be a saving in the future, which it is not possible to estimate, in connection with the provision of mobilization equipment and reserve stocks of various descriptions (ammunition, clothing, food, etc.,) due to the reduction of the cavalry of the Field Army by three brigades.

Mobilization  
equipment of  
3 cavalry  
brigades.

694. Further economies will be effected by the adoption of the following proposals made by Surgeon-General Sloggett:—

Medical  
Services.

10466.

(a) The reorganization of Field and Base Hospital equipment.

(b) The introduction of the Station Hospital system for Indian troops.

† Already sanctioned.

\* The saving on the whole of the existing number (21) of ammunition columns was originally estimated by the Sub-Committee thereon of October 1911, at Rs. 11,98,500.

- (c) The closing of cantonment hospitals in certain stations and by the revision of the scale on which the remainder are retained.
- (d) The appointment of Assistant Surgeons as dentists.
- (e) A revision of the scales and quality of hospital bedding and clothing.
- (f) The provision of sterilizers for Station Hospitals, causing a reduction in the charges for washing.

695. The reduction of the stations named in paragraph 687 (*xxii*) as military cantonments, and the reduction of Rangoon arsenal to the status of a depôt paragraph 611 (*i*) will afford appreciable further savings.

Reserve of guns.

696. The reduction in the number of complete batteries, and of guns held in reserve, will result in a curtailment of expense, estimated at 2 lakhs, for the provision of guns, stores, etc., until the quantities set free have been fully utilized.

Increased expenditure involved in connexion with the recommendations made in this Report.

697. On the other hand expenditure will be incurred in connexion with proposals made in this Report under the following heads:—

	Lakhs. Rs.
Provision of additional Brigade Commanders and Staffs ...	3.60
Raising two British Mountain batteries ...	5.48
Provision of three additional signal companies ...	4.00
Additional expenditure should two more signal companies be raised ...	2.70
Formation of additional photo-lithographic sections ...	0.20
Addition of two Field Troops, Sappers and Miners now, and three more in the future ...	Uncertain
Conversion of 4 Grantee into 4 Silladar Camel Corps ...	2.00
Increase of Horse and Field Artillery by 235 men ...	2.35
Alteration in the scales of reservists, and in the conditions of reserve service ...	16.00
Increase to the establishment of officers of the Supply and Transport Corps ...	1.50
Increased artillery reserve of horses ...	2.00
Increase to the Army Bearer Corps ...	4.50
Increase to the pensions of Indian officers, duffadars and havildars ...	6.40
Volunteer concessions ...	2.00
Increase to Headquarters Staff ...	.80
Increased training grant ...	2.00

Changes in the peace distribution of troops.

698. The following alterations in the present location of units will be causes of expense, *e.g.*—

(i) *Artillery.*

(a) Barracks and all other accommodation for a battery of Royal Horse Artillery at Delhi.\*

(ii) *Cavalry.*

(a) Lines for an Indian cavalry regiment transferred from Jacobabad to Lucknow.†

(b) Lines for an Indian cavalry regiment at Delhi (if the existing lines are evacuated).

\* Debitable to the military expenditure involved by the transfer of the Capital from Calcutta to Delhi.

† Already sanctioned, but there will be a saving in recurring expenditure.

(iii) *Sappers and Miners and Engineer Services.*

(a) Lines for one service company transferred from Roorkee to Jullundur.\*

(b) Lines for one service company transferred from Kirkee to Jhansi.†

(c) Accommodation for the Indian ranks of a signal company transferred from Fatchgarh to Ambala.‡

(d) Lines for a signal company at Roorkee.§

(iv) *British Infantry.*

(a) Barrack accommodation for the headquarters and six companies of a battalion at Delhi.||

(b) Full barrack accommodation for a battalion at Jhelum.¶

(c) Additional barracks required at Aden to complete accommodation for a whole battalion.

(d) Increased accommodation for a second company at Malappuram.

(v) *Pioneers.*

(a) Workshops, store-rooms, stabling, etc., for a Pioneer battalion transferred from Belgaum to Nowshera.

(vi) *Indian Infantry.*

(a) Lines for a regiment at Peshawar, less existing accommodation in forts, etc.

(b) Lines for a regiment at Aden or Trichinopoly.

(c) Lines for one or two regiments at Delhi, according as to whether the present lines are retained or evacuated.

(d) Lines for a regiment at Mhow (in lieu of the lines which would otherwise have to be rebuilt at Schore).

(e) Lines for a regiment transferred from Jhelum to Rawal Pindi (unless located in the Ridge barracks of the British infantry transferred to Jhelum).\*\*\*

(f) Lines for a second Gurkha battalion at Takdah to be constructed when the extra Indian infantry regiment is withdrawn from Bannu.

699. We recommend that the abandoned, or indefinitely postponed items of Lord Kitchener's redistribution and other schemes should be definitely removed from the lists of projects which have necessarily to be taken up, but that whenever barracks or lines have to be constructed to replace existing ones, the question of erecting the new buildings in another station should be considered, with a view to the completion of each division of the army in accordance with the accepted requirements of mobilization and internal security.

\* So far only as is necessary to adapt the barracks and lines vacated by the Royal Artillery at Jullundur.

† Already sanctioned.

‡ So far only as is necessary to adapt the barracks and lines formerly occupied by the Mounted Infantry at Ambala.

§ So far only as is necessary to adapt the barracks and lines vacated by the Royal Artillery at Roorkee.

|| Debitable to the military expenditure involved by the transfer of the Capital from Calcutta to Delhi.

¶ This is an item of expense which can be deferred until new barracks are required at Rawal Pindi.

\*\*\* This is an item of expense which can be deferred until new lines are required at Jhelum.

## Section XLII.—Conclusion.

700. The details given in the foregoing paragraphs have been inserted with the object of showing, in general terms, in what directions economies may be looked for or expenditure may be involved, should our recommendations be approved. It will be observed that, so far as the immediate future is concerned, the new expenditure and the economies proposed will, roughly speaking, balance each other, inasmuch as the full effect of the increase recommended to the Reserve, and the increased pensions to Indian officers, cannot be felt for many years to come, while the economies can practically be realised at once.

701. We have not felt ourselves in a position to estimate the cost of the measures detailed in Section XXXVIII, "Future needs of the Army," for the reason that in many cases it has not yet been possible for the question to be exhaustively considered. Moreover, while we regard all as being highly desirable, it is only those which are included under heading "A" as "measures closely affecting the successful conduct of operations in the field" which we could properly describe as of urgent importance. Most of these, too, are already in progress, and it is difficult to ascertain the balance of cost remaining to be provided. The completion of these, as well as the commencement of others in the list, can, we think, be left without undue risk to provision in the ordinary Schedule, according to the circumstances of the moment.

702. Although the outlay upon "Marine" services is under the charge of the Army Member and is included in the budget for military services, we have not considered any inquiry into the administration of the Marine Department to come within the terms of our reference. The affairs of that Department, moreover, have already recently been under investigation by a Committee of which Rear Admiral Sir E. Slade was President. We have therefore given no further attention to it.

703. Considerable attention was given, in the course of Mr. Brunyate's examination, to the subject of lapses, and their effect upon economy of administration. We would invite attention to the points brought to notice in his Answers Nos. 6020 to 6034. 6020-34.

704. We also desire to refer to evidence given by Mr. Brunyate in which he expressed the opinion that, for the following five heads of expenditure—(a) minor schedule measures, (b) normal store requirements, (c) annual provision for horses, mules, etc., (d) quasi-contract grants, such as annual reliefs, training and so forth, and (e) the ordinary military works grant—with which he would also include the ordnance factories, establishments, a contract system for three, four or five years would be financially sound, the annual amount to be spent under the heads being fixed for that period. We are in accord with this view, as also with his further expression of opinion that a sound system for army estimates would contemplate :— 5978-90.  
5994.

(a) Provision each year for very large schemes, on the basis of the periods within which the Government has already determined to complete them, *e.g.*, rearmament.

(b) A contract for minor schedule measures, ordinary stores, animals, minor grants such as reliefs and hutting, and ordinary military works.

(c) All the rest of the budget (pay, supplies, conveyance, etc.,) then to become a matter of expert estimating, supported generally by a statement of what new expenditure was being provided for as the result of minor sanctions given during the year.

We believe that a system of this nature in regard to army estimates, including a contract system for certain measures, would tend to the exercise of greater forethought and economy than is at present the case.

6038.

705. In his evidence Mr. Brunyate gave an estimate of £19,500,000, as being about the normal standard of the annual charge for the army, outside of such special charges as those for rearmament. While we accept his estimate, we feel that the warning should be added, which he also expressed, that, in view of the investigations into expenditure ordered by the late and present Commanders-in-Chief and consequent retrenchments, as well as the economies proposed by this Committee, it is no longer safe to calculate upon finding in the future sufficient savings each year to counterbalance the £600,000, which he names as approximately the normal amount of the cost of new and special services, due to the advance in science and the demands of military efficiency for which provision must be made in the schedule, which forms part of the total budget.

The universal tendency of all services, civil as well as military, is to increase in cost as the general price of supplies and stores rises, and as efficiency is more studied, and we see no reason to suppose that the army will escape from this general liability to enhanced charges. Finally, we would remark that, even apart from this liability, it does not appear to us to be possible, under ordinary conditions and having regard to the important requirements which still remain to be provided, to reduce the normal standard of annual expenditure on the army below £19,500,000.

706. We are greatly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Cooke, who was placed at our disposal after the departure of Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson, for the very valuable assistance which he has given us in the completion of this Report.

PERCY LAKE, *Lieut.-General.*

ROBERT SCALLON, *Lieut.-General.*

H. F. COOKE, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*32nd Sikh Pioneers.*

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# ANNEXURES.

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## ANNEXURE W.

Covering Letter to Report.

FROM

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR PERCY H. N. LAKE,  
K.C.M.G., C.B.,

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ROBERT I. SCALLON,  
K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
IN THE ARMY DEPARTMENT.

*Simla, the 30th April 1913.*

SIR,

In forwarding herewith our Report, as Members of the Army in India Committee, in accordance with the orders of His Excellency the Viceroy communicated to us through Field Marshal Lord Nicholson, we feel that some explanation is needed, for the information of His Excellency and the Government of India, of the circumstances under which it is submitted in the shape of a separate 'Minority' Report.

2. The Committee held its final meeting for consideration of the matters referred to it for investigation on 21st January 1913. At that meeting Sir P. Lake offered his co-operation in the preparation of the Report; it was not accepted. There has been no meeting of the Committee since that date, and our colleagues left for England on 9th April. There has therefore been no discussion in Committee, of any kind, upon the Report itself.

3. The first portion of the Report, in draft, was sent to us on 5th February, together with a memorandum (Enclosure A) addressed to us personally by the President. This portion of the Report, consisted of an introductory discussion of Lord Kitchener's measures of Army Reform, with a critical review of the same, and a reply to the first term of our Reference. It will be seen from the memorandum just mentioned that the draft Report is not referred to us as being in any way open to amendment or discussion in Committee. The only exception to this is the reference to one of the later and separate Sections, dealing with the establishment and duties of the Headquarters Staff, an advance copy of which was sent at the same time. We were told that the President knew we were likely to disagree upon certain points, and we were requested to prepare any minutes of dissent which we might wish to record, and to send them to him for study as soon as ready.

4. On the 16th February, the remainder of the Report was sent, with a second memorandum (enclosure B), again addressed to us personally, which advised us that it was Lord Nicholson's intention to call a meeting of the Committee shortly, and enjoined us to bear in mind "certain well known rules of procedure" when preparing our minutes of dissent. The contemplated meeting of the Committee was never summoned.

Both portions of the Report contained several recommendations to which we could not wholly subscribe, and omitted much which we thought important.

5. We desire to emphasize the fact that the draft of the Report had been prepared by our colleagues alone, without discussion in Committee or reference to us as to its general form or the terms in which its conclusions were to be expressed; and that, when it had been drawn up, we were invited, not to discuss it, but merely to point out "press errors or other patent mistakes."

6. Although we were aware of the general tendency of the views held by our colleagues upon the subjects dealt with in their introductory review, and their discussion of the first portion of our Reference, we were not prepared for the form in which those views were expressed. The draft appeared to us to contain, in addition to conclusions, certain misapprehensions of fact to which it was impossible for us to subscribe. We felt that we should fail in our duty did we allow these misapprehensions to pass without standing what were, in our view, the facts of the case.

7. The difficulty of explaining why many of the statements contained in the Introduction appeared to be based upon misapprehension of facts, and at the same time of expressing suitably our dissent from its presentation of Lord Kitchener's measures of reform, caused the preparation of our first minutes to take some time. We were meanwhile pressed to send in proofs of those minutes of dissent as received from the press, and accordingly we allowed the President to see copies of one or two of our first drafts in their rough, unrevised proof, form, as received from the printer, being, however, careful to point out that they were only drafts and were in many places not expressed in the manner in which we should finally present them. Sir P. Lake also added that he would be glad to re-word any portion which the President might wish altered.

8. We heard nothing further on the subject of the Report until the President's letter of 10th March (Enclosure C) informed us that he had laid before His Excellency the Viceroy his draft of the Report, and a draft of our joint minute of dissent on the first portion of it, and had submitted to His Excellency the question of procedure.

9. We do not know, except so far as we can gather it from the correspondence, in what shape papers were presented to His Excellency at Delhi as evidence of our intentions, or what statements were made to him—and it was perhaps a pity that, as our colleagues were aware that one of us, Sir Percy Lake, was in Delhi the day before they left Simla for that place, he was not told of their coming and asked to accompany them, when he could have explained our views, and could have shown His Excellency our dissent in its revised form to which we believe no exception could reasonably be taken. The result of our colleagues' presentation of the case at that interview was His

Excellency's letter of March 6th,\* which directs us to draw up an entirely separate

\* Not reproduced.

Report—the Report which we submit herewith.

10. We have not been shown our colleagues' Report in its final shape. If the original has been appreciably revised before its submission to Government, then we can only again express our regret that no opportunity was permitted to us for discussing the draft, and suggesting modifications, which might have enabled us to accept it.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servants,

PERCY LAKE, *Lieut.-General.*

ROBERT SCALLON, *Lieut.-General,*

**Enclosure A.**

Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake.

Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Scallon.

I send herewith paragraphs 1 to 142 of the draft Report of the Committee, which brings it down to the end of the first term of reference.

You will observe that the Report is being drafted in accordance with the conclusions arrived at by the Committee, or the majority thereof.

From the discussions which have taken place I am aware that in a few cases you may wish to record minutes of dissent. If so, I would ask you to take these in hand as soon as you get the drafts of the Report which bear on those points.

It will be a great convenience if, as soon as these minutes are ready, you will send them to me.

I also forward herewith proofs of certain paragraphs which I have drafted for insertion in the Report on the establishment and duties of the several Branches of the Headquarters Staff. If you desire it, we can meet at an early date to discuss these paragraphs.

If you discover any press errors or other patent mistakes in the draft Report, I shall be much obliged by your kindly communicating them to the Secretary.

I need hardly remind you that the draft Report, the Minutes of Proceedings, and the other papers on which we have worked, must be regarded as secret and on no account go beyond the Members of the Committee and its immediate Staff.

*5th February 1913.*

(Initialled) N.

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**Enclosure B.**

Sir Percy Lake.

Sir Robert Scallon.

I send herewith the draft of the remainder of our Report, and after a few days' interval I propose to call a meeting of the Committee.

I understand that you are writing minutes of dissent and to save time and trouble I think it desirable to remind you of certain well-known rules of procedure in regard to the preparation of such documents.

Apart from the personal knowledge and experience of the several members of the Committee, the Report is based on evidence, documentary and oral, which we had collected when we closed our enquiry for the purpose of drafting the Report; and on our prolonged discussion of the same, of the papers and notes which from time to time were written and laid before the Committee by you, Sir W. Meyer and myself, and of the various points at issue under the terms of reference.

The enquiry having been closed, no member is at liberty to raise fresh issues, or to bring forward fresh evidence for the purpose of supporting his dissent from the majority of the Committee. He must base himself on the evidence and other data actually before the Committee when we adjourned for the purpose of drafting the Report.

The object of this rule is obvious, for otherwise an enquiry might be indefinitely prolonged by any member of a committee who dissented from the views of the majority.

I should be much obliged if you could let me know, not later than Wednesday, the 19th, when I may expect your draft minutes of dissent on the several sections of the Report. I may mention that I have hitherto hoped to leave Bombay for England on March 8th; and if the business of the Committee precludes my doing so, I must have time to change my plans.

## Enclosure C.

SECRET.  
D. O.

*Simla, 10th March 1913.*

Dear Sir Percy Lake,

I write to you on the subject of the Committee's draft Report and the joint minutes of dissent therefrom now being prepared in collaboration by yourself and Sir Robert Scallan.

As you are aware, the Committee considered and discussed the questions which would have to be dealt with in the Report at many meetings held between the beginning of May last and the 21st January inclusive, the conclusions arrived at being entered in the minutes of the meetings, wherein it was indicated in each case whether there was unanimity or divergence of opinion. On certain points either you or Sir Robert Scallan held views which differed from those of the rest of your colleagues; on others you concurred in dissenting from conclusions which commended themselves to Sir William Meyer and myself, and which, with my casting vote as President, became the opinion of the majority. A number of these points, however, had already been dealt with in separate minutes which the Committee have from time to time sent in to the Army Department, and I was under the impression that those that remained were comparatively few in number, though some no doubt were of considerable importance. This being so, a draft Report was prepared under my direction embodying the conclusions arrived at, those of the majority being followed where there was a divergence of opinion. In view of the full and prolonged discussion that had taken place, I saw no reason to suppose that you and Sir Robert Scallan would take more than a few days in preparing the minutes of dissent you thought necessary, or that these would go beyond a brief statement of the points of disagreement and an exposition of your alternative proposals. Your letter of the 8th February last to Colonel Richardson after your receipt of the draft of the first instalment of the Report confirmed me in this anticipation.

Subsequently, however, as you are already aware, I was surprised to learn that you and Sir Robert Scallan would take over a month to prepare your joint minutes, and on receipt of drafts of some of these I observed that they were lengthy documents of a contentious nature in which you had not merely set forth your views on the points upon which we had agreed to differ, but intended, so far as I could judge from the drafts you had already sent me, to assume towards almost the whole of the draft Report an attitude of detached criticism which would not only dissociate you and Sir Robert Scallan from your colleagues, but would imply that the points at issue had not been fully discussed before the Report was drafted. I therefore availed myself of the first opportunity which presented itself of personally submitting the question of procedure to His Excellency the Viceroy, before whom I laid for this purpose the draft Report and your joint draft "minute of dissent" on the first portion of the Report.

I now forward for your information and guidance a copy of a letter\*,

\* Not reproduced.

dated the 6th instant, which I have received from His Excellency. You and Sir Robert Scallan will not now be called upon to sign the Report drafted by Sir William Meyer and myself, nor will your minutes of dissent be appended thereto; but you and Sir Robert Scallan are directed to submit a separate Minority Report, to be prepared in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Viceroy.

You are in possession of the five volumes containing the evidence given before the Committee, the digest of that evidence, and the appendices to the draft Report. You have also been supplied with the immediate annexures to the draft Report, including the separate minutes which the Committee have from time to time submitted to the Government of India. You are also in possession of printed copies of the minutes of the meetings of the Committee, which were circulated in draft to members for any corrections they might like to suggest. You have, in short, the same materials at your disposal for preparing your Minority Report as were available for drafting the Report which will now be submitted by Sir William Meyer and myself. I am addressing a similar letter to Sir Robert Scallan.

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## ANNEXURE X.

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN PEACE AND THEIR  
ALLOTMENT TO THE FIELD ARMY AND TO INTERNAL  
SECURITY ON MOBILIZATION.

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**TABLE**  
**PEACE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS AND**  
**1ST (PESHA**

1ST DIVISIONAL AREA.			
Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shown in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
Chitral ...	<div> 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... 1 Section, Sappers and Miners... 1-3rd Indian Mountain Battery </div>	<div> 1st Divisional Area (Chitral) Occupation. </div>	Comes from Dharmasala in 1913.
Malakand ...	<div> 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... </div>	<div> 1st Divisional Area (Malakand) Occupation. </div>	
Peshawar ...	<div> 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A. ... 1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners 1 British Infantry Battalion ... 1 British Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... </div>	<div> 1st Divisional Area Occupation. Army Troops, Northern Line. 1st Divisional Area Occupation. Divisional Troops, 1st Division. 1st Brigade, 1st Division. 3rd Brigade, 1st Division. 1st Brigade, 1st Division. 1st Brigade, 1st Division. 1st Brigade, 1st Division. </div>	
Nowshera ...	<div> 1 Indian Infantry Battalion 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. 2-3rd Indian Mountain Battery 1 British Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion 1 Pioneer Battalion ... </div>	<div> 1st Divisional Area Occupation Divisional Troops, 1st Division. 1st Divisional Area Occupation. 2nd Brigade, 1st Division. 2nd Brigade, 1st Division. 2nd Brigade, 1st Division. 2nd Brigade, 1st Division. ..... Divisional Troops, 1st Division </div>	<div> From Nowshera. </div>
Risalpur ...	<div> 1 Battery, R. H. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A. ... 1 British Cavalry Regiment 1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ... 1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ... </div>	<div> 1st Cavalry Brigade ... 1st Cavalry Brigade ... 1st Cavalry Brigade ... 1st Cavalry Brigade. 1st Cavalry Brigade. </div>	<div> From Bolgaum vice Infantry Battalion to Peshawar. From Rawal Pindi Cambellporo Rawal Pindi </div> <div>into new lines.</div>
Mardan ...	<div> 1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion ... </div>	<div> Divisional Troops, 1st Division. 3rd Brigade, 1st Division. </div>	
Abbottabad	<div> 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery ... 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery ... 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery ... 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry (on return from Chitral in 1913). </div>	<div> Divisional Troops, 1st Division. Divisional Troops, 5th Division. 3rd Brigade, 1st Division. 1st Divisional Area Occupation. 2nd Divisional Area Occupation. </div>	<div> The Brigade to be transferred from the 2nd Rawal Pindi Division. </div>



A.

# ALLOTMENT ON MOBILIZATION.

## AR) DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE			
Units shown in italics come from outside the Divisional area.			
Field Army.		Occupation Troops.	
1ST DIVISION.		The Occupation Troops required for this area consist of :—  1 Battery, R. F. A. 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery. 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry. 1 Battalion, British Infantry. 5 Battalions, Indian Infantry. 1 Section, Sappers and Miners.  <i>Detailed as follows :—</i>  Peshawar ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. Nowshera-Chitral ... 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery. Chitral... ... 1 Section, Sappers and Miners. Peshawar ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry. <i>Meerut</i> ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry. Peshawar ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry. Malakand ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry. Malakand ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry. Chitral ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry. Abbottabad ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
1st Brigade.			
Peshawar	... Headquarters.		
Peshawar	... 1 British Infantry Battalion.		
Peshawar	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
Peshawar	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
Peshawar	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
2nd Brigade.			
Nowshera	... Headquarters.		
Nowshera	... 1 British Infantry Battalion.		
Nowshera	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
Nowshera	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
Nowshera	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
3rd Brigade.			
Abbottabad	... Headquarters.		
Peshawar	... 1 British Infantry Battalion.		
Mardan	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
Abbottabad	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
Abbottabad	... 1 Indian Infantry Battalion.		
Divisional Troops.			
Mardan	... 1 Indian Cavalry Regiment.		
Nowshera	... Headquarters.	} R. F. A. Brigade.	
Nowshera	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Nowshera	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Nowshera	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Nowshera	... 1 Ammunition Column.		
Abbottabad	... Headquarters.	} Mountain Artillery Brigade.	
Abbottabad	... 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery.		
Abbottabad	... 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery.		
Peshawar	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
Roorkee	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
Nowshera	... 1 Pioneer Regiment.		
Rawal Pindi	... 1 Divisional Signal Company.		
1st Cavalry Brigade.			
Risalpur	... Headquarters.		
Risalpur	... 1 Battery, R. H. A.		
Risalpur	... 1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A.		
Risalpur	... 1 British Cavalry Regiment.		
Risalpur	... 1 Indian Cavalry Regiment.		
Risalpur	... 1 Indian Cavalry Regiment.		
Army Troops.			
Peshawar	... 1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A.		



## FRONTIER BRIGADES.

Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shewn in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on General mobilization.	Remarks.	
<i>Kohat Brigade.</i>				
Kohat ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	Kohat Area Occupation.	Under 2nd Division for training.	
	Frontier Garrison Artillery (Headquarters)...	.....		
	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	Kohat Area Occupation.		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	} <u>6th Brigade, 2nd Division.</u>		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...			
Samana ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	} Kohat Area Occupation.		
	Frontier Garrison Artillery (Detachment) ...			
<i>Bannu Brigade.</i>				
Bannu ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	} Bannu Area Occupation.		Transferred to Belgaum.
	Frontier Garrison Artillery (Detachment) ...			
	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...			
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...			
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...			
	<i>1 Battalion, Indian Infantry (temporary)</i>			
<i>Derajat Brigade.</i>				
Tank ... (Dera Ismail Khan at present, see note.)	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	} Derajat Area Occupation.	The garrison of Dera Ismail Khan to be gradually transferred to Tank as lines require rebuilding.	
	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...			
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...			
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...			
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...			

## BRIGADES.

## FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY.

Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional area.

## Field Army.

## Occupation Troops.

The Occupation Troops required for these area consist of:—

*Kohat Area.*

Kohat	{	1 Indian Mountain Battery.
		Detachment, Frontier Garrison Artillery.
		1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
		1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.

All detailed from the peace garrison.

*Bannu Area.*

Bannu	{	1 Indian Mountain Battery.
		Detachment, Frontier Garrison Artillery.
		1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
		2 Battalions, Indian Infantry.

All detailed from the peace garrison.

*Derajat Area.*

Dera Ismail Khan.	{	1 Indian Mountain Battery.
		1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
		3 Battalions, Indian Infantry.

Comprising the whole peace garrison,

## 2ND DIVISIONAL AREA.

Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shown in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
	1 Battery, R. H. A. ...	.....	Transferred to Risalpur.
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	} Divisional Troops, 2nd Division ...	From Campbellpore into Royal Horse Artillery lines.
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battery, British Mountain Artillery ...	} Divisional Troops, 6th Division ...	Will go to 8th or 9th Division when the 2 new batteries are raised and located at Ahmednagar.
	1 Battery, British Mountain Artillery ...		
	1 Battery, British Mountain Artillery ...	2nd Divisional Area Occupation.	Transferred to Risalpur.
	1 Company, R. G. A. ...	.. ..	
	1 British Cavalry Regiment ...	.. ..	
	1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ...	Divisional Troops, 2nd Division.	
	1 British Infantry Battalion ...	4th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 British Infantry Battalion ...	6th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 British Infantry Battalion ...	.....	Transferred to Jhelum.
	1 Indian Infantry Battalion ...	4th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 Indian Infantry Battalion ...	4th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 Indian Infantry Battalion ...	4th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners (less 1 Section).	Divisional Troops, 2nd Division.	From Jhelum vice a Battalion, British In- fantry.
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	Divisional Troops, 2nd Division.	
	1 Divisional Signal Company ...	Divisional Troops, 1st Division ...	The Divisional Signal Companies one from Fategarh and a new one to be raised can be located in the vacant British Cava- lry lines, at Rawal Pindi.
	1 Divisional Signal Company ...	Divisional Troops, 2nd Division.	
	1 Battery, R. H. A. ...	} 2nd Cavalry Brigade.	
	1 R. H. A., Ammunition Column ...		
	1 British Cavalry Regiment ...		
	1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ...		
	1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ...		
	1 British Infantry Battalion ...	2nd Divisional Area Occupation.	
	1 Pioneer Battalion ...	Divisional Troops, 2nd Division.	
	1 Railway Company, Sappers and Miners ...	Army Troops.	
	1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ...	2nd Divisional Area Occupation.	
	1 British Infantry Battalion ...	5th Brigade, 2nd Division ...	From Rawal Pindi vice a Battalion, Indian Infantry.
	1 Indian Infantry Battalion ...	5th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 Indian Infantry Battalion ...	5th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 Indian Infantry Battalion ...	5th Brigade, 2nd Division.	
	1 Indian Infantry Battalion ...	.....	Transferred to Rawal Pindi.
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	2nd Divisional Area Occupation ...	From Jullundur vice Battery transferred to Rawal Pindi.
	1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A. ...	Army Troops, Northern Line.	
	1 Ammunition Column, R., H. A. ...	.....	Transferred to Risalpur.
	2 Companies, R. G. A. ...	.....	To be disestablished.
	The whole brigade transferred to the Pesh- war Division.	.....	.....

## PINDI) DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY.				
Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional area.				
Field Army.			Occupation Troops.	
2ND DIVISION.			The Occupation Troops required for this area consist of :—	
4th Brigade.				
Rawal Pindi	...	Headquarters.	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	1 Company, R. G. A.	
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	1 Indian Cavalry Regiment.	
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
5th Brigade.			Detailed as follows :—	
Jhelum	...	Headquarters.	Cambellpore	1 Battery, R. F. A.
Jhelum	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	Rawal Pindi	1 Company, R. G. A.
Jhelum	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Jhelum	1 Indian Cavalry Regiment.
Jhelum	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Sialkot	1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Jhelum	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Abbottabad	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
6th Brigade.				
Kohat*	...	Headquarters.		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	An initial distribution of the troops in the area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.	
Kohat*	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.		
Kohat *	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.		
Kohat*	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.		
Divisional Troops.				
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.		
Rawal Pindi	...	Headquarters.		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.	} R. F. A. Brigade.	
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Ammunition Column.		
Rawal Pindi	...	Headquarters.		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 British Mountain Battery.	} Mountain Artillery Brigade.	
Rawal Pindi	...	1 British Mountain Battery.		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners (less 1 Section).		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
Sialkot	...	1 Battalion, Pioneers.		
Rawal Pindi	...	1 Divisional Signal Company.		
2nd Cavalry Brigade.				
Sialkot	...	Headquarters.		
Sialkot	...	1 Battery, R. H. A.		
Sialkot	...	1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A.		
Sialkot	...	1 Regiment, British Cavalry.		
Sialkot	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.		
Sialkot	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.		
Army Troops.				
Cambellpore	...	1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A.		
Sialkot	...	1 Railway Company, Sappers and Miners.		

\* Under 2nd Division for training.

3RD DIVISIONAL AREA.			
Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shown in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
Lahore ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Pioneers ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... <i>1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A. ...</i>	} Divisional Troops, 3rd Division. } Army Troops. 3rd Divisional Area Occupation. 3rd Divisional Area Occupation. 8th Brigade, 3rd Division. Divisional Troops, 3rd Division. 3rd Divisional Area Occupation. .....	Transferred to Quetta.
Multan ...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	3rd Divisional Area Occupation. 3rd Divisional Area Occupation. 7th Brigade, 3rd Division. 3rd Divisional Area Occupation. ..... Divisional Troops, 3rd Division.	Transferred to Campbellpore.
Jullundur and Amritsar...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	8th Brigade, 3rd Division. 8th Brigade, 3rd Division. 8th Brigade, 3rd Division.	
Bakloh ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	9th Brigade, 3rd Division. 3rd Divisional Area, Occupation.	
Dharmasala ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	9th Brigade, 3rd Division. .....	Chitral in 1913.
Ambala ...	1 Battery, R. H. A. ... 1 Battery, R. H. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A. ... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Pioneers ... 1 Divisional Signal Company ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	Army Troops. } } 3rd Cavalry Brigade. } 9th Brigade, 3rd Division. 9th Brigade, 3rd Division. Divisional Troops, 3rd Division, Divisional Troops, 3rd Division.	From Fatehgarh. From Roorkee.
Jutogh ...	1 British Mountain Battery ... 1 British Mountain Battery ...	Divisional Troops, 3rd Division. Divisional Troops, 3rd Division.	
Subathu ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	.....	Transferred to Delhi.
Digshai ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	3rd Divisional Area Occupation.	
Ferozepore ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Divisional Troops, 3rd Division. 3rd Divisional Area Occupation, Mobile Brigade, Delhi. 7th Brigade, 3rd Division. 7th Brigade, 3rd Division, 7th Brigade, 3rd Division.	

## DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.			
Units shown in italics come from outside the Divisional area.			
Field Army.			Occupation Troops.
3RD DIVISION.			The Occupation Troops required for the area consist of:—  1 Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 2 Regiments, Indian Cavalry. 3 Battalions, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Indian Infantry. 2 Companies, R. G. A.  <i>Detailed as follows:—</i>  Roorkee ... 1 Company, R. G. A. Ferozepore ... 1 Company, R. G. A. Lahore ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry. Multan ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry. Multan ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. Lahore ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry. Dagshai ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry. Multan ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry. Multan ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry. Bakloh ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Ferozepore ...	...	Headquarters.	
Ferozepore ...	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Ferozepore ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Ferozepore ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Multan ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
8th Brigade.			
Jullundur ...	...	Headquarters.	
Jullundur ...	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Jullundur ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Jullundur ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Lahore ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
9th Brigade.			
Ambala ...	...	Headquarters.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Battalion British Infantry.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Battalion, Pioneers.	
Dharmasala ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Bakloh ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Divisional Troops.			
Jullundur ...	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	
Lahore ...	...	Headquarters.	
Lahore ...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Lahore ...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Ferozepore ...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Lahore ...	...	1 Ammunition Column.	
Jutogh ...	...	Headquarters.	
Jutogh ...	...	1 British Mountain Battery.	
Jutogh ...	...	1 British Mountain Battery.	
Lahore ...	...	1 Battalion, Pioneers.	
Kirkee ...	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Divisional Signal Company.	
3rd Cavalry Brigade.			
Ambala ...	...	Headquarters.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Battery, R. H. A.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	
Ambala ...	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	
Army Troops.			
Ambala ...	...	1 Battery, R. H. A.	
Lahore ...	...	1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A.	

An initial distribution of the troops in the area as drawn up in the defence scheme is given in Table B.

4TH DIVISIONAL AREA.					
Station.		Proposed Garrison Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shown in block type for additions and italics for reductions.		Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
Chaman ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	11th Brigade, 4th Division.	
Loralai ...	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	...	4th Divisional Area Occupation.	
	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	4th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Fort Sandeman ...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	4th Divisional Area Occupation.	
	...	1 British Mountain Battery ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 British Mountain Battery ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 British Mountain Battery ...	...	<u>Divisional Troops, 6th Division.</u>	
	...	1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A. ...	...	Army Troops, Southern Line ...	Will be available for 8th or 9th Division when the 2 new batteries are raised and located at Ahmadnagar.
	...	1 Company, R. G. A. ...	...	4th Divisional Area Occupation.	From Multan vice Royal Garrison Artillery Company.
	...	<i>1 Company, R. G. A. ...</i>	...	.....	To be disestablished.
	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
Quetta ...	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	...	10th Brigade, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	...	11th Brigade, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	...	4th Divisional Occupation.	
	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	10th Brigade, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	10th Brigade, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	10th Brigade, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	11th Brigade, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, Pioneers ...	...	11th Brigade, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, Pioneers ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Railway Company, Sappers and Miners ...	...	Army Troops.	
	...	1 Divisional Signal Company ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
Karachi ...	...	1 Company, R. G. A. ...	...	4th Divisional Area Occupation.	
	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	...	} 4th Divisional Area Occupation.	
	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...		
	...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
Hyderabad (Sind) ...	...	1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ...	...	Divisional Troops, 4th Division.	
	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	...	12th Brigade, 4th Division.	
Jacobabad ...	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	...	.....	Transferred to Lucknow and station abandoned.



DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.		
Units shown in italics come from outside the Divisional area.		
Field Army.		Occupation Troops.
<b>4TH DIVISION.</b>		
<i>10th Brigade.</i>		
Quetta	... Headquarters.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
<i>11th Brigade.</i>		
Quetta	... Headquarters.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, Pioneers.	
Chaman	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
<i>12th Brigade.</i>		
Nasirabad	... Headquarters.	
Nasirabad	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Hyderabad (Sind)	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Nasirabad	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Ajmere	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
<i>Divisional Troops.</i>		
Quetta	... 1 Regiment, Indian, Cavalry.	
Hyderabad (Sind)	... Headquarters.	
Hyderabad (Sind)	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Hyderabad (Sind)	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Karachi	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Hyderabad (Sind)	... 1 Ammunition Column.	
Quetta	... Headquarters.	
Quetta	... 1 British Mountain Battery.	
Quetta	... 1 British Mountain Battery.	
Quetta	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.	
Quetta	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, Pioneers.	
Quetta	... 1 Divisional Signal Company.	
<i>Army Troops.</i>		
Quetta	... 1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A.	
Quetta	... 1 Railway Company, Sappers and Miners.	
		The Occupation Troops required for the area consist of :—
		2 Companies, R. G. A.
		1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery.
		1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
		* 1 Squadron, Indian Cavalry, I. S. T.
		2 Battalions, British Infantry.
		3 Battalions, Indian Infantry.
		<i>Detailed as follows :—</i>
Maymyo	... 1 Battery, Indian Mountain Artillery.	
Karachi	... 1 Company, R. G. A.	
Quetta	... 1 Company, R. G. A.	
Loralai	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	
Quetta	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Karachi	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Loralai	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Fort Sandeman	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Karachi	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
* Kathiawar	... 1 Squadron, Indian Cavalry, I. S. T.	
		An initial distribution of the troops in the area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.
		* In the event of war with a Naval Power.

5TH DIVISIONAL AREA.			
Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shown in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty out- side the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
Mhow ...	{ 1 Battery, R. H. A. ... 1 Battery, R. H. A. ... <i>1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A.</i> ... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	} 5th Divisional Area Occupation. ..... 5th Divisional Area Occupation, 15th Brigade, 5th Division. 15th Brigade, 5th Division. 15th Brigade, 5th Division. 15th Brigade, 5th Division ...	To be disestablished.  From Sehore where lines would have had to be rebuilt.
Ahmedabad ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	5th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Baroda ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	5th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Agar ...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	<u>6th Divisional Area Occupation.</u>	
Nasirabad ...	{ 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Army Troops. 12th Brigade, 4th Division. <u>12th Brigade, 4th Division.</u>	
Ajmer ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	<u>12th Brigade, 4th Division.</u>	
Neemuch ...	{ 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	Army Troops. Army Troops. Army Troops. <u>9th Divisional Area Occupation.</u>	From Deesa.
Sehore ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	.....	Transferred to Mhow and station abandoned.
Erinpura ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	5th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Deoli ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	5th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Rajkote ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	5th Divisional Area Occupation	From Deesa where lines would have had to be rebuilt.
Deesa ...	{ 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	..... .....	Transferred to Neemuch.  Transferred to Rajkote.
Jhansi ...	{ 1 Howitzer Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Howitzer Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column (Howitzer) ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Pioneers ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	} Army Troops. 5th Divisional Area Occupation. 13th Brigade, 5th Division. 13th Brigade, 5th Division. 13th Brigade, 5th Division. Divisional Troops, 5th Division. Divisional Troops, 5th Division	From Kirkee.
Nowgong ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 2 Heavy Batteries, R. G. A. ...	13th Brigade, 5th Division ... .....	The two Heavy Batteries, R. G. A., will be con- verted into British Mountain Batteries and located at Ahmednagar.
Goona ...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	Divisional Troops, 5th Division	
Jubbulpore ...	{ 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	} Divisional Troops, 5th Division. 5th Divisional Area Occupation. 14th Brigade, 5th Division. 5th Divisional Area Occupation. 14th Brigade, 5th Division 14th Brigade, 5th Division.	
Bangor ...	{ 1 Wireless Signal Company ... 2 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Army Troops. 8th Division Area Occupation, <u>14th Brigade, 5th Division.</u>	
Kamptee ...	{ 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	} 5th Divisional Area Occupation.	

## DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.			
Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional area.			
Field Army.		Occupation Troops.	
5TH DIVISION.		The Occupation Troops required for the area consist of :—	
13th Brigade.		2 Batteries, R. H. A.	
Jhansi	... Headquarters.	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Jhansi	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	
Jhansi	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	2 Regiments, Indian Cavalry.	
Jhansi	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	2 Battalions, British Infantry.	
Newgong	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	6 Battalions, Indian Infantry.	
14th Brigade.		Detailed as follows :—	
Jubbulpore	... Headquarters.	Mhow	... 1 Battery, R. H. A.
Jubbulpore	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	Mhow	... 1 Battery, R. H. A.
Jubbulpore	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Kamptee	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.
Jubbulpore	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Mhow	... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.
Saugor	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Jhansi	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
15th Brigade.		Jubbulpore	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
(Wanting) to be added	... Headquarters.	Jubbulpore	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Mhow	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	Kamptee	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Mhow	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Deoli	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Mhow	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Rajkote	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Mhow	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Ahmedabad	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Divisional Troops.		Erinpura	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Goona	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	Baroda	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Jubbulpore	... Headquarters.	Kamptee	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Jubbulpore	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	An initial distribution of the troops in the Area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.	
Jubbulpore	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Jubbulpore	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Jubbulpore	... 1 Ammunition Column.		
Abbottabad	... Headquarters.	Mountain Artillery Brigade.	
Abbottabad	... 1 Indian Mountain Battery.		
Abbottabad	... 1 Indian Mountain Battery.		
Jhansi	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.	Jhansi	
Secunderabad	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
Jhansi	... 1 Battalion, Pioneers.	Jhansi	
Ahmadnagar	... 1 Divisional Signal Company.		
Army Troops.		Jhansi	
R. F. A. Brigade.			
Neemuch	... Headquarters.	Jhansi	
Neemuch	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Neemuch	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	Jhansi	
Nasirabad	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.		
Neemuch	... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A.	Jhansi	
R. F. A. Brigade.			
Jhansi	... Headquarters.	Jhansi	
Jhansi	... 1 Howitzer Battery, R. F. A.		
Jhansi	... 1 Howitzer Battery, R. F. A.	Jhansi	
Jhansi	... 1 Ammunition Column, (Howitzer) R. F. A.		
Saugor	... 1 Wireless Signal Company.	Saugor	

## 6TH DIVISIONAL AREA.

Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shewn in block type for additions and in italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
Poona and Kirkee	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ... <i>1 Company, Sappers and Miners</i> ... 1 Divisional Signal Company ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Pioneers ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Divisional Troops, 6th Division. Divisional Troops, 6th Division. Divisional Troops, 6th Division. Divisional Troops, 6th Division. Divisional Troops, 3rd Division. ..... Divisional Troops, 6th Division. 16th Brigade, 6th Division. 6th Divisional Area Occupation. Divisional Troops, 6th Division. 16th Brigade, 6th Division. 16th Brigade, 6th Division. 16th Brigade, 6th Division.	Transferred to Jhansi.
Ahmednagar	1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Divisional Signal Company ... <i>1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A.</i> ... 2 Mountain Batteries, R. G. A. ...	17th Brigade, 6th Division. 17th Brigade, 6th Division. 17th Brigade, 6th Division. Divisional Troops, 5th Division. ..... Divisional Troops, 6th Division.	To be disestablished. To be raised in place of 2 Heavy (bullock) batteries.
Aurangabad	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	17th Brigade, 6th Division. 6th Divisional Area Occupation. 6th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Belgaum	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... <i>1 Battalion, Pioneers</i> ...	6th Divisional Area Occupation. 18th Brigade, 6th Division. 18th Brigade, 6th Division. 18th Brigade, 6th Division. 18th Brigade, 6th Division. .....	From Bannu vice Pio- neers to Nowshera. Transferred to Nowshera.
Bombay	1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	6th Divisional Area Occupation. 6th Divisional Area Occupation. 6th Divisional Area Occupation.	

## DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.			
Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional area.			
Field Army.			Occupation Troops.
6TH DIVISION.			The Occupation Troops required for the area consist of:— 4 Companies, R. G. A. 2 Regiments, Indian Cavalry. 3 Battalions, British Infantry. 3 Battalions, Indian Infantry. 1 Battery, R. F. A. <i>Detailed as follows:—</i>  Bombay ... 4 Companies, R. G. A.  Belgaum ... 1 Battery, R. F. A.  Aurangabad ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.  Agar ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.  Kirkee ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.  Bombay ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.  Burma ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.  Aurangabad ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.  Bombay ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.  Bombay (Santa Cruz) 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.   An initial distribution of the Troops in the Area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.
16th Brigade.			
Poona	...	Headquarters.	
Poona	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Poona	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Poona	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Poona	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
17th Brigade.			
Ahmednagar	...	Headquarters.	
Ahmednagar	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Ahmednagar	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Ahmednagar	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Aurangabad	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
18th Brigade.			
Belgaum	...	Headquarters.	
Belgaum	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Belgaum	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Belgaum	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Belgaum	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	
Divisional Troops.			
Poona	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	
Kirkee	...	Headquarters.	
Kirkee	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Kirkee	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Kirkee	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.	
Kirkee	...	1 Ammunition Column.	
} R. F. A. Brigade.			
Burma	...	Headquarters.	
Quetta	...	1 British Mountain Battery.	
Rawal Pindi	...	1 British Mountain Battery	
} *Mountain Artillery Brigade.			
Kirkee	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.	
Kirkee	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.	
Kirkee	...	1 Battalion, Pioneers.	
Kirkee	...	1 Divisional Signal Company.	

\* When the two new batteries are raised these Mountain batteries will be allotted to the 8th or 9th Division.



7TH DIVISIONAL AREA.			
Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shewn in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
Muttra ...	1 Regiment, British Cavalry ...	7th Divisional Area Occupation.	From Roorkee.
Agra ...	1 Howitzer Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Army Troops. 7th Divisional Area Occupation. 7th Divisional Area Occupation. 7th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Meerut ...	1 Battery, R. H. A. ... 1 Battery, R. H. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A. ... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Pioneers ...	7th Divisional Area Occupation. 7th Cavalry Brigade. 7th Cavalry Brigade. 7th Cavalry Brigade. 7th Cavalry Brigade. 7th Cavalry Brigade. Divisional Troops, 7th Division. Divisional Troops, 7th Division. Divisional Troops, 7th Division. 1st Divisional Area Occupation. Divisional Troops, 7th Division.	
Barilly ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Infantry ...	Divisional Troops, 7th Division. 21st Brigade, 7th Division. Divisional Troops, 7th Division. 21st Brigade, 7th Division.	
Ranikhet ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	20th Brigade, 7th Division.	
Chaubattia ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	7th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Almora ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	21st Brigade, 7th Division.	
Dikra Dun ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Indian Mountain Battery ... 1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	19th Brigade, 7th Division. 19th Brigade, 7th Division. 19th Brigade, 7th Division. 8th Divisional Area Occupation. Divisional Troops, 7th Division. Divisional Troops, 7th Division.	
Chakratia ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	19th Brigade, 7th Division.	
Lansdowne ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	20th Brigade, 7th Division. 20th Brigade, 7th Division. 20th Brigade, 7th Division. 21st Brigade, 7th Division.	
Roorkee ...	1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners ... 1 Divisional Signal Company	Occupation. ..... 3rd Divisional Area Occupation. Divisional Troops, 7th Division. Divisional Troops, 7th Division. Divisional Troops, 1st Division. ..... Divisional Troops, 7th Division.	Transferred to Agra.
Delhi ...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battery, R. H. A. ...	..... } 7th Divisional Area Occupation. ..... .....	From Subathu. Additional $\frac{1}{2}$ Com- pany from Agra. From Assam. From Bangalore.
Fategarh ...	1 Divisional Signal Company 1 Divisional Signal Company	..... .....	Transferred to Rawa Pindi. Transferred to Ambala.

## DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.			
Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional area.			
Field Army.		Occupation Troops.	
<b>7TH DIVISION.</b>		The Occupation troops required for the area consist of :—	
<i>19th Brigade.</i>		2 Batteries, R. H. A.	
Dehra Dun	... Headquarters.	2 Companies, R. G. A.	
Chakrata	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	
Dehra Dun	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	
Dehra Dun	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	3 Battalions, British Infantry.	
Dehra Dun	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	3 Battalions, Indian Infantry.	
<i>20th Brigade.</i>		<i>Detailed as follows :—</i>	
Garhwal	... Headquarters.	Meerut	... 1 Battery, R. H. A.
Ranikhet	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	Delhi	... 1 Battery, R. H. A.
Lansdowne	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Muttra	... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.
Lansdowne	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Delhi	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
Lansdowne	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Agra	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
<i>21st Brigade.</i>		Chambatia	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Bareilly	... Headquarters.	Delhi	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Bareilly	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	Agra	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Bareilly	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Delhi	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Almora	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Delhi	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Lansdowne	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.	Delhi	... 1 Company, R. G. A.
<i>Divisional Troops.</i>		Agra	... 1 Company, R. G. A.
Bareilly	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	Occupation unallotted :—	
Meerut	... Headquarters.	Roorkee	... 1 Heavy Battery, R. G. A.
Meerut	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	For Mobile Brigade :—	
Meerut	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	<i>Ferozepore</i> ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.	
Bareilly	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.	An initial distribution of the Troops in the Area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.	
Meerut	... 1 Ammunition Column.		
Dehra Dun	... Headquarters.		
Dehra Dun	... 1 Indian Mountain Battery.		
Dehra Dun	... 1 Indian Mountain Battery.		
Roorkee	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
Roorkee	... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
Meerut	... 1 Battalion, Pioneers.		
Roorkee	... 1 Divisional Signal Company.		
<i>7th Cavalry Brigade.</i>			
Meerut	... Headquarters.		
Meerut	... 1 Battery, R. H. A.		
Meerut	... 1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A.		
Meerut	... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.		
Meerut	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.		
Meerut	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.		
<i>Army Troops.</i>			
Agra	... 1 Howitzer Battery, R. F. A.		



8TH DIVISIONAL AREA.			
Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shown in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty out- side the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
Lucknow ...	1 Battery, R. H. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A. ... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	8th Cavalry Brigade.  Divisional Troops, 8th Division. 22nd Brigade, 8th Division. 8th Divisional Area Occupation. 22nd Brigade, 8th Division. 22nd Brigade, 8th Division.	From Jacobabad.
Fyzabad ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Divisional Troops, 8th Division. Divisional Troops, 8th Division. 8th Divisional Area Occupation. 23rd Brigade, 8th Division. 23rd Brigade, 8th Division.	
Allahabad ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Pioneers ...	8th Divisional Area Occupation. 8th Divisional Area Occupation. 8th Divisional Area Occupation. 8th Divisional Area Occupation. Divisional Troops, 8th Division.	
Cawnpore ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Divisional Troops, 8th Division. Divisional Troops, 8th Division. 8th Divisional Area Occupation. 22nd Brigade, 8th Division.	
Benares ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	23rd Brigade, 8th Division.	
Dinapore ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	8th Divisional Area Occupation. 23rd Brigade, 8th Division.	
Dinapore and Dum Dum...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	8th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Fort William	1 Company, R. G. A. ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ... 1 Squadron, Indian Cavalry ...	8th Divisional Area Occupation. 8th Divisional Area Occupation.	Found from Saugor.
Barrackpore...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	24th Brigade, 8th Division. 24th Brigade, 8th Division.	
Takdah ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	24th Brigade, 8th Division.	
Lebong. ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	24th Brigade, 8th Division.	
Alipore ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	24th Brigade, 8th Division.	
Shillong ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	8th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Manipur and Kohima ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	.....	Transferred to Delhi and remaining battalion re-distributed at Manipur and Dibrugarh.
Dibrugarh and Manipur	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	8th Divisional Area Occupation.	

## DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.			
Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional area.			
Field Army.		Occupation Troops.	
		The Occupation Troops required for the area consist of :—	
<i>22nd Brigade.</i>		3 Batteries, R. F. A.	
Lucknow	...	2 Companies, R. G. A.	
Lucknow	...	1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	
Lucknow	...	3 Regiments, Indian Cavalry.	
Lucknow	...	5 Battalions, British Infantry.	
Cawnpore	...	5 Battalions, Indian Infantry.	
<i>23rd Brigade.</i>		<i>Detailed as follows :—</i>	
Fyzabad	...	Fort William	... 1 Company, R. G. A.
Fyzabad	...	Allahabad	... 1 Company, R. G. A.
Fyzabad	...	Allahabad	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.
Dinapore	...	Dinapore	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.
Benares	...	Barrackpore	... 1 Battery, R. F. A.
<i>24th Brigade.</i>		Bangalore	... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.
Allahabad	...	Saugor-Calcutta	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
Lebong	...	Allahabad	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
Takdah	...	Fyzabad	... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
Alipore	...	Dinapore & Dum	1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Barrackpore	...	Lucknow	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
<i>Divisional Troops.</i>		Cawnpore	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Cawnpore	...	Allahabad	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Lucknow	...	Fort William	... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Lucknow	...	Fort William	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Cawnpore	...	Shillong	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Fyzabad	...	Dehra Dun	... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Fyzabad	...	Burma (eventually Takdah.)	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Wanting	...	Dibrugarh, Manipur	1 Regiment, Indian Infantry.
Bangalore	...	An initial distribution of the Troops in the Area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.	
Bangalore	...		
Wanting (to be raised)	...		
Allahabad	...		
<i>8th Cavalry Brigade.</i>			
Lucknow	...		
Lucknow	...		
Lucknow	...		
Lucknow	...		
Lucknow	...		
Lucknow	...		
<i>Army Troops.</i>			
<i>Nil.</i>			

† When two new Mountain batteries are raised the batteries for the 8th or 9th Division will be found from Rawalpindi and Quetta:

9TH DIVISIONAL AREA.			
Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shewn in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on general mobilization.	Remarks.
	<i>1 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery</i> ...	...	<i>Transferred to Delhi.</i>
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	27th Brigade, 9th Division.	
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	Divisional Troops, 9th Division.	
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	Divisional Troops, 9th Division.	
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	<u>Divisional Troops, 8th Division.</u>	
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	<u>Divisional Troops, 8th Division.</u>	
	1 Battalion, Pioneers ...		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	27th Brigade, 9th Division.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...		
	1 Regiment, British Cavalry ...	<u>8th Divisional Area Occupation.</u>	
	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...	Divisional Troops, 9th Division.	
Bangalore ...	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	.....	<i>Transferred to Bangalore.</i>
	<i>½ Battalion, British Infantry</i> ...	... ..	<i>Transferred to Madras Malappuram.</i>
	1 Battery, R. H. A. ...		
	1 Ammunition Column, R. H. A. ...		
	1 Regiment, British Cavalry ...	9th Divisional Area Occupation.	
	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...		
	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry ...		
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	Divisional Troops, 9th Division.	
	1 Ammunition Column, R. F. A. ...		
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	<u>Divisional Troops, 5th Division.</u>	
	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	25th Brigade, 9th Division.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...		
	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	26th Brigade, 9th Division.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...		
	1 Battalion, Pioneers ...	Divisional Troops, 9th Division.	
	1 Battery, R. F. A. ...	9th Divisional Area Occupation.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	26th Brigade, 9th Division.	
Madras and St Thomas Mount.	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...		
Madras, Malappuram ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...		
Wellington, etc. ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	9th Divisional Area Occupation.	
Trichinopoly ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...		
Cannanore ...	<i>Detachment, British Infantry</i> ...	.....	<i>Transferred to Wellington</i>
	<i>1 Battalion, Indian Infantry</i> ...	.....	<i>Transferred to Aden, station abandoned.</i>

## DIVISION.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.			
Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional areas.			
Field Army.		Occupation Troops.	
<i>25th Brigade.</i>			
Secunderabad	...	...	Headquarters.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
<i>*26th Brigade (for training but see note).</i>			
Secunderabad	...	...	Headquarters.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Madras	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
<i>27th Brigade.</i>			
Bangalore	...	...	Headquarters.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry (Pioneers).
<i>Divisional Troops.</i>			
Bangalore	...	...	1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.
Secunderabad	...	...	Headquarters.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Ammunition Column.
† Wanting	...	...	<i>Mountain Artillery Brigade.</i>
Bangalore	...	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.
Wanting (to be raised)	...	...	1 Divisional Signal Company.
Secunderabad	...	...	1 Battalion, Pioneers.
<i>9th Cavalry Brigade.</i>			
To Occupation, Hyderabad.			
<i>Army Troops in Area.</i>			
Bangalore	...	...	Headquarters.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Battery, R. F. A.
Bangalore	...	...	1 Ammunition Column.

The Occupation Troops required for the area consist of :—

1 Regiment, British Cavalry.

3 Regiments, Indian Cavalry.

3 Battalions, British Infantry.

4 Battalions, Indian Infantry.

1 Battery, R. H. A.

1 Battery, R. F. A.

*Detailed as follows :—*

St. Thomas' Mount 1 Battery, R. F. A.

Secunderabad ... 1 Battery, R. H. A.

Secunderabad ... 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.

Secunderabad ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.

Secunderabad ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.

*Neemuch* ... 1 Regiment, Indian Cavalry.

\*Secunderabad ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.

Wellington ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.

Madras and Malappuram ... } 1 Battalion, British Infantry.

\*Secunderabad ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.

\*Secunderabad, ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.

Trichinopoly ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.

\*Madras ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.

An initial distribution of the Troops in the Area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.

\* If the 9th Division is mobilized and removed from the Area, and if local conditions require it, the 26th Brigade will be retained in the Area to complete the Occupation Troops and be replaced by Imperial Service Troops Brigade.

† When two new batteries are raised the batteries for the 8th or 9th Division will be found from Rawalpindi and Quetta.

BURMA DIVISIONAL AREA.			
Station.	Proposed Garrison. Variations from existing sanctioned garrison are shown in block type for additions and italics for reductions.	Allotment on Mobilization. Units underlined are detailed for duty outside the Divisional area on mobilization.	Remarks.
Bhamo ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
Maymyo ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	<u>4th Divisional Area Occupation.</u>	
	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners	Burma Area Occupation.	
Mandalay ...	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
Shwebo, Meiktila, etc. ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	<u>6th Divisional Area Occupation.</u>	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry	<u>8th Divisional Area Occupation.</u>	(See note above.)
	1 Company, R. G. A. ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
	1 Company, R. G. A. ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
Rangoon and Port Blair	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...	Burma Area Occupation.	
Aden ...	1 Company, R. G. A. ...	Aden Occupation.	
	1 Company, R. G. A. ...		
	1 Company, R. G. A. ...		
	1 Troop, Indian Cavalry ...		
	1 Fortress Company, Sappers and Miners ...		
	1 Battalion, British Infantry ...		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry ...		
	1 Battalion, Indian Infantry		From Cannanore.

## ADEN.

FIELD ARMY AND INTERNAL DEFENCE.	
Units shewn in italics come from outside the Divisional area.	
Field Army.	Internal Defence.
	<p>The Occupation Troops required for this area consist of :—</p> <p>2 Companies, R. G. A.</p> <p>1 Indian Mountain Battery.</p> <p>2 Battalions, British Infantry.</p> <p>6 Battalions, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>1 Company, Sappers and Miners.</p> <p><i>Detailed as follows :—</i></p> <p>Maymyo ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.</p> <p>Maymyo ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>Mandalay ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>Mandalay ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>Bhamo ... 1 Indian Mountain Battery.</p> <p>Bhamo ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>Mandalay ... 1 Company, Sappers and Miners.</p> <p>Rangoon ... 1 Company, R. G. A.</p> <p>Rangoon ... 1 Company, R. G. A.</p> <p>Rangoon ... 1 Battalion, British Infantry.</p> <p>Rangoon ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>Rangoon ... 1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>An initial distribution of the Troops in the Area as drawn up in the Defence Scheme is given in Table B.</p>
	<p>The Occupation troops required for the fortress consist of :—</p> <p>1 Company, R. G. A.</p> <p>1 Company, R. G. A.</p> <p>1 Company, R. G. A.</p> <p>1 Troop, Indian Cavalry.</p> <p>Aden ... 1 Fortress Company, Sappers and Miners.</p> <p>1 Battalion, British Infantry.</p> <p>1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p> <p>1 Battalion, Indian Infantry.</p>



TABLE B.

## Summary of troops required for Internal Security under the proposals.

An initial distribution, as proposed in Security Schemes is given below but the troops allotted to Areas will be distributed to garrisons, movable column and railway defence by Area Commanders according to the local situation at the time.

	Artillery.	Sappers and Miners.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Indian Cavalry.	Indian Infantry.
Kohat ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery ... 1 Frontier Garrison Artillery.	...	...	...	1 regiment ...	1 battalion.
Bannu ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	...	...	...	1 regiment ...	2 battalions.
Derajat ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	...	...	...	1 regiment ...	3 battalions.
Total ...	3 Indian Mountain Batteries 1 Frontier Garrison Artillery.	...	...	...	3 regiments ...	6 battalions.
<i>Peshawar Divisional Area.</i>						
Peshawar ...	1 R. F. A. ...	...	...	4 companies	2½ squadrons ...	1½ battalions.
Malakand ...	.....	...	...	...	½ squadron ...	2 „
Chitral ...	½rd Indian Mountain Battery	½ company ...	...	...	...	1 battalion.
Nowshera ...	.....	...	...	2 companies...	...	...
Mardan ...	¾rds Indian Mountain Battery	...	...	2 companies...	1 squadron ...	½ battalion.
Total ...	1 R. F. A. 1 Indian Mn. Battery ...	½ company ...	...	1 battalion ...	1 regiment ...	5 battalions.
<i>Rawal Pindi Divisional Area.</i>						
Rawal Pindi ...	1 R. F. A. ... 1 R. G. A.	...	...	6 companies...	2 squadrons ...	1 battalion.
Jhelum and Attock ...	.....	...	...	2 companies...	2 squadrons ...	
Total ...	1 R. F. A. 1 R. G. A.	...	...	1 battalion ...	1 regiment ...	1 battalion.
<i>Lahore Divisional Area.</i>						
Lahore ...	½ R. G. A. ... ¾rds R. F. A.	...	...	1 battalion ...	3 squadrons ...	1 battalion.
Amritsar ...	½ R. G. A. ...	...	...	2 companies...		
Ferozepore ...	1 R. G. A. ...	...	...	6 companies...	1 squadron ...	
Multan ...	¾rd R. F. A. ...	...	...	1 battalion ...	1 regiment ...	1 battalion.
Total ...	2 R. G. A. 1 R. F. A.	...	...	3 battalions ...	2 regiments ...	2 battalions.



	Artillery.	Sappers and Miners.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Indian Cavalry.	Indian Infantry.
<i>Quetta Divisional Area.</i>						
Quetta ...	$\frac{2}{3}$ rds Mountain Battery, Indian	...	...	1 battalion ...	2 squadrons ...	$1\frac{1}{2}$ battalions.
Loralai ...	$\frac{1}{3}$ rd Mountain Battery, Indian	...	...	...	2 squadrons ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion.
Fort Sandeman ...	.....	...	...	...	...	$\frac{1}{4}$ "
Karachi ...	2 R. G. A. ...	...	...	1 battalion ...	*	$\frac{1}{2}$ "
Sukkur ...	.....	...	...	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ "
Hyderabad ...	.....	...	...	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ "
Total ...	1 Indian Mountain Battery .. 2 R. G. A.	...	...	2 battalions...	1 regiment <sup>b</sup> ...	3 battalions.
<i>Mhow Divisional Area.</i>						
Nasirabad (Ajmer) ...	.....	...	1 squadron ...	...	2 squadrons ...	1 battalion.
Mhow and Indore ...	1 R. H. A. ...	...	1 squadron ...	3 companies...	1 squadron ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ "
Jhansi ...	$\frac{1}{3}$ rd R. H. A. ...	...	...	3 companies...	1 squadron ...	...
Baroda ...	.....	...	...	...	...	1 battalion.
Ahmadabad ...	$\frac{2}{3}$ rds R. H. A. ...	...	2 squadrons...	2 companies...	...	$1\frac{1}{2}$ battalions.
Jubbulpore ...	$\frac{1}{3}$ rd R. F. A. ...	...	...	4 companies ..	2 squadrons ...	$1\frac{1}{2}$ "
Nagpur (Kamptee) ...	$\frac{2}{3}$ rds R. F. A. ...	...	...	4 companies...	2 squadrons ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion.
Total ...	2 R. H. A. ... 1 R. F. A.	...	1 regiment ...	2 battalions...	2 regiments ...	6 battalions.
<i>Poona Divisional Area.</i>						
Bombay ...	4 R. G. A. ...	...	...	1 battalion ...	1 squadron ...	2 battalions.
Poona-Kirkee ...	$\frac{2}{3}$ rds R. F. A. ...	...	...	$1\frac{1}{2}$ battalions	$1\frac{1}{2}$ regiments ..	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion.
Belgaum ...	$\frac{1}{3}$ rd R. F. A. ...	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion	1 squadron ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ "
Total ...	4 R. G. A. ... 1 R. F. A.	...	...	3 battalions ...	2 regiments ...	3 battalions.
Aden ...	3 R. G. A. ...	(Fortress Company.)	...	1 battalion ...	(Aden Troop) ...	2 battalions.
<i>Meerut Divisional Area.</i>						
Delhi ...	1 R. H. A. ... 1 R. G. A.	...	...	battalion ...	1 regiment ...	3 battalions.
Agra ...	1 R. G. A. ... $\frac{1}{3}$ rd R. H. A.	...	2 squadrons...	1 battalion...	...	...
Bareilly ...	$\frac{1}{3}$ rd R. H. A. ...	...	1 squadron ...	$\frac{2}{3}$ battalion ...	...	...
Meerut ...	$\frac{1}{3}$ rd R. H. A. ...	...	1 squadron ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion ...	...	...
Roorkee ...	1 H. By. R. G. A. (Unallotted)	...	...	...	...	...
Total ...	2 R. H. A. ... 2 R. G. A. 1 H. By. R. G. A. (Unallotted)	...	1 regiment ...	3 battalions...	1 regiment ...	3 battalions.

In the event of war with a Naval Power one squadron of cavalry, Imperial Service Troops Kathiawar, would be added.

	Artillery.	Sappers and Miners.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Indian Cavalry.	Indian Infantry.
<i>Lucknow Divisional area.</i>						
Lucknow ...	1 R. F. A. ... ..	...	...	2 battalions...	1 regiment ...	1 battalion.
Allahabad ...	1 R. G. A. ... .. 1 R. F. A.	...	1 regiment ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion ...	1 regiment ...	1 „
Cawnpore ...	.....	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion ...	...	...
Calcutta... ..	1 R. G. A. ... .. $\frac{3}{4}$ rds R. F. A.	...	...	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ battalions	1 squadron ...	...
Asansol... ..	.....	...	...	...	3 squadrons ...	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ battalions.
Dinapore ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ rds R. F. A. ... ..	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion ...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion.
Assam ... ..	.....	...	...	...	...	1 „
Total ... ..	3 R. F. A. ... .. 2 R. G. A.	...	1 regiment ...	5 battalions...	3 regiments ...	5 battalions.
<i>Secunderabad Divisional area.</i>						
Secunderabad ...	1 R. H. A. ... ..	...	1 regiment ...	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ battalions	2 regiments ...	2 battalions.
Malappuram ...	.....	...	...	$\frac{1}{4}$ battalion ...	...	...
Wellington ...	.....	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion ...	...	...
Madras ... ..	$\frac{3}{4}$ rds R. F. A. ... ..	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion ...	1 squadron ...	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ battalions.
Bangalore ...	$\frac{1}{2}$ rd R. F. A. ... ..	...	...	$\frac{1}{4}$ battalion ...	3 squadrons ...	$\frac{3}{4}$ battalion.
Total ... ..	1 R. H. A. ... .. 1 R. F. A.	...	1 regiment ...	3 battalions...	3 regiments ...	4 battalions.
<i>Burma Divisional area.</i>						
Mandalay & N. Burma	1 Indian Mountain Battery ...	1 company ...	...	1 battalion ...	...	4 battalions.
Rangoon and P. Blair	2 R. G. A. ... ..	...	...	1 battalion ...	..	2 „
Total ... ..	1 Indian Mountain Battery ... 2 R. G. A.	1 company ...	...	2 battalions... Includes 1 company at Port Blair.	...	6 battalions.
Total for all India ...	5 R. H. A. ... .. 9 R. F. A. ... .. 19 R. G. A. including Frontier Garrison Artillery. 6 Mountain Batteries ... 1 H. B., R. G. A. (Unallotted)	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ companies	4 regiments	26 battalions...	19 $\frac{1}{2}$ regiments...	46 battalions.

**TABLE C.**  
**GENERAL ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS.**

Units.	Present Establishment.	Proposed Establishment.	PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION.					Remarks.
			Occupation Troops.	Mobile Brigades, from one Division with one Indian Cavalry regiment added.	Troops for the remaining 8 Divisions and 5 Cavalry Brigades of the Field Army	Army Troops.	Total.	
Royal Horse Artillery Batteries	11	11	5	.....	5	1	11	
Royal Horse Artillery Ammunition Column	9	6	.....	.....	5	1	6	3 To be abolished.
Royal Field Artillery (including Howitzer) Batteries	45	45	9	3	24	9	45	
Royal Field Artillery (including Howitzer) Ammunition Columns	12	12	.....	1	8	3	12	
Royal Garrison Artillery (including the Frontier Garrison Artillery)	22	19	19	.....	.....	...	19	3 To be abolished.
Royal Garrison Artillery Heavy Batteries	6	4	1 (unallotted).	.....	.....	3	4	2 (Bullock batteries) to be abolished.
Mountain Artillery Batteries	20	22	6	.....	16	.....	22	2 (British) to be raised.
Field Companies, Sappers and Miners	*19	19	1½	2	15½	.....	19	
British Cavalry Regiments	9	9	4	.....	5	.....	9	
Indian Cavalry Regiments	†39½	39½	19½	2	18	.....	39½	
British Infantry Battalions	52	52	26	3	23	.....	52	
Indian Infantry Battalions (excluding the 5 Colonial battalions)	133	133	46	10	77	.....	133	
Railway Companies, Sappers and Miners	2	2	.....	.....	.....	2	2	
Signal Companies (Divisional)	4	7	.....	.....	7	.....	†7	3 Additional to be raised now.
Wireless Signal Companies	1	1	.....	.....	.....	1	1	

\* Excluding Fortress Company R. E. at Aden.

† Including Aden Troop.

‡ Plus two more eventually.

TABLE

TABLE SHEWING TRANSFERS OF UNITS BETWEEN

Divisicnal Area.	SURPLUS.		
	Units Surplus.	Station.	Allotted to
1st ...	1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	Abbottabad ...	2nd Divisional area occupation ...
	2 Indian Mountain batteries ...	Abbottabad ...	Divisional Troops, 5th Division.
2nd ...	1 British Mountain battery ...	Rawal Pindi ...	Divisional Troops, 6th Division ...
	1 Divisional signalling company ...	Rawal Pindi ...	Divisional Troops, 1st Division ...
3rd ...	1 Indian Cavalry regiment ...	Ferozepore ...	Mobile brigade, Delhi ...
4th ...	1 British Mountain battery ...	Quetta ...	Divisional Troops, 6th Division ...
5th ...	1 Indian Cavalry regiment ...	Agar ...	6th Divisional area occupation ...
	1 Indian Cavalry regiment ...	Neemuch ...	9th Divisional area occupation ...
	$\frac{2}{3}$ Indian Cavalry regiment ...	Saugor ...	8th Divisional area occupation ...
	1 British Infantry battalion ...	Nasirabad ...	12th Brigade, 4th Division.
	1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	Nasirabad ...	12th Brigade, 4th Division.
	1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	Ajmer ...	12th Brigade, 4th Division.
6th ...	1 Divisional signalling company ...	Ahmednagar ...	Divisional Troops, 5th Division ...
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	Kirkee ...	Divisional Troops, 3rd Division ...
7th ...	1 Company, Royal Garrison Artillery ...	Roorkee ...	3rd Divisional area occupation ...
	1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	Dehra Dun ...	8th Divisional area occupation.
	1 British Infantry battalion ...	Meerut ...	1st Divisional area occupation.
	1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	Roorkee ...	Divisional Troops, 1st Division ...
8th ...	.....	.....	.....
9th ...	1 British Cavalry regiment ..	Bangalore ...	8th Divisional area occupation ...
	1 Company Sappers and Miners ...	Secunderabad ...	Divisional Troops 5th Division ...
	2 Companies Sappers and Miners ..	Bangalore ...	Divisional Troops 8th Division ...
Burma ...	1 Indian Mountain battery ...	Maymyo ...	4th Divisional area occupation.
	1 British Infantry battalion ...	Shwebo ...	6th Divisional area occupation.
	1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	Meiktila ...	8th Divisional area occupation ...

D.

DIVISIONAL AREAS ON MOBILIZATION.

DEFICIENT.							Remarks.
Units deficient.		Allotted to	Found from				
			Division.		Station.		
1 British Infantry battalion ...	...	Occupation ...	...	7th	...	Meerut.	Will be moved into area when lines are built at Takadh.
1 Divisional signalling company ...	...	Divisional Troops ...	...	2nd	...	Rawal Pindi.	
1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	...	Divisional Troops ...	...	7th	...	Roorkee.	
.....	.....	.....	...	...	...	...	
1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	...	Occupation ...	...	1st	...	Abbottabad.	
1 Company, Royal Garrison Artillery ...	...	Occupation ...	...	7th	...	Roorkee.	
1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	...	Divisional Tr ops ...	...	7th	...	Kirkee.	
1 Indian Mountain battery ...	...	Occupation ...	...	Burma	...	Maymyo.	
1 British Infantry battalion ...	...	12th Brigade ...	...	5th	...	Nasirabad.	
1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	...			...	...	Nasirabad.	
1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	...			...	...	Ajmer.	
2 Indian Mountain batteries ...	...			Divisional Troops ...	...	1st	
1 Company, Sappers and Miners ...	...	Divisional Troops ...	...	9th	...	Secunderabad.	
1 Divisional signalling company ...	...	Divisional Troops ...	...	6th	...	Ahmednagar.	
1 British Mountain battery ...	...	Divisional Troops ...	...	2nd	...	Rawal Pindi.	
1 British Mountain battery ...	...	Divisional Troops ...	...	4th	...	Quetta.	
1 Indian Cavalry regiment ...	...	Occupation ...	...	5th	...	Agar.	
1 British Infantry battalion ...	...	Occupation ...	...	Burma	...	Shwebo.	
1 Indian Cavalry Regiment ...	...	Mobile brigade, Delhi	...	3rd	...	Ferozepore.	
2 British Mountain batteries ...	...	.....	...	...	...	...	
1 British Cavalry regiment ...	...	Occupation ...	...	9th	...	Bangalore.	
1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	...	Occupation ...	...	7th	...	Dehra Dun.	
1 Indian Infantry battalion ...	...	Occupation ...	...	...	...	Burma ...	
4 Indian Cavalry regiment ...	...	Occupation ...	...	5th	...	Saugor.	
2 Companies, Sappers and Miners ...	...	Divisional Troops ...	...	9th	...	Bangalore.	
2 British Mountain batteries ...	...	.....	...	...	...	...	
1 Indian Cavalry regiment ...	...	Occupation ...	...	5th	...	Neemuch.	



## ANNEXURE Y.

*Attached Officers.*

1. The question of employing regimental officers as "attached officers" in the General Staff Branch is referred to in the examination of Brigadier-General Headlam. As some misapprehension,—based probably on the experience of bygone conditions—appears to exist regarding the necessity for such employment, and, as, moreover, considerable change in the system of employing these officers, has taken place since 1898—we have thought it advisable to refer to the question. 14288.

2. In the first place the 'attached' officers in the General Staff are selected with great care. With but one exception (that of the officer who during the sittings of this Committee has been acting as orderly officer to the Chief of the General Staff), they are all chosen because they are either:—

- (a) Specialists in languages or some other technical capacity, such as aviation.
- (b) Staff College graduates whose capabilities it is desired to test, or
- (c) officers who have proved their capacity for intelligence work either in the field or as explorers.

Each officer is selected for the particular work for which he is required, and the reasons for asking for each individual's services are recorded, before applying for them to the Commander-in-Chief. There is thus a real check on the number, and the necessity for their employment is shown in every case. The following examples will show the reasons for their employment and the general nature of their work.

3. The present situation in Tibet, and the circumstances which have led to the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison from Lhasa, through India, to China has resulted in a large amount of Chinese correspondence passing through the General Staff. The permanent Staff of the latter does not happen to include any Chinese interpreters. By attaching an officer, who is a brilliant Chinese scholar, the General Staff has been able to deal with this difficult and important work in a manner which has proved of great value to Government.

4. The present state of affairs in Persia, and the circumstances which have led to the despatch of British troops to the Persian Gulf, either as consular escorts, or for operations in connexion with the suppression of the arms traffic, has resulted in the receipt of many documents and papers in Persian and Arabic, causing a demand for the services of officers as translators in those languages. This demand has been met by attaching qualified officers to the General Staff, thus enabling the latter to meet a legitimate call on its services without detriment to its ordinary work.

5. The General Staff at the War Office lately secured a large number of secret publications in Russian, relating to Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia and India. An examination of these books disclosed the fact that some of them were of military importance, and arrangements were accordingly made to send them to India for closer examination, and the translation of such portions as were found to be of value from an intelligence point of view. The General Staff includes in its establishment several Russian interpreters; they are, however, all fully occupied with their ordinary work, and to carry out the translation of the voluminous documents referred to, it is necessary to make special arrangements. This condition is satisfied without difficulty by bringing up an officer qualified in Russian and attaching him to the General Staff.

6. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief recently desired a scheme to be prepared for starting aviation in India, and forming a Flying Corps. The subject is highly technical, and there was no one in the General Staff who could deal with it without specialist assistance. That assistance was provided by attaching an officer to the General Staff who had previously been trained in the Royal Flying Corps at home.

7. One of the duties of the General staff is to compile cipher codes for army purposes. As soon as a code comes into use, a new one has to be prepared so as to have it ready for immediate issue should the current code become 'suspect' either through the loss of copies or through other circumstances. Owing to its secret nature, the code has to be printed in the presence of an officer, who counts every sheet pulled through the press, and locks up the type when work is suspended until the text is finally printed off. This officer has also to do all the proof reading of the text—a most laborious task requiring scrupulous care and accuracy. To take up the time of an officer of the General Staff with work of this kind would be a waste of power, and would delay ordinary business. The difficulty is got over by selecting a suitable officer for the duty and attaching him to the General Staff.

8. When, a few years ago, agitation and sedition took an active form, it became necessary to examine a vast amount of vernacular and other documents which were suspected to be of a seditious character. To do this with the rapidity and exactitude which the circumstances demanded, it was found necessary to employ officers exceptionally qualified in various Indian languages. This was done by attaching qualified individuals for the purpose to the General Staff.

9. It would be easy to multiply instances of this kind, but the foregoing examples, which are typical of their kind, show the advantages derived from the system of attaching specialists as 'attached officers' to the General Staff.

10. Moreover, the number of staff officers employed at Army Headquarters has always been restricted to just the number capable of carrying on current work. When, during Lord Kitchener's administration, great proposals were under consideration, and large numbers of papers and reports on special questions were being called for from the Chief of the Staff's Division, it was found that the only possible way of meeting these abnormal demands was to supplement the ordinary staff of this division by employing attached officers.

11. Similarly the constant requests for information arising from the enquiries of any committee investigating great questions, like the Army in India Committee, especially as these are usually "urgent," means a large demand on the time and attention of the regular General Staff officers, and if the ordinary work is laid aside for the moment it soon falls into arrears. The best way to cope with extra demands of this kind is to employ attached officers.

12. To the great demand for special papers and reports during Lord Kitchener's time may be ascribed the fact that some of the most important intelligence publications regarding the North-West frontier and Afghanistan had, until comparatively lately, remained uncorrected for nearly six years. Other but less important information was also seriously in arrears. Inquiry showed that this was due to the then staff being unable to cope with the extra labour demanded of them through stress of other work. Strenuous efforts have been made during the last two years to make good these arrears by means of 'attached' officers. To this, and to the special demands of Tibet, Persia, and aviation, has been due the number employed.

13. The War Office system of *paid* temporary staff officers would be preferable; but hitherto no funds have been available for the purpose. The present system, however, has its advantages. It is certainly cheap, and advantage is taken of it to train and test those officers who are thought likely to prove valuable in the future. The experience they gain from even a short tour at headquarters adds much to their practical usefulness as staff officers, when they go to brigades and divisions.



## ANNEXURE Z.

*Extract from joint note by the Secretaries in the Army Department, dated August 8th, 1910.*

"In the following note we look at the Honourable Sir Douglas Haig's proposals from the point of view of how they will effect the capacity of Government to deal with measures requiring their orders. This point of view is necessarily somewhat antagonistic to that which Sir Douglas Haig is led by his military position to adopt, and entire theoretical agreement in the final conclusions is not to be expected. But we do not think there is any such practical disagreement that common ground cannot be found.

"*Single note system.*—As regards the principle of a single note, we entirely agree with the Chief of the General Staff. We have no sympathy with the idea of getting a number of people to note on the same point on the chance that when the case comes to the Army or Finance Department, the disclosure of differences of opinion within the division may supply materials to the Secretariat for criticising its final conclusion. The actual difficulty in attaining the ideal of a single note, according to our own experience, lies in the expenditure of time by the higher officers in combining the materials supplied to them into a single statement. We could not do it in the Secretariat proper, but it is in effect already done to a very large extent in the Divisions of Army Headquarters.

"*Noting by clerks.*—As regards the writing of notes by clerks, we think a practical distinction can usefully be drawn. We can understand that in the technical work of such Divisions as those of Ordnance and Military Works, there is little scope for the recording of notes by clerks, whatever assistance they may give in compiling materials. From our point of view the General Staff, as regards its main functions, is an equally technical department. The same holds good for some of the work of the Principal Medical Officer's Division. But there is a vast mass of work coming mainly from the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's Divisions, though also occasionally arising in other Divisions, of a kind which relates to the interpretation of rules, to demands for personal concessions, to minor everyday administrative changes, to additions to establishment, and so forth, in connection with which the clerks can give most valuable assistance, and are in fact, as Lord Curzon pointed out years ago, the custodians of that continuity of policy which Sir Douglas Haig wishes to enforce."

\* \* \* \* \*

Robert Scallon,—8-8-10.

J. B. Brunyate,—8-8-10.





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